

# The Human Community

*Its Philosophy and Practice  
for a Time of Crisis*

*By the same author*



THE NEW UNIVERSE

EARTH IS ENOUGH

ARCHITECTURE AND MODERN LIFE  
(With Frank Lloyd Wright)

ART IS ACTION

THE PHILOSOPHER IN CHAOS

LIFE IN MONTANA  
(With Joseph Kinsey Howard and Paul Meadows)

THE HUMAN COMMUNITY





# The Human Community

ITS PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE  
FOR A TIME OF CRISIS

BY


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THE HUMAN COMMUNITY

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
PART I

*The Problem*



1. *Conflict*
2. *The Great Trouble*
3. *The Community and Rural Life*
4. *Quantitative Decline of Rural Life*
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6. *School Bus*
7. *The Alienation of Function*
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9. *The Error of the Educated*
10. *Conrad, Montana*
11. *Textural Change in the Community*





## 1. *Conflict*

An underlying conflict of method corrupts the modern era. On the one hand is the culture of specialism; on the other hand is the human community. Each is a kind of living, a way of doing things. Each has its pattern of procedures, its structural method. Today these methods are becoming more and more divergent. They would seem to be incompatible, and the former is displacing the latter.

The college professor, the business expert, the professional artist or engineer, usually labor in behalf of the culture of specialism. They establish terms and make new specificities of knowledge. They build up production and sluice increasing quantities of goods, services—and resources—through the market. They look at life selectively with sharp eyes, define bright bits of it, and make reality more articulate. Much goes on; many things happen; jobs, skills, and people's activities proliferate in the dense convocations of events. People are everywhere, or fragments of them, reducing life to more and more pieces, each smaller and smaller. But the human community under their vast trampling declines, and without the community even specialism cannot survive. In the realm of intellectual strategy this is the unanswered problem. It is also the unconsidered problem.

I find myself asking the college professor, the business expert, and other devotees of specialism and purity to step out of their accustomed ideology to consider another kind of problem. How can they or any others do this? Obviously it is difficult. But the recognition educationally and philosophically of another mode of procedure and of its value is itself an important objective.

As William James suggests, we must continue to start freshly with integral situations, not with conceptual terms. Though specialism and term-creating ways of thought have their importance, they are not in themselves sufficient unto life. The inner unity and substantiation of things, which James approaches through what he calls conjunctive relations, must be recognized in any vital procedure. These are the confluences in our experience. Central in them, a creator of confluence as it were, is the community.

This book is about the human community. I shall consider the community literally and also, so far as I can, imaginatively. I shall call

attention to its decline as a social fact, and emphasize and reemphasize its importance as the proper focus of cultural and intellectual orientation.

I shall try to join together what time, technology, and the course of human events seem bent on putting asunder, namely, education on the one hand and the small community on the other. This to scholars may seem a distortion of research. I shall try to show, however, that their methods and their techniques of thinking are involved in the decline of the human community and at least partly the cause of it. This is a social and physical decline; it is human insecurity, failure, war, death; but its roots, complex as they are, intertwine inextricably with the proud methodologies of scholars, scientists, and technicians. If I can bring their attention to bear—and I hope their conscience—on the decline of the human community in America, I shall be justified. I shall ask why the community is so little the concern of philosophers and educators. I shall aim at them and at other governing minds of our society what shafts I can command, hoping to disturb them somewhat and to convict them of negligence, if not worse, in regard to the major problem of America.

That problem is the disintegration of the community and its slow extinction in the western world. I am not unaware of the dramatic dangers, atomic and otherwise, that hang over this nation and the modern world. The decline of the human community is nevertheless the primary problem, the germinal problem so to speak, in all this modern complex of disaster.

In making this synthesis, which amounts really to an informal philosophy of the community, I shall define the community. I know that definition itself involves philosophical assumptions. I know too that the community, human as it is, a pattern of concrete behavior, voices, symbols, and all the intricate goings on of life, is in practice indefinable. Still it is worth trying. I shall also consider the community in relation to other interests. Through all of these the philosophy of the community may be diffused. It is the misfortune of modern man that it is not. The condition and decline of the community must thus be considered and the price that modern man needs pay to be saved.

## *2. The Great Trouble*

The facts pile up on every horizon, ominous and vast. Surely few decades have been darker than the black forties. Disaster has become



normal routine and indifference to it a matter of course. But disaster remains a brutal fact to millions in the western world. It cannot be brushed away through boredom, nor can the shadow of it be ignored as it closes over us. We hear the shouting, now from one quarter, now from another, now of one danger, now of some other one, and we may tire of the noise. But the insistency of the trouble continues. Here our little century of escape may be about over. It is said that the western world and western culture is under as severe a threat as any since the fall of Rome. Perhaps that is true.

That world includes, not only western Europe, but the whole culture characterized by science and modern technology. It is a culture of specialism and industrial urbanism reaching geographically in varying intensities westward around the world from the Ural Mountains to Japan. In this disordered world friend and foe suffer from the same disease. Whether it be Russia or Japan, Germany, England or America, the disease eats its way in. Their wars and the planned, massed cruelties on both sides of the lines, their tragic, collective insanities, are symptoms of that disease.

What is the disease? What are its causes? No one knows with certainty. It is not likely that either Hitler or Marx, Bishop Oxnam or Pope Pius, Wall Street or the Farmer's Union, has made more than a part of the true diagnosis. Even those sociologists whose devotion it is to abstract the social fact from values, and to present going events as somehow a dynamic process without the dynamics of value, probably have made only an indifferent analysis of the trouble. It is a complication of diseases, many of them long-standing; they have attained focal intensity, a kind of organization of disaster at this time, in these decades, at this place.

Deep in the trouble, and central to it, is the disintegration of the human community and the ever-increasing bulk and authority of affairs. Whether it be under public or private control, whether it be in areas where centralization seems to be required by a complex situation or in areas where it seems obviously to defeat human values and democratic progress, this centralizing process goes on. It is, as it were, a kind of indiscriminating compulsion, indifferent to the deeper needs of the situation. In some fields of human interest it is associated with greater efficiency and production and a cleaner order of affairs. In other fields of interest it accompanies human disintegration and the defeat of life itself. This public and private tendency toward indiscriminate centralization and mass control of life in fields of economics, corporative industry, technology, art, religion, politics, recreation, education, agriculture, and

human affairs in general may well be a tendency toward death. These are drastic statements but not unusual among thoughtful people today. Here they serve as a prelude to the discussion of the true community. In that situation the community is deeply involved.

### *3. The Community and Rural Life*

Though rural life usually is assumed to be the normal context in which the human community emerges and survives, it really is different things to different people. Its central meaning no doubt is the functional cooperation of human beings with vegetable and animal life. It is thus the context of human ecology. Rural life is not the lonely conquest of a hostile wilderness. It is not the life of the hunter or trapper or old-time lumberman killing or capturing his prey. It is a cooperative alliance with Nature in which the survival and abundance of life of many species, including man, are mutually dependent. Rural life, on the other hand, is not a life in cities removed from growing things, nor is it residence in a park or suburb, or visiting a country estate. It is a functional relationship with Nature and is found for the most part in agriculture and husbandry. It may include many members of that increasing group called "rural, non-farm," but only if they are productively close to the life of the country. A country grocer or banker, a small manufacturer, an artificer, a country doctor, or a village housewife may well be as much a part of the rural context of life as a farmer. If they partake of the rhythmic processes associated with the growth of plants and animals and participate in the variegated pattern of rural living, they belong.

This symbiotic relationship of man and growing things called rural life is normally the seat of the small community and, as I shall try to show, of the true community. All human life, of course, is eventually dependent on this relationship, though some men and women live remotely from it. They learn to remove themselves from the close, compelling influences of natural things. They abstract their thoughts and interests and even their activities from the green context and spiritual milieu of life in Nature, and reside in massive aggregations or in other ways remote from rural interests. But they have not taken with them into those aggregations the stable human community or the naturally integrated life. They have renounced Nature at a price. That price would seem to be something close to spiritual impoverishment and phyletic discontinuity and decadence.

In this age of wonders and defeat it is conceivable at least that men might dissolve entirely their alliance with living Nature, reject their symbiotic ecology, and live entirely by artifice and material technology. Scientists may find ways to substitute completely an artificial process for the green chemistries, the native photosynthesis, the animal assimilative processes, of the natural world on which we now live. They thus would release men wholly from the rhythms and compulsions of the fields. It would be a senseless procedure, no doubt; it would be economically and socially inefficient, I am told, but that might not greatly limit its large-scale development. It has in fact already been accomplished in part.

The limiting principle in such a substitutive procedure is less the physical and technological restrictions, or those of common sense, than the psychological, social, and deeply cultural cast of a man's nature. The pattern of his living, as it were, has been laid out through millions of years in association with living animals and plants and the vast music and movement of the natural world. The form of human life and the structure of its activities are involved in these natural forms and structures. The values that men have, the accents, the appreciations, the criteria of morals, even the insistence on living survival itself, were derived initially in this milieu, given form there, and now evolve—if they evolve at all—as part of that great order. To abstract human beings by some technological procedure from this functional relationship with the life and creative persistence of the natural world around them would be literally to abstract them from life itself. They would be no longer men in a complete or formal sense. Their communities would disintegrate; their values disappear. That indeed is already happening in part, as their relations with Nature become more indirect. The decline of the human community as we see it today corresponds to the decline of rural culture and economy.

The beasts and the plants participate primevally in our communities. They enter our philosophies; mold our natures; help make us fully human. They are among our greatest teachers. Through the mutuality and interlocking functions of men and plants and animals we and they domesticate each other, and create severally characters, modes of life, and human communities unattainable alone. We still hold to our totems—or the phyletic identification with animals—though not in the totemistic faith. When men are deprived of these associations something secure and primitively creative in their lives is lost. When they rebel, like some rural Lucifer, against the order of things within which they were created, they lose somehow the wisdom and the pace of Nature, and invent, as he did,

disunity and conflict. They invent disorder. For animals and plants bind us functionally to the sun and seasons. Our life and work among them indenture us to wordless patterns of the four winds and the summer solstice. We are more fully unified through them with the sources and sustenance of our lives. We are continuous with Nature and the world. This sense of functional unity with the natural world is a basic condition, we may assume, of what is called a meaningful and stable life.

On the child this revolt against nature, or, to say it more quietly, this removal of our life from the rural community of animals, plants, and human beings, is particularly harmful. John Dewey has pointed it out: when life in the main was rural, the child came into contact with natural things. He knew the care of domestic animals, the cultivation of the soil, the raising of crops. The home was the center of industry and in it all the child took a functional part. His mental and moral training was here. The development here of hand and eye, of skill and deftness, and, above all, his "initiation into self-reliance, independence of judgment and action" were the stimulus to habits of regular and continuous work. In the city these educative influences usually are absent. "Just at the time," Dewey says, "when a child is subjected to a great increase in stimulus and pressure from his environment, he loses the practical and motor training necessary to balance his intellectual development. Facility in acquiring information is gained: the power of using it is lost."<sup>1</sup>

What is this value in the relationship with Nature? It is the working continuity of men with other living things and natural processes. Though an Otis elevator or a subway train is also a natural thing subject to natural processes and in its way as wonderful as a wild rose in June, there is still a difference. The elevator lacks the evaluative continuity and spiritual response in the minds of men that native things possess. It is an artifice without organic continuity and without versatility of value. It forces its design of action on our lives but has no meaning otherwise. Our use of it involves little responsibility and no traditional concern, still it imposes its authority upon us. The elevator has no joy nor thrust of life like that of the maple sapling, the redwing, or the child. It is an instrument to go up and down. The difference from natural things is indefinable perhaps, but in the life of man critically important.

Beyond all that is the fact that rural life is the normal milieu of the human community. Thousands of years of human culture confirm it. I do not know whether the community must be rural to exist, but the evidence

<sup>1</sup> John Dewey, "The Primary Education Fetish," *Education Today* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), Chap. 2, p. 23.

of centuries seems to indicate it. Cities have come and gone. Their cultures and philosophies have been epiphenomenal, as it were, upon the deep permanence of their rural background. But the human community as a sustaining, many-functioned, organic pattern of life has rarely, if ever, been in them. The community is rural. It belongs to rural culture, philosophy, and life.

#### 4. *Quantitative Decline of Rural Life*

Until the last half century or so the cities, though often great in power, have been a minority in the populations of the earth. They have emerged as local intensifications of culture in a vast matrix of rural life. The rural life in its essential functions, such as its symbiotic relation with the natural world, its animal faith, phyletic reproduction, folk art and family life, continued on through the centuries relatively unaffected. Rural people in general have been more numerous and their values and customs more stable. Rural regions usually have reserves, both psychological and physical, that the quick-burning cities lack.

Though rural culture too has had its declines and discontinuities, the declines have been ordinarily less violent and the discontinuities more rare. When the irrigation systems of Mesopotamia were abandoned, when the pressures of empire in the city of Athens shuffled the demes and gradually reduced the power and prestige of the Greek family, when slave-operated estates about Rome began to replace the family farm, or when the "enclosures" in England finally broke the Anglo-Saxon farm and village system, we may well imagine that rural life became discontinuous and disordered. Nevertheless, the life and culture of rural regions have been more persistent than in town. The continuity of rural life in reference both to its inner coherence and its persistence as a whole has been far greater than the often shattered, fragile continuity of the city.

Today rural life does not fit this traditional pattern of society. For the first time, it may be, the rural regions of an area so large as to include most of the western world have considerably less population than have the cities.<sup>2</sup> Much of the remaining rural population of this western area is so impregnated by urban customs and ideas that the inner coherence and consistency of rural culture is lost. Both in numbers and in context rural society has suffered a severe decline.

<sup>2</sup> Arthur E. Morgan, *The Small Community* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1942), Chap. I.

For more than forty years, since the appointment of the Commission on Country Life in 1907 by Theodore Roosevelt, there has been increasing concern about this problem in America. Not only are rural regions losing influence functionally and culturally in their effect on the nation as a whole; they are declining also, it would seem, in their inner value and significance.

Even in population the rural areas of America no longer have the vigorous thrust of a half century ago. Sociologists sometimes call attention to the massive increase in world population in recent years and its threat to peace and the stability of the relatively few "low-birth-rate countries." The human population of the earth that was about 1,600,000,000 in 1900 is now about 2,250,000,000. A world population that doubled in the ninety years between 1850 and 1940 will at this rate double again through the present century.<sup>3</sup> But the threat lies not only in the increase of some populations far beyond their resources for living. The threat even more is in the differentials of reproductive rates among different peoples. At the time when world population is increasing at this terrifying rate the population of the United States and much of Europe may be leveling off or declining.

With its predominantly urban population and declining rural culture, the United States may well be faced with the most critical decisions in its history in regard to immigration and population strategy. Free migration into this country, on the theory that all peoples should have equal rights to go where they please, would involve in all probability not millions but tens of millions of entries each year until the levels of living standards, wages, and population density approached those of the more populous regions of the earth. Within this country the population pressure in many regions is declining while the pressure from without is rapidly increasing. Already the growth of the United States in numbers is spotty and in large areas is negative.

The rural regions of America decline while the urban areas maintain their increases largely through greater migrations from the land. Of the 3,072 counties in this country more than 51 per cent are being depopulated. These are all rural counties. More than 80 per cent are losing rural population through migration to the cities. Only 17 per cent of the counties having rural areas are absorbing population.<sup>4</sup> No city of more

<sup>3</sup> E. A. Ross, "How Much Truth Is There in Malthus?" *The Christian Century*, July 21, 1948. See also William Vogt, *Road to Survival* (New York, William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948).

<sup>4</sup> C. E. Lively and Conrad Taeuber, *Rural Migration in the United States*, Research Monograph XIX, Division of Research, WPA (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939).

than 100,000 in the United States, on the other hand, has a reproductive rate high enough to maintain its population—except perhaps Salt Lake City. San Francisco, for example, has 55 per cent of the children needed to hold its own without migration from outside, New York has 65 per cent, New Orleans 69 per cent, and so it goes. The rates in larger cities are roughly from 20 to 30 per cent too low even to break even.

The simple fact is that people in large cities die faster than they reproduce. This is true not only in America but probably over the entire world. Arthur E. Morgan for many years has made inquiries as to the maintenance of urban populations by stocks long accustomed to city life. He presumed that such stocks might have adjusted themselves biologically to urban life and thus attained a reproductive rate able to maintain their numbers without loss. He found in every case, however, that urban stocks, such as the Parsis of Bombay, or the urban Jews of Europe, were either dying out or maintaining population by migration from the rural districts.<sup>5</sup> In one case, and that doubtful, he found an exception: a Surashtra group in India, by the vigorous retention of rural customs in the city, seems to have found a way to survive. The white populations of cities between 25,000 and 100,000 in 1930 in America had a reproductive rate only 88 per cent of what is required to break even, while the Negro populations had only 72 per cent.<sup>6</sup> They all depend on the now declining rural reproductive rates and rural migration for their existence.

There is much other evidence to the same end. Still, because the evidence strikes home, because it applies uncomfortably to most of the families to which the students and scholars, the intellectuals, commentators, and interpreters themselves belong, it usually is ignored. When men like Morgan or O. E. Baker raise it as a critical problem in the survival of our culture and society it is often considered too indelicate or personal to merit attention, or just too difficult to face, and the discussion moves on quietly to other things. There is little evidence, however, other than evidence too recent and too limited to be weighed accurately, that people under urban conditions ever have or ever will maintain their stock against extinction.

In 1910 more than 54 per cent, or 50 million, of the population of the United States was rural. In 1940 less than 44 per cent, or about 57 million, was rural. In 1950, according to estimates, only 40 per cent was

<sup>5</sup> Arthur E. Morgan, *Community Service News*, Yellow Springs, Ohio, March, 1949, p. 35; also September, 1949, p. 99.

<sup>6</sup> Paul H. Landis, *Population Problems* (New York, American Book Company, 1948), p. 123.



rural. The decline, though relative in the country as a whole, is absolute in vast regions of it, and has continued over several decades. The farm population of the United States—as distinguished from the rural population—was in 1910 more than 32,000,000, or 31 per cent of the total population of the nation. In 1943 the farm population was less than 28,000,000, or 23 per cent of the total population.<sup>7</sup> Today it is probably less than 18 per cent. There were 950,000 fewer farms and farmers in 1949 than in 1935.<sup>8</sup> As early as 1930 more than half of the areas of Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Montana, Idaho, and Nevada were being depopulated.<sup>9</sup> Though these are rural areas and in many cases involve only small numbers of people, it still is significant.

These declines indicate a corresponding decline in the human community, for the decline of rural population and culture, as I have said, is roughly parallel with the decline in community life. Though towns considerably larger than the 2,500 population established by the census as the upper limit of rural classification may still be communities in the sense in which I am discussing them, it remains true that the larger the group, beyond a certain optimum, the less probable it is that the group will be a true community.

### *5. Functional Decline of Rural Life*

Functionally the decline of rural life as it is organized in small communities is as great as the decline in quantity. This is not always apparent, nor for that matter always serious. In the complex pattern of transition in which rural life today is involved, changes should not always be judged as aspects of decline; but the decline nevertheless is extensive. It is a widespread social erosion, deep in some places, shallow in others. Functional decline means that the rural community as an organic center is losing the rich structure of relationships in human affairs in which it has been influential. That it has gained in some ways and changed without detriment in others probably does not balance the great losses it has suffered.

Judgments and evaluations in this respect—and they are made by

<sup>7</sup> See Landis, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

<sup>8</sup> Earle Hitch, *Rebuilding Rural America* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1950).

<sup>9</sup> See map in Lively and Taeuber, *op. cit.*, p. 62.



social scientist and philosopher alike—are confusing: what seems to be a gain in terms of an urban system of values, such as specialized efficiency and size, may be a decline in terms of a communal system of values, such as the fullness of human association, phyletic continuity, and operational effectiveness through the long rhythms of natural movement and life. This loss is sometimes at the top through the community's growing larger with consequent change in social character. It sometimes is at the bottom through the community's loss of function and its general decay. Physical growth and the efficient specialization of functions may be, in terms of community values, disintegrative. The many functional changes to which rural life now is subject may be termed in general, though not always, a disastrous decline.

The small community focus of rural life seems to be dispersing, and functions such as education, recreation, agriculture, artistic expression, and moral and religious directives either are transferred to other centers and modes of influence or are abandoned. A function in this sense is "a pattern viewed with reference to one special term round which it centers; this pattern emerges when we look at the given term *in its total relation to the other terms about it.*"<sup>10</sup> It is an aspect of structure. Its decline here means a decline in the organic unity and richness of the rural community.

This is not to say that the American rural community has been universally a rich, human-structured group. Far from it. In some ways and in some places the American small community has been a unique moral and cultural contribution to human history and the source of our democracy. In other ways and in other places it has been markedly uncreative, sterile, restrictive, and a monument to human defeat. The new conditions that followed the First World War had effects which in many cases were favorable. New forces have helped to integrate some communities, made them aware of themselves, and through the agency of automobiles, better roads, and the like have made active community life more possible.<sup>11</sup> The isolated farm home that in America has been a continuous deterrent to functional community development has been made less isolated. Farmers may live in nearby villages, in some cases, and still operate their farms. If they do not retire into the tempting pattern of tenant-operated and absentee-owned farming, this may lead to the enrichment of the functional structure of the community rather than the opposite.

<sup>10</sup> Susanne Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (New York, Penguin Books, Inc., 1948), p. 44.

<sup>11</sup> Dwight Sanderson, *Locating the Rural Community*, Cornell Extension Bulletin 413, June, 1939.

On the other hand, many a ghost town, dead or nearly dead, many a recent casualty among the communities of America, could testify, if only in a hoarse whisper, that the new freedom of movement of rural people, new marketing methods, new educational concentrations, new technologies in agricultural and industrial production, and new interests have defeated the friendly crossroads store and left high and dry many a small community. The forces which brought about the substitution of a cash for a subsistence economy, forces ranging from the demand for improved agricultural methods to the Works Progress Administration of the thirties, also helped the larger towns to overreach and undercut the small community. These forces have brought thousands of small communities functionally almost to extinction.

But what I have called a functional decline in the rural community may be called by others a beneficial social change. Kolb and Brunner,<sup>12</sup> for example, hold that the American village and hamlet are on the whole holding their own in numbers, in population, and in function. Although these groups do not include all that is meant by rural communities, they do include a large number of them. Sanderson says that physical, economic, psychological, and social forces are all bringing about the integration of the rural community around a common center of interests of those living within an area which can support the institutions desired. "If civilization is to advance," he adds, "such an integration is inevitable."<sup>13</sup> Other authorities seem to be at variance with these findings, or at least give them a sharply different interpretation. There may be some question too whether the process which Sanderson calls "integration" is really the integration of the community or the consolidation of a special function, now one, now another. By this method the functional instrument is extended beyond the range and control of the community and often becomes harmful to it.

## 6. School Bus

The school bus makes its round before daylight on a cold morning in a rural district that I know. It picks up its load of children, six year olds, eight, ten, and well up into their teens. They are farm boys and girls, or they live in a crossroad hamlet attached educationally to a rather

<sup>12</sup> J. H. Kolb and Edmund de S. Brunner, *A Study of Rural Society*, 3rd ed. (Boston Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946), Chap. 13.

<sup>13</sup> Dwight Sanderson, *The Rural Community* (Boston, Ginn and Company, 1932) p. 476.

remote center. They come in ones and twos down the driveways and little paths across the snow to the main road where the bus will stop. Behind them the big barnyard light shines brightly, high on its pole, and father, with breakfast already out of the way, is thumping and clanking about the barns and corral in a miscellany of early morning jobs. The house has one dim light. That would be the kitchen.

The children are thick little objects in the dim morning, thick and quiet, hardly awake. They look like half-grown bear cubs in their woolen wrappings, their pants tucked into lumpy galoshes, their mittens formless like paws. Their red and blue scarves stream out dimly against the snow. The bus this morning is a little late.

It takes almost an hour for the bus to make the route. The wheels hum and hiss. The gears clash noisily at each start. But on the children strict silence is enforced. They sit in small silent pairs, some of them half asleep, others with their eyes on the new day outside the window, or furtively whispering. If allowed to talk the children might "horse around" and cause accidents.

Daylight is coming as they enter the schoolyard. . . .

After the day at school, the bus loads up again for the return. Twilight is already on the way. The roads darken as the bus rumbles home. Again they sit in small, silent pairs, or furtively whisper, their empty lunch boxes or perhaps a battered book on their knees. And in the night again the children are discharged. The big barnyard light, high on its pole, shows them up the roadway. Then they are home. The light is on in the kitchen.

Only on week ends can they see their parents in daylight.

### *7. The Alienation of Function*

This kind of thing comes through the removal of the operational control of a function from the community which it is supposed to serve. It is not typical perhaps, but certainly it is not unusual. Rural communities, in the process of functional consolidation in special fields, such as education, trade, sport and recreation, health service, the arts, public information, become feeders and often only feeders to larger towns. They lose their centers of autonomy, and they decline and die by thousands. The consolidated school, for example, is usually in the county seat or some other larger center. It is more than likely beyond the range of contact or acquaintance of the rural families who feed it. The teachers

probably are strangers. The school to rural parents is a relatively unknown place into which their children disappear before daylight in the morning and from which they reappear at night. This kind of functional integration integrates neither the rural families nor their local communities; it tends to disintegrate them. And what is true of the consolidation of this function also is true of many others.

It may be granted that some measure of functional consolidation is both necessary and beneficial to community life and that some redistribution of rural population is inevitable. It is doubtful, however, whether the haphazard, linear consolidation of this function or that and the large-scale centralization and the removal of operational controls from the little places, as practiced today in America, can be otherwise than generally destructive of the community.

Many a good little place is struggling against internal impoverishment. It is trying to hold its own against external pressures and the drainage away of its youth and wealth to larger centers. It is struggling to maintain—to use for example just one of many functions—its own center of school and community life against the indiscriminating drive for consolidation. Even though educational consolidation in some places and in some ways is advisable, it is by no means to be taken for granted that consolidation as a general, over-all policy is good. The costs in community integrity and human values may be greater than the gains in technical efficiency and administration.

Sims, quoting Gillette, Landis, and Zimmerman, shows that the total number of villages under 2,500 decreased between 1900 and 1930 from 73,882 to 56,575, while those above 2,500 increased from 1,801 to 3,165, and the hamlets under 250 dropped from 58,403 to 37,203. "The truth of the matter," he says, "appears to be that with a general increase of village population, the larger trading centers have grown while the smaller ones have tended to decline."<sup>14</sup> Though authorities differ greatly as to the number of villages and hamlets, they do seem to be on common ground as to the character of rural change. Whatever growth the rural communities have shown is due largely to the increasing numbers of rural nonfarm people and to association in one way or another with a rapidly expanding urban industry and culture. Whatever declines the rural communities have shown are due to the decline in rural community culture and industry as such and its displacement by urban influences and customs.

<sup>14</sup> Newell Le Roy Sims, *Elements of Rural Sociology* (New York, Thomas Y Crowell Company, 1944), p. 110.

The tendency towards functional specialization in rural communities indicates this. Though the village of Rushmore's Corners may have more stores than it had before and even may be larger in size, its functional coherence and community integrity may be less. In becoming more urban in quality and function it loses something of the sense of ageless community with which it may have been endowed. It becomes a matrix of living that is less personal, less concrete. Though it may be more articulately intellectual, it will be implicitly less spiritual.

The little places are pocketed. Their functions in trade often are taken over by larger, more vigorous establishments in larger towns, their functions in education by the consolidated school. Churches disappear or are served by roving pastors. Amusements, courting, love, go on wheels. The front parlor is deserted. The radio blares and chatters. The instruments of vicarious living take over. And so it goes; in field after field, the functions of the small community decline.

### *8. Skyland, Production Without Community*

As an example of the functionalism of the modern era, specialized, abstracted, and segregated from its natural context in the human community, I can refer to a project in industrial agriculture undertaken several years ago in a western plains-and-prairie state. I shall call it Skyland; it was roughly this: Several thousand acres of good prairie land, never before broken, were sold to a group of urban operators. Though the land had not been cultivated, it was surrounded by well-cultivated family farms.

Shortly after the sale, men and machinery were brought in. The land was plowed at once and conditioned as a single block. Skyland was planted to wheat.

Then the men and machinery went away, presumably to other operations at a distant place. No house, no windmill, no dog, no chickens, no human being, nor any mark of human culture was left on the place, except the great wheat factory in the soil. And the wheat grew apace.

Later the harvest came. Men and machines appeared once more. They took the wheat and left; and the land was empty as before.

The second year the nomad men came with their machines and planted wheat. Again the harvest came. Prices were high. The crop was good. In the two years the owners paid off on their investment with some to spare.

The third year the men came with their machines and planted wheat again and once more left. All wheat, solid wheat! "Strip farming" did not pay. Diversification or rotation and grazing for their purposes did not pay. But this year happened to be a dry one. The dust on the big block began to blow. The wind blew the wheat out of the ground. The dust drifted up in dunes and traveled toward the margins of the land. It got beyond control. Neighboring farms were smothered. Little could be done. The men and machines did not return for the harvest. They never returned. And several of the neighboring families had to move out.

This ended the project called Skyland. Several individuals profited. Several families were forced off their land. The community was injured and the soil damaged if not ruined.

It is an example of modern mass production in agriculture without a history of community or family social life. It is industry without social coordination. It is linear efficiency and functionalism without regard for the community of people and the land in which it should be integrated. Such production without community is not unusual. Large areas of California and other states have been captured by it. Even in the Middle West thousands of acres are in corporative farms. It is industrial method and urban ideology imposed upon the land without respect for the native pattern of values through which men have been traditionally associated with the soil. Skyland is as specialized as a Ph.D. thesis, as abstract, pure, and sterile in its functional relation with the whole context of human life as the dust dunes it created.

This sort of thing has its advantages. It would not otherwise have captured so large an area of manufacturing and scholarship, of sports, education, and art in its net of method. But it corrupts and fragments rural life as it already has fragmented urban life. Such developments of industry without association with any community are a widespread practice. They are parallel to the widespread development of education, the arts, and other functional activities also without association with any true community. Hired workers and technicians perform functions for nonparticipating recipients that the family and community in their group solidarity once performed. It has advantages of course, but the cost in human community life may not be worth it.

Our pride in real achievements in the modern era should be tempered by the recognition of the massive failures of that world. Chief of those failures is the decline functionally and quantitatively of the human community. This era, which began about 1912, has given us in one generation two world wars with the death of perhaps 30,000,000 young

men; two major inflations, a disastrous depression with 25,000,000 people in America on relief; several regional famines and more recently a world famine unprecedented in human history. The sorry tale of a civilization in defeat goes on endlessly and tiresomely: billions of dollars in savings lost by deflation or by inflation; millions of tons of food and machinery, of ships and capital goods, idle and wasting while the people starve; the mass eviction of entire peoples, 25,000,000 of them in one instance, from their ancestral homes and the mass execution and purging of others. These should not be neglected in listing the achievements of this era. It also is the era in which the human community in the western world has disintegrated more completely perhaps than ever before.

The new technologies and instruments of living have renewed and reintegrated some communities. They have shifted emphasis and prosperity from some to others. They have also in innumerable cases been the agency of community decline. Without much question the community in America has declined generally and drastically in recent decades. Replacing it to a great extent are wide-ranging functional organizations, such as the trade association, the chain store, the baseball league, the national luncheon club, the labor union, the professional association, the college department, the steel trust. These reach out horizontally far beyond the experience of any one community or any one member. By the abstraction of materials and the specialization of method they gain range and power at the expense of depth and human continuity.

The spherically organized, interrooted human community is increasingly replaced by these wide but very thin functional associations.

### *9. The Error of the Educated*

It is the persistent assumption of those who are most influential in the modern world that large-scale organization and contemporary urban culture can somehow provide suitable substitutes for the values of the human communities that they destroy. For lack of a better word I call these persons the "educated." They include almost all professionally trained men and women, college professors, upper-bracket educators and businessmen, generals, scientists, bankers, bureaucrats, executives, salesmen, advertising men, big-time publicists, professional artists and promoters, most of the political leaders, and indeed all those most deeply involved by training and by pecuniary and professional interest in the ideology of what is called the modern system. They may be capitalist

or they may be Communist in their affiliations, Christian or Jew, American, English, German, Russian, or French. But below these relatively superficial variations among the "educated" there is a deeper affiliation. They are affiliated in the abstract, anonymous, vastly extensive culture of the modern city. This group is usually in mind in current references to the "world community," though why it should be called a community or identified with the world is not easily made clear.

These people are by no means all the people in the world, but they are the most influential. They are in general concerned in their own welfare and enclosed in their own preconceptions. Though superficially diversified and often in conflict with each other, they are in many ways a class, definitely at least an elite, or "chosen ones," sitting complacently on their uncriticized assumptions. Though the seats are hot, a certain reticence seems to prevent them, even now, from asking questions or doing much of anything about it.

I shall not try here to analyze the assumptions of this world elite other than to point out their implicit antagonism to what I have called the true community. They assume that modern substitutes for that community not only are adequate but better. On those criteria of value—or misvalue—they are remaking human life. For the face-to-face group they accept limited and highly specialized human contacts with large numbers of people and assume that the gain in range and expertness of service makes up for the loss in spiritual depth and the association with whole men. For the functional diversity of human life in a community they accept radical division of labor, the social segregation of functions, and a linear order of performance in one function of life. They assume that the increase in production thereby and the improvements in some standards of living make up for the disintegration of personal and community life and consequent phyletic discontinuity.

For direct cooperation in the community, the elite tend to substitute remote, anonymous cooperation, massive organization, and centralized institutional control of many of the functions of life. They assume that the overwhelming power and wealth thereby accumulated are good substitutes for the security, social balance, and the democratic, diffused control of the instruments of production and communication that are lost. For them power, sometimes personal, sometimes institutional, tends to replace freedom.

For the sense of belonging in a community, the elite accept the vast but often fictitious solidarity of more or less massive groups. In these great groups a man is related for the most part to people whom he does



not and cannot know well. They are abstract and usually fragmental persons so far as they can enter his experience, and he in turn is abstract and fragmental to them. The solidarity of such a group is specialized. It is abstract. It can be expressed only by indirection and farfetched symbols. Cant, falsehoods, or just talk may then replace the native solidarities of action. Outer compulsions, directed propaganda, the vicious clatter of pressure groups, special interests and influences tend to destroy the solidarity of free men. They are spiritually burned out. It is true that some men are willing to die for this abstract kind of solidarity, but more and more of them must be compelled by conscription to perform that sacrificial rite. In view of the results of the last two world wars it may seem hardly worth it.

These chosen ones of whom I speak are experts in substitutive procedures. They have, indeed, created or helped to create a substitutive culture in which the normal life of men in their communities is being smothered out. It is hardly deliberate, but it is effective. With a fervor based on contempt for little places and the human measure, they advance the trend, as it is called, and promote the ultimate defeat of the human being in the modern world. They glow with pride in the achievements of this world. They mark them emphatically, the great productive power, the increasing length of life, the "higher standards of living," the greater facilities for comfort, the verbal literacies, the books, radios, automobiles, bathtubs, flush toilets, and so on indefinitely. When pressed about the failures of that world they are more than likely to resort to evasive tactics, blank indifference, or triumphant assertion of the value of the substitutes. These chosen ones, like other people, make their myths, their painted picture of a world, and in that picture they usually show only what to them seems suitable.

The recurrent mass wars, the mass deportations and killings, the worldwide hunger and the death of children, soil erosion on a continental scale and the general decline in soil productivity, the economic instability and breakdown, and the old rhythm of boom and bust, the virulent increase in juvenile delinquency, in insanity, drunkenness, family decay and domestic discord, these and many other terrifying symptoms of defeat are ignored in their pretty picture, or are treated as extraordinary. After forty years of persistent recurrence these failures are still treated as extraordinary. Our elite can not see the failures in the system that at times so comfortably supports them.

Nor do they recognize the persistent phyletic defeat of their own chosen ones. The groups today which apparently profit most from the

modern industrial and technological culture are as a usual thing failing to reproduce themselves. They live in a false world where children are liabilities and reproduction of the stock is socially impossible. This they are likely to ignore, or, with a casual gesture to the social mobility of our country, ask, "What of it?"

The professional groups in America have a 40 per cent deficit in birth rate relative to the rate required just to replace their numbers, says O. E. Baker;<sup>15</sup> the business and clerical groups have a deficit of 35 per cent; the skilled and semiskilled urban workers have a deficit of 15 to 25 per cent; the unskilled urban workers probably lack 5 to 10 per cent of reproducing themselves. Though the rural regions, both village and farm, better than hold their own, the villages as well as the black dirt, commercial farm owners most benefited by "modern" conditions are relatively the lower of these rural groups. In some cases they do not make the biological grade.

How much these statements as to the differentials and deficits in reproduction rates among the population groups of America should be qualified by the findings of the latest Census is hard to say. What was true of the twenties, the thirties, and the early forties of this century may be considerably modified by the recent tendency of many urban, suburban and even rural people to marry earlier and have more children. This became strikingly evident after the war, although it began earlier, and now amounts, according to Peter F. Drucker, to a population explosion that will probably continue over a long period. Others would say, however, that the upsurge in births is another variant of the usual post-war bulge and that the tendencies evident in the nineteenth century and the twentieth up to a few years ago will reassert themselves. In any case it probably remains true that the people in modern life who are considered the more "successful" still have on the whole a heavy deficit in the field of vital statistics. Nor is the social and spiritual failure of modern urban life measured mainly by the reproductive failure.

The larger groups of people, to repeat, who "benefit" most from modern industry and culture have a reproductive deficit. From the poorest, least-educated people on the poor lands of the country come the surpluses necessary to maintain a stable population in the country as a whole. And those surpluses are declining. Says O. E. Baker, "In 1910, ten adults on the farm were raising 17 children while ten adults in the city were

<sup>15</sup> O. E. Baker, in O. E. Baker, Ralph Borsodi, and M. L. Wilson, *Agriculture in Modern Life* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1939), p. 120 ff. See also Peter F. Drucker, "Are We Having Too Many Babies?" *The Saturday Evening Post*, May 6, 1950.

raising ten children." In 1940, however, "ten adults on the farm were raising between 13 and 14 children while ten adults in the city were raising seven children. The rural surplus of children now is not enough to balance the urban deficit."<sup>16</sup>

This is due to social and institutional failures. As postwar bulges and other oscillations in birth rates show, it comes not from physiological incapacity. Though some scientists seem to find that biological fecundity declines under urban conditions, this at most may be treated as only a secondary cause of the failure of urban people to reproduce. "The social environment which is associated with the higher types of success and status," says Paul H. Landis, "seems to place many barriers in the way of perpetuating the race. . . . Social adaptability becomes the major goal for large masses of urban residents, and this goal seems to interfere with biological survival."<sup>17</sup>

The chosen ones of our society, whom I have called the "educated," live in a world of privilege and some comforts. Nevertheless they still fail, it would seem, not only to provide a stable and wholesome environment for ordinary human beings, but to secure their own reproductive perpetuity. Their picture of the world is false.

Many of the triumphs of the modern age are indeed victories which must be consolidated and retained. Still it is true that victories count little if the war is lost. The failures in our modern culture, particularly the central failure to maintain the human community, are critical. They are critical failures that we cannot continue to sustain. When these critical losses have been restored, and only then, can we go on in what is sometimes called the course of normal progress. Substitutes, symbols, and vicarious presentations will not avail. For the human community and for human survival there are no substitutes.

### 10. Conrad, Montana

Wheat farming is subject to widely spaced routines. Between planting and harvesting and between harvesting and planting there is not much to take the farmer's time. Once the soil is prepared and the wheat in, the wheat specialist can come and go much as he pleases until harvest time. The operations can be mechanized easily, and, because they can be mechanized, they must be mechanized—in the modern era—to survive.

<sup>16</sup> O. E. Baker, address at the 20th Annual National Catholic Rural Life Conference.

<sup>17</sup> Paul H. Landis, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

But wheat farming still may be flexible. Even its mechanization can be adapted to the normal symbiosis of men and plants and of men in their families and communities on the land. The Skyland kind of project in absentee control and industrial operation is not necessary and in the long run is not sound.

Conrad, Montana, is a little nucleation of the great wheat culture of the western plains that denies the Skyland thesis, or denies it in part, and builds its life and values on the site of the productive operations that sustain it. Sixteen hundred people live there. Some of them, contrary to the custom of American rural life since homesteading days, are village farmers. Their wheat, which may be in blocks of thousands of acres, is within operating range of their homes. They commute, as the city saying is, to their work and find it possible with the automobile and flexible farm machinery still to maintain their identification with the wide-spaced rhythms of the wheat process. They live among their neighbors, send their children to the Conrad schools, and revoke, perhaps forever, the isolation of the traditionally American farm. Others in Conrad are the elevator men, storekeepers, hardware men, teachers and county officers, Father Moroney, the priest, and several Protestant ministers, the county agent, the telephone men and women, the truckers, the gasmen, the barber, the milkmen, the coal and gravel and lumber dealers, the garage men, who cluster there in service to the wheat.

Conrad is east of the mountains and north of the Missouri where the great plains lie loosely like a rippled blanket across the world. Northward the Sweet Grass Hills may be seen dimly above the levels of the earth. They straggle casually across the Canadian border. Westward the Blackfoot tribe lives on the reservation between Conrad and the mountains. The proud terror of the plains, the horsemen, the buffalo hunters, those who danced to the sun, now no longer threaten. Smallpox, the slaughter of the buffalo and the encirclement of their range, the creeping constriction, the cattle men, the wheat ranchers, the railroad, and the oil men have constrained the great Blackfoot to his dusty villages and agency centers, to white man's pants and coats, or usually so, and brief pacings and turnings here and there on a short leash.

They come sometimes to Conrad. Lithe and handsome "breed" girls, with bad teeth and the heat of secret liquor in their breath, may raid the towns briefly in their own way, or scatter along the bus routes and the high line. But these are momentary intrusions of the range and reservation. The great wheat surrounds Conrad and flows over it in a yellow flood. Crops were good for six years in an unprecedented succession of

prosperity; prices were high. The wheat ranches, some of them many thousands of acres in extent, poured their golden torrents across the town. Conrad, with mortgages paid and money in the bank, was confident and happy.

But a teacher in the Conrad high school was not satisfied. Ruth Robinson wanted things for Conrad that money cannot buy. She went to the school superintendent, talked to county officers and school trustees, to the Protestant ministers and the Catholic priest, to housewives and fellow teachers. She talked to Joseph Kinsey Howard, a young Montana author in Great Falls, who was a research associate on the Montana Study, and she came to me, at that time director of it. In the Montana Study she found the leverage that she desired. Within a few weeks I found myself with Howard in Conrad organizing a community study group.

The Montana Study had been established for purposes like this. Initiated by Chancellor E. O. Melby of the state university system and financed initially by the Rockefeller Foundation, it was designed as an experimental project in the problems of the human community in Montana. In Conrad the great distances, the violent winter east of the mountains, and our small staff made further visits difficult. Little provision for follow-up was possible. Nevertheless the study group continued with success. The Reverend Richard Duiker of the First Christian Reformed Church was nominated chairman by Father Moroney, the Catholic priest. As chairman he in turn appointed Miss Robinson discussion leader of the group. From then on during the entire winter the little group of about two dozen businessmen, farmers, housewives, and professional people bored into the facts and problems of their town. With great good humor and differences of opinion they occupied the county courtroom every Thursday evening, sat around the counsel's table, overflowed with their guests into the jury box and visitors' seats, and worked out what seemed to them some of the answers.

The time came at length for action. And action particularly was called for on the question of recreation, a persistent problem in the small towns of America. Since the study group was designed as a deliberative body, not for action, a schedule was worked out, first, of specific recreational needs in the community, second, of a suitable vehicle to carry these proposals into action.

The Conrad Montana Study Group thereupon called a public meeting to which representatives of all agencies and organizations were invited. At this meeting the matter was threshed out and the Conrad Education

and Recreation Association was organized. A young lieutenant colonel, L. H. Anderson, back from the war, was elected chairman. This action group then proceeded to campaign for a special bond issue of \$281,000 for a new high school and community building with a library and gymnasium suitable for use by adults. The campaign was hot, but victory was not difficult. The bond issue was approved by the largest majority ever attained there in that kind of election, and, once passed, the entire issue of bonds was purchased by an eastern company. Thus Conrad not only assured itself of modern facilities for recreation and adult education; it proved by cooperative action its own existence as a community. Later an out-of-door swimming pool and a wading pool were built and other recreational needs were met. The great wheat, in this case at least, did not repudiate the community but gave it power.

Meanwhile the Conrad study group returned to its deliberations in the county courtroom. The big, polished conference table was littered with new papers and notes. A fall festival was under discussion; a children's theatre was a possibility. Oliver Christopher with dignity and skill was giving an analysis of the financial ways and means. There was a pause for comment.

"Well," said Father Moroney to the world in general, "it's fine if you lead them but all wrong if you start to drive—some people don't understand this." With this—a key statement of policy—the study group was agreed.

## *11. Textural Change in the Community*

The textural change in the community during the last fifty years or so is in many ways an indication of social decay. Our society is loose in texture. It lacks human coherence. The social fibers binding one man to another are fewer and often weaker. Though he is enmeshed in a vast net in which millions of men gyrate and heave anonymously, his relations with any other one person are fewer, farther between, and usually feebler. This is a fundamental loss in human life that no number of partial contacts, anonymous relations, or specialized services can replace. The community in this process is lost and that is irreplaceable.

I say this although I recognize, as my friend Max Otto points out, the great and valuable contributions to life that these specialized, urban processes have made and are making. I recognize too the intense delight in living that may be found in certain selective groups under urban

conditions, and perhaps only under urban conditions. I refer to the coterie of the intellectuals, or the artists perhaps, or the musicians, or maybe the physicians' luncheon group, the press club, the millionaires' club, or the fireman's ball. Here like-minded and like-conditioned men can associate with one another largely in terms of the function, the specialized interest and activity, to which their lives are devoted. Or in other groups, such as the yacht club, the tennis club, the canoe club, the Apollo club, the businessman's painting club, they can segregate one interest more or less from the rest of their lives and associate with a selected group in terms of that function alone. I would not deny the values and satisfactions to be found in such groups. Nor in trying to call attention again and again to our critical losses in terms of the human community do I wish to find myself repudiating all other kinds of organization. If these selective, spontaneous interest groups can be accommodated to the culture of the human community, well and good. Living in that case will be made richer and more stimulating. One of the great problems of these times, no doubt, is to make just that accommodation.

But accommodation of this sort probably will not take place by drift or cultural *laissez faire*. The intensely specialized associations of urban life are created as a fact largely as substitutes for community life. In a coterie of intellectuals, for example, life may be intensely stimulating, and that may be taken as a substitute for the more diversified, hardy community. But it is not adequate as a substitute. The coterie is drawn selectively from a population of thousands of persons. It tends to arrogate to itself the intellectual functions of those thousands, and as it becomes more segregated from them often becomes more and more aristocratic in pretension and functionless in respect to those whom it is supposed to represent. It tends to corrupt and destroy the diffused leadership in intellectual life that remains an intimate function of the community itself.

These coterie, in short, are functionally and socially segregative. They are highly specialized in operation and cultural outlook. As such they do not and probably cannot be a substitute for the community, at least as I shall try to describe it. They do not now replace the great losses that the defeat of the human community is bringing upon us.

In other parts of this book I shall discuss this loss in fields where the fate and fortune of the human community have a central part. Religion, philosophy, art, education, labor and industry, urban life and rural life, each in respect to the community, will be considered. A statement of the situation and problem will be made. An effort also will be made in each

case to find what may be done constructively to meet the problem. There is still hope in action.

Later in the book I shall define the community in its context and problem situation as I see it in the modern world. It will be not wholly a description of what is. It will reflect the long history of what was, and intimate more or less openly what should be. Such a statement made to other persons is of course subject not only to my predispositions but to theirs.

As to the philosopher's tendency to evaluate as well as to describe, let that be what it will. I shall try to be clear at least in my own mind as to what is evaluation, sentiment—or editorial, in newspaper parlance—and what is descriptive fact. It is not easy. There will be failures. No work of even the most painstaking objectivity is free from hidden evaluations. Value, as the pragmatists say, is in the very structure of action. It is particularly deep in the structure of that kind of action—through symbols—called thought.





PART II

*Lonepine, a Small Community*



1. *Little Places*
2. *Lonepine, Montana*
3. *The Nature of the Human Being*
4. *The Synthesis of Ends and Means*
5. *Lonepine Against the World*
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## 1. *Little Places*

A little town is a drama that moves on from climax to climax through the years. It is as original as life and as crowded with color and character, action and conflict, as human nature can be. It is a drama of men and women, of youth and age, of spring and autumn. All the people of the place are players. They move through harvests and hog-killing time, the cold mornings in winter, through blizzards and Christmas, through the family prayers, it may be, or the dancing, gaming, quarreling, and singing of people at home with each other. There is house cleaning, making garden, the basketball games toward spring. There is swimming, the canning and freezing, the early morning and the slow, reticent twilight in summer. No auditors or spectators are in this little place except those justified by their part in the process. Mere listening and mere watching, and paying for the privilege, are relatively uncommon. The people all take part and in their parts may find a synthesis of doing things and enjoying them that usually is quite unknown in functionally more segregated cultures.

Some may say that small communities are dull, monotonous. They do indeed lack the artificial coloration of New York. They lack the shocks, the feverish discontinuity and delirium, the displays, the fictions of significance and attention-getting, that make so much in the city that is called interesting. They express more often the continuities of living, the lifelong drama with its beginning, its middle, and its end, and the deep stability and balance of movement that human life sometimes can attain.

If we are interested mainly in human beings, the little places are the most interesting area of experience in the world. I say this perhaps dogmatically. The statement is made in the belief that human beings, not parts of human beings in fragmented jolts and thrills, are the most important to us of all things. Not solely hands to work, or feet to dance, or brains to direct a bank or a laboratory; not solely athletic skill, or beauty of face and body, or sex lure; not solely this perfected skill or that narrowly limited job, or some other specialized functional relation; these are not human relations in any full or complete sense, nor can they be substituted for them. They are fragments, and in spite of scientific codes and philosophies designed to put them together again, in spite of over-all organizational efforts and totalitarian plans, they remain—so far as

human beings are concerned—fragments. They lack essential human wholeness. Human beings, I believe, are found in this enormous world only in the small community.

John Dewey says a man's conduct in a political group is enriched by his participation in family life, industry, and scientific and artistic associations. There is, he says, "a free give and take: fullness of integrated personality is therefore possible of achievement since the pulls and responses of different groups reenforce one another and their values accord."<sup>1</sup>

This of course is true. These reciprocative influences are the key to social enrichment and personal integrity. But enrichments can come only in a frame of coherent experience. They can be effective only within a man's limited periphery of attention and grasp. When the sources of these interests are perceptively unknown to him, when the initiatives of what he does are fixed in the vast and anonymous distances of a society beyond all possible range of his influence, these varied participations of which Dewey speaks become compartmentalized. They lose human coherence. They are segregated from each other under most urban conditions and, so far from enriching and integrating life, tend, by their segregation, to impoverish and disintegrate it. What Dewey points out is hardly true in the urban culture of this time; its truth is conditional on the small community of people who know each other well.

Functionally the community is both the agency through which the human being realizes most of the varied interests of his life and the area in which he finds the consummation of most of his values. And conversely, the human being is the agency through which the community necessarily attains what objectives it may be said to have and the area in which the values of the community find consummation. In this integration of means and ends—or indeed their identification—lies the value of the little place and of other communal groups, such as the family, where the lives of people are rather fully related to each other.

The human being, to be sure, may find expression of his interests—such as his interest in communication, in making and manipulating things, in competition, conflict, cooperation, in dancing, in love, in play and sport—in other groups than the true community. He will not find in them, however, the coordination of experience that he will find in the community. His productive life will be narrow. His expressive life will be

<sup>1</sup> John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1927), Chap. V, "The Search for the Great Community," p. 148.

centrifugal, scattering. His course through the world will be disintegrative in its total consequence.

For the community, as Arthur Morgan says, is the seedbed of human values. Only in the community are the values created that dignify living and make it spiritually significant. Here only are found whole human beings in relation to whole human beings. This is the central significance of community life.

## 2. *Lonepine, Montana*

Lonepine is a little place in Sanders County in western Montana. The people there are farmers. In the crossroads store a corner is set aside for the post office, and around this combination store and post office in a desultory cluster are a few buildings. These stand more or less as monuments to the common functions of the community. The frame school where the elementary and high school pupils are housed is crowded and lively. The community church and the graveyard adjoin a large and rather bare community building. The one-man cheese factory just back of Ted Van der Ende's home makes up the industrial section. A seed storage building, a garage and repair shop across the road from Freeman Halverson's store, are the rest of the business district. The Halverson house is down the road a bit and there are one or two other farm homes near the crossroads.

A single pine tree grows on the little prairie, the lone pine. The quiet valley is a cup set in the mountains, rimmed around by tawny slopes, forests, and high pastures. The Little Bitterroot River flows southward across the plain, and water in the irrigated valley, or the lack of it, limits the community to its present area and productiveness. Lonepine probably cannot expand. In the short hot summers the dust blows. In the winters the snow scatters down unevenly over the valley floor and piles up on the hills. Every spring the question is heard: Has the lake filled? Is the west reservoir up to the mark? How deep is the snow in the mountains? Last year the irrigation water ran low. There was worry and questioning toward the end of June. The crops, the alfalfa seed, the cheese, the cream, the beef that Lonepine produces, were at stake.

But the water assessments are all paid up. The soil is good, the climate mild and healthful. The valley is secure, happy, and fairly prosperous. The ninety families of Lonepine make a go of it with hard work, but

without the grind and fear of poverty. They own their farms, pay their bills, and give their children good educations.

Lonepine, not incorporated, was settled for the most part between 1910 and 1913. The old families, some of them now in the third generation, came then. Their names alone are an American social document. There are the Von Segens, the Howsers, the Dondanvilles, the Halversons, the Van der Endes, the Hillmans, the McCoys, the Brases, the Casons, Cooks, McHenrys. Here are families whose background or even nativity may be French, German, Norwegian, English, Dutch, Scotch, Irish, and even—on a remote creek in the canyon—original American. They are not killing one another, however, deporting one another, starving, enslaving, raping, or irresponsibly building tariff walls against one another. They are not trying to absorb or defeat one another in business, or competing violently with one another in sport, art, and other professions. Though Lonepiners are decidedly human and therefore not all is sunshine and sweet breezes, the community is as friendly as a human community can well be. The conflicts and tensions find normal release, if not always productive adjustment, in the simple pattern of the little place. They do not build up into wars and assassinations and rarely into neuroses, juvenile delinquencies, or divorce.

By luck or good will or perhaps the fortune of being little, Lonepine has escaped the divisive chemistries that corrode the solidarity of many groups. These corrosive influences, such as competing churches, race aloofness, the arrogance of national origins, the snobbery of the educated or miseducated, the cultural exclusiveness and privilege, or the economic coercion of one segment of the group by another have not been active in Lonepine. The cultural distances between man and man in Lonepine are not great.

At a community dinner last spring, Ted Van der Ende, who learned to make cheese in the Frisian Islands off Holland, was called on for a speech. He rose, said he had no speech, but would sing a song. He sang a boyhood song of Holland, first in Dutch, then translated into English. That started things: Freeman Halverson rose and sang a boyhood song of Norway. Another tried a boyhood Czech song, but forgot it midway. There were Germans there who could sing the folk songs of Germany. They hesitated at first, but were urged on by the others. Then four college students back for vacation rose and sang American songs.

For thirty-four years without interruption, the Lonepine community has held a Thanksgiving dinner. For the last decade or so it has been held in the basement of the community church. Last year they borrowed the

Reverend Baty from Missoula for the day, listened to a brief sermon and song service, and then the men cooked and served the dinner. Great was its reputation in the region. A scholar, were he competent, could well study the work, peace, and relative serenity in the little community of Lonepine. Amid the worthy sentiments relating to a United World it might be pointed out that only here, in these little places, where men are known not as symbols but as men, can there be significant unity.

Freeman Halverson is the downtown population of Lonepine, he and perhaps Ted Van der Ende, the cheesemaker. Free Halverson is postmaster and the owner and operator of the general store. His place is the rendezvous. The tiny post office, not much larger than a telephone booth, is on the dry-goods side of the big room. For a time the public library also was housed here. Below are freeze lockers. The butcher shop with its big refrigerator is at the back. In this rambling frame building with its somewhat informal front porch may be bought a modern cream separator or a pair of overalls, a pound of cheese or a tube of lip stick, a silken, western neckerchief, a saddle or a pound of old fashioned chocolate creams. Brisk bargains are announced in the weekly mimeographed sheet of news and market items, and the prices paid for local eggs and poultry, vegetables, seeds, potatoes, and fruit are revised to suit the season.

A blackboard nailed to the outside wall tells in scribbled chalk the socials, the study group meetings, 4-H club evenings and contests, band rehearsals, and all the goings on of the little place. Through the doors of the store—it is named The Hub—come and go the people of Lonepine, old and young, men and women, with their leisurely business, their gossip and laughter. Down the road a piece the Halverson dog, Major, greets the guest at the white gate of the farmstead. One of Halverson's good-looking daughters now goes to the university eighty-five miles away. His two sons, back from the armed service, are taking over the farm and the garage repair shop across the street.

Freeman Halverson is tall, fast on his feet, and works hard. On his slender shoulders are laid many of the responsibilities of the little community. He is postmaster, storekeeper, driver of the school bus. He is chairman of the community study group, head of the newly organized conservation unit, president of the state alfalfa seed growers' association, editor of the *Hub News*. He is on the citizens' advisory board of the state agricultural college. He leads the Lonepine band. At times he trains the girls' chorus. And then toward evening he plays the clarinet at home in the family ensemble.

Meanwhile his wife and daughters can or freeze hundreds of quarts

of fruit and vegetables. They manipulate the modern pressure cooker and the quick-freeze techniques with economy and skill. They care for Freeman's old father, now pretty feeble. They keep the house spick-and-span, teach a Sunday-school class, design smart dresses for themselves, sew, cook with ample art and joy to all the family, and regularly take prizes in the Extension Service projects led by the county agent.

The Halverson family is a productive unit of no mean significance. It is mutually cooperative in a dynamic, effective, going process. To city and suburban folk the most remarkable aspect of it perhaps is the spiritual joy and solidarity with which the members go about their work. There is work to do together and they know how to do it without psychic resistance or complaint. Here where their pattern of life is set in a modern technology, here with a good car and a truck, a vacuum cleaner and a flush toilet, an electric mixer and a pressure cooker, a modern washing machine, an electric range and a radio, their productive process is still identified inextricably with the ends and consummations of action.

The Halversons are busy but never burdened. Their tasks are not designed for escape or to be escaped, or through purchase to be replaced by "sit-down" substitutes. They live in the sunshine of this moment. They bring the past and future to bear intimately—and eternally—in this living present of their communal life. They have somehow assimilated, at least for their vivid moment here, the technologies of our modern culture into truly human values. In this their success surpasses by far that of most city and suburban folk.

Freeman Halverson supplies that ingredient so important in the little place: friendly, democratic leadership by a person living in the community. He would make a wise and progressive senator, not because he is above his community, but because he is of it and for it. But I am glad that he stays where he is.

Then there is Ted Van der Ende, the Dutchman. He makes an excellent cheddar cheese in his little one-man factory. Two batches a week of eighty gallons of Guernsey milk go into it. The water is cold in Montana; in the chilly storage place below the one-room plant the fat, paraffined, five-pound loaves of cheese get little chance to age. They are sold too fast. Van der Ende has nine children. He worries for fear one of the boys will not wish to take over his cheese business. But when I suggested buying it myself he shrank back almost in fear at the thought of letting it out of the family. He also feared, no doubt, letting it go into unskilled hands.

He has thirteen good, grade Guernseys and a milking machine. He owns



forty acres of irrigated pasture and leases forty more on which to keep his cattle. The pattern of his life has a symmetry and containment that more pretentious persons rarely find. There are his children, his good wife, his Guernseys, his eighty acres of land, his Lonepine friends, and his excellent cheddar cheese. Inner diversity and organic wholeness is here, all within the range of his influence and appreciative, perceptive life.

The Howser brothers are farmers both. Jim is white-haired, handsome, a bachelor. Chuck Howser is the reader, the dreamer, the seer of visions, of Lonepine. He recently decided to retire. He turned his farm over to his son and sat down to rest and read. But retirement was not easy for him. So he bought a little place over by the reservoir and now is busy enlarging his new house with imagination and rough skill, building a glassed-in dining room with a view across the valley to the southern rim of mountains, improving his land, planting McIntosh apple trees.

Vern Dondanville is fiery, intelligent, a writer of local history, and strong for cooperatives. He crosses swords frequently with Freeman Halverson on that latter matter in the weekly study group meetings. The conflict often is intense. The debate always is burdened responsibly with implicit programs of action. But there never is any visible hangover of spite and stubborn personal antagonism.

Frank Hillman, a former teacher and county agent, raises bees along with other livestock; and Montana honey, it is said, is the best in the country. Hillman's wife has old walnut furniture brought from the East, but she would not leave Montana. There is the Von Segen clan, grandparents, parents, children. An intelligent daughter-in-law, a college graduate, is the volunteer mistress of the new library. There is John McCoy, who has been head of the Lonepine school since almost its beginning.

I could name dozens more in the rural communities of America, in Montana, Illinois, Kansas, Wisconsin, Alabama, Florida, Vermont, and Rhode Island. I do not say that all rural communities are like Lonepine or that all rural communities have people like those in Lonepine. Rural communities are on many different levels economically, educationally, culturally. Their diversity as groups and within groups is as great or greater than the diversity of classes in the great cities. Nor do I say that there are no good people, no functional families, and no communal groups in cities. The picture is not all black or white.

The Lonepiners, however, are characteristic as rural people. Their level of ability, intelligence, and social responsibility is probably not exceeded by any large group in the entire country. Lonepine withal has

remained a community. In the cities, on the other hand, the people usually are organized on a piecework basis, not as human beings, but as functional fragments coordinated in a great machine.

### 3. *The Nature of the Human Being*

The great trouble with these times is that the rural community too seems to be undergoing this fragmentation. It is being captured, or extirpated, in a culture that has no place for it. In that sense, and in that sense only, Lonepine may be somewhat unusual: it has continued to exist as a community. But even Lonepine feels the hot breath on its neck. "What," ask the Lonepiners, "will our sons and daughters do with our farms?"

What they will do depends on many things. The concept of human nature which Lonepine sons and daughters have is one of them. If the human being is thought of as a center of power and seizure, as the base point of raids on a surrounding world, as the focus of acquisition in a realm where conflict and competition with other centers is the first principle and where impersonal, large-scale organization around those centers is the second, there will be one future—or no future—for Lonepine. There will be a world of social mechanism on the one hand and of power-centered individuals on the other, with the two inherently in conflict.

They will remain inevitably in conflict, and through that conflict will be realized to the full man's inherent curse. It is a curse as old as cities and the mass organization of society. It has had its prophets and commentators from the days of St. Paul to the modern conflict between businessmen and government. This conflict between the individual and society, says St. Paul,<sup>2</sup> is the source of man's pervading sense of guilt and sin. It convicts him, once he becomes conscious of it, and only by the grace of God may he find salvation. It is a theory of sin and salvation based on man as a lone and predatory individual becoming conscious as he matures of his conflict with a society codified in what Paul calls "the law." It is an urban concept of man and order. It avows a human defeat for which the only remedy is divine intervention. The rural doctrine and naturalism of Jesus, so far as we know them, are converted by Paul into an urban theology in which the Church as a divine and highly specialized "community" is offered in the place of the natural community lost in the

<sup>2</sup> See Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1913), Vol. I, Chap. V.

growth of civilization. Guilt followed by grace is the consequence of that civilization.

But the natural world to a Lonepine youth is hardly so rigorous as St. Paul has it. Nor does it run only in one direction. Nature has a plurality of initiatives. And human nature has many categories, aspects, centers of focus, and lines of continuity. Men have, as James says, "so many different businesses with nature that no one of them yields us an all-embracing clasp."<sup>3</sup> Nature has in it both Paul and Jesus, both reason and love. It has impersonal organization as well as the community and human beings. It contains both New York and Lonepine.

As for the Lonepine folks, they sing the hymns, they repeat the creeds and listen to the preaching when they can borrow a preacher from Missoula or Hot Springs, but their native bent is perhaps closer to that of Jesus than to St. Paul. Their concept of human nature, particularly in the minds of the younger members of the community, includes neither racial sin nor personal sin as necessarily a part of man's estate, with confession and divine forgiveness as the condition of salvation.

They are simpler than that. Their sense of sin, when they have it, is sporadic and superficial, hardly cosmic. Their guilt complexes, if any—those wolves of conscience devouring the soul—find in their lives few chronic areas of conflict and frustration in which to feed. This is not to say that all is serene among the young people of Lonepine. They have their tensions, their days of defeat and frustration, but the forms of adjustment seem for them fairly simple. Guilt in fact or guilt internally promulgated for the sake of grace is rarely a part of the pattern.

The young people complain at the lack of recreation. But they complain, significantly, that they must go thirty miles to Polson to get it, or to Hot Springs or Thompson's Falls, not that they cannot get away from Lonepine. Their economic future in Lonepine, furthermore, is uncertain, if not nonexistent. If a young man is one of several children, he may be too late to take over his parents' farm. If he matures before his father is ready to retire, he may be too early. Thus more than likely he must leave Lonepine in order to earn his living. Like millions of other migrants he must leave his home and his familiar community, according to the custom of young people in the western world.

In Lonepine, at least, this is a hardship to him. Of the sixty-five Lonepine people in the armed services in 1945, according to a canvass made by Freeman Halverson for the study group, a large majority wished to re-

<sup>3</sup> William James, *A Pluralistic Universe* (New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1909 and 1943), Lecture I, p. 32.

main in Lonepine on their return from war. Though the community tried with skill and considerable success to make places for them in its economy, not all could be taken care of.

It is clear that most of the youngsters who hope to remain in Lonepine think of the human being not as a lone wolf looking for better hunting grounds, not as a frustrated individual restricted by his group. Although the boy may wish adventure, he feels still that he belongs to people. He finds significance in his being in the family and the familiar Lonepine group, and he leaves only because he has to. In him arises not a guilt consciousness, not a sense of conflict between the individual and an unfriendly society. On the contrary he feels a loss and restlessness, a nostalgia for the friendly group. He dreads alienation from it and the end of his belonging. This, not guilt or sin, is the problem. The youngster seeks not to conquer the normal man and his appetites, but to realize him. His problem is not a question of redemption in the Pauline manner. It is dumb and impulsive in his life, an unclear wish but no less an urgent one to preserve the normal life as he knows it in Lonepine from confusion and defeat.

What is the normal nature of man? This great traditional question is raised by the Lonepine boy. In terms of his problem how might it be interpreted? What might he answer?

The human being, the boy might say, has many functions and interests. He is not just this or that. He operates amid activities called physical, social, psychological, symbolic, and in different provinces of time such as the past and future, and these he calls the circumstances of his life, though he cannot well be distinguished from them. In all this there is no clear priority of values. There is no cosmic code. Sometimes one value, sometimes another, receives emphasis; for the values of life, like the functions, are diverse. The pressures change among events and actions, and the value emphases change with them.

The good life, however, is not haphazard. Of this the youngster would be sure. In his hope to remain in Lonepine he senses in life something more than drift. It is more than casual and indifferent. He feels his belonging. It is a form in which he wishes to be identified. It is fluid, organic. Now in one way, now in another, life is a coordinated whole. It is an integration of functions and values. The community, the integrated human being—which it is called depends on the point of view.

The human community is the counterpart of the human being. It is inescapable in him. He cannot go off and leave it. Lonepine is as much a part of Chuck Howser, for example, as Chuck Howser is of Lonepine.

The diverse functions are reciprocal. The human being and the community both initiate and limit each other.

What are the coordinating principles of these diverse functions of men? I shall not try to indicate them. As worked out, for example, by Ferdinand Tönnies,<sup>4</sup> they need not be discussed here. It is enough to say that a man requires not only the coordination of functional activities—such as language, sex, economic behavior—within his frame of living, but their integration with those of other persons as well.

The true community is thus built to the human scale. Its range is limited to men's capacity for integrated experience. Beyond that limit it breaks down. The human being, on the other hand, is limited by the community. He is keyed to its capacity to coordinate the functions of his life as a whole with other whole persons. At the point where interpersonal relationships are solely between the isolated functions of different persons, the human being disintegrates.

This principle of limitation in the human being and his community is critically important. In Part VIII of this book I shall try to show that it is interlocked with other essential characteristics of communal life and thus makes unacceptable the concept, held by many sociologists, that the community may be an extensive, more or less wide-ranging group. It is not extensive, nor is it entirely identical, on the other hand, with what rural sociologists call the neighborhood. This of course is partly a matter of the terms used; still the community should be defined, I think, more by its structure and function and by the nature of the human stuff in it than by its geography. That structure and function in human affairs I shall try to clarify in the course of the book. The community in this sense will apply to many families, many neighborhoods, many villages and towns, but not to all of them.

This may seem a long way from Lonepine, the little places, and the people who define by their lives the nature of the human being. In the Lonepine context we can understand a man only in reference to norms of living. Even to describe him adequately we must take him as a disposition of activities around what may be called norms. When lifted out of its native context such description becomes too much of a mouthful. But within the concrete contextual matrix of human events, it is descriptive of every human act. Within the flux of action, the everlasting detail of this thing and that in the course of our living, so infinitely variable, so subtly different in their bearing on each other, the description becomes

<sup>4</sup> Ferdinand Tönnies, *Fundamental Concepts of Sociology*, trans. by Loomis (New York, American Book Company, 1940), Introductory Article.

assimilable. Norms enter the descriptive consideration of the human being.

This too is Lonepine. So far as human functions have continuities of behavior called human life, they are keyed to a kind of norm. For functional activities in living things are defined not solely by what they do, but what they do in certain pledged directions. They include not merely action as abstract movement but action as success. They are involved in patterns of continuity or order. If irrelevant to that end, they are defined not as functional but as something else. I do not claim that this places values within the structure of physical action; I suggest only that we must consider activities selectively in terms of the predispositions involved in the structure of life itself.

#### *4. The Synthesis of Ends and Means*

In Lonepine this coordination of functions in the human being and his community takes place without much theorizing. It is a natural order of life and the folk of Lonepine take it for granted. They live in a milieu of human beings, and somehow they are human beings—if I may use the word as a term of approbation—more securely than are most city people.

One reason for this is their spiritual unity. Not only are Lonepine people functionally coordinated; they have what may be called spiritual wholeness as well. This is a poetic term for something in human life that rises from below the levels of language and articulate symbol. This solidarity of values, this intimate coherence of values within a man's life, gives him whatever wholeness the human spirit may have.

In this is the synthesis of ends and means in human life. Lonepine is a culture where productive activities are likely to be taken as appreciatively final as well. The cleavage in values, so marked in urban culture, between work and play, industry and art, flesh and spirit, labor and pleasure seeking, becoming and being, and so on in innumerable variations and degrees of evaluative divergence, very likely in Lonepine do not take place at all. Freeman Halverson, for example, works hard, but his work, or at least a great deal of it, has also a high appreciative worth to him. It is worth-while now, in this moment. It is worth-while in this brisk realm of action; the values usually assigned to the future and past are caught together in a timeless present. Ted Van der Ende and his sons produce cheese, but in the economic and social pattern of the community, where he is master of the whole procedure, from eighty acres of pasture land to the storage

of the cool, fat loaves of cheese, production has the rhythmic form and thrill of art. It is organic production, as it were; it is identified with the richly functional and appreciative pattern of a human life.

Ferdinand Tönnies<sup>5</sup> uses this unity of ends and means in a formal sense as one of the ways of distinguishing *Gemeinschaft*—or roughly village culture—from *Gesellschaft*—or the culture more commonly of cities. Contrariwise the rationalization of the means of human activity whereby they are separated in quality completely from the ends, and are valued solely in reference to those ends, underlies the specialization of productive processes. They are divorced from intrinsic values. They are set up in urban cultures in vast assembly lines of manufacturing, sales procedures, market techniques, and the machinery of mass civilization.

Though urban professional men, executives, and some others may find a synthesis of extrinsic and intrinsic values in their work, it is at a heavy cost. That cost is their relative isolation as a privileged group and their adherence to a cult of so-called objectivity that removes from their activities some or all of the social responsibility for the consequences of their work.

The solidarity of values, or what I have called tentatively the spiritual life, is found in small communities and among people known well. Beyond those human limits the spiritual life is likely to become morbidly specialized and remote from concrete living. In such abstraction there is eventually spiritual death.

### 5. *Lonepine Against the World*

In all this it may seem that I am pitting Lonepine against the world; that I am laying on Lonepine all the virtues of living, and saying, "Go now, take over the corrupt world." That would be fantasy indeed, a kind of fantasy that boils up like foam on a simmering, helpless resentment at the way things are going and conceals the issues and alternatives of the problem. The little places like Lonepine are simple, weak in terms of modern power, and often in decay. They cannot of themselves take over, and no Principle of Righteousness, no abstract power for good, no divinity, is going to do it for them. Repeated revolts of the agrarian West and South, of the farms and villages and little places of America against the industrial East, or of the people on their family farms and in their small communities against those in their own regions who dispossess them

<sup>5</sup> Tönnies, *op. cit.*, p. 15 ff.



have been beaten down, and each time the renewed revolt seems weaker. The populists, the rural revolts of the first, second, and third decades of this century, have come and gone and left hardly a memory. Though embattled farmers are said to have won our initial revolution against England, they seem to have won little else.

The cycle of boom, panic, protest, suppression, and victorious war rolls on like a steel wheel over our land. Our country, once magnificent in resources, has been depleted by savagely wasteful exploitation. Our minerals, our oils, our fisheries, our fertilizers, our forests, our water, and our basic, life-sustaining soils have been wasted without need and without benefit to the people of America to a point of permanent, severe scarcity in many fields, if not final exhaustion. Our people, our youth and the men and women they might be, and our communities have been wasted more than all.

Against all this Lonepine may raise its head, bloody but unbowed, but that is about all Lonepine alone can do on a continental scale. It has not the numbers, nor the financial power, nor the technological control and skill, nor the informed will to accomplish what must be done to save a free and democratic culture. Alone it cannot buck the gigantic forces called "the trend." Lonepine in a word may well be the objective, or in part the objective, of our social aspirations. It should be that objective, if we value the fullness of human life and community; but Lonepine of itself cannot well be the instrument toward that objective.

The objective must be reached through technological reorientation of action and educational and social reorientation of policy in persons of influence. These now may be riding with "the trend." It must be reached by cooperation with and through Lonepine, but Lonepine alone cannot bring it about.

The great god Trend, as someone has called it, may not be invincible. There are countertrends and different trends even among the dynamic ferocities of the modern world. Lonepine and its values still may have a chance. With the help of those who may not be in Lonepine but still can appreciate its values and the importance of its survival, even this modern world may be changed.

An enduring answer to devotees of the Trend is given by John Dewey: The illusions of inevitability, such as the economic determination of history, come from thinking only in terms of antecedents, not of the eventual; of origins, not of fruits. What actually happens is "dependent upon the presence or absence of perception and communication of consequences, upon foresight and its effect upon desire and endeavor."



When they are left to work themselves out on the merely physical level, or through unequal and accidental diffusion of knowledge, the agencies of social change produce one result. When the knowledge of consequences is equitably distributed and action is animated by an informed and lively sense of a shared interest, he says, the outcome is different.<sup>6</sup>

### 6. *Lonepine Looks at Itself*

In 1944, during my first winter in Montana, Freeman Halverson and others in Lonepine asked the Montana Study to help organize a community study group. They had heard of the Montana Study through Harvey Baty, the young minister whom they borrowed now and then from Missoula. It was, he said, a small project in the humanities sponsored by the university system of Montana. Its general directive, Baty said, was to study ways to improve the quality of living in Montana through work in and with small communities. It was hoped that this might lead to clearer knowledge on how the small community in the modern world may be stabilized and enriched.

Freeman Halverson had been concerned about the increasing age level of the owning and controlling group in Lonepine. He had seen this group, of which he was part, come to the area as youngsters thirty years ago. They had founded their community, laid out their farms, built their barns and houses, finagled successfully in Washington the touchy question of water rights and payments, and with youthful energy built their school, their church, found or made their markets, and got roads through to Polson, Niarada, Missoula, Plains, and Kalispell. It was hard work and good work, but as the community became established and as the fourscore families increased in size, some of the founders became increasingly aware that the community which once was controlled and operated by young people is now more and more in the hands of old or elderly folk who often lack the energy of their youth and the capacity for continuous readjustment.

In Lonepine, to be sure, the situation is not so unbalanced as it is among the general rural population of the state, where the average operating farmer in 1945 was about sixty-five years old. But Freeman Halverson sensed the problem anyhow: Lonepine lacks continuity of operation and control beyond one generation. It has no suitable order of succession. Lonepine, furthermore, cannot absorb its young people.

<sup>6</sup> John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

functionally in numbers large enough either to provide a living for a good number of them or to assure stable and permanent families.

Grant Hokansen, for example, is a good farmer who has done well by the soil. His fields are fertile and well ditched, prices are good, and with his new machinery he continues to operate the farm well beyond his sixtieth birthday. Meanwhile his two sons have grown up. One, Nels, is forty-two, a hardware salesman who lives with his family in Spokane. The other, Albert, thirty-eight, is a chief petty officer in the Navy. Both of the sons are beyond the age and inclination to take over their father's farm; and now that Grant Hokansen is getting ready to retire, he plans to sell the farm to an outsider, rent it, or perhaps hire an inexpensive manager.

In any case, the farm probably will not receive the loving care that Grant gave it. While he and his wife are driving rather aimlessly in their new car from a tourist cabin in Denver to a tourist cabin in Albuquerque or El Paso or Kansas City, or playing checkers with another rootless retiree in St. Petersburg, Florida, or visiting the children one after another, or buying a bit of real estate in California, the Lonepine farm, we may be sure, will not be doing so well. It has been alienated, as it were, and what was an organic part of a family life is now reduced merely to a source of income. It is a source of income for one, two, or even more families, though hardly a source of family life, and its resources are strained, its capital in soil fertility drained off by repeated cropping and erosion without the long-run policy of rotation, rest, and deliberate return of soil-making materials that Grant could afford to follow.

Lonepine, it is true, is not yet a colony of tenant farmers or of hired hands—far from it. But Freeman Halverson thought he saw the symptoms. The trouble, so far as the Hokansen farm is a symptom, is a basic incompatibility of function of youth and age and a lack of continuity between them. It is characteristic of modern life, particularly in America, and Freeman Halverson, perhaps without fully realizing it, put his finger on the source in deciding to study the community.

For ten weeks, later extended to thirteen, a study group of thirty-five or forty people of Lonepine met in the high school room to analyze their community and to discuss its problems. Freeman Halverson was elected permanent chairman. John McCoy, the superintendent of the school, was recording secretary. The discussion leader for these first ten weeks was the director of the Montana Study, who drove out over the mountains eighty-five miles from Missoula each Thursday and returned late the same night.

The members of the study group came usually in families, sometimes as far as ten miles over the winter roads, and if Will Bork or his wife Loretta did not see all the ins and outs of the local land question, or the water resources problem, or the matter of school taxation and the maintenance of a local school, or the recreation problem, there was young Esther to coach them privately or to speak out for herself. A study group guide was worked out for the group, mimeographed, and later published.<sup>7</sup> It gave suggestions for procedure, discussed briefly the problems of Montana and her communities, worked out questions of local interest, and proposed areas of local research. The minutes of the meetings, devoted mostly to who said what, were read each week and later were assembled and mimeographed by the Montana Study for distribution to the members. The study group itself was a community event carried on with firm enthusiasm until spring-plowing time. A huge banquet was held in the basement of the church to celebrate its completion.

And then what happened? This is the key question. Did the interest and action end there? It is true that follow-up activities might have been better developed than they were. Had there been provision in the educational system for the training of resident, lay leaders in community work, had there been provision for continuing contact with an agency like the Montana Study and an occasional project carried on mutually by the community and the Montana Study, had there been greater emphasis on community life and values in the professional training of ministers, physicians, engineers, teachers, and lawyers, a more active and continuous follow-up activity might have taken place. But, as it was, a good deal was done.

Lonepine carried on several study groups as a result of the work during that year. The members of one group considered the problem of recreation. Through the Montana Study they were able to call in for advice a recreational expert from Denver. At another meeting they had the governor of Montana. They raised money for remodeling the community building, put in new equipment and a simple lunch concession, and found a middle-aged couple to take charge of this building and care for the church and graveyard.

Another group organized a community drama. It was a series of episodes, written by members of the group, about Lonepine history. The parts in many cases were taken by the historical characters themselves.

<sup>7</sup> Baker Brownell, Joseph Kinsey Howard, and Paul Meadows, *Life in Montana, As Seen in Lonepine, A Small Community*, The Montana Study (Missoula, The University of Montana, Helena, Montana, 1945).

First the son or daughter took the part as the parent had lived it during the early days of Lonepine. Then, as the history of the community moved down toward the present, the parents took their own parts in the show. Through the Montana Study a director and coach, Bert Hansen, was loaned to the community for several weeks by the agricultural college. The show was finally put on in February. It was a friendly and a thorough success.

A committee of the community study group made a survey of possible small industries in Lonepine. It was hoped that Lonepine might thus absorb a larger number of her young people. Within a year a garage and farm machinery repair shop was set up. This was privately financed. Other small projects, such as a local lumberyard and firewood supply, may be established later.

Another committee of the study group took up the question of a public library. Its recommendation was approved by the group. The receipts of one basketball game and of a number of church dinners and "socials" were assigned to the library. Shelves were put up by volunteer workers in the store. Mrs. Kent Von Segen, a university graduate, was appointed volunteer library head. Later the library was moved to its own room in the school building. An old settler in nearby Niarada willed his collection of 160 books to the community. Other gifts of books came in. Still other books were purchased. Now there is an active and fairly serviceable library in Lonepine. Its managers can take responsibility for book loans and gifts from other institutions and for a projector and films from the state film library.

These are not massive or resounding achievements. But in these days of multibillion-dollar projects they still have their importance. Little projects in good will, intimate successes, friendly participations in the close problems of getting along in a community, as illustrated by the people of Lonepine, Darby, Stevensville, Dixon, Victor, Conrad, Lewistown, Libby, Hamilton, are small in scale, to be sure, but the scale is essentially human. Larger projects resound over the world; some of them are necessary. But projects too large to allow participation in the entire process by men known well to each other make heavy charges on the human being's integrity. Those accumulating charges lead to moral and financial bankruptcy.

The value of the Lonepine study group was less in the action projects, however, than in the continuous interest, the pleasure, and the social understanding that marked the weekly meetings themselves. The study group was not designed to be a legislative or executive body. Though

action groups might well—and did—arise from it, the study group was planned as a kind of deliberative organ for the community. This, in a homely, informal way, it really was.

It was in its way the consciousness of the community. Through the discussions around the big tables the problems of Lonepine were made more articulate. Lonepine looked at itself; significant areas of fact were analyzed and critically tested in the give and take and the diversity of interests of the group; channels of action were laid out and by rough consensus were approved. The intimate initiative of all democratic behavior was here. The face-to-face good will, the immediacy of value and contact, the whole range of close, interior processes among familiar people, which are the essential texture of a free society, here found a natural place in life.

"But," says the critic, "is all this relevant to the major problems and disasters of these times? Charming Lonepine may be, but have nostalgic sentiments about it much effectiveness in today's problems?" An agricultural specialist told me only the other day that the farm population must be made much smaller by removal elsewhere of marginal members. In Atlanta and other cities the unemployed refugees from the cotton fields and from increased "farm efficiency" are piling up in thousands, according to the expert's formula. I read in the newspaper that day of men, women, and children, crowded into trucks in Florida and Texas, locked in, and shipped through without a stop even for watering or toilets to the Michigan berry fields.

This migratory farm labor force is but an episode<sup>8</sup> in our long history of waste of human resources, but it is relevant to what the expert said. The berry pickers, the fruit gatherers, the sugar-beet hands, and the imported stoop workers in mass vegetable gardens of California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Colorado, and other states are consequences of our indifference to Lonepine. When we substitute for the little places a system pledged to mass methods and centralized controls the human disaster begins. The relevance of Lonepine to the great problems of these times will be given further confirmation as the book goes on.

<sup>8</sup> Carey, McWilliams, *Ill Fares the Land* (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1944).




PART III

*Rural Life and Urban Life*



1. *The Two Worlds*
2. *The Village*
3. *Village Democracy*
4. *Arvin and Dinuba*
5. *Rural Life and the Natural Order*
6. *Rural and Urban Differences*
7. *Stevensville, Montana*
8. *New Trends in Rural Life*





## 1. *The Two Worlds*

The recurrence of a theme in myth and history usually is due to a persistent problem answered now in one way, now in another. It comes to the surface for a while, sinks down, then is up again, and so on along the long stream of living. In art these recurrences may be deliberate. In life they more likely are a matter of attention as our interest shifts across the problems of a complex world.

That world has recurrences, to be sure; it has tolerance of order. It has its threads of meaning. But it also has a plurality of initiatives, an amazing choice of themes, so that one recurrent theme or another across human history may be more a matter of attention than a cosmic emphasis of its own. Some problems are forced on us, but more problems than we may imagine are selected by us as long-time companions. The recurrence of a problem of this sort gives a clue to the nature of human beings and their culture, but beyond that says little objectively about the nature of the world.

The recurrent theme to which I refer in this case is the doctrine of two worlds, such as matter and spirit, across which human beings straddle. Here they live in uneasy equilibrium or in restless transition from one realm to the other. These realms are incommensurable in respect to each other. There is no normal structure of transition, except as a man makes the unique and incommunicable crossing. Over and over this theme appears. Whatever its validity in the realm of nature may be, it is an intimation of a persistent character of the living process in men.

I shall not try to probe the interiors of this cultural and psychological dualism. Religions, philosophies, patterns of social life, have been challenged into being by it. Nor can I explain its persistence. But the cleavage between the rural way of life, with its communal groups, and the urban type of organization, with the individual isolated from others in a blizzard of symbols, may be associated with it. This crossing from one to the other has been in the nature of men's lives since civilization and the symbolization of experience began. It always has been a radical transition from one kind of communication to another not commensurable with it, from experience to the symbols of experience, or as it were from being to meaning and back again. Men are accustomed to these inscrutable transitions. But there are conflicts and frustrations in them.

In the rural way of things a man's life is organized as a whole to *include* the lives of other men. It includes the full contexts of the fields, the seasons, and the cycles of growth and of living things to which a man's life seems naturally to belong. In the urban world the lives of men are organized in segregated parts to *exclude* the whole lives of others and escape the cycles of growth across the seasons and the fields. Though no instance of a life is purely one or the other, I suppose, the principles involved are hardly reconcilable, and movement from one to the other is not evolutionary but discontinuous. It is an irrational jump.

Beyond a line or zone, which should not be defined too sharply, the transition from rural community life to urbanism becomes degenerative. It is degenerative because the transition is inherently disorderly. The one world as it were repudiates the other. The primary values and continuities of life in the one are lost in the jump to the other. This means simply that some of the ways of rural life are essential to all continuous life; a transition even to the most complex and expertly organized society that abandons those rural essentials can involve only degeneration and collapse. The history of the rise and fall of peoples may be largely a chronicle of those jumps. But the zone of critical transition is hard to determine, or if determined, hard to do much about.

The western world—or, more accurately, the controlling groups and people of the western world—is obsessed by urbanism. The situation is more unbalanced, it is said, than ever in our history. It is unbalanced; it is desperate. In the long history of communal life never so large a segment of the human stock, perhaps, has been subject to this common cause of decay. Remedies may or may not be found. If found, they will be basic, searching remedies. I do not know the answers to these questions that so many people ask, but I am sure at least that the answer is neither a return to the old days nor remaining in the urban rottenness of today. A new way of life is necessary—new, but old in its human measure. Winter has caught us; like the early settlers in the Sierras, we must go on or die.

## 2. *The Village*

The past, after all, has entered too deeply into the nature of human life to be abandoned, even if that were possible. For the past in many ways is our nature. The powers and limitations of human beings were formulated there and in their deeper nature will remain unchanged

except by death. By building without regard for human nature and human limitations we shall build only for destruction.

The village community has been central in human affairs since plants and animals were domesticated and men's relations to nature were transformed from conquest to alliance. Even before that the community, including something similar to the family, was no doubt the prevailing pattern of human organization. It was continuous in time, though not yet stable in space or location on the earth. I do not claim of course that the village, or even the family, is an unchangeable pattern of human life. I do hold that in some form or other the intimate community of human beings, related as whole persons, cannot be abandoned in a society concerned with its survival.

The neighborhood, as rural sociologists describe it, and the village are given emphasis in this book as examples of what the true community may be and where it may be found. I have given them this emphasis because I think their survival as communities is a condition of the survival of other forms of the community. Without their cultural support and conditioning the family, for example, is doomed. They themselves, on the other hand, can be assured survival, enrichment, and stability, I believe, if methods and technologies now at hand are used in their behalf. They are, indeed, the crux of the problem.

But I do not mean to say that the neighborhood, the village, and the open-country group are the only examples of the community. As I shall try to show later in this book, the human community is a structural concept which often may be exemplified in these groups but is not limited to them. The family, for example, is perhaps the most basic of all communal forms of organization. Though it may depend for its continued existence on the neighborhood and village community, it is not identical with them. The roving pastoral group, the gypsy band tied no one place, also may be communities.

Even in cities a group may have wholeness of relationship among its members. In preindustrial cities this was undoubtedly true. Today it is more and more rare. Though communities in some truncated form, such as spontaneous groups based on a selective interest, or residual groups in a ghetto or a black belt, may exist in cities, they have hardly the structural fullness of community life still to be found sometimes in the village.

The village, in turn, should not be identified too completely with rural areas not so organized. The village and the open country, in contrast to the city, may be communal in social organization, though often different from each other in economy and outlook. Their units usually are small

and their members well known to one another as persons. Our villages include some 27 million people, usually called rural nonfarm. At least three fourths of our villages are agricultural, according to an estimate by Brunner.<sup>1</sup> They are mainly service centers for farm people. As to the farmer himself, not one in ten, in our pattern of scattered homesteads, lives in the village or town,<sup>2</sup> but this number I think is increasing.

Villages that are not agricultural are built around interests such as mining, fishing, lumbering, manufacturing, quarrying, resort and travel business, or, as in the suburbs, just residence. In recent decades a great increase has taken place in small, unincorporated groups attendant on the expansion of the population of large cities. The village is not always of the soil nor correlated with its growth techniques and fortune.

This change of some villages and their differentiation from the basic agricultural pattern is of significance in modern social strategy. In an economy where efficient agriculture in itself requires fewer and fewer hands, the village may be increasingly important as a seat of communal life. Villages show adaptive flexibility under new conditions. They have a chance for survival.

Nevertheless the villages of America, as I pointed out earlier in this book, are declining. Although the village populations, or roughly the rural, nonfarm group, increased more than 14 per cent in the decade ending in 1940,<sup>3</sup> the number of incorporated villages that have lost population since 1900 is very great. In the same decade from 38 to 21 per cent of the villages ranging from less than 500 people up to 10,000 lost in population. Many have disappeared completely. "Village decline," as Gillette and Reinhardt say, "is a conspicuous phenomenon in the United States." Quite clearly a massive inner shift and readjustment of population in America is taking place. According to the Census Bureau 70 million people, or six out of ten, changed homes in the seven years ending in 1947. Some of this is favorable to the stable community, but much of it is a drift toward locations where stable communities are unknown and in general undesired.

But the human past was the village, or something analogous to it. It was the community, small, organic, with a solidarity that often was complete and unconscious. Property, or much of it, was communal mainly because the individual as we now conceive him did not exist. Religion,

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by John M. Gillette and James M. Reinhardt, *Problems of a Changing Social Order* (New York, American Book Company, 1942), p. 152.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>3</sup> See Gillette and Reinhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 154 and 163.

education, art, and war, in most of their expressive forms, also were communal. Of these only communal war is left.

No one would wish the return of village life with the blind community of property, religion, education, and art of the ancient days. But the village held within it, nevertheless, an essential form of human association, which I have called community or the fullness of functional inter-relations, that we cannot afford to lose. In England, before the curse of the Norman Conquest fell upon it, the village was, so far as records tell, structurally stable, socially fulfilling, and spiritually democratic.

Here the three-field system, which Peake<sup>4</sup> says extended from the Danube Basin across France to England was used. Through its rotation of crops and the stabilization of ownership, a continuity of man's relation to the soil was worked out that our special agencies for soil conservation, subsidies, and farm loans have not yet been able to equal.

The ancient English village was built around this three-field system. There was the enclosure where perhaps thirty families lived<sup>5</sup> in wattle houses on a green with a fence or "tun" (town) around them. The arable land outside the tun was in three fields, one of which in rotation was left fallow each year. Strips across these fields were given annually by lot to each family. The same crops were planted and jointly tilled, but the harvest belonged severally to the holders of the strips. The strips were one furrow long (furlong) which presumably is the distance oxen can plow without resting, and four ox goads or rods wide. This amount of land was called an acre.

Around the arable land were uncultivated meadows, pastures, woods, and wastelands, extending perhaps to the top of the ridge on each side of the valley village, or to the next village. Hay from this land was allotted to carry the livestock according to the need, and after the hay was cut in August and the meadows opened to common pasturage, a Loaf Mass, or Lammas Day, was celebrated.

The Saxon village was governed by a town meeting, or the folkmoot of old Teutonic tradition. In England this early village was more democratic, or community governed, than later forms of village organization in that country. With the Normans in 1066 came the overlord and manorial system and the sharp class distinction that has cursed England ever since. The Statute of Merton in 1233, granting feudal lords ownership of meadows, forests, and "wastes," was the beginning of the dissolu-

<sup>4</sup> Harold J. E. Peake, *Village Community*, Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1934), Vol. 15, p. 258.

<sup>5</sup> N. R. Sims, *Elements of Rural Sociology*, op. cit., pp. 29 ff.

tion of the village system and its ancient democracy. It destroyed the traditional balance between field crops and animal husbandry and left only the field crops for the villagers. But even this did not last.

The agrarian revolutions of the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, according to Sims, completed the defeat of the early village. Through (1) the dispossession of the peasants, (2) the aggrandizements of the great estates, (3) the "enclosures," and (4) the early capitalistic systems of wages and production, the villages were beaten down and in many cases destroyed.<sup>6</sup> Villagers were dispersed onto the highways, into the forests and the cities, and became, if not serfs, then beggars, whores, servants, highwaymen, or wage workers in the growing industries of the city.

Even without the Norman Conquest something like this might have happened. The village system of old England perhaps lacked power to resist military and economic aggression. Something like the manor was developing, perhaps, before the Normans came. But the Anglo-Saxons traditionally were more village-minded than their Norman successors. In conquering Roman Britain these Saxons had built and settled new villages in preference to occupying the defeated cities.<sup>7</sup> The Norman intrusion into England with its alien stock, its different language, its different social values, and its Romanized polity exasperated any defects inherent in the system and made self-correction impossible. With the conquerors living on the English people in complete, parasitical arrogance, only greater corruption of the evils in both Saxon and Norman systems could take place.

Four hundred years after the Statute of Merton there came a kind of revival of the communal democracy of the Saxon village. This was the New England village, the English and German communities of Pennsylvania, and many of the little towns of the early West. They were a social reminiscence, so to speak, of the lost villages of England that for a thousand years were the pattern of English life. The early American village held off the forces of defeat here for perhaps a century or more. It permanently influenced the character and quality of our democracy. It gave us a tradition of resistance against the despotisms and mass cultures, within and without, that now threaten us.

The American small town, it is true, has been a variant from the traditional pattern of the two million or so villages of the world. It has been

<sup>6</sup> Oliver Goldsmith, *The Deserted Village*.

<sup>7</sup> G. L. Gomme, *The Village Community* (Boston, Ginn and Company, 1890), pp. 50 ff. See also Dwight Sanderson, *The Rural Community* (New York, 1932), for a comprehensive study of the village.

mainly a service center for farmers living scattered over the countryside. It is less often a community of farmers themselves. It has carried in its culture, however, the old tradition of family integrity, independence, and the reliance on work for security.

### 3. Village Democracy

Village democracy of this traditionally American type is different from the democracy criticized by Plato as government by the crowd. The two are not often distinguished clearly. Jefferson's warnings as to the urban mob in contrast to the small community usually are ignored.

Village democracy is a function of a small group of people. The democracy which Plato condemns in the *Republic* arises, on the other hand, not from the community, but from what I call the special public or crowd. The public, in this sense, is restrictive and fragmental in its effect on life. Under such conditions human freedom is impossible. Village democracy, on the contrary, is a necessary condition, it would seem, of the fulfillment of life.

In this connection a comment on my position by Professor Henry N. Wieman is significant, not only because it is representative of the attitude of many intellectuals toward rural life, but because it points to certain facts that admittedly are true of many rural situations. Says Dr. Wieman:

It is true that the small rural community people know one another as whole individuals *so far as they know one another at all*. But the trouble with people in the small rural community is that they do not respond to one another with diversified sensitivity. A shell forms about each individual, a shell of torpor, routine, and custom, allowing one to respond only to those matters which the tradition of that community has decreed are worth consideration. So people in such a community often live together like turtles, each sticking out his head to attend to matters only when they happen to fall within the narrow bounds of accepted concern. The great city has not only developed a mighty technology. It has broken the shell that narrows human interest.

There are two basic evils, one characteristic of the small community, the other of the city. One is just as bad as the other. It is not enough to have a community where people know one another as whole persons but where the range and diversity of interests are kept within the bounds and forms of a narrow context. The significant context must be widened and deepened. To this end the shell of torpor, routine, prejudice, and narrow concern must be broken. On the other hand, however, it is not enough merely to break it, as the

city has done. The context must be an expanding, not a contracting one. This is the problem of human living in all time and in our time.

There are guiding principles and there are forms and other demands that must be met, changing from situation to situation and from one stage of human development to another, if the significant context is to be preserved as it is enriched and expanded. But there may be no limit to this enrichment and expansion. At any rate we do not yet know that limit. Shakespeare seems to have been able to absorb an enormous breadth and variety of experience without losing significant context.

What are the conditions that must be met in order to preserve and magnify the context beyond the bounds of the typical small community? No doubt small communities are themselves necessary and always will be, but they are not sufficient. All the sciences, each in its own area, might study the demands of this creative transformation whereby the significant context grows in range, complexity, and richness. This is our problem, I think, rather than simply the preservation of the small community.<sup>8</sup>

The condition to which Dr. Wieman alludes, the torpor, dead routine, and encrusted isolation, is of course true of many rural communities. In some of these the condition may be due to causes inherent in the rural situation. In more of them the condition is due, I believe, to the draining out, or bleeding out, of the rural communities by the city. Rural communities, furthermore, are by no means all subject to the torpor of which Dr. Wieman speaks.

Certainly in our own American tradition many rural communities have not been of the pattern which he describes. In important ways the American revolution, as Jefferson probably felt, was a revolt of rural-minded people against the absentee control and exploitation of London's England and an arrogant clique of ruling men. The continued influence of what Turner called "the frontier" on American life was, again, not only the stark frontier but the pressure of western rural communities. There are Concord, Cambridge, Emporia, Chapel Hill, Carmel, Yellow Springs, Hannibal, Provincetown, and many other not-so-noted villages and countrysides in our tradition.

It may be questioned, however, whether city life as a whole really has less cultural restriction and less torpor than rural regions. The turtle image which Dr. Wieman so effectively uses probably applies to most urban people fully as much as to the rural. The city folk to whom Dr. Wieman refers are really a small group of highly stimulated urban intel-

<sup>8</sup> Comment on Baker Brownell, *War and the Human Community*, in the book *Learning and World Peace*, Eighth Symposium, The Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 356 f.



lectuals. These people are close to the controls, close to the publicity of the press. But it may be doubted whether the members of this specialized, segregated group perform their function better or live better than do the small-town lawyer, editor, pastor, school superintendent, or the intelligent physician, farmer, builder, rural surveyor, or engineer.

Except on the verbal level of a few urban intellectuals the life of the city is far more narrow as to basic interests, I am inclined to think, and more isolated than is the life of the village or farm. The factory hand, the store clerk, the office worker, for example, show little more breadth or general grasp and probably less diversity of skill and interest in closer things than the rural person. Many an urban person, living each in his pathological isolation, is indeed incapable of communal life.

I agree with Dr. Wieman that cultural narrowness is as bad as cultural scattering. In modern urban culture, however, the two are structurally joined. The one creates the other largely because the human community in which these centripetal and centrifugal tendencies might find coherent balance has been destroyed.<sup>9</sup> It happens in many fields. Irresponsible career individualism is conjoined with a mass culture. The city is organized on the basis of far-ranging special functions, not on the basis of human communities. It is structurally opposed to those communities. The small community is not merely a background necessity, or probably so, as Dr. Wieman suggests. It is not merely one condition among others of a larger life elsewhere. The small community is essential to a decent civilization and to democratic survival.

Shows such as prize fights and grand opera do indeed diversify a person's interests, but the diversification is fragmental and segregative, not organic. The groups that seek them are crowds, or special publics, not communities.

<sup>9</sup> To this discussion of his comment Dr. Wieman makes the following rejoinder in a letter to me dated March 27, 1950. ". . . I think that you have misunderstood the point of my words. I was trying to say that the kind of social situation which develops human personality and community both together (and they must be developed together or not at all) has certain features to be explored and specified by the social sciences. A rural society might have the required features; an urban social situation might have the features. But a rural society simply because it is rural does not. Neither does an urban social situation simply because it is urban. Both rural and urban may be very inimical to the development of personality and community, each in its own way. On that account I hold it misleading to refer to the rural society as though it had the features mentioned even though in some cases it might. It is possible for a situation in a city to have these features even though the typical features of city life are certainly not the ones in question!"

In reply to Dr. Wieman I suggest that perhaps the best way to make clear what are our respective meanings in these pages is to read the pages again.

#### 4. Arvin and Dinuba

An example of the decline in the rural community as centralization increases is shown in the famous study<sup>10</sup> made in California. This study points to the social consequences of large-scale, commercialized agriculture under centralized control. Collective farming, here under private ownership, has many of the same social consequences that collective farming has in Russia. Both are cases of remote control. The study may be outlined briefly:<sup>11</sup>

Two areas in the San Joaquin valley as nearly identical as possible were selected, with one major difference—the size of farms. The areas had similar soils, crops, location. The population of the large-farm area, called Arvin, was 6,300 as compared with 7,800 of the small-farm area, called Dinuba. The tributary trade area of Arvin was 70,000 acres as against 77,000 acres for Dinuba. The annual gross value of products of Arvin was \$2,460,000, as against \$2,540,000 for Dinuba. In general the two were similar. Only in the scale of farm operations were the physical features of the two greatly different. The average size of an Arvin farm was 497 acres, with production of \$18,000, while the Dinuba farm was 57 acres, with production of \$3,300.

Socially and institutionally, however, the two showed startling contrast. In Arvin 20 per cent were independent farmers and 80 per cent wage hands, as against 50 per cent of each in Dinuba. In Arvin the total volume of retail trade was \$2,534,000, as against \$4,317,000 in Dinuba. There were no banks in Arvin, two in Dinuba. There was one newspaper in Arvin, two in Dinuba, and one of these excellent. There were 60 business establishments in Arvin, the large-farm area, as against 156 in Dinuba. Arvin had one grammar school and no high school; Dinuba had four grammar schools and one high school. Arvin had two service and commercial clubs, Dinuba had five. Arvin had no fraternal and women's clubs, Dinuba had seven. Arvin had no veteran's association, Dinuba had two. In Arvin were six churches, only three of which were adequately housed. Dinuba had fourteen substantial churches. In Arvin the housing was very poor with small, crowded lots; in Dinuba it was modest but adequate, with large lots, lawns, and trees. In Arvin there were no paved streets and sidewalks; in Dinuba almost all streets and

<sup>10</sup> Senate Committee Report, 79th Congress, Second Session, No. 13. *Small Business and the Community*, by W. R. Goldschmidt. Sen. Res. 28, December 23, 1946.

<sup>11</sup> See Carey McWilliams, *Small Farm and Big Farm*, Public Affairs Pamphlet, No. 100 (New York, Public Affairs Committee, 1945).

sidewalks were paved. Arvin had county government only; Dinuba was incorporated and elected its own officials. In Arvin juvenile delinquency was fairly serious and there was little recreation; in Dinuba this delinquency was almost nonexistent, with many recreational opportunities. Home and business continuity in Arvin was low, in Dinuba high. In Arvin there was much class stratification; in Dinuba there was little.

From the point of view of our traditional values, the Dinuba, or small-farm type, is greatly superior. But the large farms are gaining in America. Between 1910 and 1940, the number of farms of 1,000 acres or more increased from 50,133 to 100,531, and from 160,000,000 to 364,000,000 acres. In the same period farms between 500 and 1,000 acres increased from 125,295 to 163,694 in number. During that time the farms between 20 and 260 acres decreased by 694,681 in number.

I am aware that the problem of marginal land and marginal farms cannot be ignored, and that many farms, particularly in the dry West, should be increased in size as the basis of the farm family's security. I realize too that the new machinery and new uses of power change some farming methods. Senator Sheridan Downey of California, furthermore, in his book, *They Would Rule the Valley*, asserts that the superiority of Dinuba is due to other reasons, such as age, than those given in the Senate report. Beyond all this, however, is the fact that much, if not most, of the modern corporation farming is economically unnecessary. It is destroying the family base of agriculture. Though an authority such as the late O. E. Baker asserts that the "family farm is not failing to function, it is the family's failure that gives me concern,"<sup>12</sup> others, such as the large-scale wheat farmer, Thomas D. Campbell, suggest that only big farms can survive.

"Probably 90%, possibly 95% of the agricultural production in the United States," Dr. Baker continues, "is on family farms. These farms are functioning so effectively that a diminishing number is adequate to provide the American people with an increase in food supplies. A century ago about 70% of the gainfully employed, to use the Census phrase, were in agriculture; in 1940, only 17%. And half of this 17%, those who produced over \$600 worth of products, produced 94% of the products sold (or traded). In other words, 9% of the gainfully employed produced over 90% of the food supply, and if modern means of power and discoveries of science were fully applied to agriculture, undoubtedly 5% would be sufficient to feed the American people with a better diet than they have enjoyed until recently.

"Nor am I concerned as to the fate of the family farm. Scarcely a

<sup>12</sup> O. E. Baker in a letter to me, dated August 6, 1945.

corporation farm survived the last depression. When prices of farm products are low and cash wages have to be paid, also interest on the investment, the corporation farm runs into grave difficulties. The family farmer, if he is not too deeply in debt, underlives the corporation farmer and survives. Only in cases where the corporation has a quasi-monopoly outlet for its products, as for instance, certified milk, or frozen fruits, am I apprehensive as to the results of the competition with the family farm.

"It is the failure of the family to function (1) in its reproduction of the race, (2) in the transmission of wealth or capital from generation to generation, (3) in the transmission of culture (attitudes, ideals, skills, and institutions of society) from generation to generation that gives me great concern."

This makes a powerful case for the survival of the family farm. Most Americans, I think, will hope that Dr. Baker's prognosis is correct. Nevertheless the corporative farms, or at least industrialized farms, seem to be increasing. Though this may be merely a concomitant of good times and high prices, the fact remains that corporative farms may come with prosperity and go with hard times and still make money for at least some of the owners. This is particularly true when the farms are financed as an incident in investments not wholly agricultural in source.

The corporation farm is less flexible in its resistance to depression, but its failures and revivals may be more easily accommodated to the advantage of some people. It can "fold up" in hard times, throw its labor on public relief and either lie quiescent or go broke, and then start up in better times probably with new management. There will be killings with each turn of this wheel; the employees and their families will be ruined; the management may lose out; but nothing in this cycle prevents the corporative farm from coming back and back again. This pattern of disorder is one more disruptive influence on the family farm.

Corporative farming may concentrate profits and diffuse losses. Like its predecessor, the manorial system of feudal times, however, it makes for moral decay, social instability, and economic collapse.

### *5. Rural Life and the Natural Order*

Rural life and urban life in a well-balanced society should be complementary. Without a principle of balance, however, urban intrusions of method, as in the Arvin corporation farms, destroy rural culture and institutions or prevent their growth. In a conflict situation these more aggressive modes of behavior and organization are likely to prevail.

These modes of organization favor a power economy over that of the community. They favor industrial production over the family system, and mass organization over democratic freedom. With these come big-city politics, industrial control from above, family and community disintegration, unemployment, war, and the inner defeat of democratic life. If this seems an extreme statement, consider the last forty years.

The central criticism and the greater evil in this situation is not so much in the fact of conflict as in what may be called "unnatural" or rationally induced conflict. And the answer to this modern problem and this defeat is somehow to restore our rational minds from their perverted role of makers of conflict to their "natural" function as coordinators and harmonizers of action. To this A. F. Wileden<sup>13</sup> suggests that reason is a dependent variable governed by the circumstances of the moment. Be that as it may, the answers are immeasurably complex and difficult. But there are answers. Obviously they do not lie in the abolition of modern technology and the prohibition of modern administrative methods, but in using those instruments which favor decentralized production, the family pattern, and community life.

What is the rural way of life? I refer not to the dreary facts of rural living conditions, not to the fact that five million farm women carry water in buckets for washing, cooking, and scrubbing, while five out of every six other women in this country have water piped into their homes; nor that 26 million farm people, or 89 per cent, use outside privies; nor that 2,100,000 farmhouses are rotted beyond repair; nor that infant mortality is one fourth higher than in the cities; nor that one third more farm women die in childbirth; nor that farm people get one half as much medical service as city people.<sup>14</sup> I have suggested that rural life in its orientation on the community has something precious in it that we dare not lose. What is the character of that rural life?

In the field of ecology human living is part of a pattern of plant and animal life. It can be made more stable by recognizing those normal interrelations and fitting men's affairs more clearly into their order. The "wild nature" approach, says C. C. Adams, leads "to the recognition of natural successions, climaxes and related ideas,"<sup>15</sup> while the approach through the more domesticated plant and animal life, characteristic of Europe, leads to gardening, landscaping, farming, and forestry. These

<sup>13</sup> A. F. Wileden in a letter to me, November 8, 1949.

<sup>14</sup> *Quarterly News Bulletin* of the Rural Life Association, Richmond, Indiana, June 15, 1948.

<sup>15</sup> Charles C. Adams, "Patrick Geddes, Botanist and Human Ecologist," in *Ecology*, January, 1945, in a review of Philip Boardman, *Patrick Geddes, Maker of the Future* (Chapel Hill, N.C., University of North Carolina Press, 1944).

two avenues of approach—the American and European—are converging.

Thus emerges a concept of rural life as an ecological pattern of behavior in which men are treated less as the sole creators of the values and normalities of life in nature than as coordinates in a great pattern of organic relationships among plants, animals, men, and the less animate forces of the world. Here human beings are not the sole standards of value and the normal way of living; they are parts of a larger system of interactive and mutually cooperative factors called the world of nature.

This is a functional conception of rural life. It is dynamic. It establishes normality on the broad basis of man's associations with his fellow plants and animals as well as with his own kind. It is different from the romantic or aesthetic approach to nature and planning, and different too from the treatment of human society, polity, and progress as a world solely of men and their institutions. Rural life in this sense is functional in a kind of cosmos of biological, geographical, and sociological forces and activities. It is not merely a matter of blue jeans, husking bees, and picturesque barefoot boys. It is a life profoundly coordinated in nature and with nature, not mainly as a predator, but as an associate in natural values and a participant in the living whole.

Broad conceptions of adjustment or cosmic planning are thus a part of the natural world. Conservation and planning practices maintain the mutual balance and order of man in nature. It follows that patterns of activity that violate these principles of balance must be evaluated as evil, a threat to the common survival.

## *6. Rural and Urban Differences*

In America the rural and the urban areas are becoming more alike. This is due more to the urbanization of rural areas than the ruralization of the cities. The more aggressive changes are the intrusions of urban habits, manners, and techniques into the rural districts. Historically the city tends to differentiate more and more from rural types of culture as it matures. This is true today. In America the mobility of life, the decline of sectionalism, the widespread agencies of common education and information, and the thrust of new technologies have led to great and fairly uniform changes in all places and among all people. Most—though not all—of these changes are urban in quality. The trend is farther and farther away from the traditionally rural culture. Still, because of the reach of these changes, the rural and urban areas become more alike.

The country as a whole, in short, becomes more urban, or to use a bastard but useful word invented by Dr. C. J. Galpin, "rurban."

This urbanization of rural life is indicated, first, by the greater mobility of rural people. In thirty years, for example, more than 58 per cent of our farmers acquired automobiles. It is indicated, second, by the access to urban culture through publications, movies, radios, schools, and the like; and, third, by industrial and commercial farming, economic fluidity, and a cash economy. It is indicated, fourth, by the decline in family and community functions; and, fifth, by the decline in reproductive rates on commercial farms, where the best lands have the fewest children on them. It is indicated, sixth, by the growth of the rural, nonfarm population. This is now more than half of the rural population. It is the only part of rural population that is growing.

Rural life has deep differences, nevertheless, from the life of the city. Nine areas of differentiation are distinguished by Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin.<sup>16</sup> These lie in the tendency of rural life to be (1) agricultural in occupation, (2) close to the natural environment, (3) small as to size of groups, (4) less densely settled, (5) homogeneous in custom, tradition, and race, (6) less stratified in wealth and social status, (7) less mobile in space, occupation, and status, (8) cityward in migration, except in disaster, (9) less interactive among many people and things.

Besides these mainly social differences between rural and urban life there are differences in psychological, spiritual, and philosophical outlook. In rural life there is experience of fewer unrelated data or of fewer things without context than in the city. This is sometimes called rural narrowness. When it reaches an extreme where novelty, adventure, and shock are no longer present in experience at all, then indeed, as Dr. Wieman says, there are torpor and decline. On the other hand, rural experience is more integrated. The objects of experience are likely to be more intimately related to one another. There is a greater continuum of experience in rural life, and what must be made articulate in urban life may here be implicit. Rural life is holistic and conjunctive in tendency rather than analytic. It hangs together. In the greater unity of experience of rural life there is an implicit poetry of action, an unsaid spiritual divination, that make for firmness in human character.

Objects in the rural person's experience are, as it were, self-defining, and because they are related to each other in a functional continuum, they do not so much need to be made verbal or consciously articulate.

<sup>16</sup> Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin, *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology* (Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota Press, 1930), Vol. I, pp. 187 ff.

Thus it is that rural life is less angular, less feverishly conscious, less devoted to seizing novelties and, by a process of facile, rational articulation, relating them abstractly in an intelligible order. In rural thinking this rationalization is less necessary because the objects of experience are already related in the familiar, concrete contexts of life and the seasons. They explain themselves in action rather than words. Paradoxical as it may seem the rural mind is less consciously articulate but has more understanding. It is concretely and contextually poetic rather than rational.

In contrast to the rural person the urban mind, says Georg Simmel, is intellectualistic, sophisticated, and is involved in the money economy. These qualities emerge, he says, from "the increase of nervous life which arises from the rapid and uninterrupted change of internal and external impressions."<sup>17</sup>

The *intellect*, says Simmel, is developed as a "protective organ against the uprootings with which the tendencies and discrepancies of the external milieu threaten him." This is because intellectual objectivity is least sensitive and farthest removed from the depths of personality.

The *money economy* has developed for similar reasons. The multiplicity and many-sidedness of city affairs make an objective standard of exchange far more necessary. Like the intellect, the money economy is objective, fluid, standardized, formal. Both are abstract.

*Sophistication* is reserve or protective dullness toward the differences in the emotional meaning and importance of objects. It is an *impersonal* response to things. Like intellect and the money economy, it is objective and abstract.

These three are not of course the sole descriptive characteristics of urban thinking, nor do they alone clarify the complex, fluid differences between urban mental life and rural. They have as much truth, however, as any that can be articulated from the flowing magma of life in process.

### 7. Stevensville, Montana

As villages go, Stevensville is neither one way nor another. In the streams and eddies of time it is now under the near bank, and now under the far one. It has seen better days, but also worse ones. It has been

<sup>17</sup> Adapted by Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin, *op. cit.*, pp. 242 f., from Georg Simmel, *Die Grossstadte und das Geistesleben* (Dresden, Germany, Zahn & Jaensch, 1903), pp. 187-206.



richer than now, but also poorer. It has good and kind people, but also cruel ones. And so it goes. Stevensville is like thousands of other little towns in America; its history is short but casual. It has no date with destiny, except the slow weaving in and out of daily, undistinguished events. Charlie Buck was ten minutes late in opening his hardware store this morning. The crested wheat on Ed O'Hare's benchland is really beginning to take over where the cheat grass grew. Seen in their native relevance, these too have context, interest, and delight. The hours are large or small depending on where the man stands, the seasons full or empty.

In winter, the day hatches in the valley like a great egg and the sun rolls up yellow over the mountains. In summer, the long light of evening never quite clears away before suggestions of tomorrow touch the sky.

Stevensville lies on the easy slopes of the valley of the lower Bitterroot. The red McIntosh apple there catches the wild sweetness of the mountains and benchlands. Once the apple boomed, as the saying is, and hundreds of acres in the valley were set out to trees that were pulled out later when the ebb set in. Apples now are one of the crops of the valley, and a good one, but the blinding stroke of apple fortune never struck here as it did west of the Columbia at Yakima and Wenatchee.

The streams roar down the slopes in spring and on into late June loaded with snow water from the Bitterroots on the west and from the wild tangle of forests and foothills and bare, rolling ranges that build up to the Great Divide on the east. The porous soil takes water quickly but loses it just as fast. Irrigation ditches run full until July or later, and the uncertain soil, already depleted or gone in many spots over the valley, is urged on into another cycle of production.

The wheat harvest is early in Stevensville. The fields are cleared in August and the wheat stored. There is a "let up," as the farmers say, and Stevensville, though knowing nothing of ancestral Saxon customs, begins somehow to perform them. There is a sense of celebration. Rites of some sort become appropriate. The village is quietly astir. In Hamilton the county fair, in Missoula the great parade, in Arlee the rodeo; the season clearly is fitting, and where the early English had their Lammas Day, or Loaf Mass Day, after the harvest to sanctify bread made with the new wheat and to mark the opening of the fields for pasture after the haying, Stevensville may put on a pageant-drama in spirit not unlike its predecessor a thousand years ago.

It began—or perhaps it did not begin but was discovered—in the round-table meetings of the Montana Study in Stevensville through the

winter of 1946. Here Stevensville seemed to find a kind of synthesis between the farmers of the area, who are largely Farmers' Union people devoted to cooperatives, and the businessmen and townsfolk, who until then had been their bitter antagonists. The study group had gone on through its regular ten meetings, discussing roundly and vigorously, but on the whole good-naturedly, the subjects outlined in the guide as follows: Why are we here?; Our town and its people; Our town and our work; Our town and our state; Montana, a place to live; Montana and our nation; The future of Montana; The future of our town in relation to its people; How to make life better in our town; What we have accomplished. And then, after several extensions, the study group finally stopped only because spring was on the way and the farms needed attention.

A well-liked businessman, Charlie Buck, was chairman of the study group. A Stevensville teacher, Mrs. McFadgen, wife of a wealthy farmer, served as secretary. Forest Ranger Charles McDonald, who was mainly instrumental in initiating the group, opened his map room for the group on Thursday evenings. A few townspeople and a larger number of farmers and their wives came to every meeting.

They had found here a kind of working unity. They had enjoyed the study group and also had profited by it. They liked the coffee and doughnuts after the meetings, the laughter and desultory comment on the evenings' arguments. Now it was over and they wished to arrange some continuing activities for the fall.

These were, first, a study group on land use in the valley. Agenda were worked out and from late autumn on for ten weeks Ed O'Hare, a leading farmer of the valley, assisted by experts from the Department of Agriculture, the State College at Bozeman, and the University at Missoula, worked over the difficult and often controversial problems and made reports.

The second project was in the practice of writing. This soon became an instrument of the third project, which was the production and writing of a Stevensville pageant-drama. For this the Montana Study was fortunate in borrowing from the State College Bert Hansen as coach and advisor. He came to live in Stevensville for several months before the production of the play in August. Though his help was important, the play in its writing, production, and acting was still the work of Stevensville itself.

The play was of early Stevensville. It was written by the writing groups in four episodes around the coming of the "blackrobes," the first mass in Montana and the founding of St. Mary's Mission by Father De Smet in 1841, its abandonment nine years later, the coming of Major Owen and

the building of the fort, the first wedding, and at the last, the expulsion of Chief Charlot and his tribe of Selish Indians from their ancestral home. Some of the people there were sons or daughters of the old-timers. From the Jocko reservation another Chief Charlot with twenty-five tribesmen and their squaws were brought down to take the ancient and often-repeated part of those who are cast out.

It was an old story in Stevensville, old as the structure of myth and history of the Hellenes was old and well known about Athens before it became a part of the tragic sequences. In Stevensville the results lacked the glowing depths of beauty and terror that long years in a great tradition had given the Greek plays. But *A Tale of the Bitterroot* still was not below such comparisons. Like the Greek tragedies it came authentically from a community of people. It gave articulate form to the diffused memories and values of the group, and presented in living symbol the deeper-meant being, or valued being, of the community through the years.

The chorus was not on the stage. The writers, the costume makers, the narrators, the scene makers, and dozens of others in the planning and creation of the work were not seen. But all Stevensville, or nearly all, participated in one way or another in the show. This participation was essential here as it was in Greece. In Stevensville and Athens, the communal solidarity of a group of people across the years was somehow seen, or created. In the native mysticism and imagination of life it was given valid being. For the creative act is the participative act. It never is detachment. The community dramas in Montana made participation real.

Those who have felt the thrust of the crowd at one of the Montana community dramas as it swarmed on a winter's evening into the gymnasium at Darby, let us say, with babies crying in the smoke-hazed room, with families from the west fork greeting old friends who now live over by Burnt Fork Schoolhouse, thundering and laughing through the show, and dancing afterwards perhaps 'til morning in the big room below, know that this is no ordinary, polite, and prettily imitative dramatic arts production.<sup>18</sup>

And those who have seen them come on an August evening to the little ball park of Stevensville, fill the bleachers, overflow the side lines, crowd the fences, trees, and adjoining roofs, 2,700 of them in a town of 700 people, to watch the pageant-drama of their ancestors and Indians moving crankily but beautifully against the 10,000-foot back drop of the Bitterroots, know that something native though crude, something authen-

<sup>18</sup> Some of this material was published originally by Baker Brownell, "Community Drama in Montana," *Wisconsin Idea Theatre Quarterly*, Madison, December, 1948.

tic in the great tradition of the arts, though stumbling and sometimes off key, is going on there in the long northern twilight. The evening star, bright as a thought of God, as an old man beside me said, has gone down over the Peak of St. Mary's. The village chorus has sung—yes, "The Bells of St. Mary's." The squaws have put out the fires, struck the tepees, and loaded them on wagons and, led by their braves on horses, have creaked and thudded away in the dust and darkness. They were led by old Chief Charlot.

This obviously is no secondhand Broadway play. This is something that Broadway, besotted and dying in its professionalism and commercialism, simply cannot produce. Broadway can smooth out its execution. It has the skills, the smart know-how, and sometimes the money. But Broadway is incapable dramatically of embodying this principle or even knowing what it means, namely, the significant identification of the drama with its living community. Broadway, a cluster of fragmented men, anonymously related, specialized pieces of people, is no community. Nor can it identify itself in imagination or devotion with anything but itself.

Drama oriented around this principle requires, first, that actors, writers, organizers, and others on the project know each other well as members of a common community; second, that the drama emerge from the dynamic patterns of the community. It should find power in its identification with the problem, not of an isolated person, but of the community, or of the person as an inalienable member of the community. The drama should be expressive, as only art can be, of the answers that men find to the perennial threat of human dissolution and communal defeat.

In Montana these principles worked themselves out not too perfectly but with considerable success. The result was a kind of modern morality play. It was important—more important than Broadway ever can be—because it was significant to the communities themselves. Perhaps the best thing about it was the fact that the plays had no spectators. Almost literally they had no spectators. All were participants in the drama. Such dramas, in a profoundly spiritual sense, are creators of community.

### *8. New Trends in Rural Life*

Stevensville resolved its inner conflict between the farmers and the businessmen, for the time at least, in the thrill of common creation and dramatic action. Other ways, more matter of fact, more permanent perhaps, but no better in immediate outcome, might have given the same result.

The rural community both of today and tomorrow need not be exclusively agricultural. Nor need it be tied to an extractive industry as have the mining, fishing, and lumbering villages of history. It can remain rural in quality and still participate efficiently in many processing and manufacturing activities. These will give it more diversified economic support, greater productive capacity, and higher standards of living. Village industries are coming to have new meanings in America. Their possibilities are not fully recognized. Their development has only begun.

These industries may be the small, family-operated industries or crafts for a national market. Of these New England and the Far West have many shining examples. They often rely on individual skills, artistic talent, folk or regional interest, and unique products that large-scale producers cannot supply.

Village industries may be, on the other hand, small projects providing either goods or services only for the local market. These can compete successfully with many a big business. The costs of transportation, absentee ownership, remote management, inflexible financing, general overhead, and the inability to adapt the product to local tastes may result in some big businesses less in the touted increase in service and reduction in cost than in reduction in service and increase in cost.

Village industries, again, may be also large-scale industries decentralized as branch plants over a number of small towns. This has its dangers. Such industries usually are beyond the social control of the communities in which they are situated and cannot be integrated with them. If the town has a sufficiently diversified source of support, however, they are less likely to get out of hand and may contribute markedly to the well-being and stability of the place. Village industry of this sort will be discussed more fully in the next section of this book.

The diversification of economic support which family farm agriculture has for centuries contributed to the community should be extended to other kinds of production. The new rural life that is evident in the growth of the rural nonfarm population can be stabilized through organic diversification. The dangers in these procedures are great. They may entail anything from the dissolution of the community to spiritual and economic peonage. But the rewards in the dynamic balance of cultural and economic factors, with family farm agriculture and home production interfused through all three types of village industry to which I have referred, may be very great. This interfusion of agriculture and other industries within the structure of the community may have many forms. The critical question is whether the community—and I mean the small community—can remain primary in value. So far as modern technology and adminis-

tration are concerned it unquestionably can. The problem is a matter of morals and moral initiatives.

Recently developed machines such as the cotton picker and the flame cultivator will reduce the need for agricultural workers in the South alone, it is said,<sup>19</sup> by one fourth, or one million. Already hundreds of cabins on the plantations are empty. Farm workers crowd into cities like Atlanta looking for work that is not there. The problem will not be easily solved, but productive projects within the rural communities themselves are one of the best ways to approach it.

Rural counties having complemental industries have incomes considerably higher than those not so organized. In some Southern areas counties with their agriculture supplemented by industries have an average of \$312 in annual retail sales as compared with \$233 in counties exclusively agricultural. Farm-home values in diversified counties averaged \$1,511 in value as against \$1,321 in counties not having complemental industries. In the vast instability of these times, in the displacement of millions of people, such facts are small but significant. They support the human community and give promise perhaps of a new rural life.

But the problem in our western world is moral. We have the instruments but lack the objectives in the development of stable community life. The people of India, on the other hand, have the objectives, it would seem, but lack the instruments. This is shown by Bharaton Kumarappa<sup>20</sup> in his studies of villagism as contrasted with western patterns of culture. Not our science and technology, but the objectives for which we mainly use them, is the real point at issue. Obviously the Indian and western cultures have complementary values. Perhaps each one can give what the other needs.

<sup>19</sup> *New Orleans Item*, February 3, 1947.

<sup>20</sup> Bharaton Kumarappa, *Capitalism, Socialism or Villagism* (Madras, India, Shakti Karyalayam, 1946).

PART IV

*Labor, the Community, and  
Industrial Technology*



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## 1. *The Cult of Homelessness*

Homelessness has become a kind of lethal normalcy of western culture. Millions of men and women of the so-called labor force, millions among the "white-collar" workers and in the business and professional groups, and more millions of children live in no accustomed place. They have no stable milieu of friends, families, and familiar routines. They have no homes; there is no rooting place.

Children know no tree with bark worn smooth by their climbing, no spot where they see the seasons change, where they wait for the robins to come and the apples to ripen. Millions of children and their adult relatives live through the years with no fragment of that time peculiarly their own, with no persons or places identified as always theirs, with few or no brothers and sisters, and increasingly less continuity even as to parents or spouses.

Home is an expectancy of familiar things, the places, people, and the movements of time that in their way are ours. It is an accustomed pattern in which we are identified. The home and the home community are thus an essential kind of continuity in the fluid processes of living. It is a focal routine. Amid the centrifugal forces, the events and multiplicities of the world, it is an organic nucleus. Here, and perhaps only here, do we find a continuity of values, a way or Tao, as the Chinese might say, which alone gives wholeness to our lives.

The home, traditionally the locus of the family, is deeply affected by the family's fate. Though homes without families and families without homes have existed endemically through the ages as a kind of price paid for social change, there have been few times, and those degenerate, when homelessness was normal or, as in these days, a chosen way of life. There have been few cults of homelessness before today. Though many sociologists accept the situation with equanimity as no more than a minor problem appropriate to the trend, others are less complacent. Zimmerman at Harvard makes no bones of asserting the decay of the modern family. Like the community of which it is so essential a part, the family today is undergoing major changes. These, in terms at least of social stability and the integrated life of men, are aspects of decay.

Of the three phases of family development through the ages, the

patriarchal, the domestic, and the atomistic, as outlined by Zimmerman,<sup>1</sup> the atomistic or anarchical family<sup>2</sup> is characteristic today. Never has the social rejection of familism been so general in its range or so massive in its effects. The family decadence of the third century B.C. in Greece had no important critic, and Greece rotted without herald or reform. The family decadence of the first century B.C. in Rome was countered by Augustus and his wife Livia through legal measures. The rejection of family life by the Manichaeans in Rome of the third century A.D., and the trend away from familism in the decadent empire, had in St. Augustine an effective critic. He gave an emphasis to family culture in the Catholic Church that still is a powerful and, on the whole, beneficent influence. Augustine had been for nine years a Manichaean and knew whereof he spoke. Luther's conception of an Eleventh Commandment—or an amendment to the seventh—"Thou shalt marry and have children," was a reaction in part against the increasing decadence of medieval family life. A return to the family, after its rejection by the French and the Russian revolutions, came in those countries within a decade or so, but it is not clear in either case that the return ever was really confirmed.

The massive rejection of familism in the twentieth century, however, has had as yet no effective resistance. This vast, anonymous, creeping revolution in family functions, with the widespread disintegration of what once was called the home, has never been made articulate. No formal leader of this revolution can be found. But apologists are many. Some sociologists, such as Folsom,<sup>3</sup> tend to accept the change in values. It is true that most sociologists, in their passion to observe objectively what the trend is, often introduce the unrecognized value judgment that what is, or what is taking place, is right. But cosmic complacency of this sort is not the only support of the modern rejection of the family and home. Folsom, for example, finds justification for this rejection in freedom of certain kinds, particularly for women, and in career values and self-expression. Others, such as Louis Wirth perhaps, accept it with tranquillity as a part of larger movements toward mass groups and the urbanization of culture.

There is little doubt that the modern trend toward what I have called

<sup>1</sup> Carle C. Zimmerman, *Family and Civilization* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947), Chap. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Zimmerman, *The Family of Tomorrow* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 218.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph Kirk Folsom, *The Family and Democratic Society* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1947). A study of the adjustment of family life to contemporary conditions.

homelessness is both wide and deep. Caught in this tide of change is a large part of our labor force. The alienation of the laboring man from the home and community life is one of the main, though unrecognized, sources of modern industrial unrest. In some contexts of society presumably less mobile than most labor, professional and business groups, families try to meet the situation, says Zimmerman, "by creating groups of intimate friends who are similar to them and who help them meet the situation. It is a sort of an artificial substitute for the old kin groups and seems to be working very well."<sup>4</sup> But this is not far reaching.

The family and home, like so much else in modern life, tend to become a special interest group. It is not likely to be central in the working man's life. The extreme mobility of labor, the shift, the turnover, the following of the job, which in our periodic hard times may take the man anywhere at any time, make it impossible in many cases to maintain a home. These recurrent dislocations are more than likely forced upon him. He is, at the beginning at least, an involuntary member of the cult of homelessness.

But adjustments must be made; continuous heartbreak is psychologically impossible. Sooner or later the working man adjusts himself temperamentally as well as economically to the problem. The younger ones without place or time or property, without ownership of the tools whereby they earn their living, with little to tie to, accommodate themselves to the great drift. Many of the lower-paid, more anonymous workers, wandering from town to town and job to job, drop off their wives and families like an old coat, find others elsewhere without legal formality, and expect their discarded garments to be picked up by other users. And so in various ways and patterns and across different economic levels the home is gradually reduced to a single resource, a specialized interest in our lives. It no longer is the focus of human affairs.

The home thus becomes a casual stopping place. It has its special function, but is less likely to be a complex of interrelated functions. It has its utility as shelter perhaps, an eating place, a bed where a woman may be found. But as a base of fully functional operations, economic, social, recreational, a focus of planning, of human companionship and community of interest, it is less significant than it once was.

And with the home the community, as I have described it, is also broken down into a scattering of segregated functions. For the laboring man and for children—usually by necessity—and for millions of white-collar workers, professional men, young executives, and businessmen,

<sup>4</sup> Carle C. Zimmerman in a letter to me, March 27, 1950.

both by necessity and by choice, the community is alienated, the home weakened, made remote. This is the cult, half willing, half compulsory, of homelessness.

## *2. Has Labor Lost Access to the Community?*

No one is "labor." No human operation is "industrial technology." These terms falsify the nature of men and their operations at the outset. The word "labor" is a selective classification. "Industrial technology" is an abstraction of behavior or method. But terms affect life and require attention.

"Labor" is a fragmental aspect of men's activities. It is a status word for millions of people. Industrial technology is a pattern of activities, usually coordinated with science. Though false, or at least distortive, as terms for human nature and life, they remain—like the economic man—a factual reality that must be considered. In the dilemmas raised by them between "efficiency" and human values is a problem. Millions of people warped into the pattern of these abstractions live without benefit of home or community.

Have working people, or "labor," lost access to community life? To a great degree they have. Under the conditions of modern industry many working men have little opportunity to participate in what I have called the community. This may be for several reasons.

The great industrial city has no community. Labor under these conditions is deprived of community life. This will seem an extreme statement to many who see in block groups, urban neighborhood groups, autonomous groups in industry, and other spontaneous or formal associations in the city what they term communities. I am aware of these urban groups and can recognize the human value of many of them. I would not disparage them. But they hardly can be called communities.

Urban organization today is primarily in great horizontal planes of activity laid out on the basis of specialized interests or classes of work. There are the industrial, commercial, wholesale, retail, art, medical districts, and the like. These are segregated areas of production to which great groups of workers, equally segregated, such as factory workers, clerical workers, sales, medical, secretarial, railroad and dock workers, art workers, roughly correspond. The consumption areas of the city, like the production areas, are also segregated from each other, but not always on the same patterns. And these consumption areas, or "residence areas," are of course separated in most cases from the production areas. There are

the slum areas, where in some cities the majority of people live. There are the suburban areas, the gold-coast areas. There also are the Negro districts, Italian, German, Polish, Jewish districts, and the recreational, amusement, and "art" areas. There are the front areas, showy and thin, and the endless back areas, clotted and dark. These areas are laid out horizontally<sup>5</sup> according to their function or status.

Much of the greatly publicized dynamics of the city is the movement twice a day of the people between the production areas and the residence areas. This vast shifting of people, though noisy, is not productive in itself nor is it consumptive or terminal in value. It is a getting ready, a journey to location, a tidal ebb and flow, to the areas of production and away from them. It may take as much as a fourth or fifth of the working day. Of every dollar spent for goods in America, some sixty cents, it is said, goes for distribution. In the same way a man whose time is worth two thousand, say, or even ten thousand dollars a year may use five hundred or twenty-five hundred dollars of it, plus carfare, going to and from his job. The tax is a heavy one.

In all this sort of thing no community and rarely a home is possible. Though the urban structures are massively organized in terms of specialized functions they are dispersive in terms of human nature. They fragment life. In them the community is extinguished. Its fire is kicked apart, the embers dispersed in sparks and smoke. Living is scattered. Human relations are temporary and relatively unorganized. Gangs, cliques, and coteries are built up in vain efforts at compensation. But anonymous contacts characterize many if not most of the associations of people with one another. Labor has little or no access to the community.

Another way in which working men are alienated from the community is by segregation in slums, separate language groups, or other specialized associations. Sometimes these groups are formed out of economic necessity, or the compulsions of lower rentals or cheaper transportation. Sometimes they arise out of race restrictions. Sometimes they are the result of the magnetism of a common language in a strange land, a common religion or a regional history that makes fellows amid the million strangers. These groups are also segmental rather than communal.

They are peripheral to a factory over which they have no control. They are ancillary. Anonymous men own the houses where these people live; pay the wages that they earn; govern the schools, the streets, the transportation systems, the churches, and the newspapers that they use.

<sup>5</sup> See Baker Brownell and Frank Lloyd Wright, *Architecture and Modern Life* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1937), pp. 71 ff.

These groups cannot well be communities. They are concentration camps built around segregated functions and special conditions of men.

In other situations labor may be so migratory that no community ties are possible. This is true in commercial agriculture as well as in many other fields, such as the lumber, shipping, and mining industries. There are, for example, 1,500,000 farm-labor "households," including sharecroppers, in the United States. This amounts to about 6,000,000 persons in farm-labor families.<sup>6</sup> They are seasonal workers in great part, the fruit and berry pickers, the beet and truck harvesters, moving on with their families from crop to crop. They are also the sharecroppers of the South, drifting from farm to farm about every year. These migratory farm workers, with the highest birth rate of any group in the United States, are displaced, homeless folk without a community. These are our own D.P.'s, or displaced persons. They present a problem as great in its moral implications as any similar problem abroad.

In some situations, where small industries are in little places or larger industries are decentralized in small towns, working people do have the permanence of tenure that makes community life possible. The worker here need not be segregated. His children rarely suffer from discrimination. He can participate as a person in some if not all public affairs, serve on committees, and engage at least to some extent in public discussion and decisions. He may, with luck, own his own home and live there, work a small acreage as a part-time gardener and dairyman, and hunt rabbits on a Saturday. Though participation in community life of this sort on the part of labor is probably becoming more rare, we are equipped technologically to make it more common.

Of even more significance are those who work part time or on reduced schedules in the city and either farm or in other ways work productively at home as well. The number of these labor differentialists, or part-time workers, seems to be increasing. Many are persons of education who have the luck or initiative to find ways to escape the all-engrossing city. These use the city up to their wish or need, work there on a reduced schedule, run a small business, engage in a limited professional practice, and put their remaining time on a cash specialty crop on a small farm, or on subsistence farming with modern laborsaving machines. Or they may carry on in the free hours a craft in leather or silver or pottery, bookbinding, weaving, woodworking, or engage in services or in a small business, such as cheesemaking, laboratory rabbits or guinea pigs, machine-shop specialties, and so on almost without limit. Others in

<sup>6</sup> Carey McWilliams, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

seasonal occupations, such as the coal miners of Illinois, may coordinate their peaks and slacks with a complementary program on the land.

In our present industrial culture, however, the size, the segregative character, and the extreme mobility of the social pattern have made labor's access to the community on the whole difficult and often impossible.

### *3. Libby, a Project in Sustained Yield*

These standards of life, a time to hunt rabbits, a chance to serve on a village committee, a garden of one's own, and a gay son editing the high school paper, seem jejune, *petit bourgeois*—to use a term contemptuously bandied about nowadays—and unadventurous in a world of war and domestic unrest, of conflicts of one kind and another and the tidal ferocities of vast powers. Still the chance to live within these moderate perimeters of personal perception, to live in a continuum of familiar things and of people known well, is essential, it would seem, not only to the development of social responsibility but to the heroism required to meet the terrifying challenge of this era. Mass-trained and mass-conditioned men are not notably courageous morally.

Libby, Montana, is a little lumber town where the mountains gather in wrinkled, crisscross ranges and the Kootenai River loops down powerfully from Canada past the Neils brothers' mill and then north again to Canada to join the head waters of the Columbia. The scream of a mountain lion still may be heard sometimes in the forests of ponderosa and western white pine. The caribou drift down in winter to this southern limit of their range.

Libby is the center of the only area left in Montana where large-scale operations in lumber are still feasible. It is not prime lumber country as compared with the coastal region five hundred miles west, the southern pine areas of the Gulf, or the once magnificent white pine regions of the Lake States. The growth here is slow, the markets remote, and the forests have a high percentage of inferior timber such as larch and lodgepole pine that only now, in our impoverishment, is coming into use.

But the Libby area nevertheless is a resource that we no longer dare ignore. Can it be stabilized? Can it be given permanence and continuity as a source of products that are peculiarly its own? There are lumber, Christmas trees, wild game and fish, recreation, water power—can they be sustained in production as perennial crops? Can Libby above all attain

stability as a human community where the drain, as the rangers say, does not exceed the growth, and men come, not to cut out and get out in the usual manner, but to live with their families and to handle timber as a perennial crop continuously moving forward to the market? The answer to that problem involves a social and tactical revolution in the lumber industry.

The forests of the Libby area cover 97 per cent of Lincoln County and amount to about seven and one half billion board feet of saw timber. Of this two thirds are national forest and about one third private.<sup>7</sup> Although the more valuable stands are privately owned, their extent is not great enough in themselves to justify a long-time policy of sustained yield. The stands of timber controlled by the Forest Service on the other hand are hardly rich enough in themselves to justify a sustained-yield policy. Thus, partly by good fortune and partly because of the desire both of the Forest Service and the Neils brothers for operating continuity, the conditions were favorable for a joint project in timber management.

The problems were many and the plan, as worked out largely by Axel Lindh of the U. S. Forest Service, was subjected inevitably to harsh criticism by big operators who felt that their methods and cut were too severely restricted; by little operators, called gyppos, who felt that their access to national timber was insufficient; by small communities, such as Troy, complaining at the preponderance of business centered in Libby; and by sportsmen who feared that their interests in the national forests would be neglected. The problem soon became largely a matter of pacifying disputants and finding a way among conflicting interests that was least objectionable.

Beyond all this lay another problem that was even more experimental. This was the stabilization and enrichment of the lumbering community in a sustained-yield program. On this problem was directed research, suggested by the Montana Study, financed by the Forest Service, and carried out independently by two associates of the Montana Study. This, the Kaufman report,<sup>8</sup> has become in a sense a pilot work. It transforms an industry using migratory, rootless labor into an organic project having at least some recognition of its bearing on community life.

Timber workers are notoriously a migrant group. They live in labor

<sup>7</sup> S. Blair Hutchinson, *The Forest Situation in Lincoln County, Montana*. Forest Survey Release No. 20, March, 1942 (Northern Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, Missoula, Montana).

<sup>8</sup> Harold F. Kaufman and Lois C. Kaufman, *Toward the Stabilization and Enrichment of the Forest Community*. The Montana Study (Missoula, Montana, The University of Montana, in cooperation with the U.S. Forest Service, Region One, 1946).



camps during the season and in the flophouses of West Madison Street, Chicago, or Trent Avenue, Spokane, when work is slack. They are pre-eminently male animals, violent, powerful, socially disorganized, and, while young, romantic. But youth in such a pattern of life is short. A decade or so usually brings disease, toothlessness, physical incompetence. The worker drifts into the shadow zone of beggary, bumming, and public relief.

To stabilize labor in such fields community life must be made accessible. It was shown in the Libby area that all-weather access roads into the forest, to take but one example, pay for themselves by making it possible for a working man to live in Libby, or on a small acreage nearby, marry, raise his family, and commute to the job by truck or car. He requires more annual income, no doubt, but saving the costs of labor camps, drunkenness, the rapid obsolescence of the workers, and high turnover would seem to compensate. Where an industry can and will orient its labor policy on the community there are returns in economic stability, in security of labor, and in social integration. Where an industry cannot orient its labor policy on the community we may assume that it is structurally out of adjustment in that respect with the public interest.

The success of a social policy of this sort depends on its coordination with a consistent economic policy. The conservation of land and timber, sustained lumber production, and the development of community and human values are equally important in the organic balance of the whole operation. In the Libby project this orientation on the community was developed in several ways. Some of the proposals made were adopted with remarkable success.

Among these proposals<sup>9</sup> were (1) a community study group, including members from the owning groups, labor leaders, professional men, educators, housewives, businessmen, laborers, clubwomen (this was highly successful); (2) a public advisory committee on forest policy, chiefly in order to bring the needs of the community into consideration; (3) certain community projects suitable for private investment or public subsidy, such as an electric power cooperative perhaps, or possibly a pure-bred-bull service cooperative, a machinery pool, a Christmas tree marketing cooperative; (4) diversified industry for local markets or for the national market (the vermiculite mine at Libby, the Christmas tree center at Eureka, and wild huckleberry harvesting are examples of the latter type of diversification); (5) the expansion of tourist trade and of

<sup>9</sup> Baker Brownell, "Social Implications of Forestry in the Inland Empire," *Northwest Science*, Washington State College, Pullman, Washington, February, 1946.

wild life interests (the area is one of the great fish and game regions of the county); (6) part-time farming, home gardens, back-yard livestock; (7) a community band, chorus, drama, debate group, a county library, a craft shop, sports, and other forms of creative expression; (8) a clean-up, paint-up campaign; and (9) processing lumber and its by-products before shipment, thus increasing the need for skilled labor in Libby. Things like these have been done in Libby with some degree of success. Not all of them were initiated by the Montana Study but all of them are in line with its proposals. A hospital now is building there on the initiative of the study group.

Needless to say the problems of the Libby community have not been solved overnight. Neither has the sustained-yield program gone through to a smash hit, a unanimous victory. The plans are still being worked out; adjustments and counteradjustments are still being made, and will be made for many months or years perhaps before the decisions are final. But Libby is no longer a dead-end town. Its ghost no longer prospectively rattles the sagging door or whistles through the loose clapboards. Libby has no prospective ghost. It has found the road toward community stabilization and enrichment. It may fail to keep on the road, but desolate defeat in a county that lost 10 per cent of its population in twenty years and had an average annual cash income per person of \$250 is no longer the only prospect. Libby knows the way out.

#### *4. The Community's Stake in Labor*

That the welfare of a community like Libby is largely dependent on the security of labor is an obvious fact, often forgotten. High purchasing power on the part of labor provides the thrust and dynamics of local trade, while on the national level the mobile balance of plant capacity, production, and consumption is maintained through the ability of labor to purchase what is produced. Forty to sixty million workers are no mean group of consumers. In the community the laboring man's prosperity tends to equalize opportunity for him and his children, create good will, promote cooperation, and give the community both industrial peace and democratic assurance. His responsibility is greater, his contribution more significant.

Stability of labor among Lincoln County's eight thousand population will result in more homes and homeowners. It means steady jobs and wages in Libby and the difference between a live town and a dying one.

In the old days a lumber worker might have nothing of his own except \$800 in annual wages, a red shirt, and a hangover from last night's binge. Today he will be more productive and earn more money. Perhaps he will own his own home and have a son on the basketball team. His family will be more stable; the lives of his children can have educational and moral consistency. His family can become a community asset. It enters creatively into the making of a human-valued world. Relief costs, police and hospital costs, crime and delinquency costs, are lower, and taxes, at least for such negative requirements, are lower too.

Where "labor" is not solely "labor," but men and women with a high social and economic status, we find more democratic schools and more years devoted to them. We find less migrant labor, less turnover, less overhead and social cost. Mental and physical health will be better. And the farm groups and labor groups may find their interests less in conflict than they thought.

All this helps to make a stronger community. Libby becomes a better place to live.

### *5. Labor's Stake in the Community*

If the community has a stake in the welfare of labor, the workingman on his part has a stake in the community. It usually becomes one of his main resources and moral supports. The small community with modern technological facilities can provide him and his family with more opportunity for participative action, and in that sense with more freedom, more responsible work, and more mature enjoyments. Libby is a far more flexible environment, with the conditions of life subject more to his control, than he would find with the same wages in Spokane.

His family as a cooperative group can be more successful in the little place than in the big one. In spite of Libby's short growing season and rather indifferent soils, part-time farming and home production for use are feasible. The area could well produce milk for its own market, and with a secure family behind him the workman can produce green goods, fruit, and minor live stock for use at home and for storage in his freeze locker. A saving every year of perhaps a fourth or fifth of his cash income thus is possible. There is the elk hunt each fall, with 600 pounds of meat for the winter, the fish, the fowl, and the wood or "hogged" fuel for heating. In a community where the way of life is continuous and events can be "counted on," this adds up. Living is more stable. It incorporates

adventure in its organic pattern and finds greater continuity of life therein.

His children live among the decencies of the little place. The church is not so stratified. Sports and recreation are casual and are naturally adjusted to the world of nature, the great woods and the mountains. His children's health, their total education, their daily play life, their spontaneous gangs and groupings, are usually superior to what the great city can offer.

The community, indeed, is a recognition of the whole person. The workingman who lives there discovers sooner or later this truth. Though Libby is far from perfect, though it runs the risk of settling sordidly into the status of a one-company town, its problems are at least close enough to be grasped. Its dominating family at least lives in the community and is accessible at the community study group meetings or on the street or working in the woods. No one in Libby is an absentee abstraction. People are still people there and the factors in industrial and social control are still largely within reach. They are not, as in the city, absent, abstract, unknown.

Though labor usually is organized for specific objectives, its welfare is still closely interrelated with that of the true community. Because of the general breakdown of community life in the western world and the monstrous extension of corporate industrial power, the creation of strong labor unions on the one hand, and of strong national governments on the other, have become necessities. But the laboring man should not assume that either the labor union or the federal government can adequately replace the community. The labor union, like the industrial corporation, is a single-function organization. It usually is highly centralized in control. The relations between its officers and the rank and file are likely to be remote and anonymous. Like an army it is a necessary defense in these times of chronic industrial warfare.<sup>10</sup> It has little relevance, however, to the causes of that disorder and warfare. Too few labor leaders realize that the union is not a substitute for the community. Like their counterparts among the operators they are often so fixed on the immediate objective that they ignore the greater values that alone make that objective worth-while. Too few realize that without the community industrial warfare and unrest will continue until all is absorbed in an overreaching, regimented, totalitarian state. The workingman's stake in the community is his own freedom and the right to be a whole person.

<sup>10</sup> See T. K. Quinn, *I Quit Monster Business* (New York, Public Relations, Inc., 522 Fifth Avenue).

This stabilization of the small community is dependent on the laboring man. Although he alone may not be able to bring about a better world, his help is necessary if we are to stop the downward course toward absentee control, corporate monopoly, and despotic totalitarian government. Normal life in a community is necessary for laboring men, professional men, businessmen, and indeed all men and women, if they wish to remain human beings. This life among the members of a face-to-face group is becoming ever more difficult to achieve.

In three ways labor leaders can have influence in stabilizing and enriching community life. They can work for greater decentralization of social and economic control. They can work toward diversification in the life and work of laboring men and women. They can support educational and industrial policies leading toward small, technologically efficient farm and factory complementary combinations, small-scale industries and industrial decentralization for the same purpose, home production for use, home building, and part-time farming. The way is open in many fields to efficient decentralization and a new deployment of productive activities favorable to community life. Whether we go that way or not will depend to a great extent on the workers' recognition of their stake in the community.

## *6. The Impact of Industrial Technology on the Community*

Modern technological development may be said roughly to be moving in two directions. The two movements in some respects are opposed, in others complementary. One movement is toward greater mass production. The other is toward decentralized production and distributed operation and use.

The advantages of mass production are well known. By means of extreme division of labor, specialization, and standardization of product a great quantity of goods can be produced cheaply. Financial concentration and a great corporative structure are coordinated with the factory system. In this way a concentration of power, of wealth, and of the production of goods are built up together. Never has such a quantity of goods been produced, and never so cheaply. This has been possible through the subdivision and mechanization of the productive process, through scientific technology.

The disadvantages of mass production and of the cultural milieu in which it operates are less well recognized. Mass production is a tendency

to substitute large-scale machine manufacture for the productiveness of the family and the community. In destroying their productivity it tends to destroy the family and the community as well. The costs of distribution in such a system become greater than the costs of production, and a culture of the market, of advertising, promotion, sales, and money takes precedence over more creative interests. Extreme centralization of control of property, or the means of production, has accompanied these methods. This has been associated with financial centralization and the concentration of population in great cities. Political authority becomes more and more external. The professionalization of the arts, of religion, scholarship, education, and the decline of democratic culture ensue. The corresponding disintegration of community life and the fragmentation of the human personality are the consequences. Such is the social and economic accompaniment of our technology of mass production. It is an error, though, to assume that scientific technology in general *must* lead toward mass production, or that any technology of itself necessarily determines our pattern and course.

The technique of production does not of itself determine the forms of social organization. Marx notwithstanding, "a close and necessary correlation evidently does not exist between the technique of production and the definite economic system of a society," says Werner Sombart.<sup>11</sup> That a culture has many variables, of which production technology is only one, cannot be doubted. It is also clear, however, that a culture of any one time and group is all of a piece. Though not a monoculture, a block without inner variables, it still has a more or less common texture in which one strand or another affects the pattern of the whole. Mass production and technology help to give a social organization its character, but it will not be solely determinative. The myths of inevitable trends should be discounted at the beginning.

There is nothing inevitable in the tendency toward mass production and its associated culture. Nor does the application of scientific technology necessarily lead to the centralization of power and population. Though many accept defeat in the face of what they call the trend toward mass organization, the trend is not inevitable. Nor is defeat certified by any necessity more powerful than their own failure to recognize the dangers of modern linear specialization and their own ignorance of the backgrounds of modern notions of property and technology.

<sup>11</sup> Werner Sombart, *Technik und Kultur Archiv. für Sozialwiss.*, Bd. 33, 1911, pp. 317 f. Quoted by Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1928), p. 574.

Of the latter John Dewey<sup>12</sup> says that the naïve identification of wealth with property in the legal form in which it had existed in a feudal or semifeudal period led to the restriction and deflection of technological industry and the subordination of the engineer to the businessman. Technological industry, he says, has never taken its own course but has been subordinated through artifice and ignorance to interests concerned less in wealth than in profits. Of this there are many examples, ranging all the way from the destruction of "surplus" goods, or wealth, in order to ensure profits—a common practice both by private industry and by government trying to support private industry—to the suppression of thousands of patents<sup>13</sup> in order to forestall competition.

In contrast to the trend of industrial technology toward centralization of control is the equally valid technological trend toward efficient small-scale production and decentralization. This is a more recent tendency. It began to have importance with the electrical transmission of power, the internal combustion motor, and similar devices whereby power can be used cheaply in either large or small quantities and at varying distances from the point where it is produced. It makes little difference in proportionate costs, for example, whether the power from the Grand Coulee Dam is used to run an electric clock or a phosphate fertilizer plant, or whether it be three hundred feet or three hundred miles from the dam. This was impossible in the days of transmission of power by belt or shaft. A new flexibility is brought not only to production but to the social and economic patterns associated with it.

The congested industrial city is no longer as necessary as it was. Dense aggregates of machines with men to work them once were necessary, or seemed so, because the use of power was limited by the length of a belt or steel shaft to the vicinity of its production. This and other technological devices of an older era gave the industrial city much of its form. The city, or at least this aspect of the city, was a function of those devices. Today newer, more flexible technologies tend to make that older type of industrial city obsolete. There are many indications that the overhead costs of these mass cities in crime, illness, delinquency, inflated land values, broken homes, economic inflexibility, congestion, and social discontent are greater than the returns.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1927), p. 108.

<sup>13</sup> National Resources Committee, *Technological Trends and National Policy* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 50.

<sup>14</sup> Ralph L. Woods, *America Reborn* (New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), Chap. V.

The internal combustion motor is another example of efficient but distributive power. The small rubber-tired tractor, the household, farm, and shop devices, the home freezers, pumps, washing machines, canners, vacuum cleaners, mowers, ironers, ranges, and heaters are instruments in a new production technology that gives support once more, or at least can give support, to community economy and family life.

Says Arthur E. Morgan, "'One foot on the soil' is a far-reaching movement without a social philosophy. All over America men are working in towns or in rural industries, but living on small tracts of land. I have official figures in mind only for Michigan. In that state, in addition to the many who work in factories and live on little tracts, more than half of the farmers of the state work half a year or more off their farms. In 'one foot on the land' living, a new cultural pattern is emerging. It is growing without design, and is getting set with many unlovely traits. There is needed research, experiment, study, example, and publicity to develop and to spread a philosophy and an art of living with one foot on the land so that this way of life may realize its great inherent possibilities."<sup>15</sup>

No thoughtful person expects to see large centers of production and population disappear even under such violent influences toward decentralization as the atom bomb. Nor does he contemplate a time when all industries will be decentralized. Some industries—a heavy industry such as steel, for example—must continue to be rather highly centralized both in their productive technique and their financing. Some cities must be rather large to be efficient as centers of commerce, banking, research, and other services. Nevertheless the overwhelming urbanism of today is unnecessary. Certainly the newer technology does not require it. The industrial massing of power, production, and population in centers such as New York, Chicago, London, Moscow, and Pittsburgh is no longer justified. Two thirds to three fourths of our industry, according to economists such as Montgomery of Texas, might well be decentralized in the interests of efficiency.

### *7. Differential Decentralization*

The best answer to this problem is a differential one. Granting that centralization is desirable in some fields and should be even increased

<sup>15</sup> Arthur E. Morgan, "The Primary-Group Community," in the *Autonomous Groups Bulletin*, Vol. IV. Nos. 2-3 Spring, 1949, p. 15.



under some conditions, it is important to recognize that decentralization in most fields is the pressing need of this time. The criteria should be the welfare of the human community on the one hand and technological efficiency on the other. In terms of a modern technology these need not be in conflict.

The Tennessee Valley Authority is the first major effort—the only one thus far—to join the efficiencies of large-scale operations and planning with a diffused enrichment of life on regional, community, and family levels. This project covers the 40,600 square miles of the Tennessee Valley, an area about four fifths the size of England, in a multiple-purpose, closely integrated structure which includes navigation, flood control, and hydroelectric power as primary functions and an entire complex of ecological and cultural factors, such as soil and forest conservation, the manufacture of fertilizer, refrigeration, designing farm machinery, farm demonstration, recreation, library service, and rural electrification, as coordinate functions in a socially organic whole.

From the point of view of the community the unique characteristic of the TVA is its emphasis on decentralized administration. Though the TVA has the centralized authority necessary to a great regional program, the administration of that authority usually is limited to the appropriate level involved. Decisions on local matters are made, not by a central authority, but by the local people concerned, and so on across the different levels of interest.

The TVA, in contrast to totalitarian patterns of authority, is administratively a structure of integrated decisions at different levels, from the farmer and his family to the community, school district, village, county, state, region, and on to the authority of Congress at Washington. All are free on their level to decide on matters relevant to that level. A local group of farmers, for example, decides whether they want a demonstration farm. They choose the demonstration farmer themselves. If he accepts, he receives free metaphosphate fertilizer, except for freight, on condition that he take the advice of the agent as to its use. As his alfalfa grows greener and his stock heavier, the other neighboring farmers make their own decisions as to this farm practice. Within six years after the beginning of the TVA there were 23,000 demonstration farms in the Valley and elsewhere.

Today the TVA is a worldwide model of applied intelligence. In 1947, for example, the dams saved Chattanooga alone \$42,000,000 in flood damage, according to careful estimate, and more millions on the lower rivers. In that same year the navigational system of the TVA carried

350,000,000 ton-miles of freight at a saving in freight rates of \$3,000,000. Power revenues in that year were \$48,000,000, with a net of \$17,176,000, and electric rates in the area averaged 1.57 cents per kilowatt hour, as compared with the 3.03 cents national average. Enormous amounts of phosphate and nitrate fertilizers were produced, soil conservation programs were carried out, and 200,000,000 seedling trees have been planted on eroded and abandoned lands during the course of the project. Malaria has been reduced from as high as 25 per cent in 1934 in some areas to less than 1 per cent in 1948. Private interests have invested there more than \$13,000,000 in recreational facilities.

In 1933 the per capita income in the Valley was 40 per cent of the national average. Today it is 60 per cent of that average. Since 1933 the seven valley states have doubled their share of the income taxes paid to the federal government. The accumulated total of this increased contribution, says James Rorty,<sup>16</sup> is about two billion dollars. This alone is more than the total government investment to date. In growth of trade, of bank deposits, of cash farm income, and total income payments the Valley led the nation between 1933 and 1939. Farm income in 1945 was 149 per cent of that of 1933, or 10 per cent above the national average. In 1946, nonagricultural employment was up 122 per cent, as compared with the national average of 73 per cent, and wages were up 250 per cent, as compared with 145 per cent for the nation as a whole.

By joining the native, local interests of the community with regional and national needs the TVA has brought about a pattern of development unique in this era of modern technology. It is almost alone in recognizing through a widespread system of action the neotechnical vision of a Patrick Geddes and the basic balance between the little places and the larger order that is so fundamental in Jefferson's political philosophy. Of this latter John Dewey says (in a letter to me): "Some years ago I edited a small volume of selections from Thomas Jefferson. I was surprised as well as much stimulated by his plan for local communities, with his vast respect for the New England town meeting which was his *constructive counterpart* of his "states rights" theory. From his own point of view the latter, *without* the rest of his scheme, which never caught on, was I am confident, a one-legged political device—though very little is said about it in writings about Thomas Jefferson."<sup>17</sup>

On the decentralization of centralized authority David Lilienthal,

<sup>16</sup> James Rorty, "The TVA Idea," *The Survey*, June, 1949.

<sup>17</sup> John Dewey, in a letter to me, May 16, 1950. See also David Lilienthal, *TVA, Democracy on the March* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1944), p. 142.

former chairman of the TVA, says, "The distinction between authority and its administration is a vital one. For a long time all of us—administrators, citizens, and politicians—have been confused on this point. We have acted on the assumption that because there was an increasing need for centralized authority, the centralized execution of that authority was likewise inevitable. . . . Out of lethargy and confusion we have taken it for granted that the price of federal action was a top-heavy, cumbersome administration. Clearly this is nonsense. The *problem is to divorce the two ideas of authority and administration of authority.*"

The original thesis of the TVA, as worked out largely by Senator Norris and the first chairman, Arthur E. Morgan, and by Harcourt Morgan and President Roosevelt, was to develop through modern technology the magnificent resources of the Valley and make them available to the people within the frame of their normal community and family life. This had not been done before, and the TVA became the great sociotechnological experiment of the century.

It challenges our fate. It repudiates man's unique kind of failure, which is to build structures beyond human limits. It leads not to distortion of the human pattern but to an enrichment of it.<sup>18</sup> In accepting a social objective it has become preeminent as a guide at this critical time.

### 8. *Plant Scattering*

In private industry there are also forces favorable to efficient decentralization. These too arise largely in the newer technology. Even without those techniques there are many occasions for decentralization that businessmen may well undertake. The violent examples of centralization, which T. K. Quinn calls "Monster Business," are costly and uneconomic. They are possible because of the development of science and technology. Their supersession by more flexible and basically more serviceable decentralized projects is also made possible by science and a still newer technology.

The factors that make for the scattering of manufacturing plants, as well as the factors that make for their agglutination, are of course complex. Not all of them are necessarily technological but many of them are. The studies of Professor Robert A. Brady of the Department of Economics of the University of California in plant scattering and his testi-

<sup>18</sup> See Herman Finer, *The TVA, Lessons for International Application* (Montreal, International Labor Office, 1944), p. 15.

mony before the Small Business Committee give promise of a more complete understanding of these problems.

Careful probing along one or more of the following lines, says Dr. Brady, may give much more knowledge than we now have on the factors making for plant scattering:<sup>19</sup> (1) processing materials on the spot to save in freight handling and other costs; (2) agricultural, forest, and other waste by-products worked up at or near the site of the primary use; (3) use of local, small-scale deposits of one sort or another in especially designed plants (such as glass blowing) for producing bulky and heavy products ordinarily shipped from central plants to local users; (4) scattering of plants whose primary processing need is for electric power where grid patterns have been built up; (5) a local project making specialized mass-production component parts in a relatively small-sized but highly automatic plant; (6) the same for chemicals, particularly in the field of pharmaceuticals; (7) biological supplies, and various types of high-value end products made out of low-value raw materials or of high-value chemicals in whose costs shipping counts for little; (8) special attention to development of small-scale household, agricultural, and shop machinery which might be made locally; (9) dovetailing of specialized industrial plant operations with agricultural and similar work in rural communities; (10) realignment of agricultural crops in an ecological pattern which increases the relative degree of local self-sufficiency at lower end-product costs and to the end of evening out the annual work cycle.

In working out such patterns of decentralization, it is important to adapt methods, materials, and instruments to the unique circumstances of the community under consideration. On this Dr. Brady says, "What seems to me to be lacking in most cases is the systematic working through of these various possibilities, singly and in combinations, for various types of communities. Of fundamental importance is the establishment of a combined physical research, engineering research, and economics research and council service, which may freely be consulted and which will undertake to bring together data and ideas from all types of sources and focus them upon the specific problems of local communities. I think the biggest mistake in practice has been to emphasize one of these to the expense of the other. They must, in my humble opinion, be taken in combination, their services must be highly publicized and freely avail-

<sup>19</sup> Professor Robert A. Brady, Department of Economics, the University of California, Berkeley, from a letter to me of April 29, 1946, commenting on parts of a forthcoming, three-volume book by him to be entitled *The Science and Art of Planning*.

able, and advice must be intensely practical without being, policy wise, indefensible in terms of a tendency to promote localism or internal barriers."<sup>20</sup>

### 9. *Planning From Within*

This careful taking thought of the entire situation of a community project on the basis of ecological, technological, and social research is a rare thing in the rather haphazard community development in America. Professional community workers rarely get down to these foundations of their problem, partly because they may lack training and interest in them, partly because their work in the nature of things is peripheral rather than central.

The custom of fixing on one variable in a complex situation and working on that without reference to the others has resulted in distortions of purpose, malformed consequences, and half defeats. Pressure groups gain power because of this segregation of the variables in a program and the consideration of them each in isolation. Each one alone may become a corruptive principle in the whole project.

For communities live as wholes; control of them by special-interest groups usually is fatal. Though older communities may have built up a body of tradition which helps to hold them on the course of community welfare, this cannot be counted on in America. Here the community not only is more subject to new influences not accounted for in tradition, but is less confirmed in character and less able to assimilate new influences and still maintain its continuity of pattern. It becomes even more important therefore to maintain continuous study groups within the community. These groups, if representative, will prevent the transformation of special interests into pressure groups.

They also will synthesize this essential planning from within with the large-scale planning arising in conditions, communities, and men outside. Planning programs can succeed, at least in America, only when the initiative and cooperation of the people in the communities themselves are engaged. This can be secured, not by presenting a program initially from above, but by working it out with the community group and within it. Something similar to the Montana Study groups is one way to this end. The community advisory committee on forest policy at Libby is a similar effort to share decisions among the people most concerned.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

Beyond this, however, is the need of reorientation in the colleges and professional schools. We do not now have the educational leadership, the intellectual know-how, or educational faith to carry on programs of this sort throughout the country. Those trained in the facts and procedures of such work are usually too narrowly trained to make the comprehensive studies proposed by Dr. Brady and too indifferent to community-centered development to learn. The Columbia River power administration has made excellent surveys on the possible uses of power. The TVA has approached the problem constructively from many directions. Even they are handicapped by the necessity of using men insufficiently briefed on the objectives that give such studies significance. Too often these men must be taken with little more than the conventional training of our professional and graduate schools, deeply indoctrinated as they are in urban values, individual careerism, mass methods, and "To hell with the hick towns!"

An example of an intelligent approach to this problem is the small service agency organized by Arthur E. Morgan and his associates.<sup>21</sup> Mr. Morgan here brings his experience as hydraulic engineer and first chairman of the TVA to bear on the problem of economic advisory service to small communities. He has published a volume, called *A Business of My Own*,<sup>21</sup> in which he lists hundreds of small business and industrial projects oriented in the community or the family. In the field of home production for use and in the household and social training for life in primary groups, the well-known studies of Mr. and Mrs. Ralph Borsodi in *The School of Living*<sup>22</sup> have long been germinal centers of influence. The enthusiasm of the Borsodis has made them among the first experimentalists in the field, and leading champions of the "green revolution."<sup>23</sup>

Beyond all this is the fact, always evident to those who look to living itself for their final information, that the community cannot be manufactured. It cannot be built like a house. Though intelligence is needed to maintain it, the community itself comes, like life, without machinery or artifice. For the community is not formulated for power, profit, wages, or production. It is the integrity of living.

This integrity may not be deliberately planned. Planning can only improve the conditions under which communities may exist. It may be necessary to their survival. But the community is not this planning. Life under wholesome conditions has a way of assembling itself in a coherent

<sup>21</sup> Community Service, Inc., Yellow Springs, Ohio.

<sup>22</sup> *The School of Living*, Suffern, New York.

<sup>23</sup> Ralph Borsodi, *Education and Living*, 2 Vols. (Suffern, New York, 1948). Distributed by Devin-Adair Company, New York.

pattern. It has what may be called organic intelligence, with or without benefit of deliberate reasoning. This organic intelligence of men in their communities is distorted by the wide-ranging organizations of these times. The specious advantages of such organizations may be great, but the loss is the loss of living wholeness.

This organic intelligence of men survives only in a culture where there is continuity, stability, and human relevance. The structure both of the industrial corporation and of the labor union, as well as the structure of government, too often is not favorable to the community. Only when they are reoriented to this end may we hope for homes for Americans, not merely housing, and communities of men and women, not concentration camps.

### *10. Affirmations*

Are there no affirmations? Are there no voices to say Yes, no native groups that support the community? There are many, and though less articulate, they probably outnumber the gainsayers many times. The reveries of men and women—more important perhaps than we imagine—the residual desires for a good life, more than likely picture in some form a neighborly, well-known group. The background of hopes, as well as voices more articulate, ask for the community.

I have indicated briefly some important affirmations in technology, administration, and business management. These are modern techniques of decentralization, new ways of making or transmitting power, new small-scale industrial machines, new administrative and planning devices such as the TVA and the Bonneville Power Administration, new initiatives in business management like those outlined by Dr. Brady, new service and consultant agencies such as those originated by Dr. Morgan and Ralph Borsodi, or for that matter, by the Department of Agriculture and other state and federal agencies—all these in their several ways are factors in community stabilization and enrichment. There are many others.

At least three great influences should be mentioned. Several agencies have had a long and inspiring record in community support. Among them are the U. S. Department of Agriculture and particularly its Extension Service, the Forest Service, the Soil Conservation Service, the Experiment Stations and Smith-Hughes services. These, or important members of these services, are aware that progress must be within the

framework of the family and community. They have probably done more for the rural community than any other group of agencies. Educationally they are about the most important planned influence in the United States. Their projects, numbering literally millions, are carried out largely within the milieu of the home and family farm. Their work in protecting soil, preserving forests and wild life and the great grasslands, is of immeasurable value to community life.

Other organizations, like the Grange with 800,000 members and particularly the Farmers' Union with 500,000 members, some labor unions, a few industrial corporations, and in some states the American Farm Bureau, are built around the importance of the community and family. They too may recognize the danger to America in the current decline of the primary groups.

Another affirmation, less in the field than in the laboratory and clinic, is the work of psychiatrists such as W. A. White and H. S. Sullivan, sociometrists such as J. L. Moreno, social anthropologists and industrial research men.<sup>24</sup> They are concerned with personal preference groups, "friendship" groups, or autonomous groups, as they are formed in industry and elsewhere in the modern world. Though groups of this sort may differ in several important ways from what I have called communities, they have, on the other hand, significant similarities to them. The autonomous group, though often casual in its organic relation to the whole living pattern of its members, is still based on mutually personal relationships, likings, and loyalties. Its solidarity is in the coherence, not of segregated functions, but of whole persons, or at least persons taken as wholes in respect to one another.

Such groups are precommunal, as it were; or should I say that they are postcommunal vestiges of communal interest in an adverse culture? At any rate these groups, as they spontaneously clot and nucleate among industrial and office workers, may have favorable effects on industrial efficiency and rates of production.

When such groups develop in a friendly or permissive atmosphere, says Maria Rogers, they may "perform indispensable functions, release creativity, raise output, reduce absenteeism and inhibit labor turn-over." They "actually perform the functions for which industrial enterprises are organized. They are basic structures for cooperative functioning.

"With this new statement of the function of industry," she continues, "human relations, or the adequate diagnosis and understanding of groups,

<sup>24</sup> See also T. N. Whitehead, *Leadership in a Free Society* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1936).



becomes of equal importance with production of goods and services. It is definitely *not* a function subsidiary to production, but a major function in itself. The two functions are interrelated and interdependent."<sup>25</sup>

Thus industrial researches, in a sector quite different from that developed by Professor Brady, find in the spontaneous group what seems to be a germinal manifestation of the community. In relating efficiency to human welfare such research may be carried toward the reorientation of industry itself in behalf of the community.

A third group of organizations affirming community and family-centered life is the cooperatives. The Rochdale type, which seems, after more than a century of experience, to be the "true" cooperative, has spread over the world. In England, Scotland, the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and Italy the cooperatives have had great strength. In Russia, the true cooperatives are virtually destroyed.<sup>26</sup> In Central Europe and Italy they were suppressed during the Axis regime. In the United States the cooperative movement started slowly but now has considerable stability and strength. Farmers' marketing and purchasing cooperatives in this country do an annual business of more than seven billion dollars.


The cooperatives maintain a distributive pattern in the economic system. They show once more the resilient yet stubborn will of men to retain control of their producing and consuming processes. In most countries the cooperatives are a living example of man's pluralism in economic systems.

The cooperative is significant in a community-centered culture because it supplies the efficiencies of size and modern administration without entering the mass patterns of centralized control. Although some cooperatives, such as certain western fruit and eastern milk cooperatives, have abandoned the cooperative spirit in their drive for monopoly under remote managerial control, this is not true generally of the cooperative movement. The cooperative is a democratic alternative to mass industry and business.

In its own way the community, in summary, is itself the affirmation of men's organic solidarity. If freedom, integrity, and good will survive, this affirmation will prevail.

<sup>25</sup> Maria Rogers, "Autonomous Groups in Industry," *Autonomous Groups Bulletin*, Vol. III, Nos. 1 and 2.

<sup>26</sup> James P. Warbasse, *Cooperative Democracy* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947), Chap. III.





PART V

# *The Community and Public Affairs*



1. *The Nature of the Public*
2. *Agglutinative Solidarity*
3. *The World Public and the World Community*
4. *Victor, Unincorporated*
5. *Organic Solidarity*
6. *The Problem of Peace*
7. *The Crisis of Tolerance*
8. *The Future of Peace*
9. *Mixed-Bloods at Dixon*
10. *Culture Without Context*
11. *The Community and Its Context*
12. *The Urban Culture of Aggression*
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## 1. *The Nature of the Public*

Extend the community and it becomes in our modern myth the public. It is the big ear that speakers, writers, radio men, and singers try to capture; the eye that makes of what it sees a huge thing good or evil. It is the monstrous mind, the decider, confirmer of fashions, making whatever it thinks massive and innumerable. The public is the public taste, the vast fancy, the general will. It is one faculty after another, one attribute after another; but the public as a concrete thing is hard to find.

Extend the community beyond concrete men and women and it becomes abstract and anonymous. It becomes a public or, rather, *the* public. As such its presence marks our festivals, sports, our crimes, statesmanship. We seek it and fear it. But its presence is like a god. It has no body. It is not concrete. The public is present only in its attributes. Its will guides us, and its anger frightens us. But the willful, angry public itself is not there.

It is our custom to call this public the larger community. We expand the community that we know in its range, numbers, power, and in thin projections here and there of personal acquaintance and assume that the public that ensues is still the community, but larger. This is supposed to give continuity between the small and the large. It is supposed to create an intensification of the values of the family and village, an enlargement of the freedom, an extension of friendship and cooperation, a deeper identification with people known well. At least so we assume. But the results do not confirm this assumption. Between the small and the large there is really little but a fictitious continuity. The personal continuity of life in the community is replaced by an aggregation of many voices, events, pressures, the formless rattle of gravel filling a hole.

The public in short cannot well replace the community. "My public," says the actor. "My constituency," says the politician possessively. But what is the actor's public? Is it not mainly an anonymous mass of faces, unknown hands clapping, an eight o'clock crowd? And because he sees the white of faces turned toward the little sun that is himself, the public man assumes that they somehow are his people, his community, his friends.

It is true, no doubt, that a kind of specialized intimacy does arise between him and them. It is remote rapport, mutually thrilling. It is an

anonymous intimacy, sudden, savage, with the beauty of passion and crowds. It is segregated from the normal contexts of living, violently limited to a single function. It is the rootless intimacy of strangers.

For what does each person in that great white of faces really do? Why is he there? Where does he go? He goes to the show for an evening and goes home. He stands in the street a half hour watching the procession and then goes about his business. He votes, but his activity as a constituent takes not one one-thousandth of his year. The public man touches only a splinter of this man. He knows only a casual fragment; captures only a moment of this person's attention. And because there are ways to assemble those splinters by thousands for a moment in the sun, the public man mistakes their aggregative glitter for a community. If a shrewd person he probably knows better, but his contact with these people is no less piecemeal and fleeting. The public is characteristically this sort of thing. It is important; it cannot be ignored; but it should not be confused with the true community nor valued as a substitute for it. (The public is an aggregation of identical fragments of different and otherwise unrelated people. The lone clapping of a man's hands becomes a roar of applause when multiplied by a thousand. The casual "pretty good," the chance gesture of interest, become public approval when produced in large numbers. The hasty reading of a crime story or scandal becomes the power of public opinion when multiplied a million times. These are the public. Though these bits and fragments may ignite when densely associated with one another, they are still fragmental. Never the whole person, never the organic community, but only a bit many times repeated. These give intensity and power. They also make the fiction of avid interest, of hot concern, that envelops the public man.)

"The public is a beast," it is said. "The voice of the people is the voice of God," it also is said. Such stereotypes are misapprehensions of the psychosocial nature of the public. They mistake a fragment many times multiplied for an organic community of persons. From these fragmental situations they may make invidious or flattering inferences as to the nature of human beings. The "people" are stupid or godlike, incompetent or wise, it is said. But the people in such cases are remote abstractions known only as the public. They are not human beings seen in their variegated context of activities. They are, on the contrary, a single, selected bit, made, through classification and repetition, into a multitude.

These are the multitudes, the masses, *hoi polloi*, of our current world. There are many publics, although in common parlance they are lumped into one. They are constructed, as it were, by the strict method of

functional specialization. They are mass-produced. They are the multitudes in the newspapers, the opinion polls, the fashions, the movies, the mass markets and sports, and those arts, more seen or heard than done, that crowd our concert halls and galleries. Though built on fictional abstractions these various publics must be recognized as the harsh and powerful realities that they are. To assume that we are dealing with human beings, however, or that these anonymous multitudes can constitute a community, involves not only an intellectual misapprehension but a dangerous misdirection of action.

We cannot build a community by ignoring the essential constituent of communities, which is the close, organic relationship of whole human beings with one another. This is ignored because it is not amenable to standardization. Because the human being is unique, because no one is like another, massing is impossible. By assembling like fragments of men into multitudes, however, a manipulable group is obtained. By a process of functional segregation without regard for the communal *Gestalt* of human life a group is created great in power and maneuverability. The "economic man," the "scientific man," the "consuming public," the "radio audience," are examples of these selective fictions.

That such a system of collective specialization is necessary in the organization of modern society no one can deny. It is equally true, however, that these procedures in industry, government, and the professions when carried on without reference to communal life lead to disintegration. The poetry of living, the native holism of communal association, are here ignored or unknown. The consequence is deadly.

## *2. Agglutinative Solidarity*

Two kinds of solidarity may be found in human relations. One may be called agglutinative, the other organic. Solidarity is a sense of unity of value in a group. It is spiritual coherence. It involves a sense of participation by the human being in his group. It is belonging. A man becomes the group. The synthesis, though poetic—or, as some would say, mystical—is no less valid. The structure of this solidarity, however, is different in different environments.

Agglutinative solidarity refers to the kind of coherence found among members of an anonymous public. It is an enumerative solidarity. In the dense association of people related to one another by a single area of

interest, there may arise a solidarity of feeling that is both intense and passionate.

The crowd at a prize fight has this kind of solidarity. With a common focus of interest, with nudges, calls, smells, fluctuations of temperature, and faint, peripheral signals of action from all around, the cue is soon taken and for the hour, if no longer, there is emotional and perceptual focus, a confident belonging, fully as precious to the average member of the crowd as the spectacle of the fight.

Here he can rave and gloat anonymously among ten thousand other ravers and gloaters without let, without restraint other than what the selective, violent situation imposes on him. Here he may lose himself in the surge and context of the crowd. There are no checks from other areas of life. No persons known in other places disturb the purity of this bright pool of experience in which he is immersed or through irrelevance withdraw him from its warm, contactual sufficiencies.

Here he can find verbally violent release for narrow areas of impulse that might otherwise be diffused over the sphere of his personality or take form as problems to be balanced out only by overt action. Though violence has its place, it is doubtful whether this isolated, nonfunctional violence can be more than a symptom of decadence. It is induced artificially. It is spectacular and public.

Even such violence might have therapeutic value in reducing the frustrations of a sedentary culture were not such spectacles introduced as alien fragments into lives remote from such experience. Though compensatory sports, highly masculinized manners, "tough guy" literature, and bloody wars go on apace, there still seems to be less and less occasion for physical action. The violence for which men seem normally equipped rarely can have functional expression.

In the stadium the scene is a mass spectacle, an induced, perfervid solidarity of the crowd. Emotional violence here becomes irresponsible because of its detachment from the appropriate physical action which in normal life would accompany it. Emotional thrills are segregated from the appropriate activities that in nature go with them. This is the essence of decadence. This radical removal of values from action, of appreciation from functional participation, this culture of "shows" where the consumers in the sports and arts sit in thousands while paid experts act for them, would be humiliating to a free people, if we knew what freedom in this area means.

The prize fight continues. The crowd roars, sweats, and the people in it are convinced that their vicarious experience here is much better—



and certainly easier—than the original. For active men, accustomed muscularly to violent exertion, the show would be justified. For them it would be aesthetically valid. It would reach imaginatively into a normal area of their experience, and enrich and beautify their action. The solidarity of such a group would involve deep levels of common life. Their experience there would be less detached from the rest of life, their solidarity less agglutinative. But men of this sort are probably not the ones who fill up the benches.

The elbow-to-elbow culture of the stadium—eyes intent, faces turned all in one direction—is characteristic of the public, or the numerous special publics which I have contrasted to the community. Each public has its intensity of interest, its density, its special medium or vehicle. The vehicle may be the newspaper, through which a public may follow the Yankees in baseball. It may be the radio or the concert hall. The vehicle may be institutional, such as the American Medical Association, the March of Dimes, or innumerable other groups. But the publics of which I speak have in common each its fragmental object of interest, its aggregative response to outer stimulus, the anonymity of its members, the monotony of its structure, the agglutinative character of its solidarity.

### *3. The World Public and the World Community*

This public, or rather this multiplicity of publics, and this culture of the special interest tend to replace the community in the western world. Because we have the facilities for communication, world-wide publics of various sorts are rather easily made. Such publics may be important, and sometimes even beneficial, in bringing about a more orderly life. They have a rightful place in our society. But to assume that such a public, or the sum of such publics, is a world community, at least as I have defined the terms, is a serious confusion.

World order and peace will not be attained by the elaboration of these publics nor by the institutional instruments that are coordinated with them. Their effect is probably just the reverse. They are aggressive and competitive,<sup>1</sup> at least in their more dynamic phases, and whether it be the Communist party or the U. S. Steel Corporation, each by nature will encroach on others and try to suppress them. Each tries to hold the

<sup>1</sup> Baker Brownell, *War and the Human Community* in "Learning and World Peace," Eighth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948). Parts of this section of the book are taken from this paper.

field alone. This is the paradox of monopoly and competition in a world that still remains plural.

Thousands of other groups organized around a special function, doctrine, special technique, or resource are examples of this cosmic paradox. The group may be Jehovah's Witnesses or an advertising agency, the Catholic Church or the Hapsburgs, the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company or the State of Israel. They may serve men, though often at the expense of others. They may build states or commercial empires or even what we call civilizations, but the half million displaced American Indians of a century ago, the 750,000 displaced Arabs in Palestine of an hour ago, the thousands of small firms, workmen, and entrepreneurs driven out of business by monster corporations, the anti-clericals of Spain denied even the luxury of a grave, the tens of millions of Germans, Balts, Finns, Lithuanians, Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians displaced in northern Europe—all of them human beings—would hardly agree that the process, "necessary" as it sometimes may be, is liberal in principle or humane. They too may be equally repressive if their chance comes. Intolerance breeds intolerance. It all helps to confirm the fact, however, that our culture of the special-interest group does not have within it the structural possibility of a world community or of peace.

Groups of this sort—or publics, as I have called them from another point of view—may interlock with one another. They may attain a kind of federation or syndicalism within a society. They may reach into communities such as the family or village. But they are different from communities. They will remain different. Communities are organized around people, while special-interest groups are organized around segregated functions. As such they tend to become pressure groups, each competing for its place and power in the world. This is natural enough, God knows. Life lives on life, and any group, even the community, can survive only by maintaining itself against those which would take its place. Though no one would assert that the pressures of life somehow should be removed, the problem remains of creating an order in which the whole man, not the special function, can have priority.

The problem lies in the rationale of special-interest groups. Already a syndication of these groups has formed. Already they make a world order. That order reflects their aggressiveness and conflict. It is not and will not be world peace.

The great community, if it means anything at all, will be a society rich with nuclear groups where the human being in his community will be of prior concern. Instead of the usual unction about the humanities,

smearing over with color and perfume the disorder within human life, there will be true reorientation. Educational, religious, artistic, and technological interests will be redirected in behalf of the human community. Only thus will an organic solidarity of human culture replace the deadly fragmentation and conflict of this day. In the world of segregated publics and anonymous men and women there can be no peace, except of the sword.

#### *4. Victor, Unincorporated*

So far as it is visible, Victor, Montana, seems more an accessory of the road than a place to which roads go. The filling station on the highway that runs south from Missoula along the great front of the Bitterroot Mountains to Lost Trail Pass and thence down the gorge into the Salmon River country of Idaho is Victor's main landmark. The garage and automobile repair shops nearby, a drugstore, and the quiet main street slip by, and Victor for the traveler is gone.

From the highway it is scattered and casual. Victor is a brief litter of business drifted together for a moment in the eddies of through traffic and is lost to the eye almost before it is noticed. But Victor is more than a roadside cluster of services. For some people, such as Julia Groff or John Greenfield, it is the place of life fixed in their fate and fortune through long years of residence. In all the world it is uniquely theirs. It is a clot in time, not as firm or old as the old towns of the East, but old nevertheless for them. In one life they hardly could touch more time or live in one place longer.

North among the cottonwoods a church, a few loosely woven streets, a large school building, and some residences may be found. Marks of age, as age is known in the West, and some decrepitude are evident. Here an abandoned basement, desolately open, or an empty house, there a charred tangle of timbers where a fire passed, are references to a brisker past and the ups and downs of Victor's history. The school, for ten years outstanding in Ravalli County and the first consolidated school in Montana, still serves well its threescore high school students and three hundred grade pupils. But its buildings are scarred by the assaults of those inveterate allies, time and youth, in their ceaseless and erosive collaboration.

The road north to Missoula and south to Hamilton now has bus service twice a day. Through the mild winters and low precipitation of western

Montana it rarely is closed by snow. But once the road was a railroad right of way. A proud two-story station graced the town. Trains moved busily up and down the valley hauling silver ore from the mines in the Curlew and Pleasant View districts,<sup>2</sup> and lumber from a sawmill and dam at the mouth of Sweat House Canyon. But the lumber industry faltered and the mines produced sporadically. The Curlew, which employed 200 men at its peak in 1890, now has 25 men working there. The railroad was moved eastward where it had more convenient access to the agricultural lands on the Bitterroot flats.

On the benchlands around Victor and in the little valleys of Sweat House creek there are wheat, alfalfa, apple orchards, and some cattle. For two years recently wheat raised by a Victor farmer won first place at the Chicago stock show. Life is secure in Victor, though not expanding. There is good hunting. The Rifle Club has bought an old hay warehouse for an indoor range. Steelhead and Rainbow trout in the upper streams are hungry and unhesitating.

When Superintendent Donald Bunger of the Victor schools asked the Montana Study to form a study group in his community a difficulty arose. Victor is not far from Stevensville and several families living in the undefined range of woodlands, wheat, and river bottoms between the two had joined the Stevensville group. Bunger claimed these families in what looked like a raid on the larger town. So the Gerden family, the McFadgens, the O'Hares, as well as Father Leonard Jensen of St. Mary's Mission, agreed to attend both study groups. This they did throughout the winter.

The group met Tuesday evenings, at first in a schoolroom. But older persons are out of place in schoolrooms. The desks are small, the aisles narrow, and older folks bulge and creak among them. The leader perforce is at the teacher's desk, or on the platform, or stands authoritatively before the class, and the give and take of the meeting breaks down. The meeting becomes a succession of juvenile recitations or obedient answers to questions.

The group moved then to the school lunchroom. With feet under the long table, with notes before them, the members began at once to respond like the mature persons that they were. A banker, a priest, three teachers, an automobile repair shop owner, a druggist, four farmers, and seven housewives made here a fair cross section of Victor's 350 people. The

<sup>2</sup> H. C. Groff, Mrs. H. C. Groff, and Mrs. Adam Hornung, *Some of the History of Victor, from 1866 to 1946*. Mimeographed by the Montana Study (Missoula, the University of Montana, Helena, 1946), p. 7.

group lacked only youth of school age. It varied somewhat from week to week and increased in size.

The study group continued through and beyond its ten weeks' period. The winter slid by. The question of Victor's incorporation was given attention. Victor unincorporated could do nothing to control the stock that wandered in from the ranches and ranges, trampling the gardens, blocking the roads, and making hazardous the highway. A standing committee made careful studies. Progress reports were read. The relevant facts, the advantages and the disadvantages, were considered. Recommendations as to incorporation were made, but no action group, so far as I know, was organized to put them into being.

Victor, unlike most of the communities that had Montana Study groups during the course of the three-year experiment, planned no follow-up. The reasons are not easy to analyze. Superintendent Bunker, who was instrumental in organizing the group, left Victor in mid-term. The chairman gave up that job at the end of the school year because of the pressure of other things. No successor in the group with time or interest in leadership was found to carry on. This failure to find or train a leader was very likely my fault. Beyond that is the fact that Victor as a community for twenty-five years has been in slow decline. The *History of Victor*, written by Clay Groff, the banker, Mrs. Groff, and Mrs. Hornung, and checked section by section in the group discussions, is the most tangible evidence remaining of the ten weeks' work.

The high point for Victor was between 1890 and 1920. The silver mines and later the lumber industry—also to be classified as mining—were going at their best. The apple boom had come, and the Bitterroot Valley for a flushed moment saw fabulous wealth in the red McIntosh. The railroad came—and went—and there were three hotels and an opera house. There were a planing mill, two poolrooms, four saloons. Two resident doctors and a dentist lived there. The Good Templars, Workmen, Degree of Honor, Modern Woodman, Maccabees, Owls, and Yeomen celebrated fraternity and solemnly played their mumbo jumbo. There were a town band, an enclosed race track with its grandstand, a baseball park. The Methodists built a new church, and the Methodists South built another one. There were two cheese factories, two blacksmith shops, and the stores, services, and facilities of a lively town. These all have now entered the land of ghosts or have been transmuted into depreciated substitutes.

Those were better times. Or were they? In any case the pressure was on in Victor like pressure in a hose, and the processes of communal living

throbbed and spurted ambitiously. Today that vital and always mysterious energy is lower and less demanding. The youngsters usually leave to make their fires and aggressions on that larger platform and among those wider-ranging influences of capture and possession of the city. One new thing, small but not unimportant, has been added to Victor through the work of the study group: A snack bar has been set up in a little building on Main Street to serve as a "hangout" for youngsters.

After repeated fires and after hard times once more, Victor now is left with Sizer's drugstore and Groff's bank, the Masonic hall and the telephone office. There is now but one beer parlor and one blacksmith shop. The post office and the barbershop, the Victor Trading Store and the beauty shop, a feed mill and a small sawmill and retail lumber yard, two gasoline stations and garages and three automobile repair shops, make up most of the formal facilities of life of the reticent Victor of today.

Always around it are the deep valleys of the Bitterroots, the mountain pastures and the woods, the sweet farms and apple orchards, the yellow wheat and the violent, flaming green of the alfalfa along the irrigation ditches. The valleys of Sweat House Creek, where the Selish Indians once built scores of steaming huts of health, have known floods and slacks, and what happened to the Indians living here is now in another way slowly happening to the white men. Decline here in the mountain valley comes and goes and comes again in its mute cycle. But no slums accompany it. The helpless filth of urban blighted areas is not known under the winds of the canyon. The sightless cruelties of unknown masters, the nameless thrust and pressures, the harsh compulsions of the great city machine, are less present here. The decline of the human community, if such it be, at least is a decent thing in the mountains. It is not advertised here as blatantly inevitable. It does not stink.

Victor, though in decline perhaps, still has solidarity. Nor is it the agglutinative solidarity that I have attributed to urban life. It is something more organic than that and more relevant to the pattern of the whole man.

### *5. Organic Solidarity*

Different from the agglutinative solidarity of urban life is the organic solidarity of the community. The solidarity of the one is massive and undifferentiated so far as the content of each group is concerned. The solidarity of the other is structurally flexible; it is personal, or tends so to be in the communal continuum of face-to-face relationships.

In a mass group the human being tends toward depersonalization. In the authoritarian party, state, or industrial organization he becomes solely a functional instrument. Amid the spectators at a prize fight or a professional presentation of *Aïda* he tends to become, even to himself, a laugh, a thrill, a clapping of hands, a smart comment, a violent boo. As a personality he is a loser and he compensates by a vast, anonymous belonging to the great group. Freedom under these conditions is rarely organic or deeply intentional. Because it is not expressive of a full command of life, it is likely to become, if present at all, little more than shallow erraticism and willfulness.

The organic solidarity of the community, on the other hand, is coherent through personality and freedom. It too is a belonging, but belonging here is personal. It is full belonging in a small group rather than fragmental belonging in a great one. In the mass group a part of the spectator's personality is caught up, intensified, and fused for a white-hot moment with ten thousand similar parts abstracted from the people in the crowd. This fusion of like fragments in the stir and violence of the stadium I have called the public, and each public is different of course according to the fragments that are abstracted, the intensity of the fusion, the place and conditions of the fusing, and the time during which the public remains a coherent group. During that moment of coherence of the prize-fight public the rest of the spectator's personality is suppressed or ignored or, as it were, entirely vanishes without reference to this moment of identification. It is, in a word, a fragmental though often violent kind of identification. Very different is this from solidarity in the community.

In the community, however, the time and rhythm, the range and content, of a man's identification with the group are on another scale. His whole life, or enough of it to have pattern and balance, is identified with a community of other men. And not only for a fervid moment, although those moments may occur, but over a rhythmic area of time, of years, or perhaps a lifetime. It is a continuity of identification across the seasons and interests and the varying phases and functions of a life. In this organic solidarity the man is neither blind nor lost, and though there may be from time to time the white-hot moments of fusion as emergencies and dangers assail the group, they are not induced moments of fusion, contrived by artifice and left without consequences in action. They are more likely to be a clearing for action, or the moment of action itself.

When I speak of the whole man I refer to the course of a life in which there are presumably interrelated functions. Here interests and behaviors have a more or less organic pattern in relation both to his own course of

life and to that of other men. Though the pattern of life may well accommodate pluralities and contradictions, it still has, or may have, lines of continuity and organic reference that give it under suitable conditions some degree of constancy and order.

This whole of life seems to me to constitute a rough kind of norm on which judgments may be based. A fragment of a life, on the other hand, refers to a function or interest abstracted from this whole and set up more or less without reference to the whole. It follows that the organic whole, used here as a basing point, is not the man alone, or the person as a self-sufficient package, but the community, or better, the man in his community.

The organic solidarity of a community thus differs from the agglutinative solidarity of the various publics. Its coherence is not of fragments but of whole men in a small community of persons known well to one another. It is a difference often unknown or ignored by professional community workers, who sometimes seem to be more concerned in techniques and ameliorative efforts within the frame of a conventional urban ideology than in meeting the basic problem of human orientation toward communal groups. These professionals sometimes accept too casually the increasing specialism and dispersal of urban civilization as if it were the norm of life. In this they fail to see its difference from the truly communal group. Their work for this reason may be of more harm than good.

The difference is critical in any future that free, democratic peoples may have. It is critical in the future of peace in the world. Within the community men ordinarily are peaceful. Tensions usually may be resolved without open conflict. Problems and competitions come and go as in any human group, but corruptive bitterness and fighting may be avoided by the mutual knowledge, organic adjustment, and creation of common ends on which the community is constructed.

In a world where neither force nor isolation is now adequate to maintain peace, a culture of whole men in their communities is necessary. Only in this pattern of life may be found the solidarity of people who hold precious both peace and freedom.

## *6. The Problem of Peace*

Peace has had many instruments, most of them unsuccessful. On a world scale these have failed because the controls to establish peace,



such as the League of Nations, the Kellogg Treaty, the United Nations, are too weak to contain the violent readjustments continually under way in a changing world. These instruments have no way as yet to allay the violence and still permit the change. If strong, they prevent changes. If weak, they may permit the change but without peace. The world today still has ancient, unresolved tensions and is building up new ones of such force that peaceful adjudication may be impossible. There can be no peaceful adjudication, says the Communist, between Marxist theory and liberal western culture, except extinction of the latter. There can be no peaceful adjudication, says the Catholic, between the Faith and atheism. There can be no peaceful adjudication, say the majority of voters in the Southern states, between the privileges and restrictions claimed by white men and the civil and social rights "guaranteed" in the federal constitution, except by suppression. Nor has an imposed peace been of service to political reform in Greece, land reform in Italy, church reform in Spain, industrial reform in Germany, or to freedom in Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary, eastern Germany.

The conflicts and terrors of the modern world have not by any means one seed or one source. They have a plurality of causes, nor will they be quieted by any one formula or system of voluntary control. Below these conflicts are usually the claims of special-interest groups and institutions of one kind or another, each with its "public," each with its agglutinative solidarity and thrust, and each with its claim to "absolute" authority over an area of interest. Thus arises what may be called the conflict of the absolutes. They are, of course, pseudo absolutes, except in the presumptions and rigors of the men who use them as instruments in their drive for power.

The competition of these "absolutes," or monopolies of faith, truth, power, social control, in a world of several such "absolutes" can result of course only in conflict. Where truth is absolute, for example, error can have no rights. It can have no recognition beyond suppression—but the errant ones do not accept this status. In the world situation the competition of national sovereignties is not alone the cause of world disorder and conflict, or perhaps even the main one. The far more absolutistic pretensions of some political organizations and parties, of racial groups, of religious institutions, and of economic cartels, trusts, and special interests, pledged as they are to total control in their respective fields or in all fields, are the main cause of world disorder.

I use the word *absolute* here to signify a comprehensive and unchallengeable organization within a field of discourse and an authority within

itself without relevance to other areas or institutions. The word usually arises in reference to institutions such as the state, the divine emperor, the church, the race group, the proletariat, by which men try to establish the presumption of authority for a special-interest group. These men, more institutionalist-minded than humane, find need to give an eternal status to an interest of theirs. An absolute sanction is devised. Some of these men quite honestly may be struggling for certitude and finality in a world all too fluid, and use this verbal artifice to attain it. More often they are hot men driving toward a mundane objective who find the absolute a useful instrument in its promotion.

Until we learn that wars are structurally involved, less in this wicked man or that malevolent state than in competing special-interest groups enormously magnified through modern technology, there will be no peace. These "absolute" interests in political theory, business organization, religion, race, as well as national and imperial states, are urban in their centralized, impersonal control and their modern massiveness of organization. They are predatory in most cases, seizing power over a region, a people, or an area of interest in the name of some absolute or other. Then they use that power almost invariably for their own group or coterie. Intolerant themselves, they may use the principle of tolerance as a weapon to destroy those who have welcomed them. Corruptive hatreds flourish and wars as usual devastate the earth.

### *7. The Crisis of Tolerance*

The principle of tolerance has come to the point of crisis in western civilization. Once our prized possession and still held high in our hopes, it flickers fitfully under blasts and counterblasts, attacks and counterattacks and the smoke of our cultural confusion. We have assumed until recently that tolerance itself is a kind of absolute, or at least a universal rule of behavior, that can be held common to all men, beliefs, politics, and institutions. Though we know that this cannot be true, still we hold to the principle as if it were universally true, a dear fiction that we dare not discard. We fear by admitting its relativity that we shall undermine the principle and practice of tolerance itself. This danger, indeed, is real.

We have assumed during the history of our American experiment a kind of moral *laissez faire*, in the belief that the life of good will and freedom will predominate in fair competition with other aims. This is

true in a fairly homogeneous culture dedicated in the first place to democratic friendliness and quality. But doctrines of moral *laissez faire*, like those in economics, are difficult to adapt to systems pledged to some other objective. Absolutism in ideology, like monopoly in business, cuts through them, and by using tolerance or *laissez faire* as a bulkhead behind which it can operate soon makes a mockery of the whole doctrine.

Although we still must have a tolerant society if we care for freedom and human self-reliance, we must learn, it may be supposed, that tolerance never can survive as a solely unilateral practice. Your tolerance alone, in spite of Christlike faith in human goodness and fair play, may not induce tolerance in me. In the village, yes; the chances are good that tolerance will work on the background of simple rural life like that of Jesus. But in the city, no. Though your tolerance may rouse a tolerant response in me when our association is personal and primary, it will not do so when our association is anonymous and restricted to one function as in the city.

To urban functionaries you are nameless and perhaps never seen. To them your tolerance is meaningless or quite unknown. They are operated by strings from distant places. You, and they, are anonymous extensions of remote controls. Human tolerance from them or from their masters cannot be expected and does not come. If you are tolerant, well, what is it to them who do not know you?

Tolerance indeed is not a universal principle that can be applied to all kinds and conditions of culture. The assumption that it can is disastrous to those patterns of life to which tolerance is most adapted. Without active devotion, laws to protect the principle of tolerance may be used as instruments to defeat it. Thoughtless complaisance is a doorway to destruction. We cannot afford to be tolerant of intolerance, as T. V. Smith has said. We must use force with both fear and love in our hearts, that we may not destroy by our action what we seek most to protect. Still the need for compulsion may remain.

There is on the one hand the urban tolerance that comes through personal indifference and the freedom of anonymity. There is on the other hand the rural intolerance that comes through personal concern and the reciprocal responsibility for communal life. This is associated with the freedom that comes of participation in the significant directives of one another's lives. In the one case tolerance, such as there is, lies in anonymity and urban fragmentation. Associated with it is the intolerance that comes of the remote authority, the absolute sanction unmitigated by personal acquaintance and concern. In the other case the personal

concern of rural life may be irritating and restrictive, but the deep tolerance for human life that comes through knowing human life is there. The future of tolerance and with it the future of peace lie in the human community. Tolerance as contrasted to indifference can come only through a culture of personal associations.

### *8. The Future of Peace*

The first condition of a peaceful world is the reorientation of western culture toward a life of inner, organic sanctions. Only in the community can men live wholly, freely, and responsibly with others. The community as I define it claims no external authority or transcendent absolutes. In its many forms and variables it is the structure of growth of men living fully in the life and seasons of their world. It is a way of life, the condition of survival. This is the inner structure of peace.

The future of peace depends on the restoration of human context to the basic social relations. Until peace can be built by means such as this, war will recur in spite of superimpositions from above. If given the benefit of modern science, technology, and social and psychiatric studies the community—and I mean the small community—can absorb the adventurous interests of men as well as their mature activities. The lost souls of this era, the millions of restless men without communities, and without rooted, stable lives, who are one cause of modern war, might then seek less aggressive political, industrial, and military pursuits.

When human society is organized mainly in community patterns, as for example in India, it is not ordinarily warlike. Though the East without modern science is famished, dirty, and ridden by superstition, it has a major contribution to make to human survival. That contribution is the age-old custom of organic, communal adjustment within the contexts of rural and village life. To that the West can add, if it will, a modern technology and intelligence differentially oriented to the needs both of large-scale production wherever it may be necessary and of efficient small-scale industry distributively controlled.

A world of small communities is not, I well know, itself a guarantee of peace. The chances of peace are better, however, in a culture of the community than in one which is predatory, aggressive, and authoritarian. A peaceful society can and should make use of large-scale production plants and centers wherever they are needed as ancillary instruments in a rural and village culture. Of this the TVA is an arresting example.

If these technological instruments are subordinated to a community way of life they need not be uncontrollable influences. They need not lead either to centralization or to war. They need not overwhelm us either by numbers or by power.

Constructive projects toward peace in any case will probably be of several kinds. In some fields, such as air transportation and world communication, functional administration on a world basis may be developed. Because such administration crosses national boundaries it is said by many persons to be the road to peace. But this alone, important as it is, will hardly guarantee world order. It too may become remote and anonymous in control and alien to the interests of men in their communities. Like the cartels and the arms syndicates it too may lead to even more conflict. This and other approaches to peace may in the long run work themselves out to the desired conclusion. But no one of them alone, or a small number of them, can be finally effective in this massive and complex problem.

### *9. Mixed Bloods at Dixon*

Race is a kind of category founded in nature but overlaid with cultural presumption and artifice that tend to obscure whatever significance the natural facts may have. In Dixon, Montana, race is the business of the town. As the seat of the Flathead Indian agency it witnesses the administration of tribal affairs. There Superintendent Wright, kindly but exact, is head of the small racial enclave. He is the white older brother of the Indians and directs them along the lines laid out in Washington. White assistants are scattered about the rambling wooden building under the cottonwood trees, and there are numerous others, most of them mixed bloods, associated in the work.

These mixed bloods, though usually classified as Indians, are the shading off or connective fabric between the whites and the full bloods. The full bloods live down the little roads of the reservation in their cottages in winter and in their tepees in summer. They stand off a little and maintain, whether they know it or not, physical as well as psychic remoteness. The great ranges of the Mission Mountains to the east of them brood and hover portentously above their heads and make more silence, I imagine, than they do for other people of the valley. Some of the full bloods speak no English, nor do they wish to. They are proud, thick-bodied, darkly reserved. But the mixed bloods chatter and laugh across

the deeply cut chasm of race. They have found casualness, uncategorized casualness, that neither the granite reticence of their Indian forebears nor the long ambitious straining of the whites could possibly anticipate.

In the third year of the Montana Study a request came from Superintendent Wright to organize a study group. This was the Dixon Agency Study Group and it met once a week in the agency house. Roger S. Bishop, a rancher and engineer, was chairman. Phyllis Morigeau served as secretary, and Bert Hansen, who this year gave his entire time to field work for the Montana Study, usually drove out from Missoula to lead the discussions. To these and the meetings of other study groups guests came from far and near. Teachers and students, state officers, Forest Service men, churchmen, county agents, writers, newspapermen, university officers, and others from Montana and other states and from abroad came now and then as visitors. Besides them there were in Dixon twenty-nine regular members. They were agency workers, ranchers, mechanics, housewives, and teachers from the vicinity. Ed MacDonald, the tribal field agent, was there. Harry Townsend, the school superintendent, came, and Geneva Wright, the wife of the superintendent, sometimes filled in as secretary. The names tell much about this mixed and friendly group of human beings. The history of the little place speaks in them, but history is abstract and fleeting. The hardships and humor of that life, the adventure and the magnificent capacity of men to live into the situation, whatever it may be, are only hinted in them.

This casual ruggedness of culture out of which the Dixon community is only now emerging is shown in some notes made by one of the members of the study group. They are about the valley's past and one of its MacDonalds:

But of all the people in that community, Duncan MacDonald appeared to be the most significant. He was half Scotch and half Indian and lived around Dixon all his life which was about 87 years. He was a well-educated man even though he didn't go to school very much, and could talk about any subject you could bring up. He liked to tell Indian Legends too and could speak Selish as well as he could English. They say that he was the one who dug the irrigation ditch through town and built the Gould house. He also had a place up at Ravalli right by the bridge. Built a big white house and lived in it for a little while but he and his Indian wife, Quilse, soon moved back into the little log house that still stands up there and rented the big place for a hotel. They had only one son who died when he was a young man and it about broke their hearts. Duncan loved to clear and burn brush and whenever people saw a smoke up that way they'd say, "Well, I guess Duncan must be out burning

brush again." He was a good neighbor too. Built an irrigation ditch for his own use and all the neighbors used it too but he never made any fuss about it. After he moved away though, they were always quarreling about the water.

When the N.P. [Northern Pacific Railroad] came through, Duncan was the one who helped make the survey for the right of way, and they got him to be the hunter to supply the crews with meat besides. The Company gave him a lifetime pass on the railroad from then on. He was a sure shot and loved to hunt and fish. In fact he had an old rifle that belonged to his father, which he kept in first-class condition.

He loved to talk about his father, old Angus MacDonald. He must have been a wonderful fellow. Came from Scotland in the '30's. His folks wanted him to be a lawyer and sent him to a private school, but he got a job with the Hudson Bay Company and took a trip from Liverpool and travelled way around the Horn up to the Columbia River. He got to be in charge of one of the trading posts over at Colville, Washington, and there he married an Indian squaw named Catherine who was a sister of one of the chiefs. They had thirteen children, and Duncan was the last one of them alive.

Duncan said his father travelled all over the Northwest Country, knew every trader from Canada to Great Salt Lake and the highest peak over in the Mission Range and the lake up in Glacier Park were named after him. He wrote about quite a lot of his experiences and even did a play or two, one of them about the Whitman massacre. One of his stories told how he joined a party of Indians just before they left for a big battle. Said they rode around on their horses singing a war chant. He stripped off his clothes to the waist, daubed himself with vermilion paint, put on an eagle feather war bonnet and rode his buffalo pony around with them, singing as loud as the rest of them. The Indians never forgot that and told about it for years afterward.

With the kind of family tree he had, it was no wonder Duncan was an unusual man. After his wife died he moved back to Dixon and lived in a little house across the tracks . . . he lived till after 1936. . . .

From life like this the community of Dixon emerged. The study group consolidated that tradition and gave it pride. The mixed bloods, who could not reenter the reticence of their native past nor on the other hand get fully free of it, found in the meetings a new, bright thing. For the first time they saw where they were and in seeing were able to adapt themselves better to their situation.

The mixed bloods are now the major part of the Indian population in Montana. Because they are articulate and know the white man's ways they often dominate the reservations. They run things, capture the tribal councils, and sometimes use their power to the disadvantage of the full bloods and of the tribe. The Indian, says Superintendent Wright, should be legally defined as a person having, say, not less than one quarter In-

dian blood. By such definition the benefits and rights due these wards of the United States may be more easily restricted to those who have remained within the Indian community and are loyal to its culture. When men with as little as one sixteenth Indian blood, or one thirty-second, capture the affairs of the group they are more than likely to import into the situation an individualism, a personal thrust and competition, that, like smallpox, works havoc in the defenseless Indian community.

A culture without community is imposed by them on the ancient forms and loyalties of Indian tribal life; and although the result is usually a mode of social decadence that few can observe with equanimity, it may bring personal advantage to those who impose it. These marginal tribesmen are not antisocial. Their lives, however, have been neither Indian nor white. They have little community with either one. They have not belonged, except legally. They have acquired only the desultory loyalties and personal ambitions of the scattered culture of the whites in their vicinity, and thus may come into the Indian community not as brothers but as adventurers.

The same disintegration in the country as a whole is taking place through the impact of urban life on rural community culture. It may be less conspicuous in a broader area; the racial categories of the Indian reservation may not give it dramatic clarification, but it is no less real. There was a marriage rush in Oklahoma when oil was discovered years ago on the reservations. Smart white lads of the towns, it is said, roared into the Indian villages by scores in order to marry not only a squaw but an oil well. Probably some of the story is true.

### *10. Culture Without Context*

The mixed bloods of Montana live in a culture without consistent context. Life comes to them with its hands behind its back and what is hidden there the mixed bloods do not know. In one hand are Indian customs, in the other, white. Whim or chance or a wild guess alone will decide what one of the scattered assortment will be next. In the same way, but in a broader field, all of us today live without relevance. We live in a culture increasingly without context.

What is context? How can our culture be without it? Context is the relevant detail in any situation. It is a clustering of data and interests having significance of some sort. It may be relevance of custom, emotion, biology, logic, or anything else. Their coherence in the situation, their appropriateness in respect to one another are context.



A voice, let us say, is the voice of a human being, a young man, blue-eyed, one's brother talking to his father at dinner. The voice comes from a background of long familiarity. It belongs in a well-known pattern of events and is intimately a part of them. It belongs, in other words, to a concrete, contextual situation and as such acquires most of its meaning. It has context.

If the voice is removed, however, from familiar clusters of relevant detail, it loses these implicit connotations. It comes from the radio, let us say, alone, without past, amid alien and irrelevant circumstances. It is a voice, not more, and to that extent is both fragmental and abstract. It comes without context.

In this sense our culture is without context. We are caught in an increasing flood of things that pour in from many directions without appropriateness in respect to one another. They have no time to lodge in our lives. They drift by in a tumultuous stream and other bits and novelties or repetitious fragments of debris displace them. This lack of homogeneity in the contents of our experience is not unrecognized by modern poets. What order the modern world may have seems not within life but outside of it. What controls may govern living seem not within our human limits but beyond them. From within, living seems compulsive, scattered. Our experience is uncategorized. Our world though more organized externally than ever before, still comes upon us in jolts and fragments. Its impact corresponds to no inherent order of life. Its effect on ourselves, our families, our communities, is disintegrative. Thus the human enterprise for many a modern poet, as the earlier Eliot, is a futility, and human society, as for Robinson Jeffers, an increasing madness.

It is true of course that nothing in human culture actually is isolated. Culture, indeed, is just that patterning of the ways of life into what we call the customs of the country, the habits of a group, the ways of a people. These clusters of customs have coherence of some sort. No datum of culture is without a crowded accompaniment of other data. The world presents itself plurally and no moment or bit of being is without companions. These accompaniments, miscellaneous though they may be, are a context in a sense, but they are hardly significant context. Significant context contributes to human continuity and value. It is a context which contributes to the clarity and import of living, not a miscellany which confuses it. Context thus is significant, and cultural context is significant of human value.

This contextual relevance is organic in character. It is organic rather than fragmental. It relates to the human being as a whole. Though the

specializations of behavior which mark the modern era may be embedded in an extensive organization or institution of some sort, such as the big government, the big university, the big corporation, the army, the labor union, the big church or baseball league, or the great city, this large pattern of organization is beyond the limits of concrete experience. Most of it is without relevant context. It is appreciatively irrelevant. Though efforts may be made educationally to extend the range of relevance the race has become hopeless. Efforts of this kind always were hopeless. With limited capacities a man cannot incorporate in himself an unlimited field of expanding experience and operation. Today he stands in defeat before a disordered world and says that the defeat is unimportant. He rejects inner relevance and claims that context is unimportant. But the defeat nevertheless corrupts him. It is a failure devised in his own nature. Until he sees that his valid nature and value lie in his limitations, until he finds the relevant context of life in the integrity of life itself, he will continue the disastrous regress.<sup>8</sup>

Under what conditions has a culture significant context? Three questions here are pertinent: Under what conditions are the things in a culture related to each other in multiple and organic ways? Under what conditions is this organic situation brought within the limits of human acquaintance? Under what conditions is this context not only brought within human limits, but identified with human interest, value, and pattern to the extent that it becomes human fact? Our culture is without context. What then is conditional to the creation of a relevant and significant context?

### *11. The Community and Its Context*

The answer is the human community. Though no complete answer is possible in this querulous problem of cultural and personal disorder, the community is the field where answers will be found. It is conditional to the integration, the proper limitation, and the human relevance of cultural context.

The community is the integration of the parts and functions of life as expressed in the group. It is the way whereby the multiple functions of men are made organically whole. When Plato says that "human nature

<sup>8</sup> See Baker Brownell, "Technology and the Human Limit," address at Washington University, St. Louis, Feb. 11, 1948; printed in the *Journal of Higher Education*, March, 1949.

is not two-fold or manifold, for one man plays one part only,"<sup>4</sup> he lays the ground, not only for the oligarchies, class systems, and slavery of the past, but the sterile specializations, frustrations, and mass organizations of the present. The community is the repudiation of this tendency in thinking.

It is not enough to define the community as any area of common interest. Nor can the special-interest groups, the clubs, the teams, the trade associations, the professional organizations, the service groups, and so on be included among true communities. These are increasing in influence. They may be displacing the community. Even in the rural regions, as Kolb and Wileden show,<sup>5</sup> they become the substitutes for community life. Unless they are able to absorb the diverse functions of a whole life, however, they remain special-interest groups, not communities.

In large-scale organizations there is a powerful tendency to substitute other values for human ones. Symbols, administrative abstractions, and other negotiable currencies tend to replace nonnegotiable human contexts. In the urban regions, in great industries, in the political structures of great states, the opportunities for living initiative and control are ever reduced or are centered in fewer and fewer people. The decline of the small community, including the family, is a critical part of that tendency. Human life is broken down into various bits, colors, and strands and then rewoven into a nameless fabric. It is woven in without reference to the normal coherence of a living pattern.

What will be the outcome? Modern large-scale organizations in their total effect are an attack not on civilization—they are our civilization—but an attack on the human being. Civilization, as exhibited in such organizations, is out of scale and out of joint in respect to the human beings in it. Continued attack will result not only in the destruction of the community of human life but of the massive predators that feed upon it. The dinosaurs, it is said, ate themselves out of existence.

This decline has taken place in the relevance of living activities. The processes of making things, for example, have been segregated increasingly from the enjoyment or consumption of them. Once in the family and community we were in some proximity to the productive process. We are not now, nor are our children. Mass industry with its over-all, horizontal organization, its assembly line methods, puts emphasis, so far

<sup>4</sup> Plato, *Republic*, III, p. 397E.

<sup>5</sup> J. H. Kolb and A. F. Wileden, *Special Interest Groups in Rural Society* (Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Wisconsin, Research Bulletin 84, Dec., 1927).

as the human worker is concerned, on the making of fragments. The man does part of the job, makes a piece of the product, with little or no contextual experience of the whole.

This decline in participative experience is true not only in industrial production but in the arts, sports, education, and religion. The loss of relevance and meaning marks tragically the decline of the human community in western culture. It is essentially a spiritual decline. The desperate adherence to dead myths in religious institutions, or the deliberate and fictitious resuscitation of them, the effort above all to keep the appearance of the faith without too much concern about the conditions behind it, are characteristic of religion without community. For religion is primarily communal, as St. Paul<sup>6</sup> says, and the community is spiritual. Religious expression which is not a mark of the integrity of the community, but serves instead as a mask for it, or an openly divisive influence within it, marks the decline both of the community and of religion.

The impoverishment of the community and the indifference to significant context in urban culture have their technological correlates. Just as community decline has been associated with changes in technological methods, so the forces that may stabilize and enrich the community will be implemented by technology. That technology is already at hand. The Tennessee Valley Authority, as I have said, is an example. It suggests a necessary technology, if the community is to survive.

## 12. *The Urban Culture of Aggression*

The profound cleavage between community life and urban life results in increasing differences between the two cultures. Although it is true that rural life is becoming urbanized and family life takes on the pattern of the market, the subway, and the comic strip, the character of community experience within its own pattern is increasingly removed from that of our urban culture, and mutual understanding is lost.

An urban man is increasingly indifferent to the value of the human community and careless of its disintegration. His life is scattered across the shattering machine of the city. He is a cluster of uncoherent fragments, and what unity he has tends to be abstract and fictitious or the unity of a bright grain of sand, a broken bit of glass, glittering for a moment as it clatters down with others into the irrelevant contiguity of

<sup>6</sup> See Josiah Royce, *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916).

a concrete mixer. He belongs to many publics but to no community. In that crowded world men become, not men with concrete contexts and differences, but "labor" or "veterans" or "audience" or "commuters." They are selectively cross-sectioned. Like parts are assembled in multitudes and we take people no longer—because in such masses we cannot take them—as unique human beings. We know human beings not as emotionally unique, contextually differentiated, face-to-face experiences; we take them as a class.

We take them in classes mainly to manipulate them or to adjust them as a group to our purpose. It is a calculating relationship. It is not friendship, impulse, or love, nor enmity or anger. Our approach to a mass situation, if intelligent at all, is one of calculated design. We must abstract and condense the massive experience, cast aside its wild patterns, and rationalize it. Our purpose is manipulative.

Those who say that man will best find himself in a large-scale, highly differentiated, and mobile society have yet to answer how he can be whole there and free and at peace. In spite of these unanswered questions the thesis has widespread acceptance. It should be made clear again and again, however, that the ideal of the small community is not a cult of isolation. It does not repudiate a larger order or withdraw from it. On the contrary, the ideal of the small community probably is necessary in any world order of integrity. It insists that social organization of whatever scale be oriented on the community. The critical failure of these times is in the fact that much of this organization is not so oriented.

Under urban conditions a man rarely can behave toward another in terms of the unique values and contexts of that human being. What initiative he may have becomes a manipulative center in respect to a class of anonymous human objects called the "crowd," the "market," the "workers," the "consumers," and so on. Toward these objects he can behave never as a person, mainly because he has there few relationships with persons as such; he can behave toward the class only as a manipulator (or in defense against it), and his efforts are directed toward its control or use.

The urban attitude, in other words, is aggressive. It is exploitative. The interest is not in humane relations but in power. The personal give and take, the mutuality of living, are replaced by power. In so impersonal a situation it cannot well be otherwise.

This aggressiveness is inherent in what Simmel calls a money economy and an intellectualistic culture. It is inevitable in a mass society, but it should not be taken as the whole story. Our culture is infinitely complex

and many cogent interpretations of it are possible. Nevertheless the tendency to reduce human beings for purposes of large-scale organization to classes of undifferentiated objects does favor a manipulative power culture. Community life, on the contrary, is counterbalanced at every moment of action by concrete interests and relevant emotion. It is resistant to easy classification. The wide-ranging control of the great machine is not in rhythm with its tough, variegated contextual nature. Community life is too slow, too encumbered with imaginative relevance, to be "effective" in the mass operations of urban life. It is too human.

Urban life as a matter of common observation is restless, nervously unstable, aggressive. It drives to dominance and unmitigated mastery. It is the seat of cultural aggression. It is the seat also of physical aggression. The aggression of urban life may be remarked historically both in domestic affairs and international relations. But only in the industrial city, based on mass technology, has this aggression reached the disastrous extremes of this day. It is well known that social stratification in the city is greater than in rural districts and that the opportunities for the exploitation of one urban group by another are greater. But the aggression of the city on the rural regions is less well known—except among rural people.

The concentration of financial control in the cities, the differential freight rates, the discriminative price-basing points, the tariffs, the urban management of national publications, of movies, chain stores, chain banks, wholesale houses, elevators, need not be explored. The tax structures bearing most heavily on the real estate and the tangible properties of the farmers, the corporations defined legally to the relative disadvantage of homes and family continuity, these need not be dealt with here. Though it is true that cities may pay out in taxation more than the amount of tax money spent within their borders, this is far outweighed, according to available evidence, by the indirect subsidies paid to the cities by the rural districts. There is little doubt that the 57 million rural people in the United States or the 70 million living in localities of less than 10,000 population have lost the large measure of effective power and technological advantage that their numbers and function justify.

I say this in spite of the well-known fact that many members of our state legislatures are elected in "rotten boroughs" through which rural districts with far less population may have representation equal to that of more heavily populated urban districts. A greater degree of home rule for cities has long been an urgent need. The cities of more than 2,500 people in this country have 60 per cent of the total population, produce 75 per cent of the national income, pay 90 per cent of the taxes,

and still have, it is said,<sup>7</sup> only 25 per cent of the representation in our state legislatures. Clearly such a situation is unsound in a democratic polity.

But the justice of the matter may be considerably more complex than at first is apparent. If home rule for cities is to be attained by increasing their representation in the state legislatures the situation in many states would be no less evil; it would only be reversed. The rural districts would now be without home rule. Their defense against the aggressive drive of the city would be broken. This does not justify the present inequity of representation in the state legislatures, but it goes a long way toward explaining it.

With legislatures dominated by urban interests, rural home rule would become practically impossible. This at least is what many rural people think. They would add, no doubt, that home rule for great cities is really home rule for a massive, impersonal organization grinding its way to dominance. It is not the home rule of diffused, personal participation in affairs, such as rural people know. It is not the intimate sense of communal responsibility that marks many areas of rural life.

Legislative equity alone is not enough to meet this difficult and complex problem. The social and economic dilemmas of the city are not solely urban matters. They cannot be answered solely in urban terms. The cities are far from self-sufficient. Their biological patterns of behavior and their economy are largely parasitic, and in spite of their disproportionately high income, their wealth, their ownership of rural property, their tax payments, and their power—or because of them—their problems bulge across urban margins into rural fields and resources. Such problems must be handled on a state-wide, national, or even international basis. City people use the state-supported highways, the state parks, the insane asylums, the penitentiaries, the correctional schools, the teachers' colleges and the universities, and the state police and inspection services fully as much and in many cases much more than do the rural groups, although the tax money for their support may not be spent in urban districts. Urban legislative control, like the sudden passion for states' rights among many Northern businessmen, is likely to involve no control at all in these larger areas of operation. It involves in other words not so much home rule or states' rights as freedom to run profit-wild and power-hungry over the feeding grounds of natural resources, communities, and human beings.

Beyond all this is the principle, wisely incorporated in the federal con-

<sup>7</sup> Lawrence Lader, "Our Plundered Cities," in *This Week* magazine, Chicago Daily News, August 27, 1949.

stitution, of regional representation as well as popular representation. Thus Montana, with two senators in the Upper House and with a total population about equal to that of one ward in Chicago, has as much representation in the Senate as has all of Illinois or New York. This too is an inequity of a sort, but few thoughtful Americans would therefore abolish the United States Senate. Most of us dread to consider a future in which this country might be governed dominantly by the crowded populations of the Eastern Seaboard.

This regional representation in the Senate is really the representation of the future. It is a device whereby the young, the undeveloped, and the *potential* of this country may have their voice in affairs along with the crowded present. Here too are represented the soil, the rivers, the forests, the mountains, and above all the hopes of those regions as well as the people living there. The stream of nationally indispensable men from such regions has its source partly in the fact that the human community is more central in the life of such regions. The patterns of behavior are more personal, more human. The representatives of such regions emerge from a context of people known rather fully and well.

From the rural regions, as from a colony or a conquered province, youth and wealth drain into the cities. There the former are consumed, largely without reproductive replacement, and the latter concentrated into fewer and fewer hands. Concerning this drainage, O. E. Baker<sup>8</sup> shows that in educational subsidies alone the rural districts of America contribute to the cities roughly \$1,260,000,000 each year. This is based on the decade of 1920-30 and is computed on an estimated cost to the farmer of \$2,000, for raising and educating a child to the age of fifteen, or about \$150 a year over and above what the child may contribute during that time to the farm income. This multiplied by the net number leaving the farms during that decade, usually to live their productive lives in the city, makes a total of \$12,600,000,000 for the decade. This is cost paid by the farmer for the education of children who leave the farm and return little to it in wealth or production. It is an uncompensated cost incident to the migration to urban regions. Other uncompensated costs that the farmer bears to support city life, including two to three billion dollars in the settlement of farm estates inherited by city and village people, five billion dollars in mortgage debts paid by farmers to nonfarmers, and rentals paid to nonfarmers, raise the total of wealth transferred from farms to the cities, in excess of that moving the other

<sup>8</sup> O. E. Baker, Ralph Borsodi, and M. L. Wilson, *Agriculture in Modern Life* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1939), Chap. IV, p. 73.



way, to about twenty-five billion dollars for the decade. This amounts to about one fifth of the gross value of farm products. It represents inexcusable exploitation of rural life by an aggressive urban culture and economy.

Nor do the benefits in civilization seem to justify these sacrifices of rural and community interests to the aggressive city. The dominating urban civilization of Europe and America can hardly be called a success. The notorious crime rates, the terrifying increase in juvenile delinquency, insanity, neuroses, the personal and social disintegration, the excessive rates of drunkenness, suicide, divorce, and abortion are primarily urban in origin or correlated with the increasing urbanization of life. The birth rates in large cities from one fifth to one third below what is necessary even to maintain the population, the cycles of price inflation, boom, and crash, the wild waste of resources, the cycles of war and human misery, the sense of human insecurity, hatred, and doom, are also mainly urban. The western world has come to the margins of collapse. It is time to recognize our urban culture of aggression for what it is.

It is not clear that urban Moscow is any less aggressive than New York, or London in the long run less aggressive than Berlin or Tokyo. Defenders of the urban pattern of living and its unconscious apologists often assert that the aggressiveness of this culture comes from certain unfortunate policies within the system, not from the urban system itself. But the facts hardly justify this assertion. The rural people of Russia compose 83 to 89 per cent of the population, for example, but their representation in the Soviet government is only 27 to 28 per cent<sup>9</sup> and these representatives, appointed by the Party, in many cases are not peasants. As for the urban aggression of the Russian government, ask the peasant parties of Poland, Serbia, Bulgaria, the farmers of Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the rural folk of eastern Germany and East Prussia, if they are any longer able to answer.

Meanwhile in the United States the march of the city continues to widen the differences in wealth and advantage between rural and urban regions. In the southeastern farm areas are 13.4 per cent of the nation's children and only 2.2 per cent of the nation's income.<sup>10</sup> In the north-eastern nonfarm areas are 27 per cent of the nation's children and 42 per cent of the nation's income. In Michigan each dollar of income per farm child is matched against \$4.31 income per nonfarm child. Or again, in the country as a whole, 63 per cent of school money comes from taxes

<sup>9</sup> Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 411.

<sup>10</sup> Angus McDonald in *The New Republic*, May 12, 1947, p. 42.

levied on only one third of the taxable resources of the nation. Thus in one way or another the city seizes its advantage and exploits it.

This aggressive culture of urban life is inevitable so long as the city remains to a great degree predatory in nature, dependent for its power and cultural domination on what is largely an uncompensated exploitation of the less-aggressive rural and community life around it. It should be made clear, of course, that the city is not a person, or a deliberate, intentional consciousness in public affairs, although I have used the word for the sake of brevity in that way; the word is merely the summary of a complex concatenation of tendencies which seem to be mainly as I describe them, aggressive, thrusting, predatory, in reference to other types of events. To live out its predatory nature the city must behave aggressively both physically and psychically. Since it has not the resources in itself to survive, nor the capacity to give back to a system as much as it takes out, it must conquer, and continue to conquer, or die.

No one can say that the urban capitalism of New York, the urban imperialism of Paris, and the urban communism of Moscow are not aggressive in intention. Wars may and probably will continue to come. Berlin or Tokyo or London or Rome may be extinguished, but the aggressive culture and the military temper of our age will continue without amelioration so long as the mass society endures, and power and production remain highly centralized in great cities. Final victory of one or another mass society will only intensify internal aggression and domestic exploitation.

In order to exist the predatory city must expand at the expense of other regions. The competition for raw resources and for markets reduces not only its own hinterland to colonialism but drives on into the world in a bitter struggle with other urban centers for wider and wider domination. Mass wars are the inevitable correlate of the cosmopolitan culture. They may be internal wars of suppression or external wars of extermination. Though different in technique, timing, and drama, these wars amount to about the same thing in human consequence.

### *13. War and the Human Community*

Reorientation is necessary to the survival of western freedom and peace. This means reorientation in behalf of the true community and the restoration of the land and folk in a balanced and stable relationship. It is the price of survival. Business and political leaders, professional

men and intellectuals, fail to face it. Often they do not dare face it. Their education has been negative in this respect. They have learned to value false gods. They have been seduced by bright, divisive cultures, specialized perfections and privileges, glittering fragments, gadgets, ready-made arts, and importations bought promiscuously without relevance to the basic making-using rhythm that is central in any good life. They live on the loot of a world, on trinkets and odds and ends, the only value of which is often the thrill of acquisition. When action is solely instrumental and enjoyment solely receptive the values of life will lie in acquisition.

In a world where the cycle of production and consumption is broken, or expanded beyond the perceptual range of a human being, there is decadence. Whether this cycle is broken in the arts or industry, in the sports or in education, or in reproduction and child care, the result is the same. The fragmentation of these basic functions, with the producing life more and more detached from the consuming or enjoying life, and with significant action more and more segregated from appropriate emotion, results in disintegration and community decay.

The instruments of reorientation are not one but many. No one key reform—except a more general recognition of the problem—no one readjustment is sufficient. The instruments of reorientation necessarily are multiple. Only very briefly can they be suggested. In other parts of this book I consider them more fully. These instruments are educational, technological, industrial, artistic, religious, social. A new world reinstated within human norms and values must be made. A reorientation in values is the basic need. The problem well may be too great to be solved or even recognized by our generation.

Truth is more than a report; it is an organization of values. The modern scholar has yet to discover it. Efficiency is more than a machine; it is a human consequence. In the excess of the great city, its dominance, its lack of balance, and the drainage into it of rural life and resources without commensurate return there is only corruption. Though a new balance and reorientation are now feasible, say engineers and educators such as Arthur E. Morgan, Morris L. Cooke, Ovid Eshbach, and the directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority, there is relatively little change for the better.

In the problem of urban aggression this reorientation in industry, scholarship, technology, and politics is all of a piece. In the same way reorientation in the arts, religion, and social expression is the problem of making the human community once more central. Until the arts and religion are returned to people they will remain decorative perhaps but

meretricious, external, decadent. Because they have become abstracted from living men and have taken their patterns from fragments of men, specialists, virtuosos, and the stained-glass professionals of the church and atelier, the modern institutional expressions of the human spirit are often little more than massive frivolities.

Folk movements in the arts and religion have been developed within recent decades. Thus in the arts and the expressions of the spirit, in technology and even to some degree in industry and education, there are indications of reorientation toward the human being. These hints and glimmerings are not enough in themselves to inspire confidence in the future. They may be the afterglow of the sunset or the premonitions of dawn. No one can tell. They indicate at least what must be done, and the way that it must be done, if we would have survival with freedom and without chronic war.


PART VI

*Education and the Community*



1. *The Swollen Word*
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## 1. *The Swollen Word*

Education is a swollen word pumped full nowadays with almost everything that comes handy. It dribbles over with multiple functions. It has in it the old, the new, and the half new, the believed and the half believed. The word is full of inconsistent hopes and futilities. It means anything and everything. It is a word that of itself, we hope, may do something to save a desperate situation.

The unrest in education is portentous and unmistakable. From the famous Harvard report<sup>1</sup> and the innumerable curricular amendments that go under the name of new college systems to the chronic complaints about the elementary practices, the signs say that not all is well. But the unrest results in little of consequence. We labor on education as slaves on the pyramids, adding one thing on top of another and then one more thing and so on indefinitely. We work along without the courage, it would seem, to make a clean-cut design or the daring to rebuild from the bottom. For all our trouble we get, of course, just a bigger pile of stones.

The process of educational accretion goes on. The littered past, the present, and the future are silted down indiscriminately on each other. The colleges in this respect are worse than the rest of the formal educational system, but all are bad enough. Where educational reorientation is needed, there is only sedimentation. Where habit and convention at last have broken down, there has been little or no replacement. Education needs intelligent reconstruction, but we get only more sedimentation. Little efforts, endless additions, and patchwork changes are made.

The trouble is the loss of focus. Once this educational focus was in a supernatural community and a formal program of salvation. The early Harvard, for example, was centered in a fairly homogeneous culture. There was no doubt where Harvard was going or what it wanted to attain. Today Harvard is little more than an undefined clot in a vast and heterogeneous culture. A vaguely generous optimism about the human individual or the potentially human individual, a friendly uncertainty and casualness about educational ends, an inarticulate faith that intelligence applied to the details of the situation will make unnecessary an

<sup>1</sup> *General Education in a Free Society*, report by the Harvard Committee (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1945).

organic comprehension of the whole, are enough for Harvard, or for most of Harvard, today. Definite direction is more than likely rejected as unbecoming in a liberal school. Perhaps that is right; perhaps that is the university; still the lack of focus in education remains the real trouble.

Formally education in the old days was supported by ecclesiastical certitudes. Informally the intimate cooperation within the family along with vocational apprenticeship within the small industrial group preserved the traditional skills needed to carry society along. These gradually have been dissolved. The ecclesiastical absolute inevitably broke down into multiple sectarianism, and less sacred doctrines took its place. Secular salvation, usually called a career or success, was based on the drawing out of the individual's inner abilities. Education today is usually described as this drawing out.

Since the difference between the secular and sacred is no longer so pertinent as it was, anything and everything relevant to the individual, whether it be vocational, intellectual, physical, or in any other category of interest, is educationally appropriate. No other principle of selection is possible on this basis, and President Hutchins' endeavor to hypostasize the "intellectual life" and abstract it whole and clean from certain writings, called great books, without much reference to the contexts of the modern situation is romantic but unavailing. He tries to give his university focus, but he finds that focus only in the frozen triumphs of the past. Like so much else in this tortured world it is an education of escape. It fixes on what minds have done, not on what minds must do. It remains within the frame of current individualism, personal efflorescence, and the delight in individual power and understanding. Though its subject may be in part religious and communal, its quality is neither one of these.

The individual has been made the basing point in our disorderly modern situation, but this is not enough. Neither is science solely as a method enough. It serves too easily any master. With little in the culture of the individual to give it form, the educational process perforce is indiscriminate and accretionary. It piles down endlessly in disordered glitter. But the result is junk.

## *2. The Atomistic Individual*

Individualism, as we know it today, is atomistic. It can give no stable form or continuity either to society or education. It has become increas-



ingly a jungle philosophy of tooth and claw, of rash, wild vegetation and disordered growth. In supplanting the despotisms and institutional tyrannies that held men so long, individualism supplied no alternative continuity, no inner form, no ordering of life. This inner initiative toward order is found not in the "individual" as such, but in a more concrete human reality. It is found in the community.

The doctrine of individual development, worthy as it is in an appropriate milieu, has been taken with an enthusiasm that is both short-sighted and uncritical. As a result education has lost its community-creating power. It has become dispersive and fragmental, and the very meaning of moral coherence in our society is denied. Because educators have taken too little heed of the integrative needs of life, their efforts have been dissipative. Because they have had little knowledge of the human community, their work has been self-defeating. It has led in many cases toward personal and social disorganization.

Educators have assumed that individual development will itself ensure wholesome social life. Is it not true, they ask, that the sociality of human nature is one of those inner interests which will be drawn out in the process of individual education? They assume that social life is a function of individual expression. They take for granted that life may remain individual-centered and still be identified with social responsibility, cooperation, and service. They have turned inward, less for freedom now than for escape. They try to find through removal to what is called the "intellectual life," the "fine arts," "business," "science," "scholarship," "religion," a life limited in its social responsibilities, governed by its own creed, self-sufficient in its values, and without much reference to the responsibilities and consequences in the human situation as a whole.

In the wildly conflicting culture of today this is natural enough. It is a defensive individualism. The power and delight found by the specialist within the pure culture of his choice are brightly rewarding as compared with the frustrations of the muddled world outside. He is often convinced, furthermore, partly with justice, that this withdrawal into a kind of monastic seclusion is the best service to the world that he can perform. Some call it sacrifice. But granting the positive values of specialism and the need for a restrictive environment in which work can be done, it still is a theory of refuge. The specialist has abandoned love for security, or what seems security.

These cysts and functional segregations, these intellectual and artistic aristocracies, cause more than they correct the defeats of our times. The uncritical confidence of some educators that all this will work together

for good is not well founded. Though the relations to each other of these specialties may be clear enough in the wide-ranging, impersonal social structure of today, their relations to the human being are haphazard. Within the human context they are more disorganic than organic. Men are related to them not as whole human beings; they are related to them, and through them to one another, only as fragments. Within these specialties men repudiate wider responsibility and thereby defeat themselves. In this functional provincialism, far more than in rural life and little places, are the real dangers today of narrow loyalties and isolation.

This is because special-interest groups of this sort, though functional in terms of a mass society, are not functional in terms of the human community. They cut across the family and the personal spontaneous associations, or make of them accidental relationships in a system oriented to a remote objective. They ignore the intimate associations that are central in the community. For the community structurally is not linear, nor in this limited sense scientific; it is integral. Its components, as I have said, may be the family, the autonomous group, the neighborhood, the village, and sometimes even larger syntheses of people, but always those components are people, not abstracted functions of them. Many educators forget that a process focused on the "individual" or the special interest as such repudiates the community of which that individual may be a member. As such the "individual" is an abstraction made, as Rousseau said, by withdrawal from its communal context. No one has experienced an individual; the very fact of communication and of mutual stimulus and response involves society. The individual in short is a moral abstraction that in today's excess is turning out to be a bad one.

But do we not find the individual in experience, as so many of us assume? Is it not a simple fact of perception? Modern philosophy was founded on that assumption. It resides without protest even in our syntax and grammar. It seems to be increasingly evident, nevertheless, that the individual in our experience, the I, the you, is one of those selective stereotypes which does not stand up under pressure. The symbols of experience, the languages wherein we think and sometimes move, are social so far as they are in the realm of communication at all. Though all experience has its individualistic aspect, it cannot be solely individual. It must be social too. This quality, attributed by Dewey and A. W. Moore to consciousness, can be attributed with equal force to the more inclusive nature of experience. What happens to the human being, or rather what is happening mutually in the intricate give and take of a man in his social and physical environment, is always socially condi-

tioned. This is experience. It is always in some sense genetically and actually social.

"A separate individual," says Cooley, "is an abstraction unknown in experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals. The real thing is Human Life. . . . In other words 'society' and 'individuals' do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing. . . ."<sup>2</sup> And no one, it may be added, has ever been a separate individual. The fiction of it has become a pretext for withdrawal from communal life.

### 3. Education Against Freedom

We have come to associate freedom with this abstract individual. Promoters of such individualism, called "rugged" or "free enterprisers" hire full-page advertisements in the newspapers to advance their creeds. But freedom here is more the freedom to withdraw the values and profits of an enterprise from the context in which they were created than the freedom of responsible participation. It is freedom to remove from their creative context the gains inherent in cooperative endeavor and to control them independently of that context. The one is the freedom of escape and the sharp segregation of functions and values. It is atomistic freedom, like the individualism from which it arises. The other is immanent freedom. It is freedom implicit in the creative processes of community cooperation.

I do not suggest that all rural groups have this vitality and freedom. Far from it. There are rural slums as well as urban ones. There are Jeeter Lesters and Jack Durbeyfields as well as Abe Lincolns. And there are rural groups bound in the proprieties and the dullness of dormant minds. Movement in these groups is likely to be the slow routine of a solely biological impulse and destiny. Rural life is by no means altogether an idyllic balance of biology and brains. Marx called it, with typical urban arrogance, rural idiocy.

But the fact remains that only under the conditions of rural community life may human freedom be participative rather than escapist. Here free behavior can remain within the context to which it natively belongs. This, to be sure, is a normative and monitory point of view, not strictly

<sup>2</sup> Quoted from C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), by Carle C. Zimmerman, *Family and Civilization* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 43.

descriptive. It is an interpretive method that assumes the freedom of men. But this itself is descriptive in its way of the community of meaning in which we live. It is the hypothesis underlying social responsibility. It is involved in the pattern of social organization and is an effective principle therein. Freedom in other words may be observed in a communal context of meanings. Withdraw it from that context, as does "individualism," and its significance is lost.

Briefly the matter can be put in this way: The "individual" as such is a rather recent invention that is both abstract and incomplete. As an operating unit in the concrete world it is incomplete physically, phylogenetically, emotionally, intellectually. Still it is presumed somehow to be self-sufficient. It is treated in our educational systems often as an end in itself. The individual is looked upon in fact, if not always in theory, as the great priority. Toward it the other values of our culture are made submissive while its own are self-sufficing.

This is a predatory self-sufficiency like that of a tiger or a tapeworm. It is attained by conflict and the denial of intrinsic values in others. Though it is an aspect of Nature—if we look at Nature from only one perspective—it is not all of Nature, nor is it dominant in many of Nature's greater manifestations. Freedom of the individual, where there is no participation in the responsibilities of the community, moves without inner change from rebellion against external controls to the conquest and exploitation of others by means of external controls. This is the curse of Rousseauism, so deeply fashioned in the structure of our educational system; there is here no mean, no organon of values, no mutuality of reference among human beings.

This instant transition from the freedom to rebel to the freedom to conquer and oppress is not unusual in recent decades. The freedom that they sought is taken now as an instrument to be used for what it is worth. National and religious groups as well as individuals have moved suddenly through this dreary pattern from rebellion to oppression. Although some groups are more mature than others in the culture of freedom, there clearly has been widespread educational failure in this respect. They have not learned as yet to honor the freedom that they won.

Only within the community do conditions favor the freedom that is participative rather than exclusive. Only in an educational system focused on the community rather than on the individual can this immanent freedom become a way of life. Love or good will to men is central here: love such as Gandhi was able to make active in an entire people. But love

of this sort is not fragmental or exclusive. It is not for pieces of men, or for selected functions, or by specialists as such, or by recessive, self-centered individuals. It is communal. And so far as it is communal and human—as Gandhi said—the good will extends to other communities and other human beings.

Freedom is the orientation of behavior around the faith that life is justified by living. It is the great imperative, namely, that human living is itself worth while. In this sense worth or value is original in our lives. It is native, unique. It is created there. But this primeval insight and evaluation in human culture are more than the dark urgency usually attributed to other living things. In us the wholeness of living, which they feel implicitly, must be recognized among other alternatives. To live we must know, not merely as they know, but more articulately than they. We must reject the forces of disorganization. We must repudiate dispersion of the living, communal synthesis. This is the great priority. In the living process human values are created. Meaning is made. Our freedom in this respect is our value initiative.

Freedom indeed is a condition of all values. Through it a man's life becomes significantly directional. In its communal course his life is a preferential process through and through. A man experiences preference or at least the preferential quality in his experiences. This is the texture of his values.

Values in things may be recognized, symbolized to some extent, and poetically interpreted. But as values they never can be completely captured in a system of symbolic reference. Though Dewey<sup>3</sup> says that recognition is itself definition, I am inclined to think that values in things may be recognized but never fully defined. Their meanings are intima-tional. They are suggestions of attitude and action, but are not fully verbal or definitional. Their character is less to delimit and define, in the sense of a fixation of meaning, than to release action fluidly in certain directions.

This directional disposition of life has significance only so far as we are free. But freedom here is clearly of an organic kind. It is a character of communal life. This organic freedom of men as members of a community stands in contrast to the whim-freedom of those who are detached from the community.

Whim-freedom is illustrated in Rousseau's doctrine of the individual isolated from the compulsive forms and habits of living together. Accord-

<sup>3</sup> John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1925), Chap. V.

ing to this principle, Rousseau could leave his babies on a doorstep, seduce the maidens in the neighborhood, and found a revolution. It is the doctrine of the splendid individual standing contemptuously aside from communal responsibilities and face-to-face groups, and dependent only on the contractual State.<sup>4</sup> This kind of libertarianism arises from a doctrine of escape. It rejects the intimate organic controls of men in face-to-face groups. It shows blank disregard for the personality-making influences of such groups. In rejecting them it substitutes subservience to an authoritarian state as the only basis left for social order. This aspect of Rousseau's doctrine usually is ignored, or, if noted, is not accepted as accurately Rousseauan. It remains true, however, that his notion of human relations is based on an abstract, highly selective concept of human nature with little reference to psychological, social, and biological fact.

Organic freedom, on the contrary, involves the participation by men in social life and secular existence. It involves creative influence. It involves above all participation, not only in the rights and licenses, but also in the controls and responsibilities of behavior. If I may make a German combination somewhat reminiscent of Tönnies, it may be called *Wesenfreiheit*. This freedom is integral in communal life, never an escape from it.

Freedom is the condition that makes possible the human synthesis of means and ends. It is thus an aspect of the spiritual life. It is involved not only in productive action but in the synthesis of productive and consummatory values. This integral freedom of men is the core of the good life and of the complete human being. It is indissolubly man and his community. In one form or another, or in one myth or another, it has been the perennial theme of the mystics, prophets, and other sensitive folk from John Fox to Aldous Huxley.

On the other hand, mass organizations are the corollaries of individualism. In those fragments of a human being's life that may remain outside of them responsible freedom is impossible. The educator in his persistent emphasis on the individual helps to destroy the freedom that he means to promote. Human freedom as a functional and practical pattern of human operations can be found only in the community.

By their participation in the community men are released from the

<sup>4</sup> See *Autonomous Groups Bulletin*, edited by Spence and Rogers, Vol. III, No. 4, Report on "Autonomous Groups and Mental Health," Apt. 12-D, 22 East 47th St., New York, N.Y. See also *Autonomous Groups Bulletin* Vol. IV, No. 1, containing an adaptation of R. Nisbet, "Rousseau and Totalitarianism," *Journal of Politics*, May, 1943.

limitations of solitary life. The quality of human development lies in this continuing release and growth. When that release is treated as a function of the individual releasing himself from the bonds of the community, freedom becomes predatory; for human release should be a function of the community. To it is brought all the communal power of stabilization, enrichment, and growth which the individual as such cannot supply. Until educators reverse their field, until they direct their efforts toward realizing the potentialities of the community, education will remain not for freedom but against it.

Modern education is egocentric and disintegrative. The righteous palaver of its institutional leaders cannot obscure the fact that its social effect, particularly on the higher levels, is undemocratic and fragmentative. The quality of its individualism is derived in a competitive hierarchy of grades, credits, honors, degrees, intellectual specialism, and the arrogance of isolated scholarship. This is all of a piece in our colleges with the social specialism and snobbery, the cliques, prestige groups, and discriminatory practices and segregation.

These practices in higher education are a disgrace to America. They are destructive in respect to the 26,000 foreign students in this country, particularly to those thousands with a darker skin or a broken accent.<sup>5</sup> They are ruinous to the morale and friendly good will of our own young people. It is no accident that some of the most embittered obstruction to the development of the democratic way of life comes from college-trained and professionally trained men and women. The current synthesis of mass education and egocentric values is destructive of human integrity. It makes halfmen. But a halfman can have no initiative as a whole human being. Nor can a creature withdrawn from the fertile contexts and influences of his community be really free.

#### *4. Lewistown, Montana*

Lewistown is one of Montana's largest towns. In this mainly rural state the metropolis of the Judith Basin with its five or six thousand people is large-looming and influential. Its school system is famous for its functional relation to the community. The great buildings hum day and night with activity. People from farm and town, old and young, find there a focus of interest and production. The school system, brought

<sup>5</sup> Frank Riley and S. A. Peterson, "Foreign Visitors on American Campuses," *The Survey*, August, 1949.

to its peak largely by Superintendent C. G. Manning, is said by many educators to be the best in the state.

On the west and south and out into the Montana distances the deep curve of the Little Belt Mountains contains Lewistown and its rural area. They are old and stubborn ridges where ancient violence has left a residue of broken gulches, craters, and valleys of sapphires, coal, and great gold strikes shining in the sun. The Big Snowy Mountains continue the long rampart south of Lewistown, with only Judith Gap as a brief interruption. Northward of town are isolated groups of peaks called the Moccasin Mountains and the Judith Mountains, and beyond them, across the spired badlands of the Missouri, another lonely group, called the Little Rocky Mountains, is one of the eastern outposts of the American cordillera.

But the wealth and traditions of Lewistown are less in the mountains than in the great plain that opens out eastward. The unending level of the plain runs unbroken on and on eastward to the Red River country whence the pioneers of Lewistown came, and on still farther to the Great Lakes. There are farm people in the Judith Basin, wheat and cattle people, horsemen and ranchers, more than mountain men and miners.

They came to Lewistown with their families—or they soon got families—and built there in central Montana a town that now is more reminiscent of the midland regions of America than are most of the communities of the state. Lewistown is more contained and seemingly more stable. Its wealth is less in risk, predatory adventure, and in dreams than in more ordered continuities and the seasonal rhythms of planting and harvest. Its people and its prejudices are more settled. East of Lewistown are the oil lands of Winnett; north is the vast disorder of the Missouri badlands; west and south are the mountains, all with their violence of social pattern and their fluctuations of life; but Lewistown is different. It is not Wild West. Lewistown is emotionally sedentary.

The perverseness of human beings whose emotions are not coordinated with their practical welfare is marked among the people of Lewistown, as it is so often in other parts of America. They dislike even to the point of hatred, for example, the Hutterites who are colonized in their vicinity. The black-coated, bearded men walking circumspectly two by two along the main street, and the quiet, bonneted women sitting quaintly and oddly upright as they await their husbands, are watched with furtive anger and suspicion. "These blackbirds will overrun us," says Meade Nelle to his delivery boy as he sets out a big sack of salt, some corn syrup, and a box of soap, "but you take it out and put it in the wagon for him anyhow. He pays cash."



Though the Hutterites round out the catalogue of old fashioned virtues, as no people more deeply involved in the modern cultural pattern can, they are hated in Lewistown. And they are hated, at least in part, for their virtues. They are honest, hard-working, cash-paying, God-fearing people. But the Hutterites, like the Mennonites of which they are an offshoot, live withdrawn to themselves. They segregate their lives, their devotions, and their virtues from what they call "the world." Only thus, they believe, can they avoid contamination. They are right in this, no doubt, at least so far as their recessive absolutes of virtue are concerned. But they get no love from Lewistown. This is their dilemma. It is their tragedy, as it is perhaps, the tragedy of all human aspiration.

They fear "the world" and its insidious infections as they must in order to preserve the values that to them are most precious. They withdraw from societies of men who have persecuted them through hundreds of years, and thus find themselves increasingly isolated, spiritually alone. The youth of their group are most susceptible to this spiritual dilemma. They sense the hate directed on them perhaps more than do the elders. They are likely to realize more fully their spiritual isolation and know that it is not good.

The Hutterites withdraw as communities much as the scientific or artistic specialist withdraws as an individual into his own codes of life, or as the businessman may segregate his business practice from the bland ethics, Christianity, and good will of his Sunday mornings. All three have virtue of a kind, an intense and precious virtue; but it is virtue without responsibility beyond its segregated order. In respect to the great social matrix in which they are undeniably imbedded, theirs is the virtue of withdrawal, not of love. In the one case the individual specialist or man of business may protect himself by a kind of social indifferentism and self-concern. He segregates himself and keeps his practice pure and self-contained. In the other case the closed community protects its virtuous practices by a similar self-segregation and provincial inflexibility. Both save themselves from outer contamination at the cost of their own love toward that outer world. And thereby, in tragic paradox, they both save and lose their souls.

The Hutterites are in the Judith Basin country, but not of it. Their farms are well managed and prosperous. They pay high cash prices for their land. They bring trade to Lewistown and their orderly ways help to stabilize and enrich the region. Their families grow apace and the margin of their expansion on the land is ever widening. They have no alien loyalties to undermine either Lewistown or the country as a whole, except perhaps a somewhat alien God. Their wealth and youth do not

drain away. They obey their God's command to work peacefully and multiply; and if their business and professional counterparts in Lewistown have not heard the latter part of this behest, perhaps it is because they have a different God. Only love they do not give. Only love, and the fusions and cooperations that go with love, do they withhold. This to Lewistown is unforgivable. In all America this perhaps is the unforgivable thing.

Thus many Lewistown people hate the Hutterites; they hate them viciously and unfairly, to be sure, but inevitably in a culture where mutual acceptance and cooperation are of primary importance. In America there is no hatred greater than that for groups who consider themselves a people apart. There is no intolerance or resentment greater than toward those who set up exclusive cultures of their own and try to live in social cysts, enclaves, or, as it were, cultural islands, without inner accommodation to the great courses of American life. This American insistence on love is often cruel and unfair. That is its paradox. But the great assimilative impulse in American life nevertheless is probably our salvation.

To the Negro in America this assimilative impulse becomes brutal rejection. And because the impulse is frustrated it becomes more brutal. This is not due to any deliberate withdrawal on the Negro's part. The colored people often are more generous-minded, more impulsively participative, and more deeply identified in American culture than their persecutors. There are other injustices and stupidities. Many people forget that there can be communities without withdrawal and difference without hatred. But the American impulse toward mutuality and cooperation nevertheless is sound. No exclusive provincialism, no cryptoculture, on the part of communities can be justified. Nor can any self-imposed segregation of racial, religious, economic, or professional groups be valid. Cultural cysts in American society soon become cultural tumors, often malignant. A philosophy of the community or of a community-centered educational system must always be considered in this context.

The community, in short, cannot be founded on withdrawal. It cannot live, Janus-faced, by love in one direction and suspicion in the other. It cannot survive the moral dualism which is the tragic paradox of Hutterism and similar self-segregative creeds. As Gandhi has shown, the community when rightly understood is the source of world good will and the inspiration of peaceful organization. It probably is the only source.

America is passionately assimilative. Its culture, to describe it figuratively, is blindly, urgently, but withal spiritually assimilative. Often it is stupidly directed. The signs are confused or lost in the smoke of bigotry. But the assimilative impulse is still necessary and good. Self-imposed segregation of encysted groups within our culture is rightly intolerable. Lewistown, however, is not always wise either in its hatreds or its loves. It hates the quiet, orderly, god-fearing Hutterites, not because the Hutterites do damage to the town, but because they do it good without love. They resist cultural assimilation. They want their own schools. They want no intermarriage with outsiders. Their church and their families are closed rooms so far as Lewistown is concerned, but they avail themselves of tax exemptions. They have their own rules for peace and war, and the fact that the rules may be good ones does not justify, in Lewistown's eyes, their unwilling acceptance of the laws that govern Lewistown. The Hutterites are clannish, sufficient unto themselves. Lewistown does not forgive them.

On the other hand the great industrial ranch area that recently was set up near Lewistown is welcomed, or at least accepted, with equanimity. Thousands of acres were purchased. Family farms were bought out and consolidated. People long resident in the area went away, or stayed on perhaps as hired labor. The great ranch is owned by a California corporation, is controlled there, and profits go there. Its hired management in Montana, as is usual in such cases, is selfish and reactionary. The effect of the project in general is disintegrative on the Lewistown community.

But Lewistown insists on the luxury of hating the quiet, black-garbed Hutterites, who for all their clannishness have pledged their entire being and future on the Lewistown area. At the same time Lewistown insists on the equal luxury of adulating the management of an industrial farm corporation which is disadvantageous to the economy and culture of the community, which pays tribute and profits to its absentee owners and bows obediently to the requirements and controls of people whose interests are a thousand miles away. This, I suppose, is human nature in its most obstinately human state. It shows at least that life is itself a problem process that never can be taken for granted. Life, like a frightened horse cutting its leg to pieces in a loop of barbed wire, is sometimes self-destructive.

A young war veteran's wife, Betty Attwell, and her husband, Al, initiated The Montana Study group in Lewistown with magnificent enthusiasm, but without enough consideration for the size and sedentary

nature of the town. The town is large, as Montana towns go, and the group not only was small but rather limited to people of one age group and one frame of mind. Interesting work was done in the study group. Pioneer histories, economic reports, and recreational studies were made that will be of enduring value in Lewistown. To many members of the group there was a rewarding spiritual satisfaction in the work. But the group met around from house to house, with coffee after each meeting, and thus perforce acquired the character of a selective coterie brought together by personal invitation. Except for the organizing meeting, no member of the Montana Study staff was able to visit the project during the first season. That a study group should have a status independent of an action group also was rather forgotten. Difficulties arose. "What were these young firebrands up to in their little groups and earnest meetings?"

In communities where urgency and movement have simmered down to the quiet of a stewing pot under which the fire has gone out, earnestness itself may be suspect. The old smear of "communism" was applied. As the whispering grew louder, the words of any ignoramus were believed. And because there were no persons in those little meetings who belonged to groups whence the whispering came, there was small chance to scotch such slanders. Middle-aged Lewistown, indeed, was suspicious of young energy. It rejected brash hope. The Lewistown study group had that invaluable component, youth. It was dominated by youth. But that, under the circumstances, was one of the causes of its difficulties.

But Lewistown, in spite of these critical strictures, is a good town. The following year I asked Frank H. Smith to make his headquarters there in order to serve more easily some of the little places of central and eastern Montana. Smith came from Kentucky, where he is well known in recreational extension work and as a devotee of folk and country dancing. He was given offices in the high school building through the courtesy of Superintendent Manning, and spent the year in Lewistown organizing a dancing group, or so and bringing to maturity other recreational and expressional projects. These were highly successful. The dance groups after several years are still going strong.

Smith sold his car just before coming to Lewistown, however, and thus imposed on himself a severe limitation in reaching the little crossroads communities of the Montana plains. A man in Montana without a car is like a football player with a wooden leg. Smith's work was confined largely, though not entirely, to Lewistown, which already was well served. He also by-passed the general rule of the Montana Study that community study group programs of ten weeks or so should be prior in

interest and procedure to other projects. In proceeding directly to the enterprises in dancing and drama that interested him most, he initiated activities that have been valuable, to be sure, but have not provided the educational background and briefing in the problems and structure of the community group that are so essential in such work.

Educationally the work of the Montana Study in Lewistown revealed on a small scale what is true in the large of much of the educational endeavor of the western world. There were successes in detail. There were worth-while results in this particular or that. But the value and vision of community self-education as a whole in Lewistown never was made quite clear. In Lewistown itself, this may have been inevitable, since the time was short and the town relatively large. In the little places within reach of Lewistown, however, and thus representatively in all central and eastern Montana, the results were less than might reasonably have been hoped.

### *5. Education and Community Decline*

The failures of the small community are largely educational failures, for education has peculiarly the function of projecting the desired pattern of the future on the present. It is the ability to imagine life as a whole. It is the process of carrying over from one generation to another what should endure. Education is a selective technique in behalf of cultural continuity. It makes for a living synthesis. In drawing out the potentialities of men, it helps to coordinate them in a working pattern that seems good. I realize that this may be less a description of the education that is than of the education that ought to be. It is an admonitory definition. Though this must never be confused with scientific description, it still is factually descriptive, in its way, of tendencies, hopes, futurities, fancies, and other peripheral extensions and inventions in men's experience that are of critical significance in orienting life to a more relevant community.

Education in short is a purposive activity. This purpose may have no status in behavioristic description, but is important nevertheless in what education means. As meaning it can be described in no other way, for what things mean to people is fully as significant as whatever they may be, or are supposed to be, in themselves. Influences that may be unknown and unwilling, the conditioning processes, the terrors remaining from an ill-adjusted childhood, for example, or the slow drawl of speech

acquired from long residence in the South, or the purchase of Chesterfields, without knowing why, because the name has been made memorable, often are more insistent in a man's life than are the more deliberate initiatives of his educational training. But they are not purposive education. They are environmental, social, or psychic sets of conditions that so far as he is concerned are external in origin and control. Though his educational process must work within them and in respect to them, these conditions are distinct in principle from his educational initiative.

A philosophy of education that is relevant to the community will embody this principle of initiative and make it central. For purposive activity, whatever it may mean in another universe of discourse, is an essential aspect of the true community. It is a function of whole men in relation to each other. Halfmen, fragments of people, the pieces of a life scattered in the usual urban pattern across a number of special-interest groups along with the vast aggregates of comparatively unrelated experiences, cannot be free or purposive. Willed action is a synthesis pledged on the assumed significance of the whole man. As such it is contrasted with the fragmental and dispersive action of specialized minds and machines. Educational initiative, in the sense that I am using the term, is a function of communal life. It is immanent in the community. It can not be externally derived.

This principle of educational initiative within the human community is different from mass ideologies, the giant patterns of advertising, the vast propaganda and indoctrinal systems, the pressure groups, and the production-line methods of many of our schools and universities. In these the environmental conditioning of men is given priority. Though purpose may lie behind them, that purpose is not implicit in the people subject to the process. This externalization of education is a consequence of the decline of the community and the growth of mass techniques.

Meanwhile the colleges and secondary schools facilitate the drainage of youth from the rural regions into the cities. Rough spot-checking, says Arthur E. Morgan, former president of Antioch College, "indicates that of rural young people who complete four-year college or university courses, probably nine-tenths do not return to small community life, but move on to urban living, where their lines commonly are eliminated in a few generations. Among rural high school graduates there is a similar but not quite so intense, cityward movement."<sup>6</sup> The drainage itself is

<sup>6</sup> Arthur E. Morgan, "The Primary-Group Community," *Autonomous Groups Bulletin*, Vol. IV, Nos. 2-3, 1949, p. 15.

bad enough, though often inevitable under present conditions. Far more serious is the failure of school and college administrators to see in it the implications of disaster.

## *6. The Great Consolidation*

The great consolidation now under way in the rural schools of America is a symptom of this decline of the communal values in education. Once the school, like the church, helped to consolidate the rural community. Today the school may be itself a center of consolidation irrespective of the community. The school in such cases has escaped the community, and as a social function is oriented on another principle.

The local controls of life and affairs are dissolving. The school, once a center of rural autonomy, may be no longer an integrating influence in the little group. The rural neighborhood, where parents, children, and teachers were directly in touch with one another, has less coherence. The teacher no longer comes there. She no longer "lives around." The father and mother never may have seen her. The children now are withdrawn from their homes and family contexts. They are abstracted from the secure and familiar situation and are fed in by school bus, often over long distances, to a central assembling point. These schools rarely are consolidated around the principle of human association and community. They are built, rather, around the impersonal, administrative efficiency of a special function.

In behalf of operational ease in school administration the values of full human relationship and the community often are abandoned. There is a shining new organization of the school to be sure, but no communal life. The children no longer are educated as concrete people in a native context of family and farm life. They are sent out among strangers, very likely to the county seat. They are treated as nameless units, standard parts, in fixed patterns of conceptual training.

It may be granted that many school consolidations are necessary. The decline or extinction of rural communities, the smaller families, the larger farms and the tenant farmers, the lack of local money and the drainage of farm profits to the cities, the shortage of rural teachers, the low pay, the poor teacher training, and the inadequate buildings and equipment in rural areas, all make consolidation of schools necessary in some cases if the formal educative process is to go on at all.

It may be granted further that new orientations of community life may

make consolidation an advantageous adjustment. New instruments of transportation and communication, better roads, more leisure, have made for major changes in community life. Not all of these by any means are bad. In view of these changes, however, the schools are confronted with the need to adapt themselves radically to new conditions. They must be transformed in order to retain their function as instruments of community integration. But many of them have abandoned that function. In relinquishing their great service as centers and creators of true community life, such schools have abandoned one of their main justifications for existence.

For this loss no amount of administrative efficiency can be a substitute. The decline of rural communities and their schools is apparent to all, but that is no justification for the failure of our educators to realize what is at stake. Nor does it justify the general, indiscriminate drive toward consolidation that is taking place regardless of the community problem. Reorientation of rural education is indeed necessary. It should involve new locations in some areas and new approaches in all. But in all areas the reorientation should be, not as in the past where the values of the community were an incidental consideration, nor as in the present where those values may not be considered at all, but always with the human community central in every consideration. This is a fundamental principle in rural problems that too few educators recognize.

From 1920 on the number of consolidations in this country increased by more than 120 per cent, or from 9,752 in the twenties to about 22,300 in the middle forties. At the same time the number of one-room schools declined. In the decade ending in 1944 these schools were reduced in number by 30,000. But many still remained. The 107,000 one-teacher schools in 1944 plus the 20,000 two-teacher schools made up more than two thirds of all rural schools and more than one half of all schools in the United States.<sup>7</sup>

That many one-room rural schools are too inefficient and relatively too costly to be maintained is without doubt true. In isolated sections of Wisconsin, for example, the costs of public schools for the children of one family may run as high as \$300 to \$400 per pupil per year. As T. Lynn Smith suggests, however, it is a question whether consolidation is always the best answer. Control of settlement may be studied not solely in terms of educational administrative efficiency but with consideration for the whole problem and place of the small community and rural life in

<sup>7</sup> Kolb and Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 434; also N. R. Sims, *op. cit.*, p. 540, and T. Lynn Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 400 and 406.



American culture. As to this the soundest rule, says Smith, is that schools "should be consolidated within the community, but they should not be consolidated away from the community."<sup>8</sup> Consolidation should accompany but not anticipate the expansion of the community area. Otherwise it can result in an educational absenteeism fully as vicious as absentee landowning.

What are the schools for? What bearing has consolidation on our educational purpose? As instruments for the selective transmission and enrichment of our culture the schools should be concerned with certain indispensable things. In rural and urban regions alike they should promote (1) face-to-face relationships of human beings with one another; (2) the integration of life in contrast to the functional fragmentation of life found in modern industry, the professions, and scholarship; (3) the enrichment of contacts as a basis for new syntheses; (4) the development of "inner" controls through inner responsibility; (5) the perpetuation of the family and biological stock.

But the transmission of these and other indispensable things—except for the third mentioned above—is not taking place with sufficient intensity to insure survival. The schools are not successful. They have failed to recognize these indispensable characteristics embodied in the community, and they have failed to perpetuate them. When educational influences ignore or corrupt the community, as is the case sometimes in the drive toward consolidation, they become dangerous.

What are the advantages of consolidation? Sims<sup>9</sup> and others point out that consolidated schools may be better in having a high school, a more definite system of grades, better-trained teachers, better physical plants, and longer terms of employment for teachers. They have larger enrollments, and they may have a consolidating influence on community life. These advantages in some cases are important.

Among the disadvantages of the consolidated school are greater taxes. It also may be an absentee institution remote from local contacts and controls. Its surroundings and influence may be urban. This alienates children from rural life. The classes are larger, the children more regimented, the instruction impersonal. Such schools often are a disintegrative influence on the small communities which feed it. There is a consequent loss of local initiative.

The local rural school also has its advantages and disadvantages. Advantage in some cases lies in the fact that it is not graded. This, when

<sup>8</sup> T. Lynn Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

<sup>9</sup> Sims, *op. cit.*, p. 520.

the teaching is good, may be an important asset. In the rural school functional responsibility and a diversification of duties, such as sweeping out and bringing in wood, are taken for granted. Children here play with other children of different ages, and group interests and conduct are worked out more fully. The rural school is close to the family and usually works cooperatively with it. It may be the social center of the rural community, the center of adult educational activities, the point of synthesis of the diverse interests of the little place. To abandon it may mean the disintegration of the small community.

But the local rural school also has disadvantages. These have become critical in recent years. There is little money available. Rural wealth drains into the cities in an economy rigged for urban advantage. The regions having the most children, furthermore, have the least material wealth. In 1940 the rural population of the United States was 43.5 per cent of the whole. This rural population, however, contributed more than 50 per cent of the nation's children of compulsory school age. These rural children in turn received only 37 per cent of the educational support, or \$730,000,000, that the nation gave to public and elementary schools. Of our public school teaching force 54 per cent, or 482,000 teachers, are rural. But the expenditure per pupil in 1942 for rural children was \$69.66 as compared with \$104.72 for urban children.<sup>10</sup> Rural schools with 43 per cent of the nation's children, says Sims, are supported mostly by a farm population which gets only 9 per cent of the nation's income. These facts underlie the disadvantages of the rural schools.

Rural teachers are immature: one third of them are less than eighteen years old. They lack training: about 20 per cent have only high school education or less. They are transient: half of them teach only four or five years. They are inexperienced: one third of them have had less than a year's teaching. They are underpaid:<sup>11</sup> rural teachers' salaries are at the level of unskilled labor or lower. There is little incentive to acquire professional skill and to remain permanently in the work. The annual turnover or replacement rate of rural schoolteachers has been estimated by the United States Office of Education at two out of every five. In cities of 10,000 to 100,000 it is said to be one in ten. The average salary of all rural school teachers (including villages) was \$959 in 1943. This was less than half the average salary (\$1,955) of urban teachers. A salary of \$500 a year is a common standard in rural education, while a salary of

<sup>10</sup> Kolb and Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 435, quoting J. K. Norton and E. S. Lawler, *An Inventory of Public School Expenditures in the United States* (Washington, D.C., American Council on Education, 1944).

<sup>11</sup> Sims, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

\$200 a year for negro rural teachers has long been customary through wide areas of the South.

Nor do rural schools hold as large a proportion of the available children as do urban schools. They have in their schoolrooms proportionately less of their school-age population by ratios running from one tenth to nearly one half. In 1943 there were 13,000 classrooms, almost all rural, without teachers at all. This alone deprived several hundred thousand rural children of any school education. This kind of thing continued through the war and on into the postwar inflation period. It has become a chronic condition.

The disgraceful situation indicated by such facts supplies an impetus to the consolidation of schools. Even though consolidation may be a disintegrative influence in American community life, it will be accepted in desperation. There is no basic reason, however, why rural education cannot be rebuilt and still be oriented on the local community. The present movements toward consolidation have been too often a specialized accommodation in terms of one function to the fact of community disintegration. As such it does not correct that situation. It accepts it and confirms it.

If our educational leaders believe that the community is indispensable in a good society, they should direct their efforts more definitely toward its preservation and enrichment. They should not accept defeat and work out a smooth administrative organization on the graveyard of our rural culture. They should seek ways to revive rural culture itself. Essential to this problem is the recognition of the little places, the friendly communities, the crossroads cooperation, the groups of human beings who know one another well, as central in the survival of American democratic life.

This is worth any sacrifice to those who believe in the American ideal. It may be brushed aside as "impractical," "contrary to the trend," "too slow," "too difficult in view of the present emergency," by those whose interests lie more in adapting themselves to a decadent situation than in creating a better one. But the test of survival of the American way of life nevertheless is here.

Morally and socially the question is not whether or not there are better roads, faster transportation, more efficient devices for producing and marketing goods, better laboratory equipment, more facilities for organized recreation, better buildings, and better programs of professional training. These all have their values. They all rightly make for changes and ever-new adjustments. The central question remains, however:

What is the human situation? Are there stable groups and rich and lasting human associations? Do human beings live fully and responsibly with each other? Is the human community central in the pattern of life? These lives of mutually cooperative action, these lives where the productive functions and the appreciative interests are fused in the inseparable values of the human community, are about all that justify men's endeavors.

### 7. *Swiss Schoolmaster*

Friedrich Frehner is a schoolteacher in a German canton in Switzerland. For eleven years now he and his family have lived in the little village in the high valley. He has kept the village papers in order, corresponded with the cantonal authorities, and joined in the holidays and celebrations through the years. At the festive *Alp-Aufzug* in early summer he always is present, for that day marks the closing of his school for a month or two. He helps in the send-off of his pupils as they herd the goats and other cattle up to the high pastures, or alps, above the village. The snow is nearly gone. All around the village the mountains raise their great shoulders, their long slopes, and their rocky, snow-marked tops toward the sky, and Friedrich Frehner is glad of their company.

Frehner's is a rural school serving the village of fifty or so families where most of the rural folk of the valley are. The school establishment is an ample house of stone where Frehner's family live the year around. They occupy the upper floor; the lower story is the school. The house is well provided with a heating system, running water, suitable toilet facilities, solid, comfortable furniture. It is indeed the best house in the village. The schoolyard and the gardens often are the pride both of the teacher's family and of the school. Where farming and vineyards take precedence over livestock and dairy the school may have a somewhat different program and setup.<sup>12</sup> Frehner's colleague in the next valley west, for example, may have vacation periods broken up in accommodation to the children's work schedule at home. But in every village in the Swiss cantons rural education is conceived as a combination of home training or service and a more formal course at school.

In Switzerland life is more stratified and less mobile than is ours. As

<sup>12</sup> Iman Elsie Schatzmann, *The Country School* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1942), Sec. I.

a consequence there are persistent differences between their rural schools and ours of which we rightly can be more proud than ashamed. But the facts still show a disparity between the rural education of the Swiss and of Americans that should be humiliating to this powerful and wealthy nation. Switzerland is not notably wealthy. Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, and Norway are not wealthy; nor were Germany, France, and Finland wealthy before the dissolution and conflict of recent decades. Still their rural schools are, or were, far more stable, far better supported, far better adapted to rural life and needs, than are ours. Some of this may be due to the more continuous cultural experience of European peoples. Some of it may be due to the greater awareness of their intellectual elite. But the disparity in general can be attributed largely to the social, economic, and structural instability of our rural life; our ignorance and indifference in such matters; and the vicious exploitation of the rural regions of America, of our soils, of our rural people, and of our natural resources by urban-centered interests.

In Denmark, for example, more than a third of the population outside of Copenhagen has attended the folk schools or people's colleges. Of these, says Arthur Morgan, between 80 per cent and 95 per cent have returned to the localities and to the vocations from which they came. Factors such as these, we may be sure, are important in building up the rich and stable rural life of this small country.

Herr Frehner in his Swiss village is secure and happy. He is happy in devoting a lifetime to the education of little children. He is well trained, competent. He is strong. His thick, Alpine legs and barrel chest are well suited to the long tours and field trips that he takes with the children over the high passes and along timberline trails. He knows his Switzerland and loves it, and he sees that the children do too. He carries well on his thick shoulders the prestige of being the leading man of the village. He lives in the best house; gets the highest pay. Only he in that little place can afford a car.

In contrast to him is the American rural schoolteacher. She is immature, badly trained, if we consider the average. She is inexperienced and holds her job only for a year or so. She is unmarried. Her pay is at the level of that of unskilled labor or lower, and is based on a nine-month year. She is rootless, often homeless, usually unacquainted with the community and the children where she works. She is little more than a casual worker who comes to the place for a brief period and then disappears.

This tragic picture of the decay of American rural life and education

is not overdrawn. Our rural teachers symbolize it. Between Friedrich Frehner and Minnie Johnson, the American rural schoolteacher, there is the difference between an integrated educational system centered in the human community and a system at loose ends, of slovenly patterns lost to the values, enrichments, and potentialities of human life.

Nor are the rural schools the only educational advantage that Frehner has in Switzerland over the United States. Nearly forty million rural people in our country, or 74 per cent, says Sims, have no library service. In thirteen Southern states the use of public libraries is denied to Negroes. With 82 per cent of the Negroes in these areas denied access, the total number of rural people without library service is really about 45 million. To this should be added the fact that the rural newspapers, the county weeklies, the other media of education and information, are inadequate. In many cases they are not locally controlled. Studies in this field show that, whereas such papers should have about 75 per cent local news, they do have less than 50 per cent local news, little socially significant news, and are erratic in their presentation.

On the other hand our rural regions have in the Agricultural Extension Service of the United States Department of Agriculture and the land-grant colleges what has been called the greatest educational system in the world. Much of this service is of the highest value. With a staff of about 10,000 and some 400,000 volunteers this great agency has been the salvation of many rural areas in America. It is a mighty effort to supply in the large some of the indispensable values that Friedrich Frehner supplies so well in the little school in his village in Switzerland.

### *8. Philosophic Intimations of Rural Life*

Is there a philosophy of education appropriate to community life? Is there a selective scheme and precept, a form as it were, a pattern of guidance, in that living situation? If so, it cannot easily be stated. A lack of symbolic precision may be one of its inherent characteristics.

The philosophy of education appropriate to community life may well be more in the continuities of action and those organic precepts that we find in the rhythmic forms of life and the comings and goings of energy and death, of waking and sleeping, of hunger and passion and their fulfillment, of laughter and anger, and the cycles within cycles of lived hours and days and seasons on the earth. These too are educative in their way. And so too are they in a sense philosophical. They

are forms within which and through which we live, and as such in the vast thrust and movement of existence they are guides, educational directives, philosophical patterns of living as we undergo its processes.

But these may not be given verbal form, at least not easily or adequately. They are primary, as it were; they resist more stubbornly the practice of substitution; and men who live on their level or near it may find symbolic communication difficult. There is good reason why the rural man, living directly in Nature and action, is less articulate verbally than his urban counterpart. Not all experience is easily converted into indirect representations. There are lumps in it and contextural resistances. The organic formulations and courses of living may not be symbolized at all. We have them, we are them, directly, or not at all.

In order to be symbolized successfully experience must partake somewhat of the nature of the symbol or be reduced by a process of refinement and abstraction to that status. We separate it out in some of the processes of thinking and isolate it from the context in which it occurs. If we think it, we must select it. We must strain it through the sieve of our symbolic method. This fact led to the building of Kant's giant edifice and to the cloud castles of his successors. But the situation need not be interpreted with their intellectual predilection. There are areas of life and experience that cannot be lifted out of concrete context, or isolated in the process of symbolization, and retain their character. For symbolization may sometimes be distortive. Perhaps it always is.

The symbol after all is an instrument used in our response to reality—or rather in our activities within reality—and though important in all intelligent behavior, of course, tremendously important, it need not be taken as an all-controlling principle of the world. It is essential in a selective and organizing activity called conceptual thinking, but there are other things going on in the world and life, no doubt, besides that particular and highly specialized activity. There is living going on in a vast, concrete context of events, and it is just possible that not all of it is amenable to symbolic representation. We must assume practically, in order to “make sense” at all and to justify the processes of thought, that experience is not all symbolic. Whatever it may be, it is not all representative.

Experience may be direct and remain direct. It may repudiate abstraction. It may be inalienably concrete and stubbornly remain in context. This is likely to be true in the cooperative experience and process of communal life. It may have forms which cannot be abstracted from the rest of it, nor rationalized as theory somehow apart from practice. In

the city with its functional specialization and anonymity, this symbolic fragmentation easily takes place. It inevitably takes place, and the living whole is torn apart in the process. Men here retreat from the primary levels of experience and live on the substitutes. The process of conceptualization becomes divisive under such circumstances rather than integral. There may be science and scholarship as well as bigotry and specialization in such a situation, but there can be, I think, little religion or philosophy.

For philosophy may be taken as a form or continuity in the world of life. It is a structure of meaningful integrity—if I may use the word “meaning” for the moment as inner bearing and importance rather than a matter of symbolic reference—and if this form is of a sort that cannot be abstracted or verbalized, I am not sure that it is therefore any less philosophical. Songs unheard may be sweeter, and philosophies unsaid may be, if not sweeter, more deeply identified in the courses of action and the formulative patterns of life.

Being born is experience. Growth and the rhythms of muscular movement through the years are experience. A blow on the head, unconsciousness, a fracture of the skull, seepage, or death is experience that has in a crude way its form; but none of it, either as process (what happens) or as experience (what happens to the human being), can be verbalized or made articulate. It cannot be lifted from its context. Still the pattern of procedure, the deadly continuity, is a guide to behavior, as it were; it is a silent precept, a schedule of action, and in this sense may be called a philosophy. In such a philosophy all values of life and death may be implicit.

A philosophy of community education, however, should be more matter of fact than this. “Education is the laboratory,” says John Dewey, “in which philosophic distinctions become concrete and are tested.”<sup>13</sup> And not only are they tested, not only do they become concrete in the educational process, they become really philosophical, says Dewey, only in being educational and concrete. Thus philosophy is defined by him as “the theory of education in its most general phases.”

But philosophy which is thus within the adaptive processes of life in their psychic, social, and physical environment is still an integrative process. It is a prejudice for wholeness, a drive within the process of living toward integrity. It is a movement, often in conflict with dispersive tendencies, toward the creation of continuity within the limits, conditions, and varied contexts of human affairs.

<sup>13</sup> John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1920), pp. 384-386.



Living is organic, or tries to be, in its deeper purpose. This thesis, imposed as it were on life, is the philosopher's great predilection. Living is orientative. It creates a focus of organization and value amid the vast diversities of things. It is the creation of that focus. In this the philosopher sees life's defining characteristic, while philosophy itself is the devotion in men to this physical, social, and psychical integrity of living. As an activity philosophy invents life, as it were, and reinvents it continuously through the years as a creative process.

"Positive science," says Dewey,<sup>14</sup> "always implies *practically* the ends which the community is concerned to achieve. Isolated from such ends it is a matter of indifference whether its disclosures are used to cure disease or to spread it: to increase the means of sustenance of life or to manufacture war material to wipe it out. If society is interested in one of these things rather than another, science shows the way of attainment. Philosophy thus has a double task: that of criticizing existing aims with respect to the existing state of science, pointing out values which have become obsolete with the command of new resources, showing what values are merely sentimental because there are no means for this realization; and also that of interpreting the results of specialized science in their bearing on future endeavor. It is impossible that it should have any success in these tasks without educational equivalents as to what to do and not to do."

It is equally impossible to have philosophical success, I would add, in a cultural situation where these educational equivalents are irrelevant. For the philosopher can be significantly critical and directive only in a context that is appropriate to the orientative interests with which he is identified. He cannot stand outside of his culture and make comments that amount to anything. He cannot create continuities of living except by living. Unless he is appropriately within the contemporary processes of human culture and events, his directive syntheses will be futile.

But the dominating urban culture of today is pledged to just this isolation of ends from means in science and society. It is pledged to the segregation of functions and special-interest groups. There is profit in the fragmentation of human purpose and development. Whether it be capitalism or communism, big business or big government, the cultural ideology in these respects is the same. Both are functions of, or at least concomitants of, modern urban development. In both systems dominant men attain through the extreme elaboration of specialistic tendencies and the division of labor the power that they are seeking.

All this is without benefit of philosophy, as defined here, and of religion.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 384.

It is attained indeed by the repudiation of philosophy and religion. This is its success, and though it be decadent and disintegrative from the point of view of philosophy, it is what many of its leaders want. In such a situation a philosopher's comment and criticism from without are futile and from within irrelevant. Comment and criticism are not enough. The philosopher must try to help in the creation of a culture where such criticism and evaluation are significant.

In the community, and only there, is philosophy a relevant and significant function. Only there are men organically related to each other as whole human beings. Only there are the normal limitations of human life as well as its potentialities integrated in a concrete, vital whole. I mean of course the small community, where men can face each other philosophically as fully human beings. In the deserts of mass scholarship and specialization philosophy can only die or leave. It becomes there only the clatter of arrogant technicalities and small certitudes.

This sterility is a consequence of life in a mass society. In a world where their lives are subject to remote and relatively unknown controls, where the instruments of production are manipulated from afar, where human relationships are fleeting, uncertain, and fragmentary, it is inevitable that human beings will seek such certitude as they can find in little and seemingly controllable techniques of mental and physical behavior, and in the miniature virtuosity of specialized areas of interest. Here in his rootlessness and isolation—or rather his multitude of isolations—a man can find peace and security of a sort. He can have his pride, or what passes for it, and the certitude of highly wrought little skills.

The arts, philosophy, and religion under these conditions move toward small calligraphical perfections. In a world where risk and imagination are not rewarding, they seek what certitude there may be in little exercises in restriction. For imagination, and in a sense all spiritual life, is risk. It depends on a kind of confidence in the universe and on an intimation of men's creative power. It assumes that human action and choice may be significant in the world. It assumes human responsibility. Mass organizations of society, however, have the lethal power to induce in men a sense of insecurity at one and the same time with a lack of confidence in risk.

Thus men become sophisticated. They set a new problem for their lives which in its nature is neither philosophical nor spiritual. They seek security without risk.

"The philosophy of education which belongs peculiarly to the small community," says Ralph Templin, "recognizes that life is an interplay

between volitional factors in the human being and environmental factors both natural and social. John Dewey and Mahatma Gandhi agree in this fundamental though they start at opposite ends and work through in opposite order. . . .

"The education favoring decentralism might be described as the 'unified educational approach.' It recognizes that the community is at every moment educating us for good or ill, irrespective of what is being done through recognized educational procedures and institutions. Therefore, true education must involve a simultaneous attack upon the inner factors and outer factors which play upon life. The small community is peculiarly the setting for this approach."<sup>15</sup>

Clearly the educational need of these times is not only that education have the unified approach appropriate to communal life, but that communities be developed in which such education is possible. The community, in other words, is both ends and means in education. It is, or should be, the primary context of human growth and education. Here the development of the individual and society in their long courses of interfused behavior should take place.

### *9. The School and the Community*

Education for community life must take place within communities. In Denmark, with its folk schools or colleges, in Switzerland, and in other areas this preeminent condition has been well fulfilled. The interests of education have been identified with those of community life. In America, however, the schools at all levels are being removed apparently farther and farther from the communities, or vestigial communities, that supply the students and to which the main educational benefits should return. In spite of considerable pretense in behalf of community education, not much actually is accomplished. On the moral theses of community life, as well as on the practical and technological requirements toward it, there is relatively little emphasis in American education and even less knowledge.

A proposal to modify the consolidated school program in order to eliminate some of its disadvantages in community life has been made in Kansas. It is called the Cooperative School Area. According to this plan certain one-room schools would be closed and their pupils trans-

<sup>15</sup> Ralph Templin, "Significance of Decentralization for Community Life," *Community Service News*, Yellow Springs, Ohio, November-December, 1947, p. 155.

ported to nearby graded schools large enough to accommodate them. Cooperative School Areas would thus be formed and the one-room school districts would pay to adjacent graded school districts the costs of sending their pupils there. In Kansas the average number of pupils in one-room schools is decreasing. In 1907 it was more than twenty-two; in 1940 it was twelve pupils. This probably is true in many other states. In 1932 in Kansas 1,054 one-room schools had seven or fewer pupils, while, 2,243 schools had ten or fewer. The compromise plan at least recognizes the disadvantages of doctrinaire consolidation as well as the need for change from the present situation. But it does not fully meet the problem.

The community school, says Edward G. Olsen,<sup>16</sup> should (1) operate as a full-time educational center for the entire community population. It should (2) utilize all appropriate community resources for instructional purposes. It should (3) center its curriculum in the community structure, processes, and problems. It should (4) serve the locality through direct attack on some of its problems. It should (5) lead in coordinating democratically all possible community agencies toward the common goal of more effective education in that region.

"Although one or more of these five approaches to the community may be found in many conventional schools," says Olsen, "it is only the Community School which is sufficiently functional and versatile to utilize them all in a balanced manner. . . . All too frequently we have become so enamoured of one conception—or so blind to possibilities in others—that we ignore or neglect the remaining four. . . . Rare indeed is the school in which all five outlooks are utilized in appropriate balance."

As Olsen sees it, the community school should be the culmination of the values represented by the academic school and the progressive school. The great virtue of the academic school, he says, "lies in its systematic organization of subject-matter; that of the progressive school is its driving concern for the all-round development of the individual child; that of the emergent Community School appears to be its emphasis upon social reconstruction through cooperative effort democratically organized. *All three* emphases, each transmuted in terms of present needs, must be maintained in the new school of tomorrow."

In Saskatchewan and in Nova Scotia, in Yellow Springs, in Brasstown, at Pine Mountain, and other places work is being done with objectives not unlike those discussed by Olsen. Sir Richard Livingstone in England

<sup>16</sup> Edward G. Olsen *et al.*, *School and Community* (New York, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1945), pp. 18-19.

has long worked in behalf of such ideas. Gandhi in India has been their great apostle. But the examples in American practice of such educational work are relatively few. The schools and colleges are hardly aware of the problem of the community or of the desperate need to solve it.

The community school, important as it is, is only one aspect of the many-sided effort needed to stabilize and enrich the human community. Not education alone, but educational reconstruction along with administrative, economic, social, and technological reconstruction, are necessary. It is a basic problem. American life and welfare are at stake.



PART VII

*Religion and the Community*



1. *A Note on the Gods*
2. *The Proliferation of Selves*
3. *The Common Life of the Community*
4. *Religious Context*
5. *Denny Gray*
6. *The Church in Our Town*
7. *Eugene Smathers*





## 1. *A Note on the Gods*

Gods rarely die. When others more fashionable displace them, they retire to the back pastures and hedges or neglected woodlots and live on in furtive sanctity. The little cemetery, the few broken gravestones in the midst of a plowed field, is overgrown with wild-cherry scrub. But the gods that lived thereabouts are stubborn. They survive forgetfulness. They are backwoods gods, or pagan, waiting with a kind of latent holiness, like endemic ghosts, for the times to change.

Gods are one way of making our evaluations of things more articulate. They mark the ways that we would go. Their being ebbs and flows, wanes and waxes, with the times. Their modes change. Their forms are flexible and variegated. But the evaluations which they image rarely die. The gods are institutes of value, affirmations, symbols, or, let us say, habits of evaluation ingrained in the structure of living. They may be left unsaid for awhile, but the habits reassert themselves in the same or other symbols of belief according to the need.

Cultures change. The processes of education have new patterns in new eras. People learn to interpret the world through different images. The sciences develop and through the lenses of so-called objective observation new gods, different gods, or nameless gods appear. But all human action is interpretive, all comment is evaluative, and behind these changing images, these screens of gods, sciences, arts, the values of living presumably are fairly constant. No matter what their language or art, their emblem or god, men find in living about the same primary significance. For evaluations are part of the essential action of living. Though it is subject to factual description, to be sure, living is made directive in terms of value.

Gods are projected evaluations. In them poetic processes are given form; pictures are thrown on the sky. They are selective scripts from the dramas of our living. We watch them with recognition and familiar awe. They change with our changes—or so it seems—they affirm what we in our community affirm. They are what we in our consensus would be.

Religion is an area of many interests. Functionally it is diverse; some aspects hardly can be coordinated with others. Appreciatively it is heterogeneous and often without inner consistency. It may be described as an inner experience, a psychological adventure, a state of inner

spiritual being. It may be a pattern of overt beliefs or affirmations both ethical and cosmological. More centrally, religion may be focused in the vision of something sacred or the holy. It is insight.

Religion, again, may be a revelation of being or a rational theology to the same end. It may be, again, solely custom, folkways, and communal ritual. It also may be what "the individual does with his own solitariness." Religion is complex, and there are many gods. Though the pantheon has little or no organic unity, it has contextual consistency of a sort. The gods might know each other as gods were they to meet under that wide-sprung dome.

For the gods are the directional interests, the many selves, groups, and functions in which a man may participate. Their unity may be little more than aggregative, but they describe in their way the multiple belonging of a man to many things. Men in a society of any complexity take part in many groups. The community is this participative aspect of man's being. It is the stuff of these participations, not so much as a pebble participates in a pile of pebbles, but as a drop of water joins a pond. There may be many belongings. These may be gods.

Though I have sometimes described the community in this book as if it wholly possessed its members, this never is the case. It never is so simple. The community is possessive in varying degrees in respect to its different members. It also is possessive in varying degrees at different times in respect to all of its members. It is by no means a fixed and simple block of relationships. Its inner emphases are variegated, and the human beings in it have numerous relationships with other groups external to it. Nor are communities mutually exclusive in their nature. One may incorporate another, as the village includes the family, or they may interlock as one family, retaining its own focus of solidarity, may interlock with another. The diversities of group relationships and the complexities of those external and internal relationships may enrich life. Though their extreme proliferation, after the pattern of the modern city, is disintegrative, a measured diversity and enrichment are still possible and are good.

## *2. The Proliferation of Selves*

As a man participates in various group relations, so he has several points of focus sometimes called selves. They are selves, as it were, consistent in their nature with the groups of which they are parts. I do not

mean here to toss the concept of self around too casually. I know well its solemn place in philosophy, psychology, and romance. A man's multiple selves, however, correspond roughly to the plurality of groups in which he operates. Those selves will have the virtues and the failures of those groups. If the groups in their structure are linear, segregative, and schismatic in respect to each other, then the several selves that are a man very likely will be too.

Religion beyond its gods is in man an integrative moment of being.<sup>1</sup> It is a clear moment, a bright intimation, a flash of functional sanity across the clutter of interests of a man's selves and societies. It is mystically—to use a dangerous word—his identification in personal and social life. It is the solidarity of his selves and the groups to which they correspond. If these groups are divergent, isolated, overspecialized, there is human failure; there is a superfluity of gods. If they enter into a true community, on the other hand, the spirit lives.

James describes this proliferation of selves in a man as the material self, the social, the spiritual self, and the pure Ego.<sup>2</sup> Once started in this multiplication of selves he has no adequate way to stop. Of a man's social selves, he says, there are as many as there are individuals who recognize him. The selves are different here according to the different patterns of response and attitude that a man may have toward different people. But he also may have different patterns of response toward the same person at different times. Thus more selves appear; for Essex as lover was surely a different self from Essex as an obedient functionary in his queen's court—and so too, no doubt, the queen. Thus selves accumulate in miscellaneous aggregations, according to this thesis, and neither James nor anyone else seems able to find a suitable limit within the individual person that gives form to a man's life.

Limits there are, of course, in various fields of experience and behavior. Our powers of perception, for example, have limits; so too the memory, attention, effort. Each has its style, its method, its fullness, its rough capacity. In the aggregative processes of experience and behavior those limits, however, are not a symmetrical whole. They are more matters of how much, how crowded, and how full.

For the limiting principle of a life is less in the individual as such than in the community. More accurately it is in the confluence of the human being and the community. If the community decays, so too does

<sup>1</sup> Baker Brownell, *Earth Is Enough* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 276.

<sup>2</sup> William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1907), Vol. I, pp. 292 ff.

the individual. If the social groups in which he participates are mutually segregated, specialized, schismatic, so too the selves of the man will be mutually segregated and schizoid. I am speaking of selves, as James probably does, metaphorically. I doubt if the individual can really be apportioned off neatly into multiple selves. The individual as a packaged, self-defined article simply is not there. But since there are few terms for these confluences of life, metaphors are necessary. They are mostly old words used in poetic contexts.

These several selves, says John Elof Boodin, carrying on from the psychic pluralism of James, "must not be taken as entities limited to one body. They are rather social intersection points, different types of social continuities. The various social situations cut the personal selves in different planes; they liberate, and make confluent, different levels of tendency and so produce different controls and fusions." Thus the selves proliferate into social life, for the social unities and minds of which Boodin speaks are evidently the selves of which James speaks transposed to another key. As an individual, says Boodin, I am no longer I, but "the social mind to which I abandoned myself, which I helped to create, but which has more truly created me." It follows, at least for Boodin, that "each social situation has its own unique mind, which persists with its individual traits and interpenetrates into the further flow of life."<sup>3</sup>

Out of this emerges a concept of human life which I think may be called situational. It is for Boodin, and very likely for James too, a situational complex, which in one instance may be mainly individual and in another mainly social according to the variable emphasis and confluency of the situation. This proliferation of situational selves has a basis in fact in the modern world. The multiplication of different centers of interest and their respective segregation is the chief cultural characteristic of this age. Whether these specializations of human careers should be called selves need not concern us; the vast proliferation is clear. It may be a tendential change. Boodin, for example, says, "History bears witness to a constant tendency from the small-scale local and personal type of group to the large-scale impersonal type of group." The change, in any case, is of radical importance.

Neither James, Boodin, nor others go very far in evaluating this change. Nor do they predict its consequences in human culture and survival. Some commentators on the problem, who lean on a cyclical theory of culture, describe it in part, but leave the human problem

<sup>3</sup> John Elof Boodin, *The Social Mind* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1939), pp. 173-175.

glumly in the lap of destiny. Others, such as W. M. Kollmorgen,<sup>4</sup> who also find glamour in prescribed courses of events, describes with gleeful brutality the inevitable course of human association from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*. They foresee the disappearance of communities except in the nostalgic sentiments of those who look backward rather than "forward." The modern trend, they say, begins with the individual and moves from there to special-interest groups and "scientific," linear functionalism. Though the "individual" with which they begin is a blank abstraction devoid of the family and communal contexts in which alone individuals are created, they move on confidently to a kind of spurious clarity. This pseudoempiricism arises from too-selective observation.

But these legends of the inevitable are not found in the work of James or Boodin. James for the first time in modern terms explored the possibility of an open universe and a human destiny that might remain tentative and fluid. And Boodin with his theories of creative social intelligence allies himself with that liberal leader. We might wish then that more attention had been given to the consequence of these proliferating selves as they reach aggregates beyond any possible human perception. That such situations do reach these aggregates is unquestioned. As they multiply, they become severally segregated because their numbers are too great to be perceived together or comprehended. They also are separated physically and socially in our complex urban life with only a thin, linear connection one with another. By apologists for these urban conditions this connection between two situations is termed rational because it is perceptively clear, simple, and impersonal as contrasted with the irrational coherence of situations in a block community. But this is no more the principle of reason than is the rod in a motor connecting the piston with the crankshaft.

The fact that the system has structural intelligibility is by no means identical with reason in the members of it. Intelligibility, indeed, in the sense that it involves mechanism, may be inversely related to reason and to rational choice. Where the coherence of the members in the community and their presence together in the face-to-face group have been lost, an essential condition of rational initiative is lost. Without that coherence and the wealth of relevant variables that are found together only in the

<sup>4</sup> Walter M. Kollmorgen and Robert W. Harrison, "The Search for the Rural Community," in *Agricultural History*, 20:1-8, Jan., 1946. Also Walter M. Kollmorgen, "Crucial Deficiencies of Regionalism," *American Economic Review*, May 1, 1945, p. 377. See also Kollmorgen's *Culture of a Contemporary Community: The Old Order Amish of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania*, Rural Life Studies: 4 (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Bu. Ag. Econ., Sept., 1942), pp. 88 ff., and 101 ff.

association of whole persons with other whole persons, there is little base or resource for initiative. Significant choice, in other words, depends on the degree of human integration. Without that integration there is chaos. The massive proliferation of specialized, perceptually fragmented selves results in a psychic jungle.

Boodin recognizes the problem, it is true, and at least momentarily appreciates this curse on the western world. As a special form of the law of degradation, he says, "we may note the tendency in human integration to substitute impersonal relations for personal relations." Thus face-to-face relationships are replaced by machinery. Centralized control and coercion replace direct cooperation. "The larger the group," he says, "the more it is likely to be cursed with this impersonalism, unless it can find a place for the smaller unit within the organization."<sup>5</sup> But there, except for his general emphasis on the need for creativeness, is about where he seems to leave it.

This degradation toward a society of impersonal relationships, of which Boodin speaks, is a movement away from the poetic and holistic comprehension of life. It abandons the indigenous and almost intuitive sense of the human *Gestalt*, or configuration of men in their community, and replaces it with a rational or pseudorational analysis of the parts of the situation. But the sum of the parts in a living situation, as Kurt Goldstein<sup>6</sup> says, is not the same as the whole. Neither does an analytic, linear breakdown of communal and personal functions after the manner of modern science and industry result in something equivalent to the wholeness of human life in its community. It results over great areas of life, indeed, in the destruction of the human community and integral life. This is the great problem of this era.

The human *Gestalt*, or organic form, if I may use the figure, is repudiated or ignored by modern scholarship and its industrial correlates. This *Gestalt*, or normal pattern of life, is the confluence of the community and the human being. Although religion is traditionally the field in which this integrity of life is most intensely realized, a culture oriented on human values, the laughter and play, the work and adventurous production, and indeed all the functions of living, may be imbued with that spiritual solidarity. This wholeness of living is defeated by the modern atomism of method. The method is not relevant, as Goldstein convincingly shows, to the facts of the biological and human organism. It is a false method, false in its results in human life and false in its experimental procedures.

We need make no sweeping generalizations, as does Kollmorgen, as to

<sup>5</sup> Boodin, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

<sup>6</sup> Kurt Goldstein, *Human Nature* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1947), Chap. I.

the disappearance of the community in the western world. But we still can recognize the critical decline of the community under the impact of modern forces. We need make no general inference as to the impossibility of community survival. Nor need we predict the inevitable destinies of human association. On the contrary the future, like the present situation, is probably a vast number of variables which cannot be placed side by side in neat consistencies. We may assume openly, what all persons who engage in discourse assume tacitly, that human volition is one of the characteristics of the living, social process, and that what will happen to us still may be to some extent an open question. If we describe our world fully, we cannot universalize the linear techniques of scholarship and specialization, sometimes called reason, and impose them on all the rest. This kind of reason has its importance, to be sure, but it may be neither complete nor universal.

Human associations, nevertheless, have today different conditions, different problems of survival, and in some ways different directional courses from those in other cultures. Spiritual coherence of life in this modern age of specialization and human fragmentation is virtually impossible. The integrity of living is not there. Though the multiplicity of special-interest groups and schizoid selves have, it is true, a vast organizational coordination, they do not have perceptual coherence. They do not and cannot have mutual presence one to another in a human being's experience. They have no immediacy. They lack these conditions of spiritual coherence because they are related linearly or mediately. Their numbers and complexity far exceed the perceptive range of a man or the common experience of his community. Their proliferation overwhelms religious life. It corrupts the spirit.

In George H. Mead's functional analysis of the self this defeat of the spirit is seen in a different pattern but with consequences in human failure much the same. In the "I" and the "me" Mead finds within the self the same kind of conflict that others, such as St. Paul as interpreted by Royce, see between the self and society, and that Rousseau in his repudiation of communal responsibility in favor of the isolate freedom of the individual also finds a way to express. This conflict, while retaining a romantic coloration, is transformed by Mead into a reciprocity between the "me," or the organizational structure of community response within the self, and the "I," or the uncategorized, more deeply personal initiative in life. "Social control," says Mead, "is the expression of the 'me' over against the expression of the 'I.'"<sup>7</sup> This reciprocal relation of the "I" function and

<sup>7</sup> George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 210. See also "Philosophy, Pragmatism, and Human Bondage," by Donald Ayres Piatt, in *Philosophical Review*, Sept., 1949.



the "me" function in the self has become unbalanced in modern culture, says Mead; the "I" tends to be overwhelmed; the initiative and creative thrust of human life are lost amid the vast conformations required by the "me."

In this poignant conflict within the self Mead brings together what had been the traditional opposites called man and society in nineteenth-century romantic thinking. If I understand him correctly, Mead thinks of the community as still the general, anonymous pattern of social pressures characteristic of the period recently called modern. The dramatic conflict between the individual and society is transformed by him into a conflict arising from a functional lack of balance within the self, but the community, now called the "me," is still mainly a resistive, defining principle over against the creative "I," much as it was before the transformation.

Because Mead does not seem to recognize in the community the small, known group of intimately cooperative human beings, in which novelty and creativeness are fully as much a function of their mutual association as of any individual's isolation from them, he misses, I think, an essential point, if not the essential point, in his analysis of the modern cultural disaster. The trouble in modern life is less the failure of the splendidly individual "I" to maintain functional balance with the coercive "me" of society than the defeat of the primary human community under the pressures of both the "I" and the "me." The trouble with our way of life is less the lack of balance between the generalized, mass "me" and the isolated, irresponsible "I" than it is this violently bifurcated culture of ours. Here the "I" and the "me" exasperate each other to more and more passionate extremes of opposition. This violence of pattern in modern life has no place in it for the human community. I doubt if Mead gives weight enough to the small, concrete kind of community where human creativity and initiative are a function of men's integral association in the group.

### *3. The Common Life of the Community*

Religion is deeply involved in the common life of the community. In a significant sense religion is the common life of the community so far as it is directly appreciated. It is the sense of common participation. It comprehends more than the "individual" but still is within his perceptive range. It is "whole" within the human being's experience.



This experience of the common life has many interpretations. It may be interpreted psychologically. Jung for example speaks of the "modern" man as rare, solitary, intensely and almost feverishly conscious. He stands alone on the brink of the abyss which is the future. Behind are the crowds of not-so-modern men still in the dusk of a kind of common unconsciousness and the habit of the past. For Jung<sup>8</sup> this common life has not the brilliance and fervid particularity of current experience. Only the "modern" man standing alone, conscious well nigh to distraction, burning with a brave but momentary flame, facing the abyss of insecurity, attains such experience. This alternative to the common life is romantically attractive, to be sure, but hardly suitable as a pattern of survival. It is indeed a bright intimation of death.

A psychological interpretation that seems more relevant to our survival is given by a Preparatory Commission on Autonomous Groups and Mental Health.<sup>9</sup> There is in the modern world a "steadily enlarging mass of people whose basic normlessness and insecurity are tragically revealed in the indices of family disintegration and community apathy, in individual emotional impoverishment, callousness and interpersonal hostility." Mental health, the authors add, can be achieved, only through personal relations in groups of intimately known people. These groups, the family and "autonomous" groups of neighbors around it, are the nuclear units of society. In a modern culture, which moves ever toward large groups of impersonally related people, psychic and social disintegration is inevitable.

The common life of men in their communities may have even physiological interpretations. The well-known Peckham experiment in London is an effort to coordinate health services with community interests. Here a center of recreation, family welfare, crafts, amusements, and medical care was formed in the belief that family health is easier to define and study than individual health, and that a group of friendly people will be more healthy than they will be as isolated units in the great town.<sup>10</sup>

The lost souls of the modern world are these isolated or rootless ones. The "original sin" of our culture is the massive development of life in which the human being has no belonging, no stable place, and no security in a familiar group of fellow men. This loss of common life has biological

<sup>8</sup> C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1933), Chap. X.

<sup>9</sup> *Autonomous Groups Bulletin*, edited by Ralph Spence and Maria Rogers, Vol. III, No. 4.

<sup>10</sup> Innes H. Pearse and Lucy H. Crocker, *The Peckham Experiment* (London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1943).

correlates in phyletic or racial failure. Right and wrong, says Trigant Burrow,<sup>11</sup> are primitive tensions in man's racial organism. In this deep feeling-life of the phylum, "you" and "me" are not basic distinctions. Attention under primitive conditions is a relationship of the organism *with* the object rather than directing interest *at* the object. This primitive unity of life that underlies all phyletic continuity is disrupted, he says, by the use of symbols or thought. The unity or *cotension* of life is converted more and more into sharp, particular attention. Conflict results. For Burrow the psychic sources of the common life are not symbolic or conceptual, but mystical, or something akin to it.

Without the spiritual community of the little group there is only rootlessness. Beyond the little place where human "belonging" is still possible, even the most elaborate institutions of the gods are not much more than verbal pretense. The Universal Church, the body of Christ, so eloquently preached by men such as St. Paul and Josiah Royce,<sup>12</sup> becomes meaningless without this condition. Here these teachers seem to ignore organizational size, terrestrial range, and anonymity of contact as a human problem. They resort to abstract, supernal unities beyond the faulty world. Universal the community may be in the need that is in all men, but universal in an organizational or numerical sense, or in a corporative sense, it cannot be. It *should* not be; and the modern assumption that there may be organizationally a universal community leads only to endless defeat. So too the secular counterpart of the Universal Church, the business monopoly, or it may be the nation, the race, or the world community, all are tragic failures when treated as spiritual corporations. The spiritual corporation must be small. It must be within the range of human acquaintance. Only a few people can gather together and know each other well.

This is carried here as far beyond Royce's intention, says Max Otto, as Royce carries it beyond Paul's, and any resemblance should be considered merely coincidental. "I do not understand that Royce means to impose an incorporate absolute on the community," says Otto; "his argument, I take it, is that in what you call community we are introduced to an experience which, if you think it through, proves us to be living within the life of the Absolute Experience."<sup>13</sup>

I will admit that I have used Royce's doctrine less as an authority than

<sup>11</sup> Trigant Burrow, *The Biology of Human Conflict* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1937), Chaps. III and IV.

<sup>12</sup> Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Chap. V. See also Royce's *William James and Other Essays* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1911).

<sup>13</sup> Max Otto in a letter to me, November 14, 1949.

as an area of relevance in interpretation. It is a matter more of a similar pattern of interest than a similar answer to the problem. Royce would no doubt repudiate my interpretations or distortions of his doctrine, as Paul might repudiate those of Royce. But Royce would admit that interpretation has an imaginative and free function, and, even when it departs considerably from the threshold of authority, still helps to make clear the matter at hand in a way that description cannot entirely accomplish.

The mysticism that pervades much of Royce's work, such as his doctrine of salvation by divine grace, or his doctrine of the Church as an absolute community in Christ, is, in any case, the mysticism of the *all*. It is the mysticism of the comprehensive absolute. The identification of a man with God and with the Church or body of Christ is in terms of an ineffable unity that transcends natural orders and comprehends them. The mysticism to which I refer in this book is, on the other hand, what seems to me a naturalistic mysticism. It is a unity not in and of the *all*, but, as James might say,<sup>14</sup> in the *each*. This is the source, I think, of the spiritual life. It has sanction within the natural order. It does not escape it, transcend it, or repudiate it.

Religiously the common life of the community may be known in a kind of experience that seems to have body and being of its own. This may be recognized merely as a release of action and an intimation of security, quiet joy, and affirmation. Or it may be a more dramatic illumination. It may remain in poetic and metaphorical terms. Or it may be rationalized in various ways to that climax of rational transmutation which for Plato is spiritual contemplation.

These different interpretations each will be one way of making the common life articulate. Each may have its mythos and project its god. But in all of them the common life will be secular, human, never supernatural. And secular though it be, it will not be necessarily amenable to science. The poetry of other levels and dimensions, the holistic comprehension and mysticism of religious life, still may be validly there.

#### 4. Religious Context

Taken from its context religion loses the unique quality that seems to be its life. This unique quality in every human situation may be what Whitehead refers to when he says that religion is what "the individual

<sup>14</sup> William James, *A Pluralistic Universe* (New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1909 and 1943), Lectures I and II.

does with his own solitariness."<sup>15</sup> It is hardly communicable in symbols. It is not merely thinking to oneself or in terms designed for external currency and transference. It is uniquely contextual.

Here is quietness, here equilibrium. Here may be stabilized somewhat the dreary dispersions of life, the tiresome scatter and multiplicity where a man has many selves, activities, attitudes, and the community many functions and diversities that shift across the fluid levels of interest with every hour. The ability to unify these complex components of a man and his community is the criterion not only of our sanity but of the human enterprise itself. But unity of operation takes more than the skillful organization of diverse components into a going process; it involves a new or renewed unity of being. For all the plurality of selves and functions in a man and the multiplicity of members and directives in a community they still are experienced as one. They have a kind of unitary being. They may be given different names, both severally and jointly, but they are basic in experience none the less. Here being is experienced first—to use the ancient terms—and reasoned only secondarily.

This is the miracle. Being, as philosophers and poets have said, always is a miracle. Here we may look into it. Here is the transmutation of the many into one that underlies not only the operational projects of life but the authority for values as well. It is a secular transmutation, a mundane mysticism or poetry within the core of human nature and existence. When realized freshly it may be called salvation. It is conversion from the realm of fragmented life. It is redemption from the pieces, specialisms, and particulars of a personally disorganized world. This integrative moment of living is religious.

Says Ordway Tead,<sup>16</sup> "The hunger for a sanctioned way of life, dedicated in spirit, guided by all the intellectually effective instruments of practical judgment finding scope for each person's creative contribution, and shot through with loving regard—this is the great and personal hunger. And if man asks for the bread of fellowship with powers he need not necessarily label, shall he be given the stone of stoic self-confinement?"

This religious integration of life, as Tead suggests, is not necessarily supernatural. Though the sanction is immediate in experience, it still is within the structure of fellowship. If that fellowship is transcendent—and

<sup>15</sup> A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1927), p. 16.

<sup>16</sup> Ordway Tead, "The Educated Man Faces the Unforeseen," an address on the 100th Anniversary of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, October 9, 1948.

this perhaps is without Tead's acquiescence—it still lies within the human context and the human limit.

### 5. *Denny Gray*

Denny Gray of Darby, Montana, is a religious man. I shall try to explain briefly why I say this.

As a concrete human being he belongs clearly enough to the here and now, with blue eyes, tough hands, a face seamed and gullied by the weather, and whatever in him is religious is within this context of homely human life. Where it came from, whether he learned to be religious or was born with it, or whether it was born in him at a later time, I shall not try to say. Perhaps he retained some primitive synthesis, some poetry of living, or some vision tintured with divinity that many others lose as they become more civilized. At any rate Denny Gray, a plain and quiet man, sees all things fervently, each one of them under the aspect of eternity, and this illuminates his footsteps.

Denny Gray is always reconnoitering for God. He is a lumberjack in the forests of the Bitterroots around Darby. For twenty years he has worked among the firs and pines of the mountainsides, the tamaracks and the cedars along the streams. His high laced boots and wool shirt are as much the mark of the forest as the she-bear's heavy coat in winter or the velvet on the new antlers of the elk. His home in Darby is a kind of ante-room to the forest. His seven children were born there, and Denny, I am sure, would say that their bones are grained like cedar sticks and they came with pine needles in their hair.

Life in the Bitterroots is the forest, literally and spiritually, and Denny is not merely in it, or a function of its management; he is the forest. He cruises the forest through the years, noting its boundaries, marking its saw timber, living its seasons, experiencing its growth. He fells and plants, blazes a tree for cutting, makes trail, piles up the brush, always with the forest his first consideration. The drain, he hears the ranger say, should not exceed the growth. But Denny feels the native balance or justice of the woods. Far below the level of verbal maxims, he lives the great metabolism of the forest and helps to maintain its equilibrium.

Denny also lives the disaster of the cutover lands. The waste and destruction burn his soul where absentee corporations ordered the timber cut, hauled out, and the forest liquidated, as the saying is, when making death becomes the more profitable adventure. The scattered slash and

fire hazards, the torn, gullied hillsides, are painful in his belly. He sees the lumber roads, trenched out in haste and as quickly abandoned, become vicious torrents in the spring runoff, ripping the hillsides, corrupting the trout streams, flooding gravel and debris over the little ranches in the lower valley bottoms. The silt-filled streams, the soil and water of his forest and his country raging to the ocean, are to him sickening hemorrhages of his own blood and substance.

Denny loves the forest. He loves the little streams, once as clear as a young girl's conscience, and the forest town of Darby where he lives. It too lives and dies with the metabolism of the forest, and he knows that its welfare lies only in the sustained, organic processes of that quiet area of life. Denny can identify his life with the forest and the town in a way that only religious people know. He is what he loves, and he turns spontaneously to action oriented on those interests as if they were his own. Indeed, they are his own.

Many an hour of overtime Denny has given to the forest, damming the hillside gullies to slow down the runoff, piling the slash to avoid fires, planting new trees where saplings and seed trees have been cut down or burned. He does it without pay and on his own initiative. Few know that many of his long days in the woods are, as it were, humble and vicarious expiation for the sins of men destroying the forest and the land that he loves. Denny works on, saying little.

Denny came regularly to the Darby study group when it began in the log community building. And because his neighbors knew him as a quiet, careful sort of person, he was appointed chairman of a standing committee to study the place and possibility of small businesses in Darby. With his committee he studied for ten weeks the material resources of the locality, the markets, transportation, labor, production costs, and above all the needs in the community which small business might supply. He consulted economists and accountants. He studied the capital requirements and the possible sources of loans. He canvassed the situation as to sustained demand and supplies, and among other things learned from the Forest Service how much lumber could and would be supplied as a permanent annual crop from the national forest nearby. He made progress reports from time to time during the course of the study group meetings and thus kept the group, and indeed the town, informed of his work.

As a result Denny Gray came through with fourteen recommendations for small businesses in Darby. They were practical, down-to-earth proposals. They were discussed rather fully in the study group and a number of persons not usually members were brought in to discuss them further.

Then the proposals were left in reserve for any who cared to undertake them.

That was several years ago. Today, not fourteen but nineteen of them have been realized in successful, going businesses in Darby. There is the plumbing and well-drilling business: Denny found that such work in Darby could be done only by men brought from Hamilton, seventeen miles away, or Missoula sixty-three miles away. They were hard to get, slow in coming, and costly when they came. A young Navy veteran, recently returned to Darby, was found who had experience in the work. He was known in town as a good risk and someone gave him a character loan for the few hundred dollars needed to buy tools and equipment. Such loans are common practice in small communities but rare in cities, where good risks are known fragmentally or not at all. The young well driller had, when I last heard, fifty orders for wells. So busy was he drilling wells that little time was left for plumbing.

There is the planing mill. Denny found that in this little forest town no lumber could be purchased. Only at Hamilton or Missouli, miles away over the mountain road, was there lumber for sale. No corral poles were available in this locality nor any treated posts for fences. A young man of an old family which once had owned a planing mill decided to take the risk. He built a small mill, worked out with the Forest Service a plan for a continuous supply of timber over the years, and started operations. After several years this planing mill is now one of the main businesses of the town. Another man set up a post-treating plant and another a corral-pole and lumber yard to supply the ranchers of the vicinity. A modern tourist camp also was established. A small hotel is being built and a new farm trading center, grocery and butcher shop opened their doors. These new businesses of Darby were stimulated into being by Denny Gray's work in the study group. They employ some seventy-five persons. In a town of five hundred that is a good deal.

Denny Gray still works in the forest, sometimes for hire by the Forest Service, sometimes for the love of God and His forest.

## *6. The Church in Our Town<sup>17</sup>*

But the church in the little place may be different. Too often it is not concerned with men like Denny Gray or the religion that he lives. More

<sup>17</sup> This is the title of a book by Rockwell Smith (New York, Abington-Cokesbury Press, 1945).



doctrinaire than spiritual, caught between its fictions of spiritual monopoly and the facts of sectarian competition, the rural church, or any church for that matter, may be less the vehicle of Christian teachings for which it presumably was created than a divisive, angry influence in the community. Its symbols lose their significance. Its sacred terminologies, endlessly repeated, become boring and blatant to young ears.

This is due to the preponderance of organizational interest in the church, while, at the same time, that organization no longer is functionally relevant in our culture. On the one hand the church fails to enrich and stabilize the life of human beings one with another in their community. On the other hand it is tied to outworn factual hypotheses that become meaningless in the long movements of time and cultural erosion. Its claims to monopoly for the techniques to salvation are disregarded. It is out of touch with the native initiatives and human concern latent in the community. As a corporate body the church usually is superimposed from anonymous sources on the little place, and both in doctrine and practice is controlled by absentees. It offers no local referendum, no creative partnership or participation in the growth and development of its corporative doctrine, and because it remains formal, authoritarian and, essentially remote from human initiatives, it either splinters into numerous marginal sects or is ignored.

Though the general managers and local agents of the church may assume a splendid sovereignty for their corporation, they find themselves, like business firms with similar ideologies, competing with other corporations making similar claims. The result of course is conflict and confusion. In their befuddlement and anger they deny, like Peter, the sacred values of the little group where God was, and turn toward the anonymous power and authoritative structure of great organizations.

The first problem here is not to save the individual, as Peter, stricken by fear, assumed, nor even to save the church, but to save the community. And the community here means, not the sharply institutionalized, usually fragmental group called the church, but a circle of people known well, associated in many significant ways, living as a basic, nuclear group in modern society. Says Mark A. Dawber, "We must save the community if we are to save the individual. We have no theology of the redemption of the community. We urgently need one. I am convinced that such a theology, if practiced by the churches, would help solve the Protestant dilemma and cure the Protestant paralysis."<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Mark A. Dawber, executive secretary of the Home Missions Council of the Federal Council of Churches in America and the International Council of Religious Education, at the Columbus, Ohio, Conference on the Community and Religious Education, Dec., 2-5, 1947. Quoted in *The Christian Century*, Dec. 17, 1947.



The paralysis has extended far. The rural church declines, not only as part of the general rural decay, but also for reasons inherent in the church itself. I do not know how much the decline of the community and of the church affect each other, but there can be little doubt that the processes are related. In number the churches have declined heavily in the last three decades; no one knows how much. The Census of Religious Bodies of 1936 indicates a loss of more than 46,000 rural churches in the United States in ten years, or very roughly 25 per cent, but this is questioned by sociologists such as T. Lynn Smith.<sup>19</sup> Some of this decline, furthermore, is due to advantageous consolidations in regions that are overchurched. Beyond these marginal doubts as to numbers and advantages, however, there is clearly a major decline going on in number of churches, in number of members, in attendance, in financial support, and in social function. This cannot be ignored. According to one estimate the attendance in six years dropped off 20 per cent. According to another the financial support of rural churches in America declined in twelve years about one third. Roving or part-time pastors replace resident pastors. The numbers of part-time pastors vary, in one study,<sup>20</sup> from more than 30 per cent in villages of 1,500 to 2,500 people to about 90 per cent in hamlets and open-country communities. Clearly the rural church is not prospering.

In some respects these changes are better so. Sectarian competition and preaching hell-fire are losing their hold on people's interest, we may hope, and if the vitality of the rural church is dependent on this aspect of our culture the decline may be welcomed. So too the emotional atavism and immaturity, the reversion to infantile imagery, the sacred baby talk, can be lost to our culture without need for regret. Again, the death of the church as a familiar instrument of race segregation and class snobbery need cause no distress. In other ways, however, the decline of the church adds to the defeat of rural life. In its origins it is a symbol of the solidarity of the community. It still may serve that purpose. If the church can enter once more the central concerns of the little place as an integrative influence its continued existence will be justified.

Wise churchmen see the necessity for a more functional identification of the church with the community. Rockwell Smith<sup>21</sup> points out the correspondence between the economic functions of the community and the church and draws up a guide for rural pastors in the administration,

<sup>19</sup> T. Lynn Smith, *The Sociology of Rural Life* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 424.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 428-430.

<sup>21</sup> Rockwell Smith, *The Church in Our Town* (New York, Abington-Cokesbury Press, 1945).

management, and distribution of their community services. D. E. Lindstrom assembles a seven-point program<sup>22</sup> for community organization in open-country areas designed to give group functions more efficiency and interest. He recognizes particularly the intimate relation of the church to the land. He lists the following suggestions:<sup>23</sup> The church might make land surveys for new settlement, buy land for resettlement, encourage better farm practices, and study part-time farming. It might give information on farms for sale and rent; encourage legislation to remedy the concentration of land ownership and operation and help prevent land speculation. So too, Monsignor L. G. Ligutti, of the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, the leader of an important rural movement within the Catholic Church, and a group of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish churchmen have issued a statement of man's relation to the land<sup>24</sup> that is in reality a credo of the union of religious life with culture of the soil.

### 7. Eugene Smathers

Eugene Smathers and his church at Big Lick, Tennessee, show what the rural church may do in dealing with the critical decay of community life. Smathers is a tall, slender young man, son of a southern tenant farmer, a graduate of a theological seminary, and trained as well, if he wishes to use it, in the language and method of the sociologist. He might have directed his life in the usual pattern of the intelligent, well-trained, personable young man. It might have been the pastorate of a big, opulent church in the city, or a college job and presumably a fairly prompt professorship, or a school supervisory job, or the pay and prestige of an executive position in a religious, educational, or business institution. This kind of thing young Smathers no doubt might easily have attained. But this is not what he did. He went instead as minister to Big Lick and there he has remained.

Big Lick is a little place of fifty families on the Cumberland Plateau west of Knoxville. When Smathers went there the region was relatively unsettled. The soil is none too good. The transportation is poor. The

<sup>22</sup> D. C. Lindstrom, *Rural Life and the Church* (Champaign, Ill., The Garrard Press, 1946), pp. 153 f. and 29 f.

<sup>23</sup> From conferences of the Farm Foundation and the Committee on the Church in Town and Country.

<sup>24</sup> *Man's Relation to the Land* (Committee on Town and Country, 297 Fourth Avenue, New York 10, N.Y., 1945).

people lived as best they could on their little farms without much cash or power of purchase. The average cash income of a family there was about one hundred dollars a year. Farming was primitive, without benefit of modern machinery. The nearest doctor was fourteen miles away. No church building, no parish house, no parsonage; the little place, like many another in the region, sat meagerly in the sunlight, inert, dull-eyed, drugged with poverty and accustomed want.

When Smathers came, the first problem was the church. He was offered from an outside source free materials, and then with their own labor, given without charge, he and others of the place built the church and the parish house. They were building more than houses of stone and wood. This work was followed by a Health House. A resident nurse, willing to substitute devotion for money, was secured, and Big Lick for the first time had health and medical service above the level of the seventeenth century. Then came a farm machinery cooperative. A pool of machinery was gradually built up and put under the Reverend Smathers' supervision. With it went informal instruction in its use and in modern agricultural methods. A church farm was then laid out which the minister and his family operated in lieu of cash salary. It was successful.

Following this a larger and more radical experiment was tried. From the inexpensive back lands of the community a considerable tract was purchased by means of a revolving fund. With this Eugene Smathers hoped to provide ways whereby young married couples might remain in the home place. Moderate-sized farms were set up and sold on a long-term, low-interest basis to well-selected young people. Thus the economic pressure on young people to leave the place and to remain unmarried were both reduced, and Big Lick, in a small but highly significant way, reversed the trend, upset what some social scientists fatuously call the inevitable, and quietly moved toward stability.

Next a soil conservation unit was established. Cash crops were developed. Marketing methods were worked out. Experiments in quick freezing were made. In the summers a small, religious, interracial, student work camp was established. The incoming college students lived in the houses of the community in entire peace and good will until influences from outside of Big Lick caused the camp to be closed. Beyond all this Eugene Smathers brought in from time to time outside visitors, speakers, and resource men of various sorts to help give the community more direct contact with the outside world.

His work continues. As a symbol it has great significance. As a pilot project in what the church may do in the rural community its importance

can hardly be overestimated. It has remained within the American pattern. It has done no more than common sense would affirm. But love and intelligence pervade the project. Above all is the conviction of the central importance of the true community in religious life.

This project required not only devotion; it took intelligence and money. The Board of National Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. put \$34,500 into it. But money and intelligence are usually available when there is a vision of the way. Father Luigi Ligutti at Granger, Iowa; Mrs. John C. Campbell at Brasstown, North Carolina; Father J. J. Tompkins and Dr. Coady in Nova Scotia; David Smith in Saskatchewan; Granville Hicks at Grafton, New York; Ralph Borsodi at Suffern, New York; Arthur E. Morgan; the Friends; and others in the church and out have made impressive demonstrations of modern ways to stabilize the community or to identify the intellectual life with it. The Tennessee Valley Authority is itself a great project in applying modern technology and administrative methods to the problem of community survival in America. In all this the church may play a central part. Eugene Smathers has shown us at least one way in which it may be done.

## PART VIII

# *The Nature of the Community*



1. *What Is the Community?*
2. *Five Characteristics of the Community*
3. *Living Is Face to Face in the Community*
4. *Inner Diversity of the Community*
5. *The Community Is Inclusive*
6. *The Solidarity of the Community*
7. *The Community Is Small*
8. *Indian School*
9. *The Timeless Community*
10. *The Community and the Scholar*



## 1. *What Is the Community?*

It becomes clear as the problem is explored that the word "community" is a fluid one. Because it refers to a human situation, the context of which changes with every progression of experience, the word is harder to pin down or fix than words made to order. In this respect a fluid word may be more accurate than a fixed one. It may refer more closely to the actual movement and shift in the situation than one contained by definition in one compartment. Though this cannot excuse confusion, it does suggest that clarification of meaning is not solely the process of fixation of terms. Some fixations obscure or distort more than they clarify.

I have used the word "community" in at least four ways. These cross the boundaries of different disciplines and help to explore a living, fluid situation that otherwise might be frozen terminologically into one form. First, the community is a group of people, contextually considered, who know one another well. Usually this involves also a locus, or home place, a neighborhood, a village, perhaps even an area within a city, but sometimes no fixed place at all. This is a social use of the word. The general sociologist is inclined to use it loosely for groups of various sizes. The rural sociologist is likely to limit it to the neighborhood.

The community, second, is a geographical place group denotatively considered, a village or other place designation. This is a statistical use of the word. Third, the community is a phyletic group. Here the unity of stock or blood across the years has precedence. The family has phyletic unity in part, while the "line" is defined by it. This community is without benefit of language or symbolic reference and indeed is distorted, according to Trigrant Burrow,<sup>1</sup> by such representational behavior. But the phyletic community in its obedience to the past and its mute concern for creatures yet to be is at least practically a community. Nature in her less-conscious manifestations gives it great emphasis and men sometimes do. This meaning of the word community is biological. A fourth use of the word is poetic or metaphysical. The community is a timeless unity of human meanings and in this sense is both concrete and metaphorical.

These differences in usage arise in the fact that the community is relevant to many disciplines. It is both sociological and philosophical,

<sup>1</sup> Trigrant Burrow, *The Biology of Human Conflict*, *op. cit.*

both statistical and biological. The definitions are many, and many people undertake them. It is as if they were reaching for a thing beyond the zone of reference, and because it cannot quite be verbalized must be made articulate in successive approximations.

Thus MacIver says, "By a community I mean any area of common life, village, town or district or country or even wider area." It is "a social unity whose members recognize as common a sufficiency of interests to allow of the interactivities of common life."<sup>2</sup> Later he says, "Any circle of people, who live together, who belong together, so that they share, not this or that particular interest, but a whole set of interests wide enough and complete enough to include their lives, is a community."<sup>3</sup> It is an areal concept, but always an area of common interest. One's life may be lived wholly within it. All one's social relationships may be found within it. The first of these quotations from MacIver supports the current notion that any area of common interest, however large, may be a community. The second quotation, a decade or so more recent, gives to the community a more measured structure and at least suggests a principle of limitation, though it does not clearly demand it.

For others, such as Albion Small, the nature of the community is primarily in its solidarity or "the common relation of all parts." This, stated more in terms of spiritual metaphor, is also the point of view of Josiah Royce. For others, such as Park and Burgess, the geographical distribution is given more weight.<sup>4</sup>

Recently the tendency has been to define the community in terms of specific functional relationships. These include an areal or geographical concept and assume a degree of psychological solidarity as well. The trade zone is used by C. J. Galpin as the defining characteristic of the rural community. For K. L. Butterfield it is a complex of functional interests, such as education or trade, and their institutional instruments. The community, he adds significantly, "is both the smallest and the largest number of people that can constitute a real social unit."<sup>5</sup> The definition by Dwight Sanderson is perhaps most used by sociologists in the field. He is considering here a specifically American kind of modern rural community. It consists, he says, "of the social interaction of the people and their institutions in the local area in which they live on dispersed

<sup>2</sup> R. M. MacIver, *Community* (London, The Macmillan Company Ltd., 1917), pp. 22 and 107.

<sup>3</sup> R. M. MacIver, *Society* (New York, Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1936), pp. 9 and 10.

<sup>4</sup> See Kolb and Brunner, *op. cit.*, pp. 292 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Extension Bulletin No. 23*, Massachusetts Agricultural College, 1918.



farmsteads and in a hamlet or village which forms the center of their common activities."<sup>6</sup>

What then is the community? My own predispositions lead me to say that men are the measure of their communities, and groups which change in size or quality beyond the measure of a man or beyond his limits of experience are not true communities. These statements, obvious as they are, do involve a philosophy and social policy. The nature of the human being is the base on which such a definition of the community rests, and an exploration of that nature is the main function of this book. But philosophy has many colors and preconceptions. Behind philosophy's façade of the universal are always the philosophers. The men whom they address also have their slants and particular evaluations. These things show through in any "universal" statement as to the nature of the community. They should show through, of course; they give a general statement its thrust.

A philosophical definition of the human community will reflect the values in the community of discourse from which it comes. I shall assume in this case that these values are conditioned and indeed created in the long series of biological and social events that are the history of the group in question. I shall assume further that the community is human behavior in which values emerge and take form because of the nature of the behavior itself. Within behavior are nuclei of interest which are part and parcel of the process but distinguished for various reasons from it. Where these nuclei of interest are distinguished biologically we may call them human beings, animals, or their phyla. Where they are distinguished in terms of customs and cultures we may call them institutions or social habits. All of them really are functions of the going process. They are part of it, are created in it and by it, but also have an importance of their own as distinguished from other functions of the process.

This does not mean that values are solely biological or mechanical or can be reduced to those terms. The goings on of the world and the living things in it are immensely rich and diversified in modes, structures, and functions. They are pluralistic, not only in the quantitative aspects of their structure, but in the kinds of structure itself. As a center of integration in that world man is also multifunctional, a creature in which mechanical, evaluational, social, and individual modes of reality somehow find a common nucleus. This nucleus may be called the human community. It is a dynamic center of order in the world. If it disintegrates,

<sup>6</sup> Dwight Sanderson, *The Rural Community* (Boston, Ginn and Company, 1932), p. 481.

man disintegrates socially, phyletically, morally, and another creative experiment in the processes of living things is marked *negative*.

## 2. *Five Characteristics of the Community*

I am aware that no fixed lines can be drawn in such a fluid situation. Nevertheless I can indicate to what I refer when I speak of the community. It has five essential characteristics:<sup>7</sup> (1) A Community is a group of neighbors who know one another face to face. (2) It is a diversified group as to age, sex, skill, function, and mutual service to each other. (3) It is a cooperative group in which many of the main activities of life are carried on together. (4) It is a group having a sense of "belonging," or group identity and solidarity. (5) It is a rather small group, such as the family, village, or small town, in which each person can know a number of others as whole persons, not as functional fragments. When the group under consideration is so large that the people in it do not know one another, the community disappears.

These five characteristics overlap, and all might be incorporated in a single statement: *A community is a group of people who know one another well*. But this is satisfactory only when "knowing well" means the full pattern of functional and social relationships which people may have with one another. I shall try therefore to elaborate somewhat these five descriptive characteristics.

## 3. *Living Is Face to Face in the Community*

The first is a disputed one. It is, *a community is a group of neighbors who know one another face to face*. Thus it falls within what Cooley calls the primary group.<sup>8</sup> This group, he says, gives the individual his first and

<sup>7</sup> These were first used by me in *Life in Montana; As Seen in Lonepine, A Small Community*, by Baker Brownell, Joseph Kinsey Howard, and Paul Meadows; "A Study Group Guide," published by the Montana Study (Missoula, The University of Montana, 1945), p. 8.

<sup>8</sup> C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), Chaps. III and IV. A. F. Wileden points out in a letter to me that some sociologists such as Sanders and Engsminger, in their *Alabama Rural Communities—A Study in Chilton County*, are beginning to view the "sociological community" as a "cluster of neighborhoods." This is vigorously protested by other rural sociologists such as Kolb and Marshall in their *Neighborhood-Community Relationships in Rural Society*. The fact is, Wileden adds, that the Neighborhood Leader System, which was the Council of Defense system for the rural areas of the U.S. in World War II, was based on this concept.

complete experience of social unity. As exemplified in the family, the play group of children, the neighborhood or community group, it is the continuous source of the more complex life. In the primary group is developed what we call human nature, as for example, the kindness and sympathy that can come only through personal association. Though cooperation without friendship has been and can be developed in great cities, armies, or in galley crews and slave ships, it is relatively recent. In the primary group cooperation with friendship is natively established as the ethical basis of social life.

To be face to face with neighbors would seem to be a familiar situation in human life, but the intense mobility of urban behavior makes it among millions of people comparatively rare. This face-to-face association with neighbors has values of profound importance in living. Such values may be diffused through that living, not in the form of maxims or moral statements, but in the unsaid contexts and movements of living itself. For neighbors are physically and factually there. They bring into one's experience the stubborn wholeness of other lives. The concreteness of neighbor folk is very different from the abstract, specialized relationship that the listener by radio, for example, has with Bing Crosby or the passenger in a railway car has with the conductor. It is a precious difference. In it is the quality of human life.

The community, it is true, may be larger than a group limited to people who are in continuous face-to-face associations through all of their lives. This would restrict it to the family, to localized kinship, to the small, immobile hamlet or other group whose members are virtually contiguous. The community may better be described as a potentially or practically face-to-face group in which a member may be easily in another's presence and where in the day-by-day comings and goings of life they may and do "run across" each other with familiarity and without surprise. The community in this sense is a pattern of life in which the members may be easily and casually in one another's presence.

This *presence* of people to one another is of critical importance in the pattern of living, whether it be compulsory or voluntary. A young person and older ones are continuously and necessarily present to one another in the family whether they like it or not. They have little choice. So, too, the urban stenographer or filing clerk, the bank teller, the factory hand, the violinist in the orchestra, or the daily passenger on the suburban train offering his ticket to the conductor has virtually no choice in these respects as to who will be his physical associates. It is fragmental compulsion, but the pressure is there.

In rural and urban society alike the presence of people to one another is at least partly compulsive. That is the price of having social functions and place. In the true community, however, there still are areas of selection. It will be large enough to permit choice and still small enough to avoid the rigid organization of the city. It is still possible here to meet human beings rather than anonymous functionaries.

To be face to face with neighbors is not always pleasant in this mundane sphere. The primary community involves an ancient and sometimes irksome discipline in human relationships. In the long run it selects people, or trains them, who are capable of continuity and sustained character in their relations with others. This is central, we may assume, in any stable life. It is a central discipline alike in individual and social affairs, and though margins of revolt, adventure, romantic escape, and thrill may be expected and indeed welcomed in any individual career or social destiny, they should remain marginal.

By accepting a life of small, fragmental compulsions we do escape speciously this central discipline of the whole personality. I can accept the coercions of the great organization as to the street where my work will be, the scene viewed from the nearest window, the person at the bench or desk next to mine, the waitress who will take my order for lunch, the clerk who will give me my pay check, and the amount of the check, the train I will take home, and the conductor who will punch my ticket, and so on and on endlessly through the course of a life. In the interstices of this vast aggregate of specialized compulsions I may hope to find novel scenes, sudden changes, and escapes. There will be amusements to buy, or rootless gayety and drink, or shows, or friendships that touch and go briefly in different nooks and recesses of life. There will be women, different ones, new ones every hour, captured momentarily in a kind of repeated, universal exogamy. I may call this freedom, but it really is escape, and the price of this sort of thing is personal disintegration and social defeat.

When escape, thrill, explosive discontinuity of experience, or irresponsible power and capture become the prevailing mode, we may be sure that human control over our destinies is weakening and that society is breaking down. The hot searching always for new futures and new worlds to conquer is at best time-driven slavery. It is defeat of the spirit. It is the repudiation of (or failure to find) the timeless values in which our behavior attains eventual stability and significance. The primary group, says MacIver, "is the first and always remains the chief focus of our social satisfactions. . . . It sustains the interest of living itself."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> R. M. MacIver, *Society*, *op. cit.*, pp. 236 and 239.

To be face to face with neighbors or kinfolk is to live in a homely presentness of value, a spiritual immediacy that cannot be attained indirectly. This is the moment of life, not the next one, when we are with people we know. This moment is the culmination of the curve of time, from which all pasts and futures slope away. It is a moment, as are all moments that can be labeled "this," dipped deeply in a timeless pool. It is significant not as this individual's moment or that one's, but only in their community. Languages, many customs, myth, religion, and other proud constructions are created only in and by the community of men. Spiritual values too are communal.

This is the essence of all social values which Jesus and other teachers called love. The saint is overwhelmed in it. He may then seek a similar communion with beings deemed by him more worthy than the uneven, disappointing human beings across the way, and find therein God. But its genesis is within the little group of men, not in the supernatural. Perhaps this presentness and the poetic unity of the several persons in the one of the community are *in* nature but not quite *of* it. In any case only in society, says Cassirer, in relation to a "Thee," can man's subjectivity assert itself as a "Me."<sup>10</sup>

In the little group of people known well men find spiritual immediacy. It may be homely, simple, native, undramatic. Its name may be merely "a natural interest in people," "sociality," "affection," "dislike," "love," "anger," "friendship," none of which more than touches the fringes. But only here are men given presentness.

Urban life in contrast to that of the small community has no abiding presentness. It is designed always to subordinate this moment to the next one. Its structure is based logically and functionally on the moment that is not here. It roars on toward endless futures which it never finds. It tips and staggers endlessly into postponed values that never are realized. It is a pattern of specialisms in which instruments of production have no final or consummatory value. Or they make way briefly for corrupted consummations and pleasure seekings that have no element of production. This segregation of instrument from end is the secret both of the city's power and its human failure.

The city has no present end, the cynic may add, the rural community has no future. This is partly true. Because the city has no presentness of value, it struggles, as it were, to invent pseudo-present things. These are violently stimulating processes, professional amusements, sports, shows, arts, addressed to leisure-time consumption. These are pseudo-

<sup>10</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *Language and Myth*, Trans. by Langer (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1946), p. 61.

present things, for the city structurally is all future. The rural community on the other hand may have too little future. Its future, in the form of youth and wealth, drains away. Its capital, which is a kind of solidified future, slips into urban hands. It is less that the rural community is inherently static than that its potentialities for progress are removed to centers beyond its control. Though the presence of neighbors does require a just sense of human measure, limitation, and a responsible control of action, it does not require resistance to all change, insensitivity, and sloth. In the primary group the relationships among whole persons are of first importance. The concreteness of human beings with all its poetry is inescapable in such groups.

#### *4. The Inner Diversity of the Community*

The community, second, is a *diversified group in age, sex, skill, function, and mutual service to each other.*

If the community as a face-to-face group refers to the concrete presence of men with one another and to the wordless, time-transcending poetry which that involves, the community so far as it has inner diversity is more secular in character. It is organic. Its inner differences go together in a native wholeness of design. This is more than the sum of all the parts. Old people and young in a community complement each other and give to each what alone they cannot have. When they are contiguous in groups without community structure, on the other hand, they often are implicitly in conflict. They become burdens on each other. Older people may sacrifice their capital of strength and wealth to bring young relatives and others through a functionless youth. Younger people may repudiate their future and their hopes for early marriage and children to carry their elders through a functionless old age. This decay of function and sufficiency in the young and old is characteristic of social groups in which the community is dead.

In the same way male and female people in a community complement each other and create the organic group called the family, itself a true community. When they are contiguous in groups without community, however, these males and females are likely to become competitors. Their interests no longer have a common center. The so-called sex war becomes intense. They compete for dominance within the family and without, or more than likely form no family at all. They raid each other momentarily, and in brief and often broken marriages and affairs sieze a few hours'

personal satisfaction and then go their several ways again. All this is natural enough, human enough, but it is human nature without benefit of the community. It is a culture of discontinuity. It destroys life now and to come.

In the different skills and diverse services the members of a community serve one another. They see one another in their whole pattern and they participate in the process of community life, not blindly and without friendship, but as known people in a common situation.

This inner diversity of the community is important, further, in giving opportunity for spontaneous associations to form. These are based on personal liking and interest. Such autonomous groups, as they are called by Maria Rogers,<sup>11</sup> or more specifically psychegroups, by Helen H. Jennings,<sup>12</sup> are spontaneously formed among young and old alike, but particularly among adolescents. In many ways they are the context of community life. In them are the immediacy and compulsive interests in human association that give it body and structure.

By some students of the problem, namely the sociometrists, these groups are held to be one of two or three structural components of a community. Perhaps this is right. In any case the living community has an inner diversification in which spontaneous groupings can arise. It has also stability enough to assure persistence of these groups and to make possible a familiar "hangout," a rendezvous to which persons interested in each other "just for the fun of it" can come again and again.

This type of association, important though it be, should not be confused with the wholeness of functional relationships that people in communities have with one another. At lunchtime in a factory, for example, three or four workmen may eat together "for the fun of it" because their interest in each other is personal. Such associations are invaluable, but they are not enough. These workmen, after all, may have little or no community of functional activity. Their lives may separate when the whistle blows. They know little of one another; they have no personally cooperative activities with one another beyond the factory walls. The little psychegroup, of which these workmen are an example, is personally and psychologically important. Though it is an incomplete association, to be sure, it should not be ignored, for most associations in the world in which we actually live are and will be imperfect. Important as it is, however,

<sup>11</sup> Maria Rogers and Ralph Spence, editors, *Autonomous Groups Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 4; Vol. IV, Nos. 1 and 2-3.

<sup>12</sup> Helen H. Jennings, *Leadership and Isolation*, 2nd ed. (New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1950), quoted by Rogers.



the psychegroup cannot be a structural substitute for the fuller and more functional cooperation of men as operating wholes.

The organic character of the community differs from the organization of special-interest groups in two important ways. The community incorporates the whole man in all his functions. The special interest group, such as the National Wholesalers Association or the American Association of University Professors, selects only certain functions and fragmental processes of a man for inclusion in its system. The community, again, finds its objectives in its own organic processes of mutual life. Its ideal is present in its own behavior. It may of course, and often does, have objectives beyond the local group; but these do not and should not determine its nature and value. The special-interest group on the other hand more often is justified only by objectives beyond itself. It could not rightly exist alone. The community thus is self-justifying. Its unity lies more in metaphor and self-identification, as Cassirer might say, than in conceptual extensions. It is living. It is living, we may hope, with fullness and reach. Nevertheless it is only living that justifies life.

### *5. The Community Is Inclusive*

*The community (third) is a cooperative group, in which many of the main activities of life are carried on together.* It is an inclusive process. I know well that a community after all is a number of men, this man and that man, with neither a body of its own nor a mind independent of those constituents, still I can speak of this process of common living as inclusive without hypostasis. As a pattern of activities, related in certain ways, the community includes the main functional complexes of a human life, or at least many of them. It is inclusive, for example, of many of the main economic activities, the family activities, the educational, religious, recreational activities, and whatever others there may be. The community need not include rigidly all activities, or even all important ones, I think, if the main sheaf of a man's operations and interests is here. If his cooperative, fully rounded life of action is shared and shared alike with the familiar group, if his neighbor participates with him, not merely in one or two, but in a preponderance of the functional activities of living, the group dynamically is a community.

This cohesion of the several functions of life within the peripheries of a rather small group of people means usually that the community has a locale. It is placed, each one uniquely, on the earth. It has its scene.



Usually, though I think unnecessarily, this is used as a defining characteristic of communities. It might better be used, as in practice it is used, as a way of distinguishing one community from another. Like the community's name, it is less a way of defining communities than of telling them apart. A gypsy band, on the other hand, may be a community. A nomad group of kin following the pastures or wild game often may be a community. Its fixed location in space, in short, is usually a concomitant of a community, but does not help much in defining it.

Dynamically a community is the cooperative process of a group of people along with, it may be added, subsidiary plants and animals. This multifunctional process is contained largely within the group in rather close-coupled interactions. The cooperative process within a community is thus largely direct<sup>13</sup> rather than indirect. It is, as it were, potentially direct. Though division of labor and functional differentiation are present, the different functions are carried out within human range of each other. To each member of the community they are clearly part of the going process over which he has some measure of influence. He is an active member of that process. It is his, psychically as well as conceptually, emotionally as well as logically. It is within his range. The coherence of functions in the true community is appreciatively clear to each member as well as rationally demonstrable. It is close in his experience. He belongs.

## 6. *The Solidarity of the Community*

*The community is a group having a sense of "belonging" or group identity and solidarity.* In this sense the community is a group of persons having an identity. This mutual identification is highly valued. The community, in other words, is an appreciative unity in each member's life. This may be expressed aesthetically, morally, or, as we are accustomed to say, spiritually. This last word, spiritual, carries in it both aesthetic and moral values along with a substantive, or ontological, connotation that varies according to the cultural complexes and sophistication of the user.

The valued identity of the community and the participation of each member in it is given various names. It may be called morale, patriotism,

<sup>13</sup> See MacIver, *Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 240. See also Amos H. Hawley, *Human Ecology* (N.Y. Ronald Press, 1950), Chap. 12, for an analysis of community structure, as it relates to the various groups called communities by the sociologists.

family pride, love, or loyalty. It may be symbolized by mottoes, songs, flags, badges, sacred rites, or gods. It is the spiritual nature of the community.

Josiah Royce, writing of the Pauline conception of the church, says it is a "divinely ordained and divinely significant spiritual community to which all must belong who are to attain the true goal of life."<sup>14</sup> Although the church, particularly in terms of Roycean absolutes, as I have said has not the face-to-face structure, the inner, functional diversity, nor the essential limitations that I have ascribed to the true community, it is cooperatively inclusive and it does above all give value to the sense of belonging. What is the nature of this belonging that is so characteristic of church and community alike?

Royce as ever moves toward the large in his interpretation. The community, he says, is an entity<sup>15</sup> in its own right, with its own mind and psychology. It is a live unit of a sort, with its own organs and its characteristic products, such as languages, customs, religions, and cannot be produced by an individual mind or even a collection of such minds unless they are "somehow organized into a genuine community."

Although Royce believes that such a conception of the community may be held without resort either to metaphor or mysticism, I am inclined to think that both the metaphor and mysticism are more valid than Royce's incorporative absolute. He would impose upon the community, not only a life, mind, and being of its own, but a universality in the body of the church that transcends human limitations. The mysticism and metaphor, if left on earth, may be creative principles of the community as men live in it, use it, and, indeed, are the community. Their projective poetry underlies our purposes and interests and our intimations of life. It gives us this bright moment now. It gives immediacy to life. It is the sense of spiritual community among men. It may be found, I think, within the due courses of Nature and within the limitations inherent in man's life.

This is a secular conception of mysticism and of belonging. Or if "absolute," it refers not to absolutes of universal structure, authority, and power but to finalities only in human appreciation. Royce recognizes this appreciative life, but comes back to the extranatural, if not supernatural, and the compelling presence of absolutes in the affairs of men. Perhaps these too are metaphors, in the sense that Cassirer speaks of language

<sup>14</sup> Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 55. See also Max Otto's comment on this in Part VII, Section 3, Page 182.

as an organ of the real, but Royce I think did not mean them in that way.

Royce nevertheless gives voice to a spiritual energy and devotional interest in the community of man that are of first importance. We need not accept his metaphysical mythology, perhaps, to recognize the solidarity of the community and the sense of belonging as more than sentimental luxury and edification. It is positive. It has inner compulsion and will. It is evangelistic. And this evangelism of spirit is what Royce calls the "beloved community." This outgoing loyalty and devotion are the source of social initiative in all that is most worth-while. It is the quality of greatness both in the individual and in communal life.

For Royce the spirit is not the recessive contemplation found in some mysticism. It is communal rather than individual. Its values are projective and by adventurous fellow feeling the many of the group are identified with the immediately present one. It is mystical, if the term be limited to the secular solidarity of the community on this earth.

This dynamic of the spirit is different also from the contemplative aesthetic of sophisticates and philosophers like Santayana who may define the spirit as the disintoxication from values. It is, on the contrary, responsible evaluation. It is living within, not outside of an evaluative community. It is devotion, not detachment, and seeks not emotional security and untouched poise above the flood and flux, but generous abandon, loyalty, and love in fellow men. This may be excessive, even dangerous in groups that because of size or corrupt organization are not true communities. It is the dynamic, nevertheless, of the communal spirit.

### 7. The Community Is Small

The fifth characteristic is, *the community is a rather small group, such as the family or small town, in which each person can know a number of others as whole persons, not as functional fragments. When the group under consideration is so large that the people in it do not know one another, the community disappears.* Of the five descriptive characteristics of the community this, I think, is likely to be the least acceptable to persons influenced by the contemporary educational environment.<sup>15</sup> Poetically the community, to summarize, is the presentness and immediacy of the face-to-face group. Structurally it is an organism with inner diversity. Dynamically it is an inclusive, cooperative process. Appreciatively

<sup>15</sup> My position has support, I believe, in George Peter Murdock's recent book, *Social Structure* (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1949), in which he says that the small community is one of the two universal and basic social groupings.

it is valued in its solidarity. To these I add now a quantitative characteristic: The community is small. This is implied, of course, in saying that the community is a face-to-face group. It also is implied in the structural, the dynamic, and the appreciative aspects of the community as I have described them. The question of size, however, remains critically important. Among scholars and laymen alike it has no commonly accepted criterion. And size itself as a critical condition of the community is likely to be ignored.

Because community life is a cooperative process it often is assumed that any cooperative process makes for community. But large-scale, anonymous, indirect cooperation may make for just the opposite. Because community life is group life, it may be assumed that all group training leads toward better communities. But training in mass groups and the vast regimentations of industrial, military, religious, or political organizations may defeat the community. So too, training in special-interest groups, pressure groups, and gangs may lead to community decay. Solidarity also is characteristic of community life, as is diversification, but the ferocious solidarity of a fascist state, or the unlimited diversification of jobs and professions in our modern industrial culture may be anything but assets in community development. Education for leadership also is supposed to be an unfailing advantage to the community. But superimposed leadership where bankers take over the railroads or insurance companies take over the farms, or for that matter leadership in any field that escapes the intimate disciplines of community life, leads only toward despotism. In all of these situations size is a critical condition which may make the difference between community welfare and defeat.

The true community is small. Without this limitation the structural, dynamic, appreciative, and poetic aspects of communal life are likely to be corrupted. Although eternities, as it were, may be found in community life, they are not eternities of extended range in time, number, or acquisition. They are poetic and in this sense have more significance in human life, no doubt, than massive extensions of power and behavior across the world. The community as a face-to-face group, for example, has no meaning in the casual and hurried face to face of people in a subway crowd or the lobby of a theatre. A small group is essential. It is an inner community, as it were, where people can stand in rather full relationships to one another and are face to face in the whole pattern of a life. In a little group like this, a community of values may be created, and the magic of what I have called the presentness of things

shines out as a quality of our existence. We are identified, poetically, with all that the communal present contains. We find values or create them, and the valued things, no matter what their location may be in the time order, remain timeless and unhurried. This is the magic of the little group of people who know one another well. Its inner intensity and value is conditional on a principle of limitation. Its human significance is in context not extension. To be great it must be small.

The community is small so far as its limits remain within human range, or, rather, within the range of personal acquaintance of the members in it. The human measure is the criterion of its size rather than the organizational structures that may be possible in its several functions.

Human measure is not fixed. It depends upon the character and capacity of each person and on the group in which he lives. Living expands in a group that encourages the organic diversity of life, the co-operative fullness of action, the sense of belonging, and the face-to-face association with people known well. The perimeters of life contract, on the other hand, in groups where specialized interests replace community life. They contract where indirect cooperation and widely expanded functional organization replace the action of people within perceptual range of one another. They contract where the solidarity of the little group becomes the large-scale solidarity of institutions extending remotely to abstract units of organization such as a political party, a universal church, a nation, a race. They contract where segregated relationships among human beings replace face-to-face community with whole men.

These expanding and contracting perimeters of a life are, as it were, the limits of a corporative human being. Such a person in relation to his community is rather fully functional. He is an organic pattern of mutually sustaining interests. In groups too large this social and spiritual integrity of the human being declines. His life is confined. Drastic segregation of function takes place. One or two of his functional activities increases in linear range across a vast and personally unknown area. This is accompanied by the corresponding diminution of the other normal functions of life.

Thus within a man's life it would seem that the law of compensation does indeed hold. These less-specialized functions become distorted, vestigial, or entirely disappear. They are replaced by purchased substitutes, vicarious superimpositions, or by nothing at all. The man's life is no longer complete in terms of fundamental actions. It loses inner pattern and fullness. It loses living initiative. His life disintegrates personally,

morally, phyletically. The central principle of symbolic substitution and specialization, so important in the development of rational man and his civilization, thus becomes his curse. It becomes through excess a principle of disintegration of modern man's community and culture.

The inherent limits of men have not been recognized in that culture. A system built, not on the human measure, but indefinitely expandible, approaches the point of self-destruction. It is built without reference to the native pattern of limited functions and communal activities that is man. Thus the measure of a man, though varying according to a set of infinitely shifting conditions, is nevertheless a measure within limits. Those limits, psychologically, are perhaps the possible range of human acquaintance in which a man can know a number of persons rather fully. In the naturally rich process of living such limits are hard to fix. How large the number is I do not know. The group may be a hundred persons, a thousand, even ten thousand perhaps; it no doubt varies, as I have said, according to the character and capacity of each person and the group in which he lives. Dr. Scott Williamson of the Peckham Community Center says that the number should be about 2,000 families. Some sociologists have said that 1,500 people, or perhaps 300 families, can provide the values and facilities of the communal group. In any case the number is not large.

Beyond these limits another kind of order begins to supervene. Specialized relationships among large numbers of remote persons begin to replace the fullness of life with persons close by. Pieces of persons are related abstractly to pieces of other persons. Though it must be granted, of course, that some degree of this remote and indirect relationship is inevitable and indeed desirable in a modern culture, it by no means follows that it should replace the immediacy and the multifunctional contacts of men with one another in a true community. When this replacement takes place, the community dies and the integrated life of men with it. This substitutive culture and decay mark the modern age.

Human beings are after all the most important element of a man's life and experience. People may be under some conditions mutually a curse upon one another; under others the greatest blessing; but in any case a man cannot escape them. People are all he has. Only among them are his values created and only through them can his values be fulfilled. They are the source or at least the occasion of valued things. In a culture that has become antagonistic in its effect to those human-centered relationships, only decline and death can be predicted.

### 8. Indian School

Children and primitive people live in a kind of deathless world where time is less articulate than in ours and the passage of experience from one moment to the next is less noticeable and on the whole less significant. They sense a world—or so we may imagine it—that flows almost imperceptibly across those boundaries of time that we, in our maturity, find separating the present from the past and future. They feel a past event more closely but, as a particle in time, far less clearly. They find it diffused in time, but more immediate and effulgent. The future likewise is for them more vague but paradoxically more warmly here. The naïve mind, in its innocence of divisionary techniques and sophistication, embeds all items of experience in a kind of glimmering *now*, and gains thereby a unity of life that more mature minds may lack.

But such a mind suffers correspondingly when confronted by a pattern of systematic time and processes. It is confused in the new dimensions and more than likely lapses into dumb indifference or truancy. Such were the Indian boys in Mrs. Lear's little school near Browning, Montana. These scions of the great Blackfoot tribe were lonelier than they knew in the school that white men built for them. They came to school indeed, at least sometimes, but remained small, stubborn lumps. They were truant in mind as well as in body, resistant and indissoluble.

With this problem before her Lillian Lear undertook a teaching job that became a social experiment and a project in folklore and scholarship of far greater scope than she or any one else had imagined. It led her step by step into fields of which she hitherto had no notion, and built up by its own momentum a pattern of accomplishment that incorporated parts of several disciplines. In order to arouse some interest in the children she began inviting their parents to the school. They came slowly at first, mothers in twos and threes, more in curiosity perhaps than through a recognition of the need. They were not indoctrinated in the ways of time and the educational order, but in the presence of their children they became slowly more at home. The child on his part sensed his familiar milieu once more. He was less the detached and inarticulate fragment in an alien situation. He became more of a person. He found more occasion for expression within the schoolroom. The great plains that he saw out of the window were no longer merely invitations to escape.

Mrs. Lear now had the problem of getting the continuing attention

of the parents. Here again her impulse was unerring. Again she saw the need to involve them more deeply in familiar contexts and activities. She tried to get more of them together and thus build up something of the confidence and chatter of familiar community life. She tried also to set them going in some of the traditional activities of their native culture. These were developed, always experimentally and with hesitation, along two lines: storytelling and handicrafts.

At about this point she chanced to come to me, in the office of the Montana Study. She had with her a belt of porcupine quillwork made by an Indian woman. It was a carefully wrought bit of handicraft as old in pattern and process as the life of the Blackfoot people in this mountain-bordered plain. The deltoid design of simple colors was boldly honest, decorative, and frank in its presentation of the materials of which it was made. Mrs. Lear had rescued the craft of porcupine quillwork from extinction among the Blackfoot. When Lillian Lear came to the school only one old woman in the tribe, and she nearly blind, knew how to do the work. Now a group of young and middle-aged women were turning out a good deal of this and other craft work, and Mrs. Lear was looking for a market.

Markets, to be sure, are not within the traditional purview of the Blackfoot people and Mrs. Lear was hesitant. In their half-primitive, half-modern ways of living, however, the work could not have the appropriateness nor be needed so intimately as in older days. Rather than see it disappear entirely, Mrs. Lear felt justified in resorting to at least half-modern means of maintaining it.

But the commercial marketing of such things requires skill and persistence that neither the Indians nor Mrs. Lear possess. I saw here the same frustration that I saw a few months before on the Flathead reservation across the range. The agency superintendent, C. C. Wright, brought out from an inner room a robe, or Indian bridal dress, of white buckskin. An old Selish woman had worked on it all one winter and brought it to the perfection that only loving pains could give. It lay magnificently white across the superintendent's arm as he entered the room. Its delicate decorative theme flowed around the edges and rippled inward here and there across the tender skin. It was ineffably white and skinlike in texture. It was sincere. Hands long used to leather work, hands used through generations of common life with the deer and elk of the mountains and the buffalo and antelope of the great plains, alone could work such truth into the leathery context of the robe.

"This robe," said Superintendent Wright, "was offered for sale for



twenty dollars. I tried all through one tourist season to sell it. The highest offer I received was ten dollars." But the old artist proudly refused to sell her winter's work for that haggled sum. Finally she gave it to the superintendent with the request that he keep it as a gift for himself.

"We can take not dozens but hundreds of dozens of craft articles," said the concessionaire of one of the great national parks of the West one day, as he discussed the need for quantity production of gimcracks to sell in the park trading post, "but they must be of standard quality and uniform design so we can price them accurately." The white robe of the old Selish woman and the porcupine quillwork salvaged from extinction by Mrs. Lear did not fit that category.

In Blackfoot folklore and storytelling the work of Mrs. Lear was more rewarding. In order to interest the school children and bring the Blackfoot families more closely into the pattern of the school she set aside times for stories, and Blackfoot mothers—and later fathers—were asked to come and tell them. The stories were legends of the tribe, or fragments, Indian wit, tales traditionally for children, animal stories, god stories, stories of the great winds and the buffalo and of raids and fighting. Most of them never had been recorded except in the memories of the people.

They were told usually in the native tongue, and Mrs. Lear, who did not know the language, was confronted with the problem of transmuting them as well as translating them into the substance of the English-speaking school. At first she had an Indian translator and began to copy down laboriously his version of the stories. Then she found that the translations were not always adequate. Other Indians gave her other versions and what the story really was became increasingly doubtful.

She then began to copy down the Indian language version with a line-for-line translation opposite. But this was hard if not impossible to do well, so long as she did not know the language. To meet this problem she began to study the Blackfoot tongue, and after many months of work, checking as she went along with Indian friends around her, she became competent in the oral lingo and learned somehow to write it down. She showed me notebooks filled with Blackfoot tales written in the native tongue on the left-hand page, and on the right a translation worked out line for line with her Indian collaborators. It was a job of slow patience and care.

On one of her visits to my office I was able to find Professor Harry Turney-High and introduce him to her. As an anthropologist who had published works on Western Indian artifacts and customs he was im-

mediately interested. He advised Mrs. Lear to learn the international phonetic alphabet and to translate the Blackfoot stories thus into a fourth version. He guaranteed publication of a number of them in appropriate journals. He proposed that she collect the stories and their translations into a book.

But Lillian Lear was less interested in publishing articles and books than in capturing the interest of her Blackfoot boys and girls. She wished somehow to weld together a community of them among their own people that might contain their trauancies and make significantly whole the scattered fragments of their culture. She began her new tasks with the phonetic alphabet and the new translations. What results were forthcoming I do not know. I returned to Illinois a few months later and have not seen her since.

Lillian Lear was not a college graduate. When I last saw her she was troubled at her lack of material and professional advancement. "Should I," she asked, "come down to Missoula and get my degree? I might then get a high school position paying far more than this little rural Indian school near Browning." And who can blame her? She had none of the vanity of scholarship, or even a premonition of the prestige that her researches might give her. She was using scholarship as an instrument toward the timeless values of the human community without thought of its personal rewards. In this her insight was profound. It was without the cant and verbalities of the academy. But she worked alone with little or no recognition except the simple gratitude of her Indian friends, and at the traditionally mean salary of the rural schoolteacher.

I tried to tell her that a unique career lay in the work she was doing at the lonely, Godforsaken post on the gray plain. But it was hard to put conviction in my voice. Her own security, a college degree and high school teaching somewhere, a life of comparative comfort and local prestige, were at stake.

### *9. The Timeless Community*

A tale cannot be told to the Blackfoot boys except in terms of their response to that telling. Nor can a book really be written until it is read. That is the paradox of writing. In the same way a statement is not significant until the recipient has given to it his bit. Statements and books are like telephone circuits; they cannot be made until they are received. They must reach some indicated person to be completed. Thus they are

mutual references or cross references between persons seen or imagined in a human community. In a communal and timeless circuit of meaning such as this lies the unerring relevance of Mrs. Lear's stories. Told to her Indian friends they have a contextual pertinence and presence, a poetic immediacy, that no stories printed in the professional journals could have.

I can address only people whom I know and whose response, by the timeless magic of projection, affects me before it is given. My statements cannot find their destinations in the anonymous abstraction called "people in general." When deprived of concrete, human context they lose way and their meanings have no particular reference. Under these conditions directive language breaks down. Circuits cannot be completed with all persons at once, nor can statements have a universal direction, for there is no universal direction. Universals of this sort are wingless things that clutter up the directive course of language.

Primitive language, it is said, is holophrastic; it takes things as wholes. A name may be not merely the designation of an object; it may include an entire set of contextual relationships belonging to the object. Thus the Indian word *Antigonish*, which to us is a simple place name, is to the Indian "the place where branches were torn off trees by bears gathering beechnuts." A primitive statement may not analyze a situation into its abstract components, as so often with us; it will, on the contrary, synthesize the situation as a whole, with the concrete context and relationships seen, as it were, visually all at once. Instead of fragmenting objects of attention into smaller and smaller parts, holophrastic statements bind up the object of interest inextricably with its concrete group relationships.<sup>16</sup>

This primitive, poetic way of talking and thinking is not scientific, but still is valid in its way—and naively profound. It is an evaluative way of thinking, or, at any rate, tintured with value. It creates a community of meaning. It crosses the lake of time back and forth like a ship. We all wander in our thinking in this way back and forth across time, but only the primitive and poet accept it. The past after all is meaningless and entirely inane until we bring the present to it and identify that bright interest with what we think has gone before. We call that magical procedure memory. We create the psychic past by appointing verbal substitutes for it: "Let this word," we say, "stand for what hypothetically was," and before we know it there comes out of the inventive dark

<sup>16</sup> John Elob Boodin, *op. cit.*, p. 46. Also R. R. Marett, *Anthropology* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1912), Chap. V.

something important. The future—or more accurately, the content of the future—is nothing at all until we take the present to it and in the union of the two find the projected real. All this is infinitely fluid in the integrative process of living, but only the primitive and the poet are willing to look at it that way. For them the great freeze has not yet come. The world as they see it is still fluid. The primeval community of things across the different provinces of time has not yet been congealed into one fixed order with the parts segregated in rigidly consecutive compartments.

The primitive and the poet—or at least some primitives and some poets—take things as native wholes that otherwise are made abstract, consecutive, and fragmentary. Sometimes, though rarely, we too have intimations of this world beyond the screens and lattices of our sophisticated understanding. It is a way of thinking that should be fostered by educators and philosophers, not merely as a residual, quaint primitivism in our language, but as a valid approach to the world that we call real. It is, as it were, our way of being the world in contrast to knowing about it. Until we can approach the world more confidently in this concrete, holistic, poetic way, the course of scholarship will continue over stony ground. For the impersonal categories of science are justified after all only by their function in a world of persons and values.

I can write only to familiar people whom I have seen or heard of. There is Harry Wells for example, or T. V. Smith. There is Ordway Tead, or Granville Hicks, Paul Douglas, John Chancellor, or J. K. Howard. They enter the meaning and structure of what I say and, whether I like it or not, there they remain. The timeless community of meaning in which statements, books, invoices, sonatas, lectures, waybills, or poems attain any relevance or reality is really timeless and really a community. Thought at first is metaphor and primitive identification; it makes community no doubt long before it is also analytic and abstract. But this community of meaning can subsist only in a community of people.

Language, as John Dewey says,<sup>17</sup> is a natural function of human association; it reacts upon other events, physical and human, and gives them meaning. This connivance in events is the community of meaning, timeless and wonderful. But such community has no authority, or at least should not have, when removed from the community of life. The community of people also is timeless in its way: the circuits and cross references, the mute wisdom of common action, the directive statements, the knowings and thinkings, are effective backward and forward both.

<sup>17</sup> John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

These transpositions of the categories of time are the great commonplace of our living, although we may ignore them. The native poetry of experience underlies our more articulate or verbally accurate expressions. For I can make a meaningful statement only in an already established situation that somehow, in the long inductive ways of life, is prior to the statement. If what I say is understood, there is a community of meaning already present, a solidarity of human meaning and being, as it were, that antedates by far the selective, individualistic, carefully linear thinking that follows. There are potentials established in the context of the communal situation that are in a real sense the future. This future—along with what is called the past and present—is embedded in the human community. It is created there. Thus a meaningful statement never is one-way. Its structure is communal, reciprocal. Of this the poetry of time and timelessness is an expression.

It is obvious that no person can talk or write alone. What he says is a chorus of those who listen and those he knows. Though the expressive functions of the arts and languages are more important by far, I think, than the strictly communicative, the fact remains that a statement of any sort, whether it be expressive or more narrowly communicative, grows, lives, and is created in the first place only in a community of people. Language, says Cassirer, "makes man's life in a community possible,"<sup>18</sup> but the conditions and initiatives of the human community are very likely prior to the lingual formulation of it.

Language, it is true, creates community and through meanings gives it form, but language is also a function of the implicit community that lies in other kinds of behavior. In levels more primitive than language men still behave communally. They have community in some dynamic way before language has made it formally articulate. They are organically aware of one another and of their participation in the group, and that, I think, is as truly communal as representational consciousness of them might be. They are organically aware of others in the sense that their community of life underlies the development of representation and language. They know at least practically, if not symbolically, the common areas of their action. Without words, there still may be mutual response.

Some things are born of language, but not, I think, the community. Much of modern philosophy, for example, and most of the older work of that name, is irrecoverably verbal. It is created by its language—justifiably so—and remains in a secondary, though important, relation to our experience of the world. Modern science also is largely the creation of

<sup>18</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

its symbols. It takes their character. It shines with their glamour. Great as science admittedly is, its triumphs in the purer areas of research often are scholastic and recessive. They are inner triumphs of technique, symbolic nuances among the pure and lovely inner orders of numbers.

But other things are prelingual. They are involved in primordial patterns of human action and are lived less in words than in more direct behaviors. They are behaviors. They are not only prerational but prelingual so far as language involves a grammar of reference and a system of signification. They live reticently in the wordless ways and impulses of action. Poetry and women, to use notorious examples, have this primordial indefinability. The human community also is in this prelingual group.

Neither the community nor human communication is wholly dependent on verbal language or the use of the substitutive processes of symbolic reference. Words do, of course, enrich communal living. They create, or help to create, new dimensions in time. They expand our controls over areas of experience that would be impossible without them. They well may be, as Cassirer says, not imitations but organs of the real.<sup>19</sup> They make communities of meaning; they elaborate and give form to communities of men; but they hardly can be given credit for initiating the human community. Below the lingual levels there are direct behaviors, primary forms of human association, social identifications, from which these enriching and elaborating processes arise. In the indefinable schedules of behavior the community is initiated.

The community of people, in any case, enters all that any human being does. The readers and listeners—all who enter these pages—all acquaintances, and all those present in action, though not in words, perhaps, have also their part and responsibility in what a speaker says.

To be understood by others a speaker must enter the common experience of language, familiar symbols, skills, and project in what he says the nature and experience of those who listen. He can succeed only in part, but the effort takes him into the timeless realm of mutual response and action. It is a timeless realm, at least metaphorically, but a better word perhaps would be not "timeless" but "many-timed." It is a multitemporal realm where time, so to speak, has many directions. Here responses, as it were, reach backward into time and help determine their causes, and language, still fluid, has not fixed on one order of procedure as its ironbound convention.

<sup>19</sup> Cassirer, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

### 10. The Community and the Scholar

All this is different from the sciences. The fluid community of human response and action, though directional, is pledged in no one direction. It is a realm created in the community of people, a varied realm of purposes and meanings, but is no less significant than the world of science and, in that sense, no less real.

In respect to this book I can presume at least that some of the readers are college professors, of which group I am more or less a marginal member. It is a group of professional knowers and thinkers, with doing often confined to internal skills of language and knowledge. Doing of this sort may become a technique without much reference to the larger problems of men. It is a language technique but removes from language its more primitive functions in behavior, active use, and operational adjustment. It is refined, symbolic doing, without kinesthetic accompaniment or much sweat. In order to purify and isolate the technique, it is withdrawn, so far as possible, from the variegated urgencies, sentiments, and emotions of the communities of men. It is given a linear or consecutive order both in logic and in time. *This follows that* irrevocably. And one-way time, which to the poet and primitive is only one alternative in a rich and variegated world, is fixed in that one way.

This internal technique of knowing and thinking, if abstracted far enough from the color and detail of living, may be called pure scholarship. It has made possible many things of value, including many of the refinements of civilization itself. It also has been the source of great disasters. As it becomes more segregated from the whole pattern of living, it often acquires more vogue. Purity is the shibboleth. The college faculties are full of professional maidens, vestals, proud of their intellectual virginity. Along with a similar segregation of processes and values in business and the other professions, it has become a curse of the modern era.

The pattern of it is this: First, isolate a process. In this case the process is thinking. Isolate it, though it is clearly a functional instrument associated with many other equally valid processes. Try to isolate it then, as you might isolate a chemical element by qualitative analysis; abstract it artificially. This segregative procedure is the key to the realm of indirect or cooperative specialization. Second, treat this process as a self-sufficing end with little reference to the other processes of living. In this way the basic cleavage in our culture may be initiated. Here some things with

final or end value are treated as if they were solely ends, and other things having instrumental value are treated as if they were solely instruments or means. An experimental and abstract situation is thus created in which the process under consideration is handled without reference to other naturally associated processes. Thus it can be given linear order and analyzed in terms largely of itself. Third, try to find inner techniques in this process that hitherto have been unrecognized or unknown. These appear amazingly when sufficiently abstracted. Purify these, discover appropriate skills, methods, and resources, and in this way specialize the process. Thus are the professions developed, and very important they are. Fourth, promote a protective morale, or a cult of intellectual virginity. Purity here is measured by the degree of segregation of a single order of procedure.

The pure scholar permits no mixture with the promiscuous world of living things. He is immaculate. He rejects its many modes, its plurality of interests and approaches, its many ways of prosecuting the real. He rejects that world, so far as his scholarship is concerned, with a rigor and exclusive spirit not unlike that of the Christian soul rejecting the world and the devil. And like the Christian soul he falls into an inoperable dualism. His scholarship has no clear place in its method for a working association with that world. It is conceptually removed into a different mode, and such associations must be made illogically, clumsily, and often viciously by others. The purist knows all that in the background of his mind but religiously excludes such heresy from his method.

The modern "scholar," the specialist, the professor of some segregated technique, usually fails to evaluate the community of statement and of people in which good work is done. By his recessiveness he tends to destroy that community through fragmentation. Whether it be the scientist who says, "Discovery is enough, let others find the uses," or the businessman who says, "Business is business," or the philosopher endlessly refining words and fields of discourse, he ignores too often the community that produced him. In creating and developing the internal technique he turns away from the problem of evaluation and living integrity. He ignores, as James says, the conjunctive relations. But these are no less important. The one problem is analytic and factual. It is most at home in a world of fixed and linear causes. The other is evaluative, communal, and integrative. It is more at home in a world of multiple variables in which no one line or mode, not even language, is sufficient. Neither scientists, philosophers, nor educators have found for these two kinds of behavior a unified operational pattern. Only simpler men, no doubt, can come to an answer.



PART IX

*The Philosophy of the Community*



1. *Corrupted by Universals*
2. *The Community Is Concrete*
3. *The Anatomy of the Community*
4. *The Linear and the Integral*
5. *A Great Architect's Prose*
6. *Integrity in the Trobriands*
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8. *Mysticism and Symbols*
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## 1. *Corrupted by Universals*

Of all those stony virgins who day before yesterday were set upon public buildings to represent the arts and other cultural graces of our era, Philosophy always was the most virginal as well as the most stony. And with reason. Whereas Industrial Art, for example, obviously must have her feet on earth, and even Music or Poetry could not deny sensuous implications, Philosophy, all of stone as she was and as rigid in her structures as the eternal hills, still was supposed to float free. She was the purest of man's cultural attainments, without smirch of earth, uncontaminated by emotion.

From Greece down to recent days philosophy has stood for this principle of purity and purification in our life and thinking. It is a rite as well as a research into what is called the nature of things, and as long as a man wishes to find, or be, something that as a fact is not present in the flesh, I suppose it will continue. Through the technique of the universal, whatever that may mean, our western theory, as well as that of most of India, has withdrawn the sacred essences of things from the humid contexts of living. It has attained significance and reality in the fact of that withdrawal. For example there is the Truth, written large and somehow more valid in herself than in this true thing and that, or Art standing statuesque and pure above behavior, or Reality or Love or Beauty or the Good in a kind of Platonic revel of the forms, an ethereal dance of ideas. They are pure, abstract, divinely real, and removed aristocratically from the toil and waverings of this problem-solving world. Did not Plato urge us to seek, not beautiful things, but Beauty itself rising above them? Thus the dualisms emerged. These, suggests Dewey—unlike Plato—answer no problems, take us nowhere, and leave us stalemated in the strategy of life.

In the west the concept of the real arises in this ability to universalize some aspect of experience, withdraw it, sanctify it in a kind of purificatory rite, and set up thereby an "other" world, an inner world, a true world, an eternal world that is superior to the concrete, visible, behaving things around us. Even science is involved in this, and is becoming more so. This western concept of the real, says F. S. C. Northrop in *The Meeting of the East and West*, is just opposite to the Chinese concept of a relativistic, concrete, invariably particular sort of reality. The Greeks knew man and nature "by the methods of hypothesis and deductively formulated theory

in which every fact is seen as an instance of a universal rule." The Chinese on the other hand know nature inductively, "every case is a particular, and it is falsified if treated as a universal."<sup>1</sup>

A philosophy of the community, if there be one, will lie for the most part in this concrete realm of particular experiences. That may seem to western minds philosophically a contradiction of terms. Perhaps it is a contradiction in the sense that terms are themselves abstractions designed to fixate something in our experience in a symbolic continuum of meaning.

Nevertheless a philosophy of the community has relevance. It may be more plasmic than articulate, more a matter of sea change and fluidity than the strict terminological topography of the land, but in expressing that or trying to, it may have importance. Living, after all, is not all verbal, and there are things in heaven and earth that perhaps can have no terms. Some of life, I imagine, cannot be verbalized, and a philosophy of the community, whether it be stated as a treatise or a dance, must try to recognize it.

For the community is inalienably concrete. A philosophy of the community cannot ignore that characteristic. Not only must it start there, thence to soar irresponsibly in the accustomed manner into realms of the abstract and the universal; it must stay there. Or at least it must return in circuits short enough for personal grasp and check. The community is concrete in the experience of its members. It is also concrete as a functional agency in the living process. Though it may have symbolic importance beyond the purposes at hand, as Edward Sapir says,<sup>2</sup> as a projective function toward a more general integration of the individual in society, it is still concrete in its meaning, its impact, and effect.

By the concrete I mean "the many sided, obvious tangibility or perceptibility of a particular thing as it is found in common sense experience."<sup>3</sup> It is in its way the opposite of what is called "essence" by Santayana, or "distinction of everything from everything else." The concrete is the stickiness of things. It is a kind of immanent viscosity and coherence. It is the lumps and stubbornness in our experience. In the concreteness of things is their particularity. Here is their existential emphasis. Whereas a doctrine of essence must assume, I suppose, a world of ultimately distinct

<sup>1</sup> F. S. C. Northrop, "Toward Valid Integrative Concepts," in *Main Currents in Modern Thought*, Port Chester, N.Y., Spring, 1949, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Edward Sapir, "Groups," *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, edited by Seligman and Johnson (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1937).

<sup>3</sup> Baker Brownell, "Santayana, The Man and the Philosopher," in *The Philosophy of George Santayana*, Vol. II, *The Library of Living Philosophers*, edited by Paul Schilpp (Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University, 1940), p. 48, note.

and distinguishable bits, the concrete ignores such perfections of distinction. These distinctions, such as the realm of essence implies, are rationally imposed. Concrete reality slides out from under such intellectual commitments.

The concrete is a world less of clean distinctions than of fusions, shiftings, rounded things, and deposits in which distinction has a function, to be sure, but no status in itself. In this world of the concrete we contemplate, not essences, but things. We perceive concrete things, act on them and with them, direct our interests toward them, but the effort to isolate partial aspects of them, to remove such specialties from the natural matrix in which they occur, to direct a more and more selective attention on them without relevance to the context from which they have been abstracted, is distortive. It defeats the function that abstraction had in the first place.

Thinking is not useful if removed from the matrix of concrete behavior and problems which is the occasion for its process. It belongs within the concrete as a part of its creative thrust and gratuity, not outside of it. Though thinking may be substitutive behavior, a representational process through symbols of what otherwise must be "lived out" directly in action and shock, it can hardly retain its function if detached from that action. It dare not set up self-sufficiently on its own. Thinking of course may project beyond action. It may go on from there. It may erect situations that have no strict counterpart in the life from which it came. Still it dare not remove itself beyond a prompt return to those concrete, fluid processes. It dare not impose on the concrete situations of life its own nature and tendency toward universals. This corrupts not only life but its own function. Corruption by universals, if I may call it such, can happen and does happen. It is a logical infection. If the disease is allowed to run its course, the patient is left nervously disorganized, without vitality or hope.

## *2. The Community Is Concrete*

How can the community be concrete when no one can see it, touch it, watch it move, or measure its motion? Is it not observable through the symbols and abstractions that only just now were warned off the property? Is it not known inferentially rather than directly? It has obviously no body of its own but is exhibited to us through this body and that and these various behaviors, none of which alone can be labeled a community. Its concreteness would seem to be a matter of interpretation rather than something directly perceptible. Why then call it concrete?

Still the community is concrete. Not only is it concrete; it is the creator of concreteness in the perceiving, behaving, sensing, thinking complex that we call our lives. Though we may find no terms that can refer to the community as something directly perceived, this in itself need not remove it from the concrete. Terms or the amenability to terms do not make things concrete. They are inevitably selective. In applying a term to a thing or situation, we remove it so far forth, from the appreciative fullness, many-sidedness, and roundness of the concrete. Selective thought of itself, as Trigant Burrow says, is a distortion. Though we must accept thinking as an invaluable utility, and though it may create the concept of utility itself, we should not assume that its report must always take precedence over other ways of living and behaving in the complex of our affairs. The log, the manifest, the maps and charts, and the navigational intricacies and projections of the charthouse are important, but there are also other aspects of the going ship.

We may have no perceptual terms adequate to describe the community, but I am not sure that the critic is justified in saying that we cannot perceive it at all. We do perceive it in the round. Although I grant that perception may have several meanings, we do get the community perceptively and appreciatively in the rich, many-sided actions, procedures, and intimations of living. It is here, inalienably here, in any human situation. If we must treat it inferentially in trying to find symbols to represent it to others, this need not mean that the community by nature is remote, indirect, selective, abstract. Quite the opposite: it is concrete. This concreteness of the community, uncorrupted by universals, is what makes it difficult to symbolize.

This verges on mysticism. It suggests that the community, if not ineffable, is at least not well suited in the round to symbolic expression. It is a secular, concrete mysticism. It is a mysticism more of the each, as I said before, than of the all. It says, or tries to say, that concrete things may not be communicable in terms and symbols. It suggests that communal life, integrative in pattern, organically whole, is the prototype of the concrete in our experience. It is the roundness of things. We perceive these round things less through linear logic, distinction, and selective terminologies than in the confluences, the variables, and the continuities of action in the complex of living.

The community in this sense is a kind of mythical synthesis, the function of which in Virgil Aldrich's phrase is "the feeling of vital solidarity throughout nature,"<sup>4</sup> while the function of language is "solely to precipi-

<sup>4</sup> Virgil C. Aldrich, "Man as the Symbolizing Animal," a review of *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, edited by Schilpp (The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Ill., 1948), *The Kenyon Review*, Vol. VI, No. 3, Summer, 1949.

tate the things or objects of ordinary experience out of this otherwise fluid unity, by 'naming' them." In this realm is the philosophy of the community. Thought, to use the word loosely, not quite as language nor yet as general consciousness, is from this point of view a process of symbolic presentation. It is also an exercise in distinction. Perception, on the other hand, is more often an encounter with the confluences and fusions of things. We can perceive things in the concrete. We can get them in the round. Though thought and perception really are inseparable, of course, since we cannot perceive without making distinctions nor think without some reference to the confluences and integrations of the world and at least a memory of their pattern in concrete action, still the separation may have some value.

### *3. The Anatomy of the Community*

The parts of the community cannot be abstracted from the rest and retain communal meaning. Under segregative procedures such as these, whether they be in urban industry or scholarly specialization, the community both as meaning and as fact disappears. For the community is people. It is inalterably people, and people, on the other hand, are community. The community's components are many-sided, acting, living folks. Any procedure that tends to break down these people in the round and these native pools or confluences of behavior into separable functions is not working on the basis of the human community but on some other principle. A segregated function is different from that function mutually associated with others in what is called a context.

This grouping process is varied, flexible. It may have different patterns in different cultures. Helen Jennings holds that the group structure of the community is triadic: the family group, the psychegroup—or the private, personal association for the fun of it—and the sociogroup, collective project, or team. For sociometrists these are basic patterns of the community.<sup>5</sup> In any case the community no doubt is a group of whole people grouped as whole people in an integral pattern of behavior.

What is this clustering of people? It is not solely the unfolding of a process, but is established in the human situation. From this threshold the group process goes on in continuous change. People, in other words, do not make groups; they are endowed with them. The group is part of their human situation. The clustering goes on always anew in varied per-

<sup>5</sup> *Autonomous Groups Bulletin*, Vol. IV, Nos. 2-3, p. 5, 1948-49; Vol. II, No. 4, 1947.

mutations throughout life. There are, of course, spontaneous groups, but no group really is invented. It is a shift and transmutation of the clustering to which people are born. The group, if no more than father, mother, and child, precedes life, or at least is initiated with it.

Cooperation among those cultural atoms called individuals thus is an established pattern. It is prerequisite. Just as no atom of matter is suited to unique existence, and indeed could not exist, according to modern theory, as a universal or total atom beyond which there is nothing, so the individual is involved inextricably in the group. His being is involved in relevance. Neither he nor the group can escape it. In order to get along intelligently in the world we must at least assume that this relevance is not only symbolic but existential as well.

But the group also may be nonrelevant. A man may find the group of relational significance in one case, while in another he may find the group—and for that matter the individual too—a self-sufficing unit of interest. This comes somewhat from the shifting back and forth of his ideological predispositions, but it lies also in the nature of the community of which he is a part. The community is a kind of group that has this self-containment and centrality of meaning. Though its structure has inner relevance and at the same time involves outer association with other groups, the community still is self-relevant. It is self-justifying morally, aesthetically, socially. Were we not accustomed to such dyadic evaluations, this would seem confusing. The world however is full of such cases. We are used to things which seem both instrumental in their being and final. A gold sword, as Plato said, is neither functional nor beautiful, but a steel sword may combine function and beauty. It is a union of both function and finality, and that is the point of the whole matter.

The community is this kind of union. It has functional relevance. It has relational significance of critical concern in all the structures of society. But the community is also nonrelevant. The holism and timelessness, the close concreteness, of experience in the community are this. Throughout the book I have tried to give weight to this nonrelevance as a kind of counterbalance to the linear specialism and discursiveness so greatly emphasized in our modern culture.

Groups are of many kinds, of which the community is only one. Human groups have a thousand variations. They may be loose or tight or in between. They may be casual or telic, spontaneous or formal, large or small, conscious or unconscious. They may be scattered or concentrated, voluntary or involuntary, and so on. Since one person can and does belong to many groups there well may be more human groups on earth, as Sapir



suggests, than there are individuals. Grouping is the great nexus. In this system of relevance are all people and all things. The question need not be raised whether or not this concept of universal relevance indicates a philosophy peculiar to our culture, which may do for us but may not be suited to all living practice.

The human group in any case is allied with Nature but is by no means fully identified with it. To accept human value at all involves a reorientation of Nature—within Nature—around the human thesis. The human being in his community is creative in the world of Nature; here is a point of initiative, among others, here an intimation of novelty amid the plurality of natural processes and behaviors. By this assumption men can cooperate with the directive course and movement of the world.

The group, according to Sapir,<sup>6</sup> may be classified in so far as it varies between physical proximity, on the one hand, and symbolic extension, on the other. Three main kinds of groups are defined respectively by their physical character, their specific purposes, their symbolic values, but all groups have to some degree all three of these characteristics. Groups which are mainly physical are, for example, a bread line or a crowd at a football game. Groups defined by their specific purpose are the employees of a factory, or a board of education. Groups defined mainly by a symbolic function are a family, the U.S. Senate, or the membership of a church. The church, for example, has not only a specific purpose but symbolic significance as the intermediary between God and man. This classification of groups is made from the objective point of view of a nonparticipating observer.

From the point of view of the individual's participation Sapir classifies groups according to the degree of identification in the group. This identification may be direct, selective, or referential. In direct participation a man is or feels himself to be in direct personal relationship with the fellow members of the group with whom he comes in contact. Selective participation in a group means that the individual has close identification with only one or more members of a group who serve as representatives to him for the rest of the group. These representatives tend to exhaust for the individual the significance of this group itself. Referential participation in a group is legalistic and impersonal. The individual makes no effort here to identify himself personally with any of the members. The group here has functions and purpose but does not incorporate them in personal life.

The changes among social groups, as observed in the past and through

<sup>6</sup> Edward Sapir, *op. cit.*

current trends, make up a great part of the history of society. They may be changes in personnel, says Sapir, such as the extension of membership in political parties by the removal of property and sex qualifications. They may be changes in the degree of symbolic significance, as when a club matures to a point where its originally political purpose becomes solely "social" through symbolic reinterpretations. They may be changes in the degree of direct participation of the individual in the group, as, for example, where the direct participation of members in the family group becomes less. All this illustrates in modern life the tendency of secondary and voluntary groupings to become dominant over primary and involuntary ones. Related to this is the greater mobility of group membership and the tendency of earlier symbolic group sanctions to be replaced by more specific group purposes. These changes and combinations within and among these six types of groups, the physical, the specific-purpose, the symbolic groups, and the direct, selective, and referential groups, are found in many degrees and forms.

A classification such as this is a framework in which to compare groups anatomically one with another. Whether the anatomy thus indicated is actually the working structure of the human group, and the basing point of behaviors, is not easily ascertained. Sapir insists that the "psychological basis of the group must rest on the psychology of specific personal relations; no matter how impersonally one may conceive the behavior which is characteristic of a given group, it must either illustrate direct interaction or it must be a petrified 'as if' of such interaction." Thus he comes to what seems primarily an individualistic thesis as to the origin and nature of the group. This is the point of orientation from which his analysis of groups proceeds. There is no doubt of its value as one of several possible classifications, but I am not sure how much it clarifies behavior. I cannot make out clearly how appropriate it is either to the patterns of group action or to the normative aspects of group life. The value-creating functions that seem to be implicit in communal behavior are given no place.

Meaning in any human situation has aspects that are inescapably normative. This should not be ignored. It is not merely that human desires should be included among the data, but that groups themselves, or at least some of them, are in their way normative in structure and behavior. The scientist here will find himself in his characteristic dilemma: In his efforts to objectify his material by stepping out of one set of values and predispositions, he must always, it seems, step into another set of values and predispositions. This should be recognized as part of the problem of classification.

Where does the community belong in this classification of groups? The community would seem to be one of the simpler kind of groups which Sapir outlines, namely, that based on physical proximity and the direct identification of the participant with the other members. Classified as to kinds of interest, the community would belong to the primary group. It would be genetically early or primitive. Its characteristic pattern of change would be a continuous extension of membership due to changes in economy, transportation, and communication, probably a deepening of symbolic significance and a tendency toward less direct participation in the group by the individual. As the group gets bigger, in other words, and as individual participation becomes less direct, it becomes, according to his classification, deeper and richer. It would seem to follow that the experience of the members also becomes deeper and richer. Thus Sapir's classification of the community as a definitional unit seems easy enough.

But this does not work out so well when the community is felt in all its concrete fullness and existence. As such it reaches across several of his divisions from pole to pole. The classification becomes, as it always must, a thin approximation, useful in its way, but full of inner incongruity. And the apparent conclusion that experience in the more mature group is deeper, richer, and presumably more integral is not supported by the facts.

Sapir's classification assumes, for example, that the symbolic extension of a group is a substitutive process whereby experience is enriched at the same time that personal participation in the group becomes less definite and less significant. This may be true if the community is laid out according to an intellectual Mercator's projection. When the human community is considered in the round, however, it is no longer adequate. Symbolic extension may indeed bring about the extension of experience over a greater range of objects and human contacts, and this extension may be a substitute for a more integral experience among fewer human beings. But this is not necessarily an enrichment of experience nor an increase in living value. It may be just the opposite. Though extension of acquaintance is of course important in human development, extension without limit becomes disintegrative. Fully as important as this symbolic extension of experience is the organic intensification of experience, the living wholly one with another, which alone can confirm human values. This has no place in the classification of groups on a linear schedule.

Nor am I sure that the mystical identification with the group, to which Sapir refers, follows from the symbolic extension and impersonalization that are for him the polar opposite of the physically proximate, directly

participative group. Seen in the round the community may be incompatible with this. Mystical or spiritual solidarity, rather than the lack of it, is more native to the proximate and intimately participative group. Though an impersonal symbol, such as a flag or cross, may serve as a substitute in mass situations for the mystical identification of the members with one another, this does not imply that the mystical approach to the group is limited to these impersonal situations. Lovers, for example, are not often thought of as impersonal in reference to each other; still there may be an intensely mystical identification. In short the spiritual solidarity of men is within the community, not a substitute for it. It is an accompaniment of the fullness of human association, not a replacement of it. The idea of love that is brotherly, before it was misinterpreted by Paul and later churchmen, can well refer to this spiritual identification of men known well to one another in their small communities. The teachings of Jesus envisioned less the mystic symbols and abstractions of the universal church than the familiar good will of these little groups. Symbolism may be found here too, but it is not a substitutive symbolism. Nor is it founded on the impoverishment and fragmentation of human association.

It is hard to incorporate in a linear classification of groups these complexities of the living situation. Sapir's classification is no exception. It is hard, for example, to maintain the categories of individual and group that are implicit in his classification and at the same time take account of the different levels of integration that a man may have as a member of different kinds of groups. In the community he is organically whole. This wholeness is fluid, complex, variable, hard to describe. Still it has meaning. Here a man is taken as a whole in his community and on the other hand acts as a whole man in reference to others. In another kind of group, such as the stamp collectors' association, his membership is on a different level. His association is fragmentary. He is taken as a fragment of a man, i.e., a single function named philatelic, and as a fragment he in turn approaches others in the group. These levels of integration are important in any philosophy of the community. They involve the degree of wholeness of the participating member as a kind of norm.

The incongruities and hiatuses in Sapir's classifications of groups suggest the complexities, the innumerable variables, and the plurality of modes and methods. This critique serves, not to show weakness in Sapir's excellent classification, but to show that any linear schedule of human groups is at best only a rough approximation that will remain inadequate in the face of the concrete, variable, contradictory facts. If science or

intellect are pure, then life must be impure. The fact indicates more the inadequacy of science and intellect, however, than of life. They are corrupted, as I have said, by universals.

#### *4. The Linear and the Integral*

In illustrations throughout this book I have tried to clarify the difference between things considered in the linear schedules of science and things in the round. For the latter I have used different terms, according to the situation. Thus the "concrete," the "contextual," the "integral," the "holophrastic," the "poetic," have been more or less appropriate to things in the round. Things in the round, however, cannot well be categorized by science, nor can the sharp-edged entities and orders of science be translated easily into the round.

Though linear thinking, as I have called it, can be described rather fully in terms of its own method, that is as far as it goes. It is confined to itself, like a man imprisoned in a room made all of mirrors, and thus has become rather narcissistic. Beyond its reach, particularly in communal experience, there seems to be a residuum that is not easily subject to symbolic representation. We get intimations of this through behavior other than thinking, through action, through a kind of implicit thinking, a stub of thinking, a hunch or blind directive that does not develop into full and explicit symbols. Of things in our communal life that are not easily represented we have perhaps a direct experience that is present in some primitive way in all of us.

The community, it is true, is set in a pattern of communication and created through communication. Not all of it, however, is communicable in symbols. There is a substantive there, at least to the imagination, that is not easily dissolved into concepts. Though not easily represented, it is grounded nevertheless in our behavior. In our culture this is usually overlaid by other modes of thought, but in some cultures it is dominant.

Linear thinking thus is not well suited to these things in the round, and the conflict and divergence between the linear and the integral are still unresolved in practice. This vast unanswered problem of these times lies in our inability to understand representational experience over against the more direct realities of life. Linear thinking is purely representational. It is a process of converting a situation into a number of units which are arranged then in a progressive and irreversible order. These units are mutually segregated except for one narrowly defined connection in each

case. The purity and abstraction of scientific method begins to appear when these units and this narrowly defined relationship are treated as the only significant considerations in the situation. Thus one unit is treated as if it were conditioned solely by the preceding member of the series and in turn as the sole condition of the next following one. In this way a series hypothetically is created indefinite in length, in number of units, and in direction, in which only the proximate relation of any member to its immediate predecessor or successor is admissible.

This pattern of proximate relations in an indefinite series is an illustration of the linearity of science. To any member of the series the next member is the sole representative and the plenipotentiary of the entire situation. Although we know that ordinarily one unit of the situation would be related to and conditioned by all or most of the others, we admit those other relationships only so far as they are applied through the instrumentality of the adjoining members of the series. Thus the logic of the linear is imposed on a world which may not be solely in that order. If my son, for example, stands third in the spell-down at school, his place is determined in that series by the position of the boy just above and the boy just below him. At the same time we know, but do not admit into the series, the fact that he is second in the hundred-yard dash and ninth in weight, since weight and speed, we say, are not relevant to spelling. We make it clear that the proximity of one member of the series to another is such only in terms of one category. Although other members may be equally proximate in other categories, all these other considerations and relationships are inadmissible in the linear process of thought.

On these premises there is thus a continuity created which is solely linear with only proximate conditioning or responsibility in any one case. The effect of this as a method or guide to behavior is to create processions of activities of indefinitely long range and great numbers, but limited in responsibility and comprehension to proximate events. Only the next thing is likely to count morally or intellectually. This proximity value, this limitation of responsibility to the special function at hand, is characteristic of modern scholarship, science, and technology.

These link-form relationships and proximate responsibilities are functionally specialized. They are rationally articulate. They do not have the nuance and the concreteness, however, and the plurality and concomitance of variables of things perceived and lived. They are not appropriate to fully human situations. Linear thinking cannot represent fully the changing colors of the integral situation.

### 5. *A Great Architect's Prose*

Perhaps I can illustrate this difference between the linear and the integral by using as a case study the prose style of Frank Lloyd Wright. In this incidental work of a great artist can be seen at once the energy and integration of his impulse and the surface disorder of materials to which he is able to give no linear pattern. His impulse breaks through in his prose as if from a deeper level of integration. It erupts with all the power and consistency of a volcano, but its deposits on the surface of the earth are disorderly. Although an impressive number of books and articles have come from the great architect's pen, they have aroused, because of this lack of clarity, only minor interest in the reading public.

Wright has confined himself in his prose to insights and explosions. He makes magnificent love to the blue domes of Persia but vast denunciations of Michelangelo. The broken-nosed Italian as an architect was a good painter, who felt no thrust or tension in materials or the muscular distribution of forces. Wright turns away from St. Peter's to write with tenderness of stones, lava, tile, wood, glass, steel, canvas. He is not a commentator noting this and that in an orderly fashion. He is a poet identifying himself with these materials. He climbs into this concrete block. He becomes the brick. His words grunt and struggle with the unaccustomed effort.

Or he writes his hates of cramping institutions with pompous contempt. It is scattered anathema strewn across the pages amid anecdotes and communiqués of personal and philosophic life. To most readers it seems disordered and sudden, very different from his buildings. His prose is angry, sometimes vituperative, and noisy. His buildings never are, for buildings express dislike only by silence. Wright deprecates his prose style and has called himself a "dub" as a writer. For so confident a spirit this is a remarkable admission.

His prose indeed is not consecutive. It lacks flow. It lacks linear order. To the reader it seems disorganized, flashing forth abruptly with a cosmic utterance, then sinking back into formless superlatives and mumblings until the time for eruption comes round again. To the reader it lacks the mystic grace of his buildings. His prose never gets itself said, while his buildings are the utterances of a great spirit. They, not his words, are his poems.

All this may be said of Frank Lloyd Wright's prose; still I believe him to be a great writer. His prose may not be subtle, but it has power. It may lack craft, but it flows all from one source. It may not have linear con-

tinuity, but it has spiritual coherence and a proud though harsh integrity. His prose is not sensitive to the materials that the writer must use. Wright sees those materials; he walks among them with eyes open; but I am not sure that he hears them or feels them. He can find more poetry in a brick than in a word and more sensuous delight in his lyrics of glass and stone than in the niceties of language. But his language is direct. And if he is blank sometimes to verbal distinction, quality, and sound, he is also blank to the worn dance routines, the timed kicks and fillips of the professional word masters of our day.

On the background of the thousands of fully written books and articles, raised like a screen to filter the sun, produced with endless competence in all the professionally tested modes, Wright's prose is somehow naked and revelatory. It is direct, whole, abruptly real. Though it is not always professional or fluid, nor even competent, his prose has the sting and substance, not of a book, but of a man.

It is integral rather than linear. It lacks the marching rhythms and proximate coherence of style that goes, as it were, from one place to the next. His words shift and run like quicksilver under his hands. They bulge beyond his control, and their damned plasticity makes fixation of meaning for him, or definition, impossible. But his style has the kind of spherical continuity, wholeness, the mystical or spiritual coherence, that often mark great work.

Wright, indeed, is never mainly linear in his thinking but integral. Because his thinking lacks connectives, it seems saltatory. Because it is not a line or a linkage of one thing related to the next thing in terms only of those two things, his conversation seems to be a series of pounces. The things that he writes emerge abruptly like divers from under the water. They come up like bubbles. They have radial organization rather than surface continuity. Because his thought is integrated on other levels, the visible bubbles seem to have little continuity with one another.

This lack of continuity in his prose style may be related to the fact that architecture, his chosen field, is involved more in the rhythms of space and matter than in the time and movement of words. That may or may not be true. Beyond that however is the fact that things in an integrated situation are deeply and wholly related in terms not of one line of functions or causes but of many. Wright's prose, for all its literary faults and incapacities, or because of them, reveals this deeper integration. Structurally it is a body, not a line. Each item of it refers not merely to its proximate predecessor and successor but in a multitude of intimations to all the members of the group.



His recent book, *Genius and the Mobocracy*,<sup>7</sup> is an appreciation of the master, or *liebermeister*, Louis H. Sullivan. The book does indeed uncover, as it drifts like sand across the years, brilliant bits and memories of Sullivan as well as searching insights into his meaning as an artist. But these seem incidental. The drifts seem incidental. Each comment and wise saying, each person uncovered anecdotally, and even Wright himself as told in the scattered events of many years, all seem incidental to a great storm, hidden and brooding, pressing on the barriers of events. This storm is not in the book; still it conditions the items in it. It is implicit, passionate, a half-frustrated giant, that would overturn our culture, blow through the lies and greed and the massed towns, and restore human life to what is right. This angry power integrates Wright's prose. In his architecture, because of the nature of the art, it finds little or no expression.

### 6. *Integrity in the Trobriands*

It is hard, as James says, to deal with the confluences of experience in terms that are abstract and disjunctive. It is equally hard to consider integral situations through substitutes or symbols. I have suggested that modes of language called holophrastic may serve this function more adequately than does linear thought. These are primitive modes of thinking and of using language, but there is an important substratum of them left in the poetries and intimations of modern life. These should be recognized, not merely as lingual vestiges in our affairs, but as indispensable ways of organizing experience.

Integral situations stand out clearly in the thinking of some primitive peoples. Their culture is likely to be simpler than ours, and modes of thought that in our world are overlaid with variations, complications, and conflicting ideologies may be found there in the nude. If we try hard enough and have imagination enough, we may learn to think as some primitive people do, at least some of the time, and to accept experience in their cultural frame of reference. Thus a mode of thought that in our culture must be abstracted from an enormously complex situation may be found in a primitive culture in a fairly homogeneous milieu. This makes the problem easier.

The Trobrianders, says Dorothy Lee, "are concerned with being, and being alone. Change and becoming are foreign to their thinking. An object

<sup>7</sup> Frank Lloyd Wright, *Genius and the Mobocracy* (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc., 1949).

or event is grasped and evaluated in terms of itself alone, that is, irrespective of other beings."<sup>8</sup> While we ask ourselves what manner of things are these, at once so strange and so familiar, the Trobriander goes about his business. By us this sort of thing can be grasped only through imaginative effort, and then we are not sure, but for him there is no question and presumably no alternative. Although the Trobriand approach to experience has deep analogies in our own arts, religion, and communal experience, it seems to us exotic.

For the dark Trobrianders, however, on their far islands in the western waters of the Pacific, it is the great commonplace. They know no other. "Being," says Mrs. Lee, "is never defined in our sense of the word." For us, definition "presents an object in terms of *what it is like* and *what it is unlike*, that is, in terms of its distinguishing characteristics." But the Trobriander "is interested only in *what it is*. And each event or being is grasped timelessly; in our terms, it contains its past, present and future, but these distinctions are non-existent for the Trobriander."

These are strange, wild, stubborn words. They are words that seem to us to touch only half a world. At the same time they reveal a world that we had forgotten. It is hard to realize that such words, or rather such notions of behavior, are not exciting to the Trobriander but just ordinary, everyday living. There is one sense, however, in which being for them is not self-contained, says Mrs. Lee, whose lively paper is based on Malinowski's studies in the Trobriand Archipelago: "To be, it must be part of an ordained pattern."

For the Trobriander the word *pela*, which is used in some situations that for us would require the word *cause*, does not mean linkage, linearity, or causal continuity; it means to *jump*. The Trobriander has no concept of changing things in a continuity of time, nor of the transition of things into different forms in a continuity of substance. Things don't happen; they simply are. Men don't cause things to take place through magic; they simply do magic. Different things have their coherence, it is true, both within themselves and in regard to one another, but this is not a linear order of time or of proximate conditioning. It is, for lack of a better word, what may be called an ordainment or established pattern. It is not a system of relationships, says Mrs. Lee, but simply the fixation of those things, each without reference to another, in the pattern. Paradoxical as this seems to us, the Trobrianders and Mrs. Lee are getting at something important.

<sup>8</sup> Dorothy Lee, "Being and Value in a Primitive Culture," *Journal of Philosophy*, June 23, 1949.

Confusion is inevitable in trying to translate these organizations of Trobriand experience into terms of our culture. It is evident, however, that these primitive people have a way of thinking things, and in a sense doing them, in which integral situations have no relations. They accomplish this by assuming that being is plural, particular, discrete, and without universals except as "the pattern" of fixation is itself a kind of blind and mute universal. Nor has being to them any conceptual confluence. Only the objects of perception are confluent.

This is a mode of organizing experience, it might be said, which has no place for integrity at all. But that hardly is correct. The Trobrianders do recognize integral situations. The yams to be given as gifts are one thing, and the yams to be eaten are quite another. They do not have the same names. They belong to different situations. Their values differ and thus their being is different too. An object bears in each situation a unique context of values, insights, and perceptions that is integral as much as anything can be. Its confluence of being, or of perception and evaluation, however, is concrete. This is analogous to what we might call substance or self-contained being. The ontology of the Trobrianders seems to be limited to these integral situations.

These integral realities stand out boldly in the Trobriand way of life. Although to us they are irrational, they are as basic in our culture as in theirs. In ours they are overlaid with highly specialized chains of relationships and linear patterns of activity and thinking, but the two in their different cultures are functionally alike. Both for the Trobriander and for us these integral situations are the center of orientation of our lives.

Poetically the community for us is timeless, even as being is timeless in the Trobriands. It is a kind of substantive, and in the realm of human intimations and behavior, of values and initiatives, it is a focal point.

I do not wish to overwork these notions of the substantive and of being without relations, although the Trobrianders may have done so; nor do I wish to convert the integrative situations of our lives into abstractions. The philosopher above all must accept the discipline of the concrete, and because he does not often do so, his techniques of escape, his flights and wanderings from perception, usually result in disaster. The integral situations in the human community to which I refer are concrete, experienced, living. If they have intimations of the substantive or of self-contained, relationless being, those must remain within the milieu of the concrete, not used as vehicles to escape it.

The common life of the human community is direct. It can be "known" only by being there. This is not knowledge in the relational sense, and

thus cannot well be symbolized. It is immediately participative. In this sense the community is substantive and, as it were, relationless. It is integral. It is a basing point in behavior. The integral aspect of community life has importance in the patterns and problems, and above all in the values, of human behavior. It is not communicable, I think, in terms of representative symbols, but as a kind of substantive or substantive function, it should not be ignored.

### *7. Communicability and the Community*

The community, as Dewey points out, is an area of human communication. In view of the undeniable good sense of this statement, is it not erratic to say that the community is not wholly communicable in symbolic terms? If the community is created in the fact of human association, is it not paradoxical to suggest that something in its texture and "substance" is not suited to full association? The nature of the community and its functional development, it often is said, lies in the increasing ease of communication among its members; surely then an area of incommunicability must be treated either as potentially communicable but as yet unrealized, or as alien to the community altogether. But this is not the case. The primeval core of the community in some ways is not referable in communicable terms. And some of the communal behavior of men may have no symbolic formulation.

This paradox comes of the fact that communication usually is taken solely as a system of symbolic reference. It is assumed to be a matter of a medium, or familiar go-between. This medium, or symbol, is different from the two poles between which it operates and the poles are different from each other. Communication in this sense is a formulative and directive process wherein something converted into symbols is carried over from one person to another. It is tensional, a spark jumping across a void. Communication thus is a function of the separateness of people. It comes of their polarity. It arises from the fact that people are many and different and still establish contact with one another.

But this is not all. Perhaps it is not even most of it. Communication is also a function of the identification of people with one another. In this is the substance of community. Men behave not only as if they were separate; they behave also as if they were identified with one another. Here there is no void between, no tensional divergence. In such behavior there may be communication without symbolic medium. It is direct.

Through communication we confirm the basic unity of our common life and try to convert it into intelligent or at least successful action. By means either direct or indirect we identify our experience with another's. We try to live together in a fairly coherent world, share in its values, and bring about mutual cooperation. Communication is primarily among people, but in less-developed situations it may be found among animals or between people and animals. At still another level there may be communication, at least poetically, between people and things without the gift of life. Did not Wordsworth commune with Nature, and Frank Lloyd Wright with his beloved bricks and stones?

Through communication we enter more fully into the knowing and assimilating process of living. We identify our experience more fully with that of another person and even of another thing. We wrap ourselves around it assimilatively like an amoeba on one of its ingestive conquests, and it in turn reveals itself to us. It identifies itself with us in a crude, primal kind of response. The brick in its simple way may experience Frank Lloyd Wright, even as Wright on his part experiences the brick.

Though symbols such as words, gestures, lights, taps, whistles, and so on are substitutes that refer to something other than themselves, they also are experiences in their own right. They are final as well as instrumental. Our ability mutually to substitute one experience for another and to maintain the delicate, discriminative balance between the symbol as representative and as an experience in itself is a measure of our skill in communication. For example, there may be a sound which is meaningless and referable to nothing but its own tone and quality; there may be a red signal of warning that the engine is running, or a sign on the window that this is a lunchroom, or a symbol of things remote from present experience, and so on to a point where an experience is entirely referable, with no quality of its own. Actually we find in life no sound that is entirely meaningless in this sense, nor one that is solely meaning. All of our experience presumably is referential in some way or other. All of it is tinged with symbolism. At the same time all of it is direct. It has a quality of its own. It is final in its own way. The balance is different in different situations. In symbolic communication, however, a balance of some sort between the symbol as representative and as direct experience always is there.

Words as representative symbols are subject to test for their justness and validity. Their truth lies in their success as instruments in representing something or establishing it successfully in action. Their criterion in this sense is not in themselves. When words are directly expressive,

however, or when they are taken only as sounds without meaning, no such test can be applied. They cannot be wrong—or right—except as they abandon directness and become representative. As instruments of symbolic communication they may serve to change, organize, and develop our experience, but they still are derivative in character.

Just how the symbol is attached to experience and becomes either a substitute for it or an elaboration of it is not clear. It is one of those gradually unfolding inventions of Nature that is justified in economy and greater range of action and control; but the inner technics of symbolic substitution, the process of replacement, and what experience itself means in this context remain difficult to understand. Men do behave according to these schedules, however; they live in a pattern of culture where subject and object, doer and thing done, speaker and one spoken to, are familiar ways of organizing experience and action, and where symbols are supremely useful. Between the poles men have introduced mediative and elaborative instruments, high-tension conductors, vast representative agencies, symbols, concepts.

Beyond all this is the fact that some communication is direct. It is without symbols. Although all symbols and surrogates in the communicative process are themselves experiences, it is true, and thus in a way direct, communication without symbols is direct in a different way. It is identification rather than a representational process. It is final and, as it were, substantive in its nature rather than relational. We can perceive the difference. We can recognize in the identificatory experience an intense and final value.

Although all communication may be said to be a way of identifying one person's experience with another's, the direct way without symbolic intervention is different from the representational method in its function and its limitations, in its nature and power. Words, we say, are not enough. Nor can we live on symbols. In the human community there is directly lived action of all sorts; there is embodied laughter, religion, art, love, and other concrete situations called qualitative and emotional, where representational communication has not displaced the more direct identifications of life. Our activities in these fields are likely to be valued in proportion to the directness of communication in them.

Like the Trobrianders we may find being without relationships a deeper influence in our culture than we know, for being without relationships may be merely a way of describing the integral nature of our lives. It is involved in the structure of the community. It becomes empty in those morbid cultural patterns, such as the "individualistic" or the "mass

society," in which the community is denied. In the community there is for all peoples no doubt a basic integrity in which communication is direct and the values and knowledge of living are immediate.

### *8. Mysticism and Symbols*

The limits of communicability by symbols have not been fully explored. In their long tradition the mystics have declared that words cannot express the experience which they have nor can any system of symbols represent adequately their direct communication with God. For them there is knowledge about things and there is knowledge or identification in things. Because the latter is direct experience without mediation, or, as a philosophic Trobriander might put it, direct being without relationships, any system of mediating symbols is bound to be unsuited to the task. Some things, they say, cannot be represented.

Had mysticism been traditionally less a matter of breath-taking absolutes and the blank and empty reaches of cosmic ecstasy, it might have been taken more seriously. Had mystics turned their attention more intimately to the common things in life that are similarly ineffable, though less grandiose, their complaints through the years about the inadequacy of words might have been more effective. Some mystics, it is true, do just this. Brother Lawrence scouring copper pans in the kitchen, a Zen Buddhist preparing the tea, a Negro carpenter finding God in the grain of wood, a lumberjack in Darby collaborating with the forest in devoted abandon, these are mystics who find wordless beauty and being in nearby things. They are mystics of immanence. Their concern is in the textures and the contexts of things. All people in some way such as this are mystics; all communicate directly in the life and being of their world.

But these quiet ones are not ordinarily the mystics starred in college halls and churches. The public mystics have been different from these private ones. Their emphasis often was on transcendence; their outlook on this world dramatically rejective. The content of their spiritual insights and imaginings often was farfetched, or seemed farfetched. It was remote from the communities of men and the concrete, living experience of this day and hour. Men usually rejected it as inalienably abstract and perverse, or ignored it entirely. Mysticism too often has been a technique of escape from the disciplines of the concrete. In being this it has diverted attention from truly mystical values to a romantic and frustrate repudiation of the world. In the blur and frenzy of the mystics' exaltations their

claim that symbols are inadequate to some communicative situations has received relatively little attention.

In partial support of this claim by the mystics Paul Henle,<sup>9</sup> a logician, shows that some systems of symbols limit what can be expressed in them, and further that some situations, particularly novel ones, may not be describable by analogy to a given concept. He suggests further that since all of our concepts may have something in common, there might therefore be situations which cannot be symbolized in terms of any of them.

He sums up his paper as follows: "(1) We have seen that there are symbolisms in which certain things cannot be said, and so are ineffable. This much is established. (2) We have seen reasons for regarding our concepts as a system of symbols in which certain statements may be ineffable. This is not established, and I have only indicated reasons. (3) Such ineffable statements may well be what mystics are trying to express. This has not been established and cannot be, short of finding a new symbolism for expressing what is now inexpressible. (4) Nothing has been claimed regarding the truth of what mystics are trying to express. This lies totally outside the domain of semantics."

This partial support of the mystic's claim establishes in logical, symbolic terms the inadequacy of symbolic representation in some situations. I am not sure that the establishment of a position depends on finding adequate symbolism for it, as Henle seems somewhat paradoxically to suggest, but I am confident that the mystic's rejection of symbolic methods as the only adequate way to establish or disprove his claim will gain new strength from Henle's demonstration.

The mystic probably would go farther than Henle by asserting that any system of symbols will be inadequate to express what the mystic considers direct experience. It will be inadequate because the symbol as an indirect and representative instrument is unsuited to express experience which is characterized by its immediacy and immanence. It is also unsuited for the same reason to convert the direct kind of communication which the mystic finds in an integral situation into symbolic or secondary communication. In this I am inclined to agree with the mystic.

But the mystic is not alone in asserting that language or symbols cannot say some things in our experience. The physicist of today, or at least some physicists, assumes almost as a commonplace that experience has a structure different from language. It is obvious to him that some experience, or some situations in experience, cannot be represented in

<sup>9</sup> Paul Henle, "Mysticism and Semantics," in the *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, March, 1949.



symbolic terms. He goes farther, indeed, and intimates that not only language but thinking are out of key with the content of much experience. Bridgman makes this point repeatedly in his remarks on thinking and language as systems of correspondence between symbolic forms and experience. Language as representational is not sufficient to the job. Bumbling as it is, however, it is useful. Language itself belongs in the active process of living and within that process provides such things as functional short cuts, classificatory substitutions, operative universals. Lacking as these are in descriptive completeness, they still are useful stratagems in getting along.

"The more one thinks of it," says Bridgman, "the more unlike do the structures of language and experience appear. Complete similarity of structure would demand a one to one correspondence. This we obviously do not have; not only is it impossible to get all the aspects of experience into language, but language does not afford a unique method of reporting any isolated aspect of experience, and further, nothing is easier than to set up combinations of language that have no correspondence in experience." The reason for this, says Bridgman, lies in the essential difference between language and experience. Language "separates out from the living matrix little bundles and freezes them; in doing this it produces something totally unlike experience, but nevertheless useful. That is, language as language is divorced from the *activity* which is the basal property of all our experience."<sup>10</sup> Though language used enters the movement of experience, language proper, as substitutive symbol, never quite can be accommodated to it.

Bridgman obviously is referring to the logico-linear kind of language of conceptions. If he had given more recognition to those other modes of language called poetic or holophrastic, the problem might have been less bedeviling. Still the question of adequate symbolic representation would have remained unanswered. Poetry is participative. Sometimes it is expressive, but it never is suited to description.

In the field of descriptive science, however, the linear approach becomes less and less adequate. The assumption that whatever is subject to scientific consideration has a unique description by which it can be distinguished from the rest of the cosmos and given a place in the order of nature is no longer tenable in some areas of quantum physics. What was assumed to have but one predicate or description in the catalogue of natural realities must now be treated in some situations relating to

<sup>10</sup> P. W. Bridgman, *The Nature of Physical Theory* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1936), pp. 22-24.

the valley to join the Missoula. The cliffs and canyons of Blodgett Creek roaring eastward from the range, the vistas through the high passes above Hamilton of wild, sun-touched peaks and snow and mist, make a broken line across the sky. They mark the imminent end of peace and sedentary settlement and the beginning of another order of values and behavior. A man was lost last winter hunting mountain goats above Blodgett Canyon. He was an old-timer. His bones were found late in the next season by a forest ranger.

The mayor of Hamilton for many years has been Joe Iten, a quiet, solid man, Swiss in his background, who loves the mountains and the solitary valleys. He remembers how his native villages lived into the mountains and with them, accepting their wild nature and beauty. Thus they learned to make a joint synthesis of man and nature that endures as a rich and stable way of life. Joe Iten remembers his Swiss valleys, where he lived for nineteen years, and wonders why we cannot make the same rich synthesis in America that the Swiss have made.

The most valuable private citizen of Hamilton is G. M. Brandborg, or Brandy, the supervisor of the Bitterroot National Forest. He is the town's Socrates, the gadfly stinging the corrupt and contented, the voice of a social conscience preaching the needs of conservation and the community, the divine irritant and pest always at work stirring the dark waters of indifference and sloth and arousing to ecstasies of rage those who profit by them. He is the resistance, often effective, against raids on the public lands in his district, against the greedy efforts to overstock the public pastures, to overgraze or overcut and ruin in a few years the slopes, the soils, and mountain watersheds of the great forest, and he is hated for this by some powerful men.

Charles D. Haynes, superintendent of schools in Hamilton, is a tall and stately man, serious in voice and manner. Along with Superintendent Cole of Darby he has built up far and away the best schools of the county. Miles Romney comes of an old family and is the editor of a zestful and independent little paper that repeatedly rocks the town with unexpected opinions and exposures. There is B. K. Monroe, as she is called, poet and the correspondent for the Missoula and Spokane papers. And there are the long, quiet, tree-lined streets, the sunsets caught among the great peaks of the Bitterroots, the stars hanging over the valley in the evening.

In Hamilton, but not of it, is the great federal laboratory of tropical diseases. This began as a research center for the tick and virus of Rocky Mountain fever, which is endemic here and seemingly the source of general distribution. Highly trained scientists and technicians work in

the laboratory and live along the streets of the little town. But in general they draw more or less together. They remain rather remote from the community. As the Hutterites form a religious enclave in Lewistown, and as the full-blood Indians form without choice a somewhat segregated racial group in Dixon, so these specialists form a cultural cyst in Hamilton. In this magnificent land and in this beautiful little town some of them feel removed from "cultural" life and contacts and cluster nostalgically together like a lost colony in the jungle. They are a special-interest group living without much sense of responsibility for the community as a whole.

Hamilton is not highly integrated as a community. Like many another little town it is vastly overorganized in terms of formal clubs, coteries, and special-interest groups. Correspondingly it is weak as a unified community. A check made several years ago and later in the study group showed that this town of fewer than 2,500 people had between 85 and 90 formally organized clubs, groups, societies, and the like. As the community declines in significance and holding power the impulse to make formal organizations seems sometimes to go wild. Unconsciously it is a compensating device, perhaps, as some animal species when facing extinction are said to develop excessive variations and freak forms.

At the request of Mayor Iten and G. M. Brandborg a Montana Study group was organized at Hamilton. The immediate question, of course, was whether such a venture would further increase the overorganization of the town or help to reduce it. Though definite findings in such cases are hard to get, the general opinion of those in touch with the work seemed to be that the group somewhat strengthened the sense of community experience in Hamilton. It thus may have helped to reduce, by making less necessary, the town's overorganization.

At the first meeting, which was held in the big school building, there were 26 persons. They were fairly well distributed as to occupation, financial status, age, and interests. Mayor Iten was elected permanent chairman of the group and through the ten-week period (later extended to twelve) served with loyalty and good will. Mrs. Clem Rose was secretary. At Chairman Iten's request I usually led the discussion, but sometimes brought down a volunteer from the university faculty to take my place. I also arranged several free public lectures or conferences in Hamilton and the vicinity, one by Arthur E. Morgan, another by O. E. Baker. These aroused interest.

But the greater values of the study group in Hamilton were indirect. On the initiative of Brandborg "show-me" trips over the county were

organized to bring home to some of the leaders in the county and state the relation of soil erosion to the community. The county agent and men from the Soil Conservation Service, the Forest Service, the Agricultural Experiment Station, and the Extension Service, the president of the state college of agriculture, as well as leading farmers of the county and citizens of Hamilton, were brought together several times with members of the Montana Study staff to consider these problems of social and economic integration. Later a brief documentary film was made with borrowed equipment to show more dramatically the impact of destructive land use in Ravalli County on human life.

Beyond these show-me trips and interagency councils Brandborg hopes to find ways to unify and coordinate the generally uncorrelated efforts of the local branches of the different national and state agencies, such as the Forest Service, the Extension Service, the F.S.A., and the rest of them, controlled in Washington or Helena but operating in Ravalli County. This was a harder nut to crack. Washington could not easily grant local authority sufficient to make full coordination possible. Usually it did not wish to. Brandborg was more successful in bringing about some coordination among locally controlled groups, such as the mayor's recreation committee, the Hamilton schools, and the like. These problems of interagency coordination arose out of the pattern of unrelated multiple organization of the area. In attacking them Brandborg and the Montana Study were facing a situation of general import over the entire country. The problem of community integrity has many aspects.

Hamilton is the town of Marcus Daly, the copper king, who built his mansion across the Bitterroot River and raised here his champion horses. Those were the old violent days before the mining men of Butte and Anaconda had learned by force or fraud to coordinate their interests and before the rigid peace of their dictatorship had settled on the state. The Daly horses now are gone from Hamilton. The mansion has become by gift a hospital. Young Marcus Daly, III, now lives quietly in Missoula, drives a Cadillac, buys stock here and there in small, local enterprises, and discusses the weather and the football game with his neighbors. He is very different from his swashbuckling forebear.

### *10. Time and Context*

Through overorganization Hamilton has splintered into many special-interest groups and categories of living. In Hamilton these have become insulated. Because they are organized less within the values of the com-

munity than as units valued independently of it they become disintegrative in their effect. They become enclaves. They are exclusive in purpose and value, if not in personnel. Do what he can to make Hamilton a more integrated community, Joe Iten, the mayor, finds his efforts frustrated by this dissipative plurality of organized interests.

Any community will have, or should have, a plurality of interests and functions. It will have diversified stimuli and many things for its members to do. The difference between the organic group and a disorganic one like Hamilton is the degree to which there is continuity across them. Through implicit communication and sharing of rich, complementary patterns of experience organic development takes place. In Hamilton, however, these divergent groups become more and more segregative in character. Though the same personnel in the little town makes up, or partly makes up, the membership of many different groups, each person tends to be fragmented or subdivided so far as he has membership in the different groups. His behavior is fractionated. His life becomes relatively discontinuous. He lives in many unrelated categories.

In the more organic community, on the other hand, the groups are less divergent than convergent. The pattern of relations is less linear than integral, and the human being participating in them is not thereby impoverished and disorganized but enriched. Hamilton has many categories, many rates of time, many codes and vistas of experience, many uncoordinated behaviors. These tend to get out of hand. They tend toward a social kind of schizophrenia and disorganization. Many little towns in the western world and no doubt all big ones are in this condition.

A category, such as time or simple succession in space or logic, may not be natively abstract, Euclidean, and bare. It is embedded primevally in concrete situations, involved in this event or that circumstance, as in the culture of the Trobrianders. It is variegated and flexible, and its character may vary with each situation. When withdrawn from these contexts, however, it suffers lethal change. It is purified. The modes and variations that once were relevant to the local scene are now called irrelevant and are cleaned away. In its new rigidity of definition it may impose a different organization on our experience and in turn exclude as irrelevant the contextual diversities and native disciplines that once had accompanied it. It is removed from the unique contexts of the community and, as in Hamilton, no longer is relevant to the concrete whole. This purifying, segregative process is functional, of course, and functional in important ways. Too often, however, it is functional in isolation. What was in the round is now linear. What was concrete is now

abstract. In escaping the disciplines of the concrete it may contribute more to human dissolution than we now foresee.

To the poet, as I have said, time may be a variegated order. In the holophrastic thinking of some primitives time may swell and shrink or be reversible according to the context of the situation. To the Trobriander—and to Einstein—time is within being as a specific character that is different in different fields of reference. The Trobriander finds it seemingly more qualitative than quantitative. It is no category at all. Also to us time, implicitly at least, has different meanings according to the context in which our living finds it.

The community and the culture of communities is established on this kind of time. The circuit of communication is based on it. The tensional character of a community and a culture, their reciprocative functions across the past and future, are fitted to a flexibility of time unknown in the rational tradition. Poetically, if not scientifically, the community is timeless. It also has many times. And in any culture time will be fast or slow, backward or forward, or without movement at all, according to the context of the situation. Through inner adjustments and coordinations such as these a culture finds its integrity.

Culture is not only the development and divarication of customs, the educational transmission of things worth saving, and the itemized researches of a civilization; it also is an impulse toward wholeness. It is tensional wholeness. The centrifugal tendencies of a culture, with their huge proliferations of specific behaviors and interests, are balanced in a sound situation by centripetal tendencies. Of the proliferation of things and their increasing specialization there is much evidence. The cohesiveness of groups and the fact that there are families, communities, states, and innumerable other groups by virtue of communicated experience are evidence of the other. Human culture thus is not merely a schedule of acquired customs and materials; it is a kind of formal tension between elaborative and cohesive behaviors. There may be disruptions and disorders, but in general a culture has this unifying tension.


In the local field this tensional equilibrium is the mark of integrated community life. These communities are the nuclei from which a culture develops. They are essential to a sound society. As the wholeness of the human being and the wholeness of the community are poetically identified, even if they are not conterminous in all other ways, so the integral community and the integral culture are mutually dependent. A great culture cannot evolve except on a basis of communities. The community, on the other hand, cannot survive except in an appropriate culture. This lack of balance and of balance within balance is the modern problem.

P A R T   X

*The Community in Art*



1. *The Names of Art*
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## 1. *The Names of Art*

It would be better if art were nameless, and that those of us who write about art in books and the reviews and newspapers, always clacking about art, or Art, or ART, were constrained somehow by good taste or a hickory club either to *do* art in its appropriate human context, and in doing *be* it, or keep still. For art suffers more than most activities in being withdrawn from the contexts of living. It is categorized as something special.

Art belongs deep in the synthesis of the human project. It should remain there without much separate articulation as a part of the thrust of life itself. When withdrawn by too much naming and sophistication it becomes the sick culture of a T. S. Eliot or Ezra Pound, the segregated, self-contemplating purpose, the enclaves of words and cultural narcissism. To these things men turn who have repudiated the vitalities and assimilations of their native context.

There is no substitute for life. Those who would escape the matrix in which their lives were formulated or deny the disciplines of the concrete world where time, fate, chance, or fortune have placed them are likely to succeed only in repudiating their own integrity in their communal group.

The birth goddesses, whom the Greeks sometimes called Moirai, assign natures and destinies to human souls. Their commands are final before men are born. Men can escape them only through acceptance, or at least recognition, and within that acceptance use the privilege to create freedom in the context of the given situation. Escape other than this, or freedom other than this, can be only the freedom of the lost. This disaster of lost men, revealed in many a modern literary or artistic specialist, is the predicament of millions in America and Europe east and west.

Art is not naming. It is not an escape into words, as the saying is, or into colors or sounds abstracted in patterns of thin finality. Art is not a substitute for life, though many would make it so, nor is it a representation of life. It is a formulation from within, not of the life that we escape to, but of the life that we find native in our own context and community. Art may be symbolic, it is true; it may be a projective formulation of action beyond the limits of time, space, and matter then prevailing. It may be an extension of experience beyond the current patterns of exist-

ence, but art still is not rightly representative, secondary, or escapist. It is central and, like religion, participatory. Art is action.

Ours is a culture largely of displaced persons. It is tattered with escape and wandering, and as such is a culture founded on being lost. Men in millions and tens of millions are romantically and violently transported or are conveyed along the great production lines out of their homes, or what might have been homes, into vast reservoirs of death. What the Germans did to millions in the concentration camps, and the Russians to tens of millions in the mass deportations, the western world in general does less dramatically but as effectively to hundreds of millions swarming homelessly to centers of vicarious and secondary culture. Their lives die out, love rots, and hope is replaced by avid stimulation. In all this, art may become merely one of the seducers to death. Or it may become the insight of life and survival itself.

## *2. The Tough Problem of Norms*

These I know are sentiments that cannot be fully verified. They are preferences and as such, i.e., having preferences, are factual. That these preferences are verifiable as true, false, or probable is, however, another question. They may be a correct interpretation of what the norm is supposed to be, or even a correct projection of the situation that arises when modern tendencies and movements are evaluated in reference to that norm. But only so far are they verifiable in the relational, equative sense. That is not far enough to be important in the artistic, communal problem.

Norms are near the center of the human mystery, and to know ourselves in these terms, as the Greeks suggested, is not only to have philosophy but in a sense to be it. That we have norms, or think we have them, is obvious. These standards of reference, these carpenter's squares, as the Latins put it, are common enough in our affairs. We live by comparing one thing with another. We see correspondences or invent them. We discriminate this from that in the course of using things or making them or getting out of their way. We call in our powers of memory and recognition, analysis, classification, and evaluation in the process. When we try to stabilize these activities of comparison and set a point for reference so that the comparisons in turn can be compared with others, we have in a crude way a norm. Thinking, emotion, willing, the well-worn faculties of what is called the mind, have norms in those

noble stereotypes, truth, beauty and, goodness. At least some philosophers think so. Our action is evaluated in terms of some sort of normative reference. Our projected actions, as ideas, cannot escape them. Even verification as a kind of equating process wherein one thing is placed in correspondence with something else is of course involved in norms. More fundamentally the making of truth, a kind of truthing process, the creation of coherence in our lives, is also normative.

Norms are used in all purposive behavior. They are assumed as a structural part of most other behavior. But they are not very clear. The process of verification, for example, so far as it makes use of standards, is obviously normative. But norms themselves, philosophers may say, are subject to verification. Norms, in other words, are determined by normative procedures, which seems about as helpful as saying that automobiles are made by the automobile-making process. Still it is not all nonsense, though unclear. Norms, as Max Otto says, may be used to establish other norms. If there is no final term, that need not vitiate the other ones.

Who or what established norms? How are they established? Why? Is the process one of simple designation, as a symbol is assigned by common agreement to mean a certain thing? Are norms thus a function of the system of human communication? Are they designations of value of some sort which are made norms by their common acceptance? Are they a kind of value symbol? In that sense they would be communal entities. Their function would be then to give evaluative coherence to our life in the community. But the matter is not clear.

The norm may be taken as the average of people's preferences in any culture. It may be taken as a personal insight into what society should be, or as any other kind of effort to fixate a set of evaluations. But in any case the norm eventually is a preference. This too may be a simple designation. But the mere fact of having it, or a descriptive report of its content or of its incidence in society, is hardly enough to verify its normative or evaluative justification. Such procedures make only a futile circle. Preferences indeed are exceedingly hard to verify by equating with something else. Only with difficulty can they be called cognitive judgments, or value judgments, or judgments at all as an aesthetician such as Stephen C. Pepper<sup>1</sup> would define judgment. It is difficult, if not impossible, to incorporate preferences in the relational, conceptual, cognitive pattern in which the aesthetician does and probably must work. It is hard to equate them. Still the nature of normative thinking is to

<sup>1</sup> Stephen C. Pepper, "Values and Value Judgments," *Journal of Philosophy*, July 7, 1949.

compare norms with something else in a way that seems to be equative. This normative procedure of course is not the verification or justification of the norm itself but the use of it to justify something compared with it. Perhaps that is a different principle, but it is not clear why.

Norms come out of those preferential (and normative) statements. They are likely to be ignored, or referred to with patronizing good nature, by the technician in philosophy. Still, evaluative processes such as these, woven as they are through all human thinking and affairs, have pertinence in the philosophical and human problem. The concept of pertinence indeed is itself dependent on norms for any clarity that it may have. We like to endow norms, furthermore, with the dignity of being right or wrong, and in a sense true, false, or probable, and perhaps this wish so to endow them is justified. But *right* in this case means more than equating the normative statement with something else. It means more than bringing in the factor of factual comparison so often presumed to be necessary in matters of judgment. It means also a just statement. It means an appropriate or proper statement in view of the context and consistency of the situation. This I think is hardly the same as factual comparison. Nor can the truth or correctness of such a statement as part of its rightness be easily reduced to factual comparison. The correctness of such a statement is inalienably involved with the justness or appropriateness of it. The cognitive process here seems inseparable from the evaluative process, even for methodological purposes. Meaning itself is in some ways normative.

Cognition is inseparable from evaluation in this case because we are concerned in an integral situation rather than primarily with relational analysis. Though structurally different, as I have indicated elsewhere, the two are not separable operationally, and cognition in this case dare not set up business for itself. Thus preferential statements, so far as they are integral, have the kind of relevance and rightness that insights in art, religion, or other holophrastic syntheses always have.

I do not deny that elements of cognition and judgment, or of the equative relationships on which they are sometimes supposed to rest, may be found in this primitive synthesis. In some truncated form they probably have a place in that union of function and end, feeling and action, truth and preference, which seems to be characteristic of artistic, religious, and poetic attitudes and activities. I say only that they are not purely cognitive and judgmental. Nor can they be made so by abstraction, however great the need to rationalize the situation may be.

These rites of purification in philosophy, science, and scholarship give

certain priestly satisfactions to their devotees. They also have led to massive results in acquired learning, power, and in some kinds of production. In their purification and selection of certain lines of relationship, however, they tend to distort the native synthesis in which these lines are found in experience. They dissipate the ancient integrity on which their values are founded. Thus they destroy the very function which justified them in the first place. The effort to segregate an operation such as making judgments of fact, set it up with criteria (or norms) more or less its own, designate equative counterparts, and equip them with the shining machinery of validation, has practical use in promoting some kinds of action. It is not fully satisfactory in terms of complete theory, however, nor can it give us in itself more than a fragmented world which is forever at odds with the contexts of our experience. It is a process in specialization that may repudiate without justice the insights and integrity of living. Therein is the problem.

### *3. The Curse of Segregation*

The arts in their most primitive forms are not easily distinguished from religion. Both are naïve, uncritical, but profound. They precede the categories and modes of discourse that today we isolate and package separately. We have a chemist's technical persistence, and though it is just possible that sodium taken by itself and chlorine taken by itself are different from common salt, we forget the common salt of life, or try to, in our enthusiasm for the new uses of sodium and chlorine. Art and religion, as they now are called, have been progressively segregated from each other. They have been withdrawn from the native context of the community. They have become progressively more secular. As is inevitable in such routines, they have become more professionalized. They are business for the experts.

In the general splintering of things, action or doing is segregated from the consuming or appreciating aspect of the situation. The former is given over to those best fitted for that special purpose, as the saying is; it is left to the virtuosos, the specialists, the priests, professors, the experts, and above all to the so-called geniuses, in their respective compartments of the field. The rest of us as the appreciators take pretty much what these hand out. What once was artistically and religiously an integral behavior of the community or family, in which all had their active part, has become over great ranges of our culture corrupted specialism. We

purchase our arts and our religious salvation, but do little ourselves. And because we assume that feelings, thrills, lifts, spirituality, can be segregated from their appropriate activities and be bought in separate packages, our life and our community as a spiritual whole sinks into decadence.

The arts in general have been codified around the medium in which the work is done, such as paint, sound, marble, brick, and the like. A more thorough codification is around the kind of limitation imposed by nature on the activity in question. Thus movement in time threads through dancing, music, drama, poetry, and in each finds characteristic forms and limitations. Perhaps all of them, as Havelock Ellis suggests, are developments from the ancient art of dancing. Spatial form gives structural continuity to architecture, sculpture, painting, and other visual and volume arts. Of these architecture no doubt is primary.

But the arts characteristically escape rigid codifications. They can be classified in diverse orders and no one of them fully belongs to any code. There are fine arts and folk arts, Apollonian and Dionysian, direct and symbolic, little and big, in all sorts of combinations. All arts are no doubt kinesthetic or muscular in some direct or indirect way; they are behaviors. At least they should be behaviors. But this may seem only faintly true as we watch the thousands hiring others to do their music for them, their poetry, their sports, their painting, their praying, their dancing, in the great markets of leisure-time commodities. When the arts become so segregated from the common activities of men that they must be bought entire, there is no art. They become collectors' items for the museum. Fortunately, some powerful streams of interest in America are running the other way.

Because activity in the arts still is fairly diverse and free, the prospects are better for the arts than for religion to meet the challenge of the time. Religion as a set of social manifestations not only is highly codified; it is frozen in institutional structures so rigidly that flexible adjustment to modern experience has become almost impossible. The churches, or at least most of them, are unable to speak in terms of modern experience without repudiating their dogmas and pseudoscientific myths. This they dare not openly do. They dare not, perhaps cannot, face their dilemma: if they honestly adjust their doctrines and interpretive myths to the crucial problems of this era they not only will lose large numbers of their communicants; they will relinquish their power to other churches which refuse to make this adjustment. If the churches, on the other hand, do not make honest adjustments of doctrine to modern knowledge and problems,

they will lose not only the support of youth but of many of the more sincere adults. We have thus the shocking spectacle of great churches, in the name presumably of religion, fighting viciously and clamorously for their corporative persistence and mundane power.

This dilemma does not confront people of artistic interests. The field is more open. The authority is less external and absolute. The chances that the arts, or rather people in the arts, in spite of modern failures, will become more fully significant and functional, are fairly good.

The progressive secularization of the arts and religion is the consequence, I think, of the tendency to segregate certain doctrinal categories or technical procedures from the concrete context. These abstractions are then treated as centers of organization sufficient in themselves. Some such elaborative development is of course inevitable in life and growth. To try to repudiate it would be unrealistic, undesirable, and silly. But to withdraw these elaborations from their context, and to treat them as if they were particular, concrete entities of value in themselves, is another matter.

The segregative processes in art and religion go on apace. Perhaps in the extremes of their course they mark the turn from a balanced social process to disintegrative behaviors and decline. Perhaps we are over the crest and on a great, inevitable downslope. But if men have creative functions within the order of nature—and this is an assumption that underlies all values and the very concept of human significance itself—we can hardly take these segregative procedures as inevitable. They are hardly beyond human modification. Nor can we accept this downturn of destiny as implacable fate. In a world where men are in part their own destinies among many other complex variables, these rigidities of cyclic orders seem altogether too abstract and geometrical to be true. They are not, in other words, contextually true.

Art, laughter, religion, love, play, and similar confluences of action have meaning in the primeval integrity of men's lives. Among primitive people they sometimes lie uncovered. There they are culturally nude, but they also are in modern civilizations. They may be masked in forgotten symbolisms or overlaid with newer codes and customs; still they are present even in these times.

The anthropological fantasies may or may not be true. Is football, for example, a struggle—vestigially symbolized—for the god's head? Is horse racing a relic of the sacrificial games such as were held to honor the death of Patroclus? Is the service of mass in churches a ritualized dance? Is the capture through graphic art of the outline of an animal, man, or god an act of magic, a sacred rite, which gives control over the object whose



form is thus captured? At any rate such fantasies have value in suggesting the primeval sacredness of these integrative acts of life. The source of the *mana* concept, or the sacred, perhaps is here.

#### 4. *Woodman School*

When Sacajawea, the guide, the bird woman and daughter of the Lemhi Shoshones, had come as far west as the Three Forks of the great river, she told her friends, the red-haired Clark and Meriwether Lewis, that here her home country began. It was still well east of the Rockies. Here the Missouri springs dark and full-grown from the confluence of the Madison, Gallatin, and Jefferson rivers. The high plains country begins to ripple into the preliminary ranges that become the vast surf and uproar of the continental mountain system farther on.

It was frontier country even for the Indians. The Blackfoot ranged down this way from the north, fiercely but fluidly trying to maintain a hold on the buffalo hunting of the region. The Crows or Absorakas came here from the south and east. The Minnetarees raided along this junction, following the Missouri from the plains far to the eastward. They had driven Sacajawea's people back across the Rockies years before. Sacajawea remembered the dark days of her fear and capture. And she remembered the way back over the passes of the Continental Divide to the Lemhi River.

Here she found her people when she returned with the white explorers. They were a little band of Shoshones, hungry, without guns and not many horses—a displaced people and thereafter always a displaced people until they were a people no more. They made futile raids through the pass into the buffalo country. They wandered here and there west of the Bitterroots in search of a friendly interval in the hostile front of nature.

She followed the trail north from the Lemhi to the sources of the Bitterroot and down to the meeting of the five streams that is now Missoula. She led her friends to the turn up Lolo Creek and Canyon, over the Bitterroots again, thence into the newer wildernesses of the great western slope. Only once before had she traveled the Lolo trail. She went on from there with her white friends to the ocean, paused at the mouth of the Columbia, and then reversed her steps. She went far to the east again, leaving her people behind her, and traveled on beyond the mountains and the plains to St. Louis.

The Lemhi Shoshones now are gone. Sacajawea's life and death after



those days with the shining, red-haired Clark and Meriwether Lewis has become a legend that experts and old men quarrel over. Nobody knows where she lies, although there are many guesses. Whether her blood flows today, and in whose veins, and whether a red-haired line filters down from her across the years are questions sealed no doubt forever in the fertile earth.

Lolo Creek, however, maintains its silvery continuity down the mountainside. Moose browse in the pools and on swampy levels along its course. Above it, over the pass, is the Lochsa wilderness and the Selway. Elk now graze and bellow there and hole up in winter. Had they been there in Sacajawea's day, a century and a half ago, her people might have survived.

The town of Lolo is a bit of a place on the highway at the mouth of the canyon. There is a gasoline pump and a little store. A dirt road leaves the highway to go upward to Lolo Hot Springs and the pass. Nine miles up the canyon is the Woodman School. History has passed near the place, as history is known in Montana. Sacajawea's feet once trod the trail that runs past the schoolhouse. Lewis and Clark found their way through here to the Great Basin of the Columbia. Chief Joseph, magnificent in his effort to save a people from their dark destiny, passed here in the night with his doomed community. He evaded the bungling whites entrenched in the canyon and moved on a thousand miles and more in one of the great retreats of history. Today twelve families live within reach of the Woodman School. The group of some forty people are lumber workers and small-scale ranchers. Their cabins string along the road among the trees. The Indians all are gone.

On a July afternoon, a few months before I returned to Illinois from Montana, Mrs. Louise Forney came to me to talk about a community study group for her one-room Woodman school. She is a gray-haired, energetic woman, alert to movements about her, quick-eyed, intelligent. She said that the Lolo Canyon group was well suited to one of our experiments. Whereas the projects of the Montana Study in other places had been concerned directly with only a representative cross section of the community, at least at the beginning, this one, she said, could include the group entire. The people had promised to come and, she said, they would come.

I talked at length with her. She had worked out her plans fully after casual contacts with the work of the Montana Study in other places. Now she wanted to begin. Since I was leaving Montana, I turned over the lively little Woodman project to her and to Miss Ruth Robinson.

The latter was to be resident at the Montana Study headquarters the following year. They worked out schedules, organized the group after the rural school opened in the fall, brought in some university students with experience in rural community life to help lead the discussions, and carried on the work successfully well into the winter.

The project was simple. Fifteen or twenty neighbors came together to talk over the life of the Woodman group, its people, and their comings and goings. There was the brief church history by Flora Wilkinson. Years before a minister had come Sunday evenings to the sawmill near the old Chickaman mine but left in anger at the small turnout. And forty years ago a Baptist minister from Missoula came down every two weeks. But that is long ago, and that is all. There was the Woodman School history, without break since 1890. There was the story of the homes on Lolo creek, the little mills, the dead mines, the homesteading, and the endless shift of families across the thresholds of old buildings. There was the story of lumbering in the canyon and the great fires. There were poems of Lolo and the West by George Wilkinson. There was the longer commentary on the ups and downs of the little neighborhood, its growth and wastage, by Elaine Mills. They worked with three-forked time: the past, present, and future, but the past seemed easier to make articulate.

A few visitors came to the weekly meetings. The county superintendent, Mrs. Moore, the pastor of the Christian Church in Missoula, four students from the university, and others joined the group from time to time. It was simple, unpretentious, good-humored. But who shall say that merely meeting each week for more than four months and contemplating the being of Woodman was not itself a new spirit in the place?

The professional resource of Woodman is the teacher, Mrs. Forney. She had come to the West from Ohio. She is well educated, with cultivated tastes, and she is willing to infuse her interests into this group buried in the green depths of Lolo Canyon. It is work without the prestige that Herr Frehner has in Switzerland. There is very little money. But Louise Forney undertakes it with an enthusiasm that soon becomes an infection in all the group. She works with Marion Magee, the chairman of the study group, and with George Wilkinson, the secretary, in preparing simple researches into the problems of the canyon. She busies herself getting ready for the Christmas party or perhaps a February sing. She gives devotion and hard work. There are few tangible compensations.

I do not know just how to account for this in human beings. Albert Schweitzer can leave his Bach and his philosophy to bury himself in medical service in Africa. G. M. Brandborg can give up friendships and

risk his livelihood in his devotion to the welfare of the land and people of Ravalli County. Louise Forney can overload herself with work just for the stubborn value of seeing a human project developed and a little neighborhood enriched and stabilized. Schweitzer of course does not and cannot leave his Bach and philosophy behind him. They are transmuted in the new situation and become in a sense the structure and significance of the reward that he finds there. So too Brandborg takes with him paradoxically what he leaves behind. It is the meaning of his deep integrity. And Louise Forney finds in the Woodman group all that she sacrifices in going there. This perhaps is the secret of those thousands who through devotion can create the profound synthesis of value and action.

Men can find freedom with integrity only by accepting the nature and destiny assigned them and within that context using the human privilege to create what is worth while. Surely this devotion, such as we see in Schweitzer, Brandborg, or Louise Forney, is the way that the Moirai open to us to extend the native synthesis of life, to heal communities broken or disintegrated, or to build where there is none to start with. Devotion to people in their concrete context is in the nature of human beings. It is their cohesiveness and communality without which there can be only disorganization and defeat.

### *5. Art as Community*

Art as a function of communal behavior belongs to the evaluative aspect of life. In this simple statement there are huge crevasses of implicit contradiction and obscurity. These I shall not try to probe. The statement is a kind of metaphysical metaphor that intimates something of importance but cannot capture it in clearly conceptual form. As to values, there are no values as such and certainly not a self-sufficient realm of them. There is only this evaluation of a concrete situation or that one, each with its color and intensity, and each defined, not by some universal core or characteristic called value, but by the unique quality of the situation in each case.

Value, to use perforce an abstract way of saying it, is the unique focus of things in our experience. It is the context that gives them the intensity, the point, the pressure, that words such as *our*, *my*, *here*, *this*, convey. It is the bringing home of things to what is called *our* situation. Whatever they may be otherwise, things step out of their universals and indif-

ferentism in being evaluated. They take on that character of the real that is called intimate.

This is not to define it; still there is in our experience a qualitative intimacy and warmth and in that sense a specificity that underlie all evaluation. I have said that value is the directional character of action. It is not so much the end, or desire for the end, as a preferred direction, where the end is more within than beyond the activity. Value in these terms is the directional aspect of life. In another context, value is the concrete, intimate quality of things. Herein they are mine or yours. Herein is the unique, concrete situation that is called belonging to the community. This I know, must be taken more as poetry than as judgment of fact. Nevertheless, this kind of particularity in experience, whether we call it directional or intimate, is not found in the linear orders of science.

This intimacy of things in our experience gives our lives whatever sense of reality they may have. It is the incidence of things *here*, in *our* world, in *this* situation, and it is a function of communal life. I doubt whether men can evaluate experience at all, or claim it, except within the integral relevance and context of the community in which they are created. Things have bearing within this field that they can have in no other way. They are direct. Though indirect methods and representations may be of use in clarifying their relevance, the evaluative act itself is direct and intimately real.

Thus the arts, like religion, play, laughter, love, and all the other integrative poetries of our existence, may have their metaphysical metaphor. They belong fluidly to the community of living. If their values and intimacies do not have factual stability, they have at least intimate importance. They enter our effort to interpret, transmute, and express the blind being and behavior of the world.

If sound, the arts cannot get far away from men's basic symbiosis with outdoor life and movement. The natural rhythms of the days and seasons, the growth and decline of living things, the vast, reticent patterns of the soil, belong inalterably in men as in other living creatures. Divergence too far from our ancient synthesis with these movements and materials can mean only disaster. The arts in this sense are within agriculture and rural life, within the handling of fine machines, and within hunting and adventurous projections. In urban and mass industrial groups they are fractionated and specialized. They lose integrity amid the cleavages and segregations of instrument from end, of producer from consumer, of the virtuoso and professional producer from the mass public which buys their wares.

## 6. *The Genius Cult*

The cult of the genius is an example of this decline of art. Where once the individual was relatively unknown, the "genius" today is an inflamed, overstimulated individual, swollen with pride in that which doesn't matter. I refer here not to good men who may be more able than others, but to the cult of the genius and its inflated sentiments. This cult is individualism in one of its most decadent forms. It persists with its posturings and irresponsibilities largely because it supports a pattern of action commercially profitable, usually to others. It is symptomatic of the modern cleavage in the arts between production and consumption. Its repudiation of the communal synthesis of men in behalf of a vain and willful individualism makes it easily the tool of those who will feed that vanity and willfulness and make money.

Genius fits well in the technique of puffs, promotion, and the big build-up. The mass market for music, sports, drama, painting, literature, the dance, humor, may be captured in this way, centralized, publicized, and issued at high prices for a public to buy.

There is the star of baseball or opera, the big man of the movies or the orchestra conductor, the virtuoso of the violin or piano, the professional humorist hiring his gag writers, or the man of affairs hiring his ghosts. There is the faker, who puts his name on other men's work because the name has a market value or other use. There are the built-up intensities of attention on this public figure or that, the rave notices, the clagues, the glamour, and all the vulgar trappings of a device to get mass attention for money. These are features of the transfer in the arts from participative activity by all in a communal group to the segregation of production in a few experts and the mass purchase of the product by everyone else.

We have seen this genius cult at work in recent years in the case, for example, of Albert Schweitzer. Here I think is a great and good man, who was drawn to America from Africa by the force of two million francs for his beloved mission at Lambarene. He came ostensibly to speak of Goethe, but the pressure of the big build-up was turned on. The clamor grew. Before he set foot in America he was touted in the press as the "genius" of the age. Surrounded by thousands chattering fragmentally, smeared by hasty adulation, but in all probability having few or no full associations with any person, he was exhibited as the "genius," the man who took doctor's degrees in medicine, music, the-

ology, and philosophy, the expert on Bach who went to Africa, who said "reverence for life." And "reverence for life," "reverence for life," was repeated at large, thrilled over for a moment, then forgotten for the next excitement. This was Schweitzer in America. A great man was lost so far as our culture was concerned. He was led to the whirlwind. He was abandoned by complaisant hosts, perhaps at his own insistence, to the acquisitive clamor of thousands. So far as he was a man of community, or in other words so far as he was a human being in equilibrium amid the organic tensions and diversities of familiar people, he was literally torn to pieces.

The friendliness of Americans, precious as it is, may become a storm. Because it is diffused and casual, without much inner direction or goal, it may be easily channeled by manipulative influences from outside. Because it is a kind of universal good will without much structural continuity, it "makes up," as the weatherman says, in sudden spells and irrational violence. It is childlike friendliness, vigorous, gay, indiscriminating. But it is killing too when it veers suddenly and without limit or communal context pours itself upon a man.

### *7. The Invention of the Substantive*

The genius emerging as a cult in our society comes from the tendency to turn functions into substantives. It is another example of words embodied into behaving things. Such words should remain merely terms for collections of attributes and aspects selected from one situation and another. The error is hypostasis, as the philosopher would say. Here it is overwrought, dangerous, a case of excessive individuation of the concept of man. But the tendency to hypostasize nevertheless is pretty fundamental in our affairs. It is the invention of the substantive and is I think the contribution that the poetic or holophrastic way of organizing experience makes to our lives. The girl who tries with desperate enthusiasm to make something concrete and whole of "the Voice" that she hears over the radio is using youth's privilege to organize her experience imaginatively. Though she finds herself in a cultural situation that is deformed and frustrating, her poetry still will out.

I have discussed somewhat the community as substantive. Here I shall try to distinguish this notion more clearly from the community as attributive. As attributive the community refers to a relationship among men that varies in intensity according to the cultural distance, the kind of

relationship, the number of recognized relationships associated with it, and numerous other variables involved in the complex social situation. As an attribute the word *community* indicates an association that is present to some extent in all situations where men in any way are in communication. It is a broad term meaning any kind of association or, if one insists, any kind of communication. This word *community* as an attributive indication of relationship tends to supplant in scientific and philosophical language the more substantive or nuclear term, *the community*. As adjectival rather than substantive it is used as a definitional basis in such studies.

Thus *the community*, like so many other substantives in modern life, is treated as a quaint and mildly erroneous hypostasis for which the attributive words *communal* or *community of* might better be used. This tendency of use leads to the conception of community life as primarily a matter of different strands of interests and of lines of functional relationships. *The community* as an organic, corporative social being tends to be discarded. It must be discarded in this linear mode of thinking.

This solely attributive concept of community I do not accept. The community is less an attribute of some function or interest, such as community of feeling, community of science, community of language, community of sport, than an integral whole which is organic in structure, limited in size, concrete in context, substantive in syntax. For this I think there is both perceptual evidence and moral need. The community is socially a "real" thing that may be observed in various stages of prosperity and health through all the area of human affairs. It is also a moral and poetic necessity of life as we value it in western culture.

In that easy slip stream of successive analogies in which so much loose thinking is carried on it is customary to speak of communities in an order of serial progression as to size, as if size had no bearing on the nature of the community itself. From the family community to the neighborhood community to the village community, thence smoothly to the so-called city community, to the state community, to the national community, and then to the world community—ah, yes, the world community—the movement is comfortable and progressive. If all goes well, the world community from this point of view is our logical and moral destination. It becomes our norm. And in terms of that linear order of thinking in which the word *community* is an attribute of some political, economic, or other function this world community is indeed where we are going. Though bigger, looser, and more comprehensive, it still is communal in this attributive sense.

This smooth conceptual continuity, however, takes no account of the inherent limits or the size of the community as substantive. It ignores that point of no return, beyond which increasing numbers in a group make the true community quite out of the question. It slides over without recognition the crucial change in structure and quality that takes place in groups as they increase in size beyond a certain limit of human acquaintance. Beyond a critical point in size of the group human association in the round is impossible. Beyond this point the association of whole human beings one with another declines. Nor is it other than common sense to say that this fullness of human association is greatly important, critically important, in our life. What more can human beings have than human beings? They are life. They justify life. As inalienable members of communities they alone can be the criterion of valued effort, problem solving, action.

The tendency to lay out communities in serial order as to size with the so-called world community as a kind of culmination, or holding company, justifying all the rest is a dangerously academic approach to the problem. It reverses the values of human life. It treats men as fragmental. It makes human beings in their concrete communal situations attributive to some anonymous and universal pattern called the world. It slurs over without recognition the profound difference between men in the community associated with one another mainly as whole persons and men in another kind of group too large or too loose for perceptual grasp. In this latter situation the human being, or rather the human being as realized in his local community, is made inevitably secondary. He is associated in pieces. He is fragmented. He is an aggregation of isolated functions. The attempt to serialize men and their communities is an old story in the history of our organizations and disasters. It substitutes an organizational pattern for a human one.

### 8. *The Hutchins Constitution*

Quite characteristically the constitution for a world federation or state prepared by Chancellor Hutchins and his group, to use just one example, mentions the word community only five times, and then only as secondary in importance. In two of these cases the word is used in the phrase "communities and states," in a third case in the phrase "communities and territories,"<sup>2</sup> as if some basic similarity were involved in these conjunc-

<sup>2</sup> "Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution," in *Common Cause*, March, 1948, pp. 331 and 340, 975 E. 60th St., Chicago 37, Illinois.



tions. The small community as such is ignored in this constitution. At the same time it is dedicated to Gandhi, whose very life and mission were focused in the little group.

The proposed constitution is built upon large, organizational concepts and presumed universals. It misses the integral, human point of reference in the small community that so wisely and shrewdly was recognized both by Gandhi and by Jefferson, and for that matter probably by Jesus too. The Hutchins constitution, like so much in America, is based on diffused good will. It is good but without orientation. Its wide-swinging universals, its bland phrasing of abstract human rights, its naïve manipulation of big organizational concepts, have value perhaps in stating what some good people wish were true. But they miss the concrete intimacy in the lives of human beings that Gandhi, for example, always maintained. They have no base, as his thinking always had, in the soils and salt, the spinning and the cotton patches, the village schools, gardens, and the little communities of men living rather fully with one another. These they ignore—and this sort of thing they always must ignore—because the professional experience, the urban abstractions, and the wide-ranging, discursive reason on which this constitution is based simply do not have that content.

For Gandhi peace issues from behavior itself. It is a spiritual or poetic emanation from a concrete way of life. For the Hutchins group peace is an organizational concept, a coordinative, impersonal principle, which is the polar opposite of Gandhi's faith and implicit conviction. The Hutchins constitution is something to look at as it floats in the upper air. But without an anchorage to concrete human life, without orientation on the human being's wholeness in his community, and without an organization focused on that human kind of integrity, it can be little more than a pious hope. Perhaps in this bitter world of broken hopes it is so intended. In such a world hope itself, without substance, may seem to some worth creating.

The integrity of the human community, I suggest, is poetic so far as it is communicable. It is substantive in this sense, not attributive. Efforts to rationalize it in Aristotelian universals or in the linear patterns of the sciences and expert professions have incidental values. But the presumptions underlying such efforts are arrogant and frivolous. When given priority in the orientation of human affairs, such efforts miss the main thing. They would organize men and life in sweeping generalities from above. Without recognizing the central integrity and coherence in men's lives, they make large scale areal and occupational classifications much as children rearrange their toys. They miss the poetic substantive of life.

They miss the concrete ictus, the rhythmic emphasis on the human community, which always is so deep in the experience of a Gandhi or a Jefferson. They lack these insights of the spirit.

### 9. *The Community in Art*

Fortunately the vitality of Americans is great. Their arts often break through confinements and restrictive classifications. Art still may make the substance of community. In spite of decadent tendencies to segregate the arts from the intimate movements and processes of men living familiarly together, the arts still may be found sometimes deeply imbued with life. The work songs,<sup>3</sup> for example, of the Negro team tapping in the spikes on the railroad, the magnificent swing and movement of the hammers as they drive them down, or the chant of the heaving of the lead line on a Mississippi barge, the cornfield holler, the quitting-time songs—here is singing that to them is significant. Here song and act are deeply identified.

In spite of the myth, long since outworn, long since soured and corrupted in modern industrial culture, the myth called vicarious appreciation, the arts still sometimes make their primal synthesis. In spite of rotten codes where the emotions are separated from their appropriate behaviors, the arts at times do break through to reality. These syntheses are likely to be in the informal arts, the lively arts, often unrecognized as conscious arts at all. But they may be deep in human behavior.

The unconventional vitality of art persists. Though it may be hard to pick out the joy of knowing in movement a beautiful power tool, let us say, or the presentness of being that comes to two youngsters dancing in the syncopated compulsions of a new tune, or the grave thrill and tenderness in skilled work with livestock where the life of an animal makes up in a slow storm and rhythm of growing, or this bit of song, the melodic phrase or so, the moment of rhythm that finds itself singing on the lips of a child, or the bright drama of a story told at supper table, or the poetry and muscular humor of a man's wartime reminiscence, or the household crafts, or the rites and procedures of morning as a little town begins another day; though these and a thousand more are hard to pick out as arts or the works of art, they still may have in them the central substance of living—and its inner gratuity—from which all values

<sup>3</sup> Library of Congress, Division of Music, *Negro Work Songs and Calls*, Washington, D.C., 1943, edited by B. A. Botkin, Album 8.

emerge. They are arts in action, informal, unrecognized, unpretentious. Perhaps they have not the formal tradition that is assigned to what are called The Arts. But they have life. They are caught in the timeless moment. They are action freed of time in a way; they carry in the fusion of what was and what will be an eternal presentness of things now.

The rural arts, says the sociologist,<sup>4</sup> are traditionally close to religion. They are participative. They are homemade, and their inner values compensate for lack of expertness. They are usually spontaneous. Big days, fairs, and celebrations may be part of their communal expression. Art in the community is for the value of the doing. It is for the fun of it. But the fun of it is less likely to be segregated in what is called "amusement" or "pleasure-seeking" or "Culture." It is not withdrawn from productive functions. It is integral in the whole of life. This is not likely to be the case of art under the pressures of industrialized sport, mass-amusement techniques, and the vast fixations of audiences on the virtuoso, the professional actor, the orchestra director, the stars, the coaches, the best sellers, the smart lecturers and commentators, the promoters, the radio gagsters, and all the entourage of the great urban show.

The community in art is thus close to the rural kind of culture in being close to the sustaining base of living. It is close to the soil and its culture. It is close to the muscular or kinesthetic patterns of crafts and jobs and to the action of men in their basic routines. The community in art resists abstraction from these underlying routines. It cannot tolerate and does not easily understand the piled-up paper work of secondary activities, tertiary symbolisms, symbols of symbols of symbols, that make urban situations ever more remote from human and communal contexts. In the realms of symbols men become always more clever but they lose substantiality in their approach to experience.

In all of this the art of the community has a characteristic significance that is not true of most urban art. The significance—and I use the term *significance* for want of a better—comes from the fact that rural art is an appropriate participation in events. There is the fall plowing, for example, or the rain, the seasons, or the cycles of birth and laughter and of death and weeping. There is spring coming on the fringe of April, the long, flowing river, or the growth and waste of the woods. Rural art is the transmutation of the events and crises, or the spiritual identification with them, that lie reticently but still poignantly in the context of community life. It is a metaphor for life, a creation anew of its substance and value.

<sup>4</sup> See Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 445 f.

It is a transubstantiation of functional behavior, crisis, event, being, in the community.

The great Greek dramas had this contextual significance. Rarely, if ever, were they allowed to depart from their intimacy with the concrete substance and rhythm of the community. They never were shows. The drama was performed once and only once, unless by some extraordinary dispensation a repetition was permitted. Like the autumn harvest the drama was fruition. It was a reaping once for all. Where our urban theater is likely to be measured by the number of repetitions, and six hundred times over, line for line, word for word, gesture for gesture, and emotion for emotion mark a successful show, the community dramas of a Sophocles or an Aeschylus, or the little community dramas of our own backwoods and country places, find their values in participation, in timeless statement, and in the unique transmutation of communal life. Sophocles danced in his own plays. Freeman Halverson of Lonepine, Montana, played the part in their winter's drama that he himself not only had written but had lived.

Urban art on the other hand is likely to be abstract. Concert art, easel art, or the virtuositities of the genius usually relate to no concrete event or crisis, to no local situation or routine. It presents the show and then tries to conjure up an appropriate context in the realm of make-believe. Rural art in this sense is the opposite of urban art. It is the concrete situation. Rural art in this sense is significant.

"Communication," says John Dewey, "is uniquely instrumental and uniquely final. It is instrumental as liberating us from the otherwise overwhelming pressure of events and enabling us to live in a world of things that have meaning. It is final as a sharing in the objects and arts precious to a community, a sharing whereby meanings are enhanced, deepened, and solidified in the sense of communion."<sup>5</sup> In this penetrating statement of the primary synthesis of instrument and end Dewey has dealt with communication as a function. It is a relational and attributive function, and it describes the pattern, as well as such concepts can, of the artistic integrity of rural and community life. Beyond that point Dewey must resort, I think, to the substantives of poetry and metaphor. He himself would say, I think, that description cannot be enough. If he would go farther, he must turn to the more participatory or identificatory behaviors. He must sing, let us say, or gravely dance—as the religious devotee may dance himself into God—in order to enter the community of art.

<sup>5</sup> John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

This is done—or at least is more easily uncovered—by children or by others when they can break through cribs and confines and find for a moment the immediate presence of the community itself. It no longer is attributive and relational in character but substantive, poetic. This is done too by teachers of art, such as the German, Henry Schaefer-Simmern, in their work with children. It may be done also with the insane and other uncovered souls, and with normal adults in their more uncovered moments.

"In the natural ways of working man acts as a psychophysical whole, his intellectual, emotional and physical forces operating in a coordinated fashion," says Schaefer-Simmern. Thus "constant compulsory isolation of functions must inevitably endanger the individual's equilibrium.

"It is significant that the most thoroughly industrialized country, the one with the most progressive mechanized system," he continues, "undertook the greatest effort to conserve human integrity. The establishment of the Works Progress Administration was a decisive step in this direction. . . . Never before has any nation shown such foresight in recognizing artistic activity as an instrument for the restoration of human dignity."<sup>6</sup>

And to this John Dewey adds, "There is no inherent difference between fullness of activity and artistic activity; the latter is one with being fully alive. Hence, it is not something possessed by a few persons and setting them apart from the rest of mankind, but is the normal or natural human heritage."<sup>7</sup>

The community as the central synthesis of art, to sum up briefly some of the implications of these statements, is not a divisive or a linear process, but the wholeness, substantively or poetically recognized, of human living.

## 10. Singing Group

Alfonsa Dorsey has strong hands. They are large, but muscularity more than size makes them hands apart from others. Alfonsa is a carpenter. His hands all day are gripping and relaxing, cording up and smoothing away, holding fast and letting go of the handle of a plane, a saw, a hammer. Or they reach for nails in the pocket of his apron in brief rhythmic figures, now right-handed now left-handed, or flow smoothly

<sup>6</sup> Henry Schaefer-Simmern, *The Unfolding of Artistic Activity* (Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1948), pp. 3, 4, and 9.

<sup>7</sup> John Dewey in Foreword, *op. cit.*, p. x.

with a chisel through the soft gray cypress wood or southern pine. His hands dance all day muscularly, powerfully, delicately, across the wood, the sweet-grained wood, of his trade. There are sheets of fir plywood shipped here from the State of Washington far to the northwest, or live oak, clean, hard, tough to handle, from the bayou east of town. Redwood from California sometimes gets under his saw, and now and then the mild and rosy ponderosa pine from western Montana.

Alfonsa's hands are saw-and-hammer hands, muscular, flat-fingered. They move in skilled rhythms and routines. They gather strength in the muscular poetries of motion. The hands of Alfonsa's Negro forebears built the great white houses of the Southern countryside. They built them with clean joints and nice engagements of mortises and tenons from the classic plans introduced by Thomas Jefferson. Alfonsa has forgotten that, but his hands still dance reticently, almost religiously, through the eight-hour day.

The workday ends. In the evenings Alfonsa's hands do other things. They leave the wood, and work now with tunes and time measures. They take hold of tunes at the singing group on Monday evenings and mold them as his chisel molds the bland cypress wood. They guide the group through the moments of songs.

All this is to say that Alfonsa Dorsey has strong hands as a conductor of the chorus as well as for carpentering. He leads the choir in a flourishing Negro church of Fairhope, Alabama. He also organized there The Negro Community Singing Group. It meets once a week in the decrepit colored schoolhouse south of the town. Alfonsa usually is the leader.

I arrived in Fairhope one winter evening to find that the weekly singing group would be meeting in an hour or so. Alfonsa called for me in an old car and transported me and my young son three miles to the schoolhouse. Through the early darkness of winter the white camellia blossoms were faintly visible along the way and the boughs of pines and magnolias brushed across the car as it bucked and plunged along the clay road through the woods. At the schoolhouse a few other cars were parked. They were poor people's cars, the unseen cars of the woodlands and the clay roads. Even in the darkness they looked like refugees from the junk yard.

Inside the schoolhouse were thirty-five or more men and women. They sat on camp chairs or at the school desks that made three battered, broken rows across the room. Two little boys tended the iron stove. From the scuttle the coal rattled noisily into the fire every little while. The iron door banged. Alfonsa had asked Boykin James, the principal of the

school, to take charge of the meeting. Mrs. Bob Dorsey, Alfonsa's sister-in-law, a graduate of Tuskegee and a skilled musician, sat at the piano.

I do not know what enters the making of music. Here the music certainly became a living thing in the tattered old schoolroom south of Fairhope. It arose bright and momentous from the voices of those people. It filled the room with its presence; captured the singers. Then it seemed that no singers were there but only the presence of the song.

This is not to say that the singing was expertly done. The quality of the chorus was marred by a few harsh voices. They were there from love, not selected for quality or training. The piano in its broken, ill-tuned clangor was an insult to the art. Only the skill and courage of Mrs. Dorsey could make it an instrument of leadership. "Now, once more," she would call out suddenly, "begin with 'Ten came,'" or "The altos now! Do that alone," or, as she forced the piano over the passage, "It goes that way."

They were simple people by no means expert in the art, but they loved music. The compulsion of their singing filled the room with a kind of greatness of its own. Mr. James led the carols with a justness and rhythmic confidence that only the born musician has. Then for the spirituals Alfonsa stood before the group ready to lead. He was obviously embarrassed and hesitant. Probably my presence made a difference. The piano struck the chord. His hands took over. Alfonsa forgot himself in the music. The others forgot him too. Alfonsa disappeared, but the hands remained. They led the music. They molded the singing. They made it march.

Singing groups like this are organized simply. In Fairhope before the group was organized, I canvassed the situation quietly to find what support there might be for a white people's group and a Negro group and to find two suitable leaders. I found what seemed to be both the support and the leaders and then offered the leaders a flat sum of five to ten dollars a meeting for a series of ten to twenty-five weekly meetings. The amount offered varies somewhat according to the location of the group, but never is different, of course, as between white or colored people. The white group in Fairhope never started, but the Negro group under Alfonsa's leadership has gone on successfully for several years.

Other community singing groups of this sort have been started. As in this case they are financed through a small grant for expenses from the Rockefeller Foundation. Some have been successful, others doubtful. A Negro group at Daphne, Alabama, was organized under the direction of Mrs. W. J. Carroll, wife of the principal of the industrial school there.

A small band, a good dance caller and a monthly turn-out at square dances of as many as two hundred rural white people has been developed by L. H. Harris at River Park, Alabama. A singing group in Indiana and another in Ohio were started through the help of Stanley Hamilton of the Rural Life Association. One of these under Doris Wipert is bright, lively, hugely successful. Four Negro groups in Virginia were organized through Dr. William M. Cooper of Hampton Institute. The singing group directed by C. H. Flax at Grove, Virginia, now has ninety members. So successful have they been at Williamsburg and over the radio that I begin to fear that the group may outgrow its initial community meaning. "Success" sometimes is as hard to avoid as failure.

### *11. Wyndham Lewis and the Cosmopolitan Man*

These roots of art in the small community are repudiated by men such as Wyndham Lewis,<sup>8</sup> who delight in the abstraction, the rootlessness, and fragmentation of modern men. These fragments and abstractions are the future, says this English critic, and the America of cosmopolitan New York is the center of its development. There is of course a monstrous load of evidence—excepting only that of human value—to bear him out. The quiet skills and rhythms of Alfonsa Dorsey's life, or of Freeman Halverson or Eugene Smathers or Denny Gray and their little groups singing or making a home drama or playing the clarinet or planting trees to help the forest live, are passed over in his studies.

Such simple things are not big enough. They don't have a "public." They cannot produce "audience appeal." They do not have the cosmic stimulations, the big-time universals and controls, the wide-ranging power, to justify consideration in massive cosmopolitan operations. And if these massive operations destroy the simple things and little places, if they invariably fragment the human being, if they are a scale of action entirely beyond the human limit and indifferent to human value, then that is all right too. Why not? If a schizoid life of pieces of people is the trend, then pieces of people is the trend. Let us celebrate it. If the so-called cosmic man or cosmopolitan man is inevitably a parasite on these simple people, if he cannot continue to exist without continued military and industrial aggression—nor continue to exist with them—if he cannot reproduce himself biologically or maintain his sanity or keep a decent

<sup>8</sup> Wyndham Lewis, *America and Cosmic Man* (London, Nicholson & Watson, Ltd., 1948).



sense of moral responsibility in his vast organizations, so what? Anyhow, we are on our way. We are moving. The scene that flips by our windows at least is changing. And that in a culture where change is an obsession seems to be enough. Even change is meaningless, however, if there are no stable terms and no security of points of reference.

These are harsh comments, perhaps unjust to much in Lewis' book that is generous and brilliant. But they are true, I think, of the general implications of his work.

Wyndham Lewis is a voice of the elite, of whom I spoke early in this book. It is a bright, persuasive voice, always wandering in the world, always coming from nowhere. It speaks for the cosmopolitan culture of expertness and of disorganization. It is the voice of a thousand specialists, professionals, virtuosos, and of death. The rootedness of life, which he repudiates so briskly, is the rootedness in time, in place, and in human association. It underlies the creation of human values. It is conditional to human integrity. Lewis celebrates the modern disorganization of men's lives and communities, and because there may be stimulation and brightness in decay, at least for the elite, he says with complete sophistication, "All right then, it's good. We will let it go at that," or words to that effect.

He does indeed rebel at the race discrimination and vicious snobbery of our modern culture. He repudiates valiantly the wars. All this, he says, is preliminary to the great mixing of an eclectic culture in which such things will pass away. Men will know each other just enough to be interesting but not enough to be concerned. They will escape the family, community, region, nation, and other possessory groups. They will escape devotion and its inconveniences. And as for love; well, yes—love we may have, says Lewis, if it be kept well diluted, generalized, transitory in content. It will be made to the formula of tolerance, moral *laissez faire*, and sophisticated indifference. And love in any case should be secondary to happiness of a versatile but epicurean kind. All this is as things should be mainly because this sort of thing is what Mr. Lewis and the urban elite really like. New York today becomes the great prototype of the world cosmopolis of the future.

In the cosmopolitan man Lewis has produced a formula for a denatured man. Such a man as he flits about among varied attractions is casual, ironical, gay, and indifferent. On the whole he is pleasant under favorable conditions. Lewis assumes that an entire world of such insouciance and irresponsibility would be very nice. Here, as William James said of Santayana's sophisticated thesis, is the perfection of rottenness. Lewis

does not realize that the cosmopolitan man to whom he turns so naïvely is the parasitic man. The cosmopolite's liberalism, of which Lewis is so hopeful, is a segregated liberalism, a well-bred luxury, like that of the English aristocratic class or some of our leisured groups, which lives on the labor and enforced sacrifice of others. It lives in a world sustained by the moral convictions and biological fertility of others.

This universal barfly is presented seductively as the liberated man. It is the inevitable culmination of Rousseauan individualism. It is the individualism that exists, like a dark, fetid flower, only in concomitance with an absolute state. This concomitance Rousseau admitted, although Lewis incongruously seems to reject it. The cosmic man, the Rousseauan individual, escapes the community. He escapes devotion. He escapes labor. He does not and cannot produce what he consumes. His gay detachment is possible only through other people's concern. His insouciance and indifferentism sit on the underlying aggression and war, the mass classifications and bigotries, the violence and human seizures, of the urban culture that produced him. His arts rest on rottenness.

## *12. The Future of Art in the Community*

I doubt if the more authentic arts of today are in the field of the "fine arts," at least so far as they have been professionalized. Deeper in life and more profound in art are the less formal efforts to possess the poetry and substance of living. I would not reject Paul Robeson as the professional artist, the highly acclaimed singer of beautiful songs, but Alfonsa Dorsey, with his carpenter's hands, is more important. The participation of people appreciatively and functionally in the movement and being of their communities has more value a thousand times than paying the experts to do it for them. Because the so-called fine arts have been built up without much reference to this participatory need and substance of living they have become extraneous. They have become shows and splurges or the exhibitory antics and novelties of genius. Originality, as Carlyle said, is not novelty but sincerity, and sincerity the fine arts today do not often have.


John Barton's book of the rural painters of Wisconsin,<sup>9</sup> most of them amateurs, is more important as a critical exposition of art in the community and in life than many a high-flown abstraction in the quarterlies.

<sup>9</sup> John R. Barton, *Rural Artists of Wisconsin* (Madison, Wis., University of Wisconsin Press, 1948).

And beyond all that is the love for the new machines, the fusion of appreciation and action in the daily movements of living, the gestures and skills in work. There is the cream separator, beautiful as a woman in its swirl and movement. There is the hay baler, the tractor. There are the automobiles, always the automobiles, lived into as movement and as art. There are the great lathes and presses, the endless machines that, even in their abstraction and remoteness from the possession of those who operate them, still are possessed at least faintly in another way. The native movements and rhythms of living have their values. They refer usually in some way or other to the community of men, or the hoped-for community, in which men, the artists, work and live. That community, or that hope, justifies the work.

This is the future of art in the community. Though the creation of community life in art may be more of a hope than an actuality, the community alone gives being and value to the artist's work. Otherwise there is no future.

To sum up briefly, the art of the human community arises in certain philosophical attitudes and insights and in fundamental metaphors common to men. The lives of human beings as both ends and means are identified in the common life of the community. They are multifunctional men, and if the community endures within the human limits of perceptual experience, these men never will be abstracted into segregated fragments or single functions or specialized interests, or solely means or solely ends. A man will remain organically continuous. He will remain multifunctional and multievaluational within that whole, for the community alone can respond in this way. The human community is both a factual situation and a moral or normative pattern. It is an organization of value that emerges from the poetic substantives of the community itself. As such the human community is the condition and the spiritual concomitant of all philosophic or artistic behavior. These summarizing statements I shall leave as a kind of conceptual condensation of what in life is above all vivid and real.



PART XI

*The Price of Survival*



1. *The Assumption of Survival*
2. *The Great Indifference*
3. *Lethal Factors in Western Culture*
4. *What Must We Do to Be Saved?*
5. *The Price of Survival*
6. *Is the Price Too High?*



## 1. *The Assumption of Survival*

No one need ask if men wish to survive or if they should wish to survive. Clearly enough they desire it and, further, they should desire it. These are common assumptions of living. That these can be questioned also is clear; they should not be made too confidently. Nevertheless all who live take these things in some way for granted.

To say that men should desire life because as a fact they do desire it is also a hasty disposal of the matter. Many question it. Others behave as if they questioned it. In some cultures and philosophies, such as the Indic, most people probably question it. The assumption begs the question, furthermore, for it closes the doors of escape from life even before they are opened. It seals off the right to philosophic doubt as to the value of living before the problem even can be raised. It asserts in effect that life is unquestionable because it is unquestioned.

Still, assumptions such as these are in the nature of life. Living is experienced never as a question but as a gift with which we find ourselves endowed. It comes to us never as doubt, for doubt has little substance in behavior. Life is gratuitous; the reasons for or against its factuality and value are irrelevant.

The assumptions of life, or animal faith, are prior to all questions about them. They are the bases without which the questions themselves cannot be asked. We assume the priority of survival in fact and value and make no bones about it. They are assumptions which may be charged off as predispositions of our western culture. In a world that is mainly predispositional that is hardly a disqualification.

Survival then is a norm or point of reference in terms of which we may judge some of the values of human customs and activities. Survival is not the only norm or even the main one. It is conditional, however, to all such evaluations. Without survival the other interests of life are meaningless.

Survival may refer to a people or a stock, to a culture or a community, to a family or a single person. Ordinarily it refers in some degree to all of these. The lines of human survival are intricately interwoven. In any case no one of these lines alone is sufficient as a norm of living, nor can these lines of survival ordinarily be segregated from one another and given separate status. Each has its span of time that varies in different

cultures, but the presence of the others in organic association with each one provides for renewal or continuity in the human project as a whole. The community, the family, and the single person, for example, renew one another. The stock, the culture, are also renewal factors among the rest. All these together are the great continuum of living. This is the norm that usually is central in our assumptions of life. This is survival.

But survival is not only a succession of events stretched like a cord from next to next. There are also the poets and the Trobrianders. There is the holism of thinking in the distant, dumb imaginations of our ancestors and their current homologues, and in our own works and days as well. This too is important. Survival in this sense is not a linear progression from incident to incident with one extinguished when the next one comes alight. For the poet things are present one to another in ways that a world of one-way time never permits. For him survival is radial as well as horizontal. It is round as well as long. This too is an aspect of survival.

In decadent cultures these several survival patterns are not integrated. They have lost natural balance. One factor in survival is ignored; another given undue emphasis. In one culture the survival of the individual is a matter of relative indifference, while the family or the continuity of culture may be given harsh and extreme emphasis. In another, the family or its functional equivalent may be central while the larger group is forgotten. In still another the individual may be the focus of survival while the community decays. In another the race or stock may be given great priority, at least in conscious ideology, while the individual or family is ignored.

Decadence comes when one or more of these factors in survival is drastically reduced or is no longer present at all. When the stock or the culture or the community or the family or the single person no longer has the means and vitality to continue, the death of all obviously is imminent. For these are not segregated units of life as they seem to be in such a listing; they are organs of the human project. On each one the whole project depends. In the human community they are related radially or poetically as well as in lines of sequence. This is essential. When man no longer is a poet as well as scientist, he will die.

The continued decline of the community in the western world will involve the end of the characteristic culture, the extinction of the family lines, and the death of many if not most of the people of that world. This is the modern problem of survival. This is the crisis of what we call modern civilization. That the community is declining to the point of death is evident from the studies of its functions. The economic, political,



educational, religious, philosophical, and artistic functions of the community in modern life are neither integrated with one another nor surviving separately. Things are not going well, and the death of the human community, like stopping the heart, will involve the death of the whole body.

This is a functional disorder. In terms of our resources and technology, our scientific capabilities, administrative techniques, and our biological power it is not by any means necessary. Still the decline goes on, and every war, every national and social emergency, seems to carry it farther.

This, I repeat, is unnecessary. There are constructive projects, there are methods in industry and education, and technological and spiritual reorientations whereby we may rout disaster and make life good. Some of these, such as the TVA, already are in existence. Others, such as the decentralization of production, plant scattering, and technological reorientation, seem to be in part emergent. Others, such as community-centered education, may be found at least in the hopes of many men. Common to these in this crisis is the need for functional reorganization of society around the human community. This is the way. But we may fail to take it.

## *2. The Great Indifference*

Some, sensing dissolution, like to die gaily. They weave fictions of indifference around themselves, after the manner of Wyndham Lewis. Or they may in their sophistication come to a real indifference. Here the death wish in all its romantic, Freudian accoutrements cancels out the desire for survival. This may underlie, or at least symbolize, some of the psychic disorder, the reproductive failure, the family decline and irresponsibility, and the intense, compensatory aggressiveness of urban life. It well may underlie in part the communal decay and disorganization of the modern city. It also is caused in part by it.

Other persons in our culture are wrapped in another kind of indifference. This is found in modern scholarship and the professions. These persons may ignore the modern disaster largely because, in their specialized approach to the world, they do not see it. Their interests are tied to isolated values. They usually are defensive of that isolation and those fragmental values. These persons may refuse to consider what seem to them irrelevant crises because such events do not appear within the purview of their special problem.

This insulated kind of thinking accounts, I believe, for statements

such as those by Harold G. Moulton, of the Brookings Institution, to the effect that we have mass industry and organization with us after all, and that there is nothing much to do about it. We must go on from there, not in the hope of reconstructing or restricting it, but of developing its virtues, making it somewhat smoother in operation, and reducing some of the more violent ups and downs. There is seemingly no recognition here, nor in those less-distinguished economists and businessmen who follow him, of the lethal factors in business culture or of the disastrous impact of mass industry as well as mass government on the community and the human being.

### *3. Lethal Factors in Western Culture*

What are these lethal factors in our culture? I know that any answer in so complex and unexplored a situation will be inadequate. First is the excessive development of a method of organizing experience and behavior. I have called this *linear*. It underlies the decay of community life and the corruption of human values. This linear method is characteristic alike of modern science and scholarship, of technology and professional specialization, and of industrial standardization, division of labor, and the mass organization of production. It has given us great productive capacity. It has brought at the same time the fragmentation of life and our personal and communal disintegration. The loss of this integrity of life is critical. No people can survive it.

The problem thus is one of excess. Granting that the so-called linear method is indispensable to human welfare, its excessive elaboration has led, nevertheless, to the near collapse of modern civilization. If, as John Burnet says, this in its beginnings was a unique contribution by the early Ionian philosophers, which no people uninfluenced by Greek thought ever has attained, then it may be that we see here, after twenty-five centuries, its tragic denouement. Without the tempering influence of the Greek residual culture or the religious cohesiveness of later times, without the counterbalancing by a Pythagoras or a Socrates, or the integrative influence of a Plato or St. Augustine, it moves on to the ultimate shattering and dispersal of man's communal life.

I do not suggest that men meet this human disaster by turning to outworn faiths and the discredited factualities of religious myths. This custom in times of insecurity is illustrated in one way or another by men as remote from each other as P. A. Sorokin, T. S. Eliot, Mortimer Adler,

and Arnold Toynbee. But a faith is like youth: though it may be advisable to have it, the recovery of it becomes difficult once a person has moved on culturally to something else. Men cannot easily choose a faith consciously and keep their integrity. They cannot select a salvation in the showroom. This is not to say that reason has nothing to do with belief or that practical need does not enter the faiths of living. Far from it. Still, there is a difference between the tendency of some toward ex post facto faiths, because they discover the instrumental value of them, and the faith of our fathers. This faith, as the hymn has it, is the expression of the entire cultural *Gestalt* to which a man belongs.

Faith is a body of implicit assumptions in every good life. It is the rootedness of men's lives in the soil and substance of common living. It is their belonging. Though unrooted men may sooner or later discover their need for faith, they hardly will satisfy that need by selecting from the market any flower that happens to please them. To find faith they must live again into the human situation. They must be born again, as the saying is, into the community. They must find where and what they are and above all where among men they really belong.

The broken destinies of a life and of a civilization will not be mended by an antiquarian return to old gods and myths. The disintegrative effects of science and specialized thinking on our culture cannot be countered by trying to abandon science and escaping to a supernatural asylum. The resources of salvation are not in selecting from a varied repertoire this faith or that god to lean upon. The resources of salvation are only in men themselves.

The lethal factors of our civilization are the excesses. Functional disorder is the trouble. The extreme development of a method vastly extensive in range, massive and all-inclusive, overrides human limits; crushes out the more intimate integrity of the human community. It disintegrates the human being—invariably disintegrates him—so that the human world of values and communal life is destroyed. In the great elaboration of this kind of functional order the deeper functional order of human life in the community is abandoned. In effect men abandon their survival.

The great city rises; the human community declines. And from these dragon's teeth of urban instability and aggression, incessantly sowed across the earth, war, the threat of war, become the repeated pattern of our culture. The mute certitudes and illuminations of communal life are overwhelmed in the tumultuous city. The stability of little places and the ordered rhythm of rural life are lost. The intimate faith that this man

belongs here in the little group of people known well calls only for a "wisecrack" or contemptuous indifference. The things that modern men are losing are not easy to compare with the great massing and manipulative powers, the skills and specialties, of our industrial civilization. They are not easy to compare because they are within the human limit, but men cannot long survive without them.

Those who "profit" most from the urban tendencies of our culture show the stigmata of decay. Their reproductive failure, their social instability, and their community disorganization all are the mark of death. They live in a milieu of human disorder. Usually they are parasites—institutionally—continuing as they do only through predatory seizures, increasingly extended, of the youth and wealth, the soil, natural resources, and the living hope of the countryside and its communities.

Of a piece with this is the substitutive culture that overwhelms us. Here are symbols of symbols of symbols; digests of digests of digests; promises of promises of promises; debentures, stocks, bonds, notes, certificates, checks, bills, coins; grades, credits, honors, degrees. Such things increasingly displace direct experience and native evaluations. Here is the cleavage of ends from means, the divorce of poetry from reason, and those from action, the segregation of consumption from production, with vast interpolations between these poles of symbols, briefs, digests, reports, criticisms, representations. Here are the professional virtuosities of the arts, sport, religion, politics, charity, education, industrial procedures, and business. These build up a clamoring world around us of substitutive and vicarious life. Though we may grant that these have their value in the rich and variegated fields of human experience, we need not accept them as the dominating character of a good life. In their excess they cause men to live in pieces. In their welter of highly segregated functions and the anonymous, scattered bits of human endeavor they dissipate the community or leave it only an abstract shell.

Such things as these are the lethal factors of our western culture. They lead to moral and communal disorganization, to human disintegration and death.

#### *4. What Must We Do to Be Saved?*

In the midst of this defeat there are still great reserves in America of residual good will, of selfless enthusiasm, of unpretentious devotion.

There are the poetries and mutual participations of men rather fully knowing and known to one another in their communities. Touch the American countryside, even lightly, touch it with friendliness and respect, and the responsive surge of human life leaves no doubt of the communal potentiality of American people. In ten thousand places across the plains and mountains, along the great seaboards or in the central valleys, among little towns and rural districts, there is this potentiality. In the small, inarticulate experiments and communal projects over the country these interests find some kind of expression. In the cities, too, these efforts and experiments go on, often around residually rural people who, like most city people, have migrated there within a generation or so. Life even here remains participative, or tries to. The community in these ten thousand Americas is not dead.

But the community is blocked off. It is frustrated and distorted. It is exploited without respect for its meaning as the focus of men's significance. It is broken down and its parts used severally in other projects. We raze the house in which we live in order to use the lumber on another job, the stone somewhere else, the pipes on still another job, the heating plant in another—and now we have no place to live. The community is only the stirring of a memory in many places. It is a tendency in life seemingly ineradicable so long as there is survival, but without vehicle or instrument, without means of expression, without tools to formulate behavior in its normal patterns. This is the great frustration. It is the tragedy, without catharsis, of this age.

What can we do? The one answer is the recognition of the evil. We have the resources and instruments. We have the new technologies and skills. We have the physical, intellectual, and perhaps spiritual equipment for good life. We lack mainly a sincere sense of the problem. The bright lights blind us. The thrill of nearby stimulations obscures the dusty chaos beyond. The purr and brilliance of the machine in which we find ourselves bewilders us. We care little that the machine has no base for operation except bottomless sand, no clear function as a whole except its own destruction, no continuity in human values. We are lost in the lights, the success, the violence, and the pompous clattering of the city, and do not see the problem.

What must be done is obviously a coordination of activities on a broad front. These should lead toward the stabilization and enrichment of the human community. There is deep need for educational reorientation, for technological and administrative reorientation, and for artistic and religious reorientation. There is need above all for reorientation around

the native poetries of life. Thus a new culture, a new village, a human association, at once old and new may be developed. This should have the advantages that science, technology, and modern administrative, educational, and psychological studies can give it. Men should have these advantages, and can have them, and still live within the human limit. They can have community without repudiating the main advantages of the modern world. The denial of this central thesis, or indifference to it, is the core of the defeatism and besotted unconcern of this day.

Many persons assume without investigation that the sciences and technologies, the modern economic and administrative skills, and the efficient processes of industrial production cannot be coordinated with the life of human beings lived wholly. They assume that these advantages are incompatible with a life lived within human limits and within the range of concrete, perceptual experience. They assume, in short, that men must face a great alternative fixed in their destiny and that they must take one or the other. Thus men usually will choose the so-called modern advantages, when the fictive alternative confronts them, because power lies there—or so they think—power, stimulation, and violent movement. Or they choose it through weariness and defeat or because they know no better. This assumption, I believe, is wrong. The choice is not either-or. This lethal choice, the death wish, is not necessary.

Educational reorientation on the human community will replace dead stereotypes with vitality. Founded within the context of American communities it will help to make the little place the main resource of living for young folk. Here they may find the economic, intellectual, and appreciative opportunities that youth demands. In some places in America there already are new schools for a new culture. The technological reorientation of behavior in respect to the community also is here in one great experiment, the Tennessee Valley Authority. The instruments of science and technology needed in community-centered life no longer await invention. So, too, the vehicles of administrative and economic reorientation are at least to some extent available, although less widely used. They have been tested enough to show that the monster businesses of America, built like Oriental monarchies, or the totalitarian states abroad, or the unqualified mass industries, the huge concentrations of financial and administrative power in private and governmental institutions, can be challenged. Progress may seem small, but the instruments at least are at hand. The future of American democracy and western free institutions and of the human community itself is at stake.

### 5. *The Price of Survival*

Survival in any form that matters is the survival of the small community in its implicit freedom, friendliness, and fullness of human association. Though this may seem naïve and sentimental before the towering façades of billion-dollar corporations, mass operations, and the multi-billion-dollar national debts that exaggerate our days, still these little places and these small human things remain of critical importance in any living culture. Seemingly inconsequential, easily brushed aside, their quiet voices lost in the thunder and pretense of big-time activities, still they are the great predisposition of human beings. They are the inalienable values of living where survival is still a main concern.

The price of this survival is probably not too high to pay. It involves, nevertheless, a reorientation of some of our methods and institutions and the revaluation of many of our proudest claims to bigness, power, and learning. The price of survival is really more in giving up the lethal sentiments attached to these things than the sacrifice of the material welfare of which they are instruments. In a good life modern technology will not be abandoned. It will be adapted to the service of the small community. In a community-centered culture not all large-scale organization need be destroyed. It needs to be kept subservient, however, to man's inalienable right to be human.

The sentiments attached to the mass methods and highly centralized controls in our society, not the science and technology that made them possible, need reformulation. This applies both to the monster corporations and other excessive centralizations of economic, religious, recreational, and artistic activities and to the monster governments that these have made necessary. There is no place in a free and well-integrated society for the massive authority of these public and private institutions. But to abandon governmental controls at the behest of big business in order to give free rein to the predatory practices of great private corporations is hardly the way to make things better. Only by a functional approach to the problem can there be effective improvement. And if the functions involved are conceived not amid sentiments of bigness and private power but as functions in the stabilization and enrichment of the human community, there will ensue a differential development in our culture of great importance. There will be centralization in some fields, but by no means all, and a greater degree of decentralization in many more.

This is a difficult and important project in the survival of American democracy and culture. Its precarious answer turns upon a moral evaluation: Can we make the human community central in our lives? To this economic question and also this moral one the answers are far from complete. If survival is desired, answers in practice and in theory are necessary. That the people in America would attain higher standards of living through this differential development has been demonstrated in the Tennessee Valley and elsewhere. Residual sentiment, vested emotions, the sentimental lag, prevent the coming of a new world. This sentimental lag, particularly in powerful persons with interests vested in decay, may well be the final obstacle. It is far from being overcome.

The price of survival is easy to pay but exceedingly hard to collect. Survival is hardly inducement enough to secure it.

### *6. Is the Price Too High?*

No price, it might seem, is too high for survival. Still, there are many occasions when some men refuse to pay it. On some of these occasions we honor this resistance. Cherished legends honor the spirit of men rising above death. They are revelations of devotion in which life as an individual or as a special group is relinquished for the survival of a more valued group in which they spiritually are identified. Leonidas, Arnold von Winkelried, John C. Waldron and his torpedo squadron at Midway, or, in a more mystic sense, Jesus at Calvary, are examples of this kind of resistance to survival. We honor it because we understand it and in some way may participate in such resistance ourselves.

On other occasions resistance to survival is less easily respected. There are the rule-or-ruin policies and there are the blind drives and passions for death where all that a man values in the world is carried by him to destruction. This, too, we can understand in ourselves, but can less easily honor. There is Hitler, for example, carrying all Germany with him into fiery disaster. In the last months of the war this was a neurotic, senseless resistance to survival that included all to which he was most devoted. It was a wild death wish, a passion, a *Götterdämmerung*, a lethal sentiment carried beyond the requirements of events. Only death could complete it. In the demand by the victors for unconditional surrender far beyond the requirements of events there was the same sense of the death cycle, less dramatically expressed, and the same lethal sentiment. Here survival had no differentiation. It was an absolute. It was all or none. This re-



sistance to survival by a Hitler, a Goebbels, or the controlling clique of Nazi party men is understandable perhaps, but in a land where Robert E. Lee in defeat is held in reverence almost as high as are the great victors, it is not much admired. This passionate, blind, useless death of a defeated people may be imposed both by the victor and the vanquished, but after all what profiteth it either one?

There is still another kind of resistance to survival, hard to understand in this case, and impossible to admire. There are those who accept the disorganization and death of the culture in which they live as their price for immediate power and personal gain and aggrandizement. Since they usually are intelligent, they can hardly help but sense their own implication in the system that they help destroy. Like a parasite destroying its host and source of sustenance, however, they choose to ignore it. This, too, is understandable in the sense that men may be involved so deeply in a special interest that the mature concern, which only the true community can give them, may be lacking. They tend in our urban culture to be halfmen or fragments of men, and if they behave that way it is not surprising.

It is still hard to understand, however, why men will continue to undermine the base on which their survival stands. The stench of decay is all about us: Corrupt politicians of a great city or of a state, tunneling like maggots through the structures on which the security of their country and of themselves depends, grafters in government and business, massive profit groups and corporative monstrosities, and some labor groups, some business corporations, some professional associations, and some churches are willing to wreck their country to gain their special ends. Not all Americans, or even a large part of them, are like this. But there are enough of them to threaten the survival of this country.

This may be interpreted as the proximate type of thinking and evaluation which I discussed before. These proximate ends, where intelligence is directed brightly on the next thing but is blank beyond, these immediate advantages, these segregated objectives of urban life, these individual emoluments, are the price that seems too high to pay for survival. In the linear patterns of life these are all that are perceived. Without the community men lack the wholeness of being to see farther. Living is proximate living. The morals and poetry of survival are ignored. Living is a spattering in time. There is no timeless vision.


It might seem from this that the people of the western world do not desire survival. But most of them, we may assume, do desire it. They desire the survival that comprehends the community, the stock, and the

culture. There are powerful streams of influence in our great cities, however, that seem to deny that primordial assumption. There are men who will not pay the price.

In conclusion it should be said once more that this book voices neither despair nor helpless defeat. The hour is dark, to be sure, the prospect doubtful. The days of easy confidence are gone. The sense of destiny and luck that once supported us has faded away. We cannot find security in our accustomed habits and assumptions of good fortune. All this familiar confidence, this American destiny and luck, these habits and assumptions of security, have been challenged by events once and for all. Only fools can cling to the stereotyped optimism of a few decades ago. The survival of what we value most is conditional, it is clear, on our facing these dangers, recognizing them for what they are, and doing with resolution what must be done to overcome them.

But this in no way justifies despair. It does not call for resignation or acceptance of defeat. The people of this land are not unused to danger. We have faced dissolution and ultimate defeat in the course of our history without disabling fear. And only recently in England, after the collapse at Dunkirk, the hours seemed numbered, the outcome hardly so much as doubtful, but the English became only more resolute.

So too in this more extensive defeat of western culture a great people will respond, not with despair or panic or cynical resignation, but with greater resolution. Both for the individual and for the community the instruments of survival are at hand. They are at hand in science, technology, economics, in education, art, religion, and most of all in the fiber of human life itself. The weapons are there for brave men to use.



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Perhaps I should add that the community situations in Montana and elsewhere as described here are based on fact. Since they are not included in the book for purely factual reasons, however, I have in a few cases changed a name or altered a situation in order to clarify the point and to avoid long explanations. An exact factual description of the Montana Study is found in Richard W. Poston's book, *Small Town Renaissance, The Story of the Montana Study*, recently published by Harper & Brothers.



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